Approximating Moral Facts
My idea is that analyzing approximate moral facts in terms of the semantics of their constituent parts and comparing the combinations of constituent parts to the outcomes arrived at by their application could yield a basis for combining said constituent parts into a more accurate approximation of moral facts through trial and error.
Basically you would insert different combinations of chunks of meaning into an ever-closer approximation based upon how you know they interact from trial and error, and then check the consistency/closeness of the approximation against its constituent parts.
For instance, we know that combining the statement “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath” with “it is okay to steal on days that are not considered holy” yields the normative statement: “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath, but you can steal on some days that aren’t the sabbath”. We need only check this law against the truth of its constituent parts to then decide whether or not it is a valid approximation. If it is consistent, and this one is, then we have a law governing when it is okay to steal - on some days other than the sabbath. Exactly which days it would be okay to steal on would require more testing.
Thus, it would seem that if we know what some moral facts might be, we could use them to approximate genuine moral facts by applying the process over and over again.
Furthermore, taking some inspiration from Chaos Theory: maybe this process could potentially yield an understanding of underlying laws governing morality by analyzing the trends in the formation of these moral facts? Perhaps certain qualities of combinations of chunks of meaning are more likely to produce valid approximations? And then maybe these underlying laws could be plugged into the process to find exact moral facts?
Basically you would insert different combinations of chunks of meaning into an ever-closer approximation based upon how you know they interact from trial and error, and then check the consistency/closeness of the approximation against its constituent parts.
For instance, we know that combining the statement “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath” with “it is okay to steal on days that are not considered holy” yields the normative statement: “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath, but you can steal on some days that aren’t the sabbath”. We need only check this law against the truth of its constituent parts to then decide whether or not it is a valid approximation. If it is consistent, and this one is, then we have a law governing when it is okay to steal - on some days other than the sabbath. Exactly which days it would be okay to steal on would require more testing.
Thus, it would seem that if we know what some moral facts might be, we could use them to approximate genuine moral facts by applying the process over and over again.
Furthermore, taking some inspiration from Chaos Theory: maybe this process could potentially yield an understanding of underlying laws governing morality by analyzing the trends in the formation of these moral facts? Perhaps certain qualities of combinations of chunks of meaning are more likely to produce valid approximations? And then maybe these underlying laws could be plugged into the process to find exact moral facts?
Comments (15)
Removed my stupid joke. Sorry.
The semantic units could be anything from a whole sentence to just a few words. Including the ideas/concepts that appear as words or phrases would complicate things because it is difficult to square the compatibility of a concept with another. Keeping it as basic as possible would allow for greater efficiency in the calculations.
Quoting TheMadFool
As I wrote above.
Quoting TheMadFool
The best way I can think of this is that many sentences could potentially be compatible with a number of phrases, but they don't necessarily have to be understood in those terms to make sense. In my process the sentences/laws must accurately represent all of their pre-specified constituent parts to be valid (approximations).
I really need to read more about linguistics; I'm sure there are better words for what I am trying to say.
I will keep at it, thanks.
Facts can't be argued. There are no such things as facts that are approximate. Our opinion based on our differences of observation may be approximations. But facts are never approximate.
Furthermore, to speak about moral facts, you need to know what they are. Do you have a description of what makes a fact a moral fact? A completely accurate conceptual definition that delineates moral facts from other facts? If yes, I'd like you to show what it is. Without a benchmark, you can't approximate. And the benchmark is missing.
This paragraph begs the question. How do we know the statements reflect morality? There is actually no logical connection between "it is wrong to steal on the Sabbath" and anything wrong stealing on the Sabbath. Semantically your theory may work, but it is not tied to reality, and thus, it is not something that says anything.
You need to learn the meaning of "fact". Sorry, tim, but a fact is not subject of debate for whether it is this way or that way. It is our perceptions of the fact that we argue. You said it so in many other threads, so please don't contradict yourself for the sake of the argument.
All facts are contingent. Explanations, even descriptions, of facts are approximate (i.e. fallibilistic).
Quoting god must be atheist
Moral facts ...
I expected this. We can get close to expressing a fact, and so it is an approximate fact. Never claimed they were beyond dispute. But I did say that there might be a way of using approximate facts to arrive at less approximate (or even real) facts given the approximate facts started with are within a certain range of their real counterparts. It is just difficult to say whether or not we can indeed approximate facts the way a computer can approximate things in a simulation.
Why I think there are approximate moral facts is that, according to a moral realist, there are objective features of the world that make the propositions contained in ethical sentences true. If we ground ethical sentences in such things it follows that we can approximate a moral fact if the approximate moral fact is sufficiently close to the actual moral fact such as that it functions no differently given a certain set of true ethical sentences; the approximate moral fact would also merely represent the features of the world that would make the corresponding moral fact true, without regard to whether or not it contradicts or represents other actual moral facts inaccurately.
Quoting god must be atheist
A moral fact is a fact that represents a facet of objective morality.
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Quoting god must be atheist
I'm presupposing that the statements are moral merely to show how the heuristic would work. I obviously don't actually think that I just made a universal law that governs when it is okay to steal.
Quoting god must be atheist
The benchmark is indeed the biggest issue: in order to apply my heuristic we would need a good idea of a few moral facts to begin with. But then again I already said that in the OP.
Good point - as usual. Perhaps I should call them contingent facts.
I mean, surely you recognize that one sentence can have almost the same meaning as another? That a sentence can approximate the meaning of another sentence, or at least approach it?
Quoting god must be atheist
It's a heuristic, not a comprehensive theory.
Morality is just fairness. Once you realize that everything will become simple and clear.