The ship of Theseus paradox
Imagine a wooden ship (A). Its old planks are replaced gradually over time until it so happens that ALL its parts are completely replaced with new planks. This new ship is B. Now we refit the old planks (which we have preserved) to rebuild the old ship A.
Which of the two ships (A or B or both) is the ship of Theseus?
The referent of ''the ship of Theseus'':
No one doubts that A is a referent of ''the ship of Theseus.
What of B? Does ''the ship of Theseus'' refer to it also?
There is one other factor that is relevant to the answer to the above question. The temporal aspect of how the parts were replaced. It was done gradually rather than at one go.
To explain, imagine if ship A was torn down at one go while simultaneously replacing the parts to build ship B. Permit me to use the word ''instantaneous'' here. So, if the whole exercise was done instantaneously there would be no doubt that A is the ship of Theseus. Ship B is just a copy of A.
Therefore, the gradual replacement of ship A's parts counts as a relevant factor in the paradox. But is it truly relevant?
Imagine you take a walk from point x to point y. One time you do it in 5 minutes and another time you do it in 10 minutes. There is a temporal difference BUT the end result is the same - you reach point y.
Imagine you're playing LEGO. Building the doodad in 1 hour or 15 minutes makes no difference to the end result - you've built the given toy.
Similarly the gradual nature of the building process for ship B has no relevance to the issue. The end result is the same - ship B.
The process involving ships A and B can be interpreted as instantaneous and time has no relevance. So, ship B is not a referent of ''the ship of Theseus''.
If at all not convinced with my argument above I am willing to accept the interpretation that ship A is the old ship of Theseus and ship B is the new ship of Theseus.
Which of the two ships (A or B or both) is the ship of Theseus?
The referent of ''the ship of Theseus'':
No one doubts that A is a referent of ''the ship of Theseus.
What of B? Does ''the ship of Theseus'' refer to it also?
There is one other factor that is relevant to the answer to the above question. The temporal aspect of how the parts were replaced. It was done gradually rather than at one go.
To explain, imagine if ship A was torn down at one go while simultaneously replacing the parts to build ship B. Permit me to use the word ''instantaneous'' here. So, if the whole exercise was done instantaneously there would be no doubt that A is the ship of Theseus. Ship B is just a copy of A.
Therefore, the gradual replacement of ship A's parts counts as a relevant factor in the paradox. But is it truly relevant?
Imagine you take a walk from point x to point y. One time you do it in 5 minutes and another time you do it in 10 minutes. There is a temporal difference BUT the end result is the same - you reach point y.
Imagine you're playing LEGO. Building the doodad in 1 hour or 15 minutes makes no difference to the end result - you've built the given toy.
Similarly the gradual nature of the building process for ship B has no relevance to the issue. The end result is the same - ship B.
The process involving ships A and B can be interpreted as instantaneous and time has no relevance. So, ship B is not a referent of ''the ship of Theseus''.
If at all not convinced with my argument above I am willing to accept the interpretation that ship A is the old ship of Theseus and ship B is the new ship of Theseus.
Comments (144)
Consider instead a process involving millions of very skilled tiny workers who, working together, could replace every plank or other component so quickly that the entire replacement takes place within a millisecond. Then I think we can argue that the final product is the same ship, as long as only one plank at a time was replaced (say taking a picosecond per plank).
On the other hand if the ship were exploded by a bomb and another built in its place, with all new materials, I would say the new one is not the same ship, regardless of whether it took a millisecond or a year to build.
So maybe I'm agreeing with you that time is not the important element. It seems to me that what is important is that only one component at a time is replaced - so that the ship is not missing say more than 1% of its components at any instant.
My thinking on this is guided by a process metaphysics, a la Whitehead, which I find a very satisfying and paradox-free way of looking at things.
Thanks for seeing my POV. I may be wrong but your condition that ''the ship is not missing say more than 1% of its components at any instant'' makes no sense without a time factor in it. And time, as you and I agree is irrelevant.
They're both instances of the same particular; they're effectively duplicated, or cloned. The referent is only important insofar as you need to direct people to board or load or sail the appropriate vessel - 'you, get on B. You, you're to get on board A. '
'A is going to Thessalonika, B is going to Crete.'
I don't see any paradox here.
I'm sorry I didn't express myself as well as required. I do understand that we can't just throw out the entire notion of time.
Quoting andrewk
You posted the above and if you'll notice your paragraph ends with the words ''at any instance'' and this, if I understand you, reintroduces the temporal element as in the speed of destruction/construction of the ships A and B.
You seem to be saying that the ratio of old planks to new planks is relevant (). But this relevance is tied to the notion of speed (time) of construction/destruction which you agreed is irrelevant.
But you have two very distinct descriptions of A. You have the original ship, and you have a later ship which is built out of salvaged materials. The original ship is clearly "the ship of Theseus", because you have bestowed this identity upon it in your description. Later, you have built another ship out of salvaged lumber. Why would you give this ship the same name as the other ship? That makes no sense unless you are doing this intentionally to create ambiguity. This, other ship, which is built from salvaged material is what you should call ship B.
Furthermore, there is no "ship B" as per your description. Ship A can go through as many changes and repairs as you want, and we still identify it as ship A. To change its name to ship B because it has been repaired X number of times, is unnecessary and unwarranted. Identity is maintained through a continuity of existence, so ship A does not become ship B just from going through numerous repairs.
Quoting TheMadFool
You should respect the fact, that to completely destroy something is to annihilate it, and deny the continuity of its existence and therefore identity. To rebuild a copy, is as you say, to rebuild a copy. But this is different from your original description which has ship A being repaired, and its continuity of existence maintained, and its identity maintained.
But which one does ''the ship of Theseus'' refer to? A or B
Imagine a person A. Over the course of time his entire being is replaced at the atomic level. Would you not say that person A is, despite the dramatic change in his constitution, still the same person A we began with? [B]Isn't ship B the ship of Theseus[/b]?
Continuing from there, we collect ALL the atoms that were replaced in person A and reconstitute it as another body in its original configuration. Wouldn't you say this is person A? Isn't ship A the ship of Theseus?
So which ship A or B is the the ship of Theseus?
This is the pardox.
The Ships of Theseus
... about your daughter’s missing teeth?
No, as I explained, I don't agree. Why would you think that completely annihilating an object, and then completely rebuilding a copy of the original object, with the same parts, constitutes having the same object?
So ship A becomes ship B, but remains "the ship of Theseus" because people continue to call it that, despite the replacement of all its planks. As @apokrisis would say, echoing Bateson, for most people having one new plank - or a lot of new planks, or even all new planks if they are replaced gradually - is not a difference that makes a difference for the purpose of referring to the ship. Hence I suspect that most people would call the reconstructed ship A something like "the original ship of Theseus" to distinguish it from ship B as "the current ship of Theseus."
The played out metaphor is between personal identity and the ship's identity. Ships are traditionally female.
Let us imagine a scenario which hopefully will make you see my POV.
Ship A needs to be transported from city x to city y. However, it has to be done by land and also it becomes necessary to disassemble it for easier transport. These kind of situations are quite common. So nothing difficult in imagining it.
After the parts of ship A reach city y they are reassembled in the original exact configuration. In this case annihilation is present but the ship A hasn't lost its identity. There is nothing grossly wrong in holding such a belief.
Yep. It is the purpose, the finality, that causes the ship to be repaired and so there is unbroken continuity in the identity - for all practical purposes, as they say.
And even if the boat was replaced in toto instantly - as in Parfitt's Star Trek transporter: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teletransportation_paradox - then still the intent is what perseveres through time and maintains identity.
If the transporter works by dissolving your molecules at one end and then - via a transmission of information completely specifying your form - recreates you at the other, then your identity is preserved.
But note now that the logical requirement is your body at the departure point must be destroyed. There are problems if the goal of transporting you leaves this earlier you still stuck at the other end - or now this dopplegager replicant at the arrival end.
So make the change instant and the erasure becomes as important as the replacing. And so really even with a slow change of the parts, the rotten planks of the ship should be burnt to secure the identity of the new.
But what would make an object? What composes or constitutes an object?
I think it is fairly common to see artefacts, or human-made stuff, isn't really "anything" outside of what we see them as. A hammer is only a hammer to the eyes of the wielder.
But what about modern inventions, like genetic engineering or artificial intelligence? If there's no ontological difference between a solution of hydrochloric acid in the lab and hydrochloric acid in a digestive tract, then what is the difference between a cow born naturally and a cow cloned in a test tube?
And the fact is that humans are not separate from the rest of the world. The world produced humans. The phenomenon of human creativity is not something spawned from the endless depths of some ethereal dualistic plane of existence, but a phenomenon that is rooted right in the world as a whole. The world produces agency.
So we can ask a further question: what difference does it make if objects exist or not? Would it make any real difference in the grand labyrinthine causal structure of the universe if a telescope actually existed, or if it were simply a structure of simples organized telescope-wise?
Neither theories seem adequate in my opinion. There is too much ambiguity and vagueness in nature to be able to set any real strict boundaries between material objects. But there are patterns the universe falls into, patterns which the mind is able to pick up. And here we have the threat of extreme nominalism: maybe all the "work" is done by the mind, maybe it's "all in the mind". But we simply have to put this into the perspective of a cosmology and evolution, and question how or why something like a mind would arise out of a mess of non-patterns and disunity.
So the verdict, in my view, is that the reality of objects is determined by their causal role in a system, which includes minds. What we call something is irrelevant, the fact is that something materializes as a real entity as soon as it becomes an active part of a causal system, and dissolves or mutates into something else as soon as it loses or switches roles. This includes things that signify or represent something else: a piece of clothing may not "actually" be a piece of clothing, but it is something that tells me I can wear it for warmth and to avoid indecent exposure. It's not an "object", but it's not "nothing" either. What something is is not simply a question of its material constitution but of its relationship to other things as well.
This is a very important point. Identity is only possible within a context, where we can distinguish one "thing" from all of the other "things" that are reacting with it in its environment. As I said before, we do so in accordance with our purposes. Sometimes an object's material constitution is what matters most to us, but not always - maybe not even often. As you said, its relationships with other things - including, and especially, ourselves - likely matter more in most cases.
Agree.
Quoting TheMadFool
That is a bit of a 'bait and switch' I'm afraid. Persons are not objects, but subjects of experience.
This is a very important point indeed. While trying to find out ways of explaining "top-down causation" to some friends of mine, this has come close to becoming my philosophical motto.
When this point is not sufficiently attended to, then the relation of material constitution becomes liable to be confused with numerical identity. But something can persist through time as the thing it is (and remain the same individual) while gaining and/or losing material parts. So, material constitution isn't identity. The statue isn't (or need not be) the lump of bronze that it is made of since it can be destroyed while, at the same time, the lump of bronze persists. Likewise, a ship isn't (or need not be) the set of planks that make it up -- even with the qualification that the planks remain suitably arranged so as to preserve its function -- since the ship can persist through the replacement of some (or even all) of its planks.
Those considerations, though, only partially solve the paradox of the ship of Theseus. I owe the fuller illumination of this problem to Peter Simons (Parts: A Study in Ontology, OUP 1995/2000) and David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge University Press, 2001)
The trouble with the standard telling of the story of the ship of Theseus is that, while it makes explicit the issue of the relationship of "the ship" with its parts, it obscures the fact that there are actually two different contenders for being the object singled out as "the ship" (since "ship" signifies two different sortal concepts with incompatible persistence and identification criteria associated to them, as explained below); and both of them metaphysically relate to their parts in different ways thus pulling our intuitions regarding the persistence and identity conditions of this (ambiguously named) object in two different directions.
There is first the historical artifact -- some sort of a relic -- that we may think of as "the ship of Theseus" and which is such that we do care very much about its retaining at least some -- and maybe most -- of its original constituents. Else, at some point in time, it ceased to be what it was qua historical artifact (or relic). The same is true of most works of arts, such as a Picasso painting say, where we do care that the canvas, or paint, not be replaced even as the form might be maintained.
And then, secondly, there is the functional artifact -- the seafaring vessel -- that retains its identity through carrying forward its function (through maintenance and repair, etc.) This object is not the same thing that we previously named "the ship of Theseus", though nothing prevents us from giving it the same name, just as two different men can be called "Peter". The crucial thing is that, whatever name we give "it", the "it" that is at issue very much depends on the way "it" (and the sets of its material parts) not only hang together, functionally, but the way in which "it" (and the relevant function) relates to our pragmatic interests. Since nothing stands in the way of our having simultaneous pragmatic interests in singling out more than one object -- e.g. an historical artifact and a functional artifact -- then, it may occur that the original "ship of Theseus" (as singled out at the moment of its historical origin -- had material constituents that make up two different objects that merely happen to occupy the same space and share the same material constituants at that point in time but are liable to have divergent histories, spatial trajectories and material constituants some time in the future.
At the end of the story, there is one historical artifact that is identical to the original "ship of Theseus" (the historical artifact that essentially originally belonged to Theseus) and another, different, functional artifact that is identical to the original functional artifact that we also want to name, misleadingly, "the ship of Theseus". This is the functional seafaring vessel that, as it happens, originally but non-essentially belonged to Theseus. Just as is the case for the statue of Hermes and the lump of bronze that materially constitute it at a time, those two "ships" (qua historical artifact and qua functional artifact) are two different objects.
(This accounts rests on David Wiggins's thesis of the sortal dependence of identity, whereas the account earlier suggested by Wayfarer relies on the thesis of relative identity, defended by Peter Geach. I think Wiggins's account accomplished what Geach's account seeks to achieve while eliminating its severe logical problems)
The Ship of Theseus is the one its crew have been using all along as it gradually became replaced. You could not build a working ship out of the old parts which had presumably been replaced due to becoming individually defective. If they had been individually defective, then what kind of a ship could be built out putting them all back together? The fucking useless Ship of Theseus, perhaps?
You can imagine a variation of the story where the planks have been replaced for merely cosmetic reasons and the paradox remains.
I don't see a paradox, even in that case. In that case the unused ship rebuilt out of unattractive parts would be the fucking ugly Ship of Theseus. Even if it were used by a different crew it still wold not be called 'the Ship of Theseus'. If it replaced the Ship of Theseus then it would be the replica built out of old ugly parts that became the new Ship of Theseus for some stupid reason.
You seem to be arguing that, in a case where some artifact is being disassembled and later reassembled, then what determines the identity of the reassembled artifact with the original is the beauty or ugliness of the reassembled object, or the wisdom or stupidity of the motivation for assembling it. What if there were an wise and intelligent motivation for reassembling a ship from its original parts, and the reassembled item would be even prettier than the continuously repaired ship?
What other reason can you think of for the parts of a ship being replaced over time other than their dysfunctionality or lack of aesthetic appeal?
The Ship of Theseus in any case would be the one that had been used by Theseus' crew and thus deemed to be that entity. Another ship that had been rebuilt out of the old rejected (for whatever reason) parts could not be called the Ship of Theseus, unless it replaced the original, and even then it would really be the Ship of Theseus 2, (even it were called 'the Ship of Theseus') because it is could obviously not be the same ship.
It all depends on how you describe the act of dismantling and assembling. If this is described as a continuity of existence of the object, then it becomes part of the object's identity, as per the description. That is the case in your example. If the act is described as an annihilation, and the rebuilding of a new object, then there is no such continuity of existence, as per the description. There is a description of one object ceasing to exist, and a new one coming into existence. So for instance, if you break a drinking glass, and collect the pieces, melt and remold them into a drinking glass, we would describe this as one object being annihilated and a new one coming to be.
The point is, that identity, as a continuity of existence is something which is assumed. Continuity of existence has never been proven, so you hear things like people wondering if an object continues to exist if it is not being looked at. Since continuity of existence, and therefore the "identity" which is associated with it, is just an assumption, then what constitutes continuity of existence, in our beliefs, depends on how we define it.
The reason why someone might collect the discarded parts might be because she sees the process through which a ships is being continuously maintained and repaired through substitution of material parts to amount, in this specific case, to a progressive destruction of a historically significant artifact and she hopes to, some day, be in possession of all the original parts and to be able to reconstitute the original. Your insistence that this is not possible because the continuously maintained functional artifact *is* (and remains) *the* original "ship of Theseus" is begging the question against her.
No, a ship reconstructed from discarded parts could never qualify as the original for two reasons; firstly because it would not replicate the physical condition the ship had been in at any point in its history, and secondly because those discarded parts had ceased to be part of the ship, and had remained so for varying periods, and had thus not participated in its entire history.
It's true that replacement parts did not participate in the entire history of the ship either but current parts had become part of the ship and remained so until the time when any substitution might be proposed.
The identity of the ship does not reside in any part, but in the whole structure, with its entire historical trajectory and facticity.
It could actually come even closer to replicating the physical condition the ship originally had been in than the continuously maintained ship does. Your second objection, if valid, would entail that a fully disassembled object could never be reassembled as the same object it originally was. Disassembling a piece of furniture for purpose of shipping, for instance, would amount to irreversibly destroying it, on your view.
This doesn't explain why, on your view, some objects can't still persist in disassembled states, or, at least, couldn't be brought back into "active" existence as (numerically) the same objects that they originally were before disassembly. What if you are chopping some wood and the head of the axe flies off the handle. After you've glued the two parts back together, is it necessarily a new axe that you have now manufactured, on your view? Why might this not count as your having repaired the old axe?
Yes, I agree with this but I would go eve further and -- following darthbarracuda -- I would potentially include the ship's external relationship to *other* things (including ourselves, our pragmatic interests, and our conceptual skills) as part of the determination of the objects identity though time (or as part of the transcendental constitution of the object's form, to put it in a Kantian/Aristotelian way).
That would be the ship with all its "accidents". So to get the metaphysics right, it has to be sortal (or constraints-based) in Peircean type fashion. Our notion of identity has to include the accidental or contingent in smooth natural fashion too.
So that is where the causal notion of purpose pays off. A purpose - in its potential for satisfaction - also spells the further possibility of indifference. After a while, the details cease to matter because the general purpose is being served (and aught else then makes a real difference).
Thus it can be accidental that one of the ship's planks is made of kauri rather than oak. The different woods achieve the same purpose from the ship's point of view. And therefore it continues to make no difference if the ship eventually becomes all kauri, returns to all oak, or gets made of some other wood of equivalent sea-going, ship-making, qualities.
So it is possible always to get fussed about preserving the accidents of history. From the ship's point of view (ie: in terms of the formal and final causality that are the people who designed something for their own purpose), the actual wood is a matter of indifference - if it serves its purpose. All further difference gets classed categorically with the accidental. And yet there is still (say the metaphysically obsessive) another point of view ... the god's eye or transcendental view of history where all accidents are fixed in the memory of existence and never forgotten or erased. So beyond particular purposes (like wanting a ship to cross the sea) there is going to be a metaphysical level generality in which even accidents are essential to notions of identity.
But you can see the trap inherent in claiming accidents as essences. The nominalist path that leads to the Society for the Preservation of Historical Accidents really doesn't want to make claims about the reality of essences. Yet in trying to skirt the existence of differences that don't make a difference, nominalists in fact double down on essentialism without realising it.
So a Peircean style triadic approach can smoothly handle this little problem with the accidental as a component of the purposeful. Pragmaticism says that everything starts in pure contingency or accident. and then limitations arise to suppress most of it. So sortal concepts or constraints cannot eliminate the accidental - that must always be present as history gets fixed. However constraints can limit the accidental aspects of identity to the degree that it matters in terms of some global essence or sense of purpose. So continuity can be defined in that way, regardless of the continuing presence of innumerable localised accidents - the differences that don't make a difference, like whether a ship's plank is oak, kauri or teak.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Yep. It is the telos or function that is the source and determiner of continuity. That is what would have to be extinguished.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
So I have defended an equivalence between sortal concepts and constraints. But then also they speak to quite different metaphysical orientations as well.
Constraints make it clear how they operate - as the limits on freedoms. Thus they rely on proper holism. Whereas sortal concepts are the product of predicate logic - the reasoning from the particular. It rather avoids the central issue to simply point out - in circular fashion - that having more than one of some thing suggests a further thing of which it is "a sort".
Circularity is bad. Hierarchy is good. Recursion needs to transcend scale to make sense. Hence you need an inherently reciprocal metaphysics in which to frame an understanding of identity - one in which the globally top-down and the locally bottom-up are each other's natural inverse.
A ship built out of entirely new parts would come closest to replicating the original condition of the ship (i.e. its condition when newly constructed, and prior to use). A ship built out of old worn out parts could not replicate the condition of the ship at any time in its history because it would not have consisted of all worn out parts at any time; so I'm not sure what you are trying to claim here.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
It seems to me that this argument is irrelevant because in the case of something being disassembled and then reassembled, its period of "non-wholeness" is part of its history, and cannot be considered a "destruction". (This has everything to do with human intentions). In any case, the case of the disassembled furniture is not at all analogous to the case of the ship that is gradually repaired, because the original functional ship continues to exist during the entire process, despite the fact that all its parts might be ultimately replaced, and stored somewhere, and later used to rebuild another ship.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Well, I didn't read the whole thread, I just responded to the OP straight up. But I have already covered this aspect of identity by defining the Ship of Theseus as the ship which was used by Theseus and his crew from the beginning to the end of its history, and was designated as 'the Ship of Theseus' throughout the period of its history (although this latter is not guaranteed to be correct, as it is logically possible that another ship could have been substituted without any of those who designated it as 'the Ship of Theseus' knowing about it)..
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I disagree here; it would be a "model" in the sense you are outlining, only if there had been more than one Ship of Theseus.
Identity is specific, not generic, so I think you are on the wrong track. Genera has to do with identification, what something is identified as, not with identity as such, which is the logical existence of a unique entity.
That's what serial numbers are for ;-)
Also, numerical identity is not a relation that holds between species (as opposed to genera) but rather between particulars (as opposed to universals). The general/specific distinction is not the same as the universal/particular distinction. (Distinguishing clearly those two distinctions has payoffs in the philosophy of law, the philosophy of action, and meta-ethics, as Richard Hare and, following him, David Wiggins, have suggested.)
Thanks. There is much to agree with in you post, and maybe some to disagree with (or to clarify about my own position) but I must give to what you have written much more thought.
Yes, but they don't guarantee identity since they can be faked. ;)
Well, no. That's why I said the thread is a kind of 'bait and switch'. When it comes to artefacts, such as the proverbial ship, then the matter of identity is different to the nature of the identity of humans. But notice this exchange:
Quoting TheMadFool
So that is the 'switch' from 'the ship' to 'a person' . And, note, the assumption that 'an entire being' CAN be replaced by replacing the components, in the same way that an artefact can. So there's an implicit materialist assumption: that personal identity is of the same order as the identity of material objects, whereas I don't know if that is true at all.
That is why, pragmatically, I am able to agree with Aletheist's point about identity, in the case of an artefact, being a matter of designation - because a ship is not a being, but a collection of parts, and as such, has no intrinsic identity. It is what it is, purely as a matter of designation.
This is true, and only the particular is absolutely "specific". Both species and genera, as they are employed, are, relatively speaking, both specific and general. The first is specific in regards to species and general in regards to individuals, and the second is specific in regards to genera and general in regards to species.
Again, I think this is wrong. All entities have, logically speaking, a unique identity. Whether there is a metaphysically robust identity beyond the purely logical, or what exactly are the metaphysical implications of logical identity, is an entirely different question; one which cannot be definitively answered either by rational or empirical inquiry.
All this shows is that none of the parts are uniquely and separately involved in the identification 'chariot' or uniquely and separately constitute a chariot's identity; they are all uniquely and collectively involved in its logical identity, however. So it also shows how far logic has come since the times of King Milinda.
That would be to say that artifacts and inanimate objects (such as rocks, planets, storms and rivers) have merely nominal essences while only human beings (and possibly plants and non-rational animals) have real essences. But I thinks that's too sharp a dichotomy. Artifacts and inanimate objects may only have being though their being embedded into the practical form of life of human beings, but that is enough to confer them essences of a stronger sort than merely nominal essences as traditionally conceived, or so it seems to me. Conversely, there also is a need to pragmatize our own essences in something like the Sartrian existentialist fashion. We have some inescapable freedom (however constrained) and responsibility to make ourselves the sort of thing that we essentially are, and not just to build artifacts, or cognitively carve nature, in accordance with our given needs and interests.
Which would be what, exactly? What constitutes the identity of a particular tennis ball, or hydrogen atom (for that matter)?
not missing say more than 1% of its components...
). But this relevance is tied to the notion of speed (time) of construction/destruction which you agreed is irrelevant. [/quote]
No, it is not tied to that. The requirement is that only one plank be replaced at a time. Those replacements could happen at the rate of one per nanosecond, or one per century. The speed is irrelevant. Just think about playing a video of that process in fast or slow motion. No matter what speed you play it at, it will never look the same as one in which the ship is exploded by a bomb and rebuilt from scratch.
Not a one word answer, but a reasonably clear understanding of what transpired over a period of time. I guess paradoxes may be created when one attempts to tell a story that elapsed over time in one sentence. But really there is no such requirement since time changes everything, some more so than others.
You seem to be making the mistake of asking the metaphysical question and thinking it is the logical question. Logically speaking, the identity of anything at all is constituted by its difference from everything else, and its existence as the particular unique thing that it is.
I agree.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Maybe humans are designated 'beings' for a reason!
Quoting John
Doesn't that just re-state the law of identity - A=A because it's not everything that isn't A?
The reason I brought up the idea of 'models', is because I think the Platonist insight into the eidos provides a way to understand how something can maintain an identity while also be constantly changing. The 'idea' of the ship is what is real, in that understanding. So you could theoretically produce a blueprint for the ship which dicates its exact attributes and measurements, which can then be made by any builder. So in that sense, the 'real ship' is an idea that the built ship conforms to; the idea, is in some real sense, 'more real' than this or that instance of ship.
And the same principle applies to anything that assumes a form, the form being the blueprint towards which each instance teleonomically strives.
(One of the reasons I think that is important, is because the separation of idea from substance is fundamental to the whole idea of manufacturing and mass design in science and technology. So, I wonder if the reason that the industrial West got the initial idea of mass production which underlies so much of modern technology, because of the Platonic intuition which enabled the separation of the form, the idea, from the substance. Note that the Renaissance and early modern science was marked by a revival of Platonism; and that this is an idea which is generally absent from Indian and Chinese philosophy.)
As to whether the ship is 'the original artefact' - that is really only of interest to 'collectors of artefacts'. I suppose that is a legitimate interest, in that if you're going to spend a million dollars on an artefact, then you want to make sure it's the real thing and not a knock-off. That is where the historical artefact is a different matter to the 'type of thing' - by virtue of it being 'the real one', then it's not simply an instance or a model, but that particular item, the one that was sailed on by Homer, or whoever it might have been.
I think the problem that this doesn't address is that every actual ship (or anything else, man-made or not) has a logical identity in the way which is expressed by the law of identity, as you actually noted. It is by means of that logic that we makes sense of our experience, so we can scarcely discard it, whatever we might think its metaphysical implications are.
Quoting Cavacava
That's not too bad as poetry but I don't find the simple explanation that logical identity is a matter of mere abstraction at all convincing. I think identity and difference are immanent in all our concrete practices; they evolve from and reveal our existential/ontological oneness with, and difference from, the world. It won't do to try to dismiss them as mere "abstractions"; I think that would be too facile.
Actually, a case comes to mind. One of my very oldest friends is a world expert marine archeologist. He has been involved in the case of identifying the remains of James Cooks' 'Endeavor', which is thought to rest on the bottom of the harbour of Newport Rhode Island, where it was scuttled after active service. But being a wooden ship, the actual wreckage has mostly rotted away - all that could be expected to be found would be the ballast-stones, and perhaps some brass fittings. But if they're found, then they will be judged 'the real Endeavor'.
So, you mean to say that so long as the ship is replaced in small degrees the new ship B also has a valid claim to the sign-the ship of Theseus?
You also say that the time aspect is inconsequential i.e. it doesn't matter whether the destruction/construction took 10 minutes or 100 years. This is probably because you agree with me that the final result is simply indistinguishable - in both cases (10 minutes or 100 years) we end up with ships A and B. How do we proceed now to a solution to the paradox?
If I were to follow your line of reasoning then I'd have to say both ships A and B are referents of "the ship of Theseus? Do you accept this conclusion? If you do then you need two different sets of criteria. One leading to the conclusion that the ship of Theseus is A and another leading to the conclusion the ship of Theseus is B. Wouldn't this be fallacious - specifically the fallacy of equivocation - because we're defining the term ''the ship of Theseus'' in two different ways?
Also, responding specifically to your post, how does the extent of repairs (doing it plank by plank or all at one go) affect the issue? Didn't you agree that it didn't matter if either some or ALL planks were replaced?
I quality 'identity' with 'logical' in order to indicate that I am not referring to any traditional metaphysical notion of substantive identity or essence (think for example of Aristotle's idea of 'Soul'). But it doesn't follow from this that I must then be referring to something abstract. That kind of either/or thinking is itself mired in traditional philosophical assumptions which I believe have been successfully challenged and superseded by the ideas of the likes of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel and probably Peirce too (although I am as yet not that familiar with his work).
Quoting Wayfarer
Is the structure of rational thought and language an abstraction?
As I said above, you need to think about this in the context of a process-based metaphysics. Your question is rooted in an object-based metaphysics, which is incompatible with it.
In the process view, the ship forms a process - similar to what physicists call a worldline. When we say that something is the ship of Theseus, we mean that it is a particular location on that worldline. Both 'ship A' and 'ship B' are locations on the same worldline, so it is valid in both cases to say that it is the ship of Theseus. They are not the same location, but that doesn't matter. What matters is that they are part of the same process. That's why I said that a process metaphysics prevents the sort of paradoxes that can arise in trying to analyse this within an object-based metaphysics.
'logical identity' means the kind of identity which is implied in all our understanding of experience and linguistic usages; it means that the identity of anything consists in its existential difference from everything else, and in its existence as a unique entity. This is repeating what I have already said; what more do you want. I think I know; you are looking for a traditional substantivist explanation of identity.
And you didn't answer my question.
Of course. What else could it be? When you refer to 'ship' you refer to a class of objects. What is a class but an abstraction? All language, maths and logic relies on abstractions.
Quoting John
That still says nothing more than A = A, and that everything A is A because it is not not A.
If the structure of thought and language is an abstraction then thought and language must also be abstractions. What are they abstracted from?
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes and pretty much everything about identity and our experience and understanding of it is implicit in those formulations, which you apparently think are so trivial. You really should read some Hegel some time.
I answered the first question previously.
As children it is common for us to play games. One of these games involves breaking apart toys into its components and then rebuilding. We've all done it and we've seen others do it too. In such cases we never think that the process of annihilation - reconstruction yields a different toy. Are you saying this common sense intuition is wrong?
How do you make that distinction - the original and the current?
Does the time between the swapping of axe-heads and the swapping of handles matter, such that if we did this within the space of a few minutes then we've switched axes but if we did this within the space of a year then we've retained our original axes? Does the proportion of the change matter, such that if we swap 10% of each axe at a time then we've retained our original axes but if we switch 60% (and then 40%) of each axe then we've switched axes?
I think I explained this. Identity, based on continuity of existence, is an assumption only. As such there are no real objective standards for assigning such "identity" to an object, such "identity" is somewhat arbitrary. There are however, conventions, but the conventions are informal, and vary depending on many different factors, just like our conventions for using words. So if we describe the activity of taking the thing apart and rebuilding it, as a continuity of existence of the thing, then we believe that it maintains its identity according to that convention. But if we describe the activity as an annihilate of the thing, and a rebuilding of a new thing, then we believe that the thing does not maintain its identity, according to that convention.
No bait and switch - at least not intentionally. You said there's no paradox and I gave an example in which the paradox is unambiguously manifest.
Also, why is it so hard to imagine a person being physically renewed at the atomic level. There's no logical contradiction involved implying it is possible. So, your objection on this point is moot.
I understand what you mean - basically that full-blown materialism(?) is not sufficient to explain the human phenomenon. For that reason I understand personal identity may differ from the identity of material objects. However, is this difference relevant to the paradox?
The basic assumption you're making, in the case of personal identity, is that the whole is not simply the sum of its parts. There's that extra thing which, according to you, I've overlooked. This is not the case in the paradox. Surely you'll agree that the ship (the whole) is more than the sum of its parts (the planks, nails, etc). So, my analogy actually factors the very thing you accuse me of ignoring.
Your post suggests that the paradox is solved by simply switching one's perspective (process/object metaphysics). Isn't that a cop out?
In addition, if I understood you correctly, as per process metaphysics it is valid to say both ships A and B are referents of the sign ''the ship of Theseus". If this is the case what is the criteria/conditions that need to be followed/met for the conclusion that both ships A and B are "the ship of Theseus"? Can you clarify. Thanks
1. Arbitrary conventions. For example it is an arbitrary convention that the symbol ''1'' refers to unity/one. There's no logic behind it. It's random.
2. Reason-based conventions. For example there's logic behind the convention that it is good to return a favor - it makes for a better society.
If there's any convention in the paradox we're discussing it is not of type 1 (arbitrary). Rather ''identity'' is a reason-based convention. We have to reason out what ''identity'' means and then, much later after rigorous analysis, we establish the convention that ''identity'' means so and so.
Hence, we can't simply brush aside the problem by saying it's just a matter of convention.
The "original ship of Theseus" is the one made up of the original planks. The "current ship of Theseus" is the one that has had all of its planks replaced over time. Remember, these are just possible names that I suggested people might use to distinguish them; there is nothing philosophically significant about the terms "original" and "current" themselves.
I'd like to point out a small issue with such an interpretation. The criteria/conditions that define the ''original'' ship of Theseus is significantly different from the criteria/conditions that define the ''current'' ship of Theseus. After all if the criteria/conditions are same then there would be just ONE referent of the sign ''the ship of Theseus''. Also, there wouldn't be a paradox to begin with.
However, isn't this equivocation? Using one definition of ''the ship of Theseus'' we get the original ship and using a different definition we get the current ship.
I guess the paradox exposes our defective comprehension of identity.
Saying
Quoting Wayfarer
made it seem to me that you did think it was trivial, you seem to be asking for more than that. My apologies if I have misunderstood you.
So you do think thought and language are abstractions, rather than practices? If you answered the question as to what they are abstracted from I don't know where to find that answer. Could you point me to the post where you answered it, or answer it again if it's not too much trouble?
OK, I agree very few conventions, if any are purely arbitrary. So even in the symbols, 1 and 2, etc., there are some reasons why these are the symbols which became used and not something else. So I assume that there are reason why, when the kid takes the toy apart and rebuilds it, we think of that as part of the identity of the toy, yet if we remolded the broken drinking glass to remake the glass, we would identify it as a new glass. Conventions come into existence for different reasons, so they are not truly arbitrary. Why do you think it's not a matter of convention?
The simpler example is not a good analogy to the ship, because a somewhat different logic is at work. An axe has only two significant components; the head and the handle, with the head being the more significant ( because more can be done to it to change the character and the effectiveness of the axe). If you swap heads (which is the same as swapping the handles apart form the question of ownership) of two axes, then you have different 'hybrid' axes.
The talk of percentages doesn't help at all, there is no precise logic of percentages operating in such cases, Of course if a handles wears out, and replaced, then it would normally be thought it remained the same axe. But this sameness has more to do with its history of utility. If we swap a perfectly good handle for no reason then the fact that this swapping is arbitrary might lead us to think we have changed the character of the axe, and that it is not now the same axe. In any case, greater importance in terms of identity is certainly given to the head.
I think we intuitively know the rough answer to these kinds of questions and it will differ in the case of each different kind of tool or equipment. The fact that no general principle can be precisely formulated makes it seem that there are paradoxes where there really are none. Identity comes down to nothing more than the logic of our practices when it comes to human-produced things. That logic is sometimes fuzzy is all.
The objection is that 'the soul is not material' and not composed of parts, whereas an artefact is. The soul is not 'an extra thing', to say so is to treat it as another object. 'The ship' is only more than the sum of its parts because it represents an idea, namely, the idea of a ship, and it is associated with history in the minds of people. So it is only other than, or more than, the sum of its parts, in the minds of people.
So again, humans are designated as 'beings' or 'human beings'. To equate the question of identity of beings with that of objects, is to overlook or obfuscate the real distinction between beings and objects. That's why I said it was a bait and switch - whatever you say about the question in terms of the identity of an object such as a ship, can't be assumed to then equally apply to the question of the nature of being. You would have to make a new argument, instead of just casually switching between 'the case of the ship' and 'the case of person A'. That move is inherently reductionist.
Now, of course, most people will object 'the soul doesn't exist, if you say it does exist, how do you prove that it does?' The way I understand the soul, it is not a separate entity to the body, but the totality of the being - the body, but also all the proclivities, talents, dispositions, the past, and the destiny - the sum of the whole being (which as I understand it is nearer the Aristotelean view than the Cartesian). As to whether the soul exists or not, that question is analogous to the question 'does reality exist' - which is an inadmissable question, because for any such question to be asked, someone must exist to ask it.
So essentially that is a Cartesian type of argument, with the caveat that, unlike Descartes, I don't believe that res cogitans is something that can be known objectively, it is never a 'that' to the observer, in the way that ships and other objects are.
Quoting John
I have always assumed that language, number, grammar and the like, if not wholly and solely abstractions, rely on abstractions. When we say something is 'like' something, or 'the same' as something, what the mind is doing is abstracting characteristics and attributes from a range of types and comparing them. What is that, if not abstraction? Rationality must surely be dependent on abstraction, musn't it? All of the 'laws of thought' that we've been discussing are reliant on abstraction (and generalisation, which is a type of abstraction.)
I guess what I'm really looking for is a good explanation as to exactly what constitutes abstraction. We see differences and similarities and from there we generalize to recognize different types of entities. I think it is obvious that animals do the same, albeit perhaps unconsciously, so I don't think abstraction, which if it is really to be anything at all must be a function of symbolic language, plays any crucial role in recognizing entities for what they are ('what they are' meaning their significance, whether to human or animal).
Of course the logical analysis of difference, similarity, sameness and identity is only possible by means of symbolic language, but it's hard to see where the abstraction is in all that, because it is always concrete entities using concrete visual marks or sounds, even if these marks or sounds are "visualized internally", that process is itself really as much a "felt' or "visceral" one as for example the sensation of pain or pleasure is. Well at least that is my experience; I guess I can't, in the strict sense, speak for others, but it seems reasonable to assume a commonality of experience.
You're not seeing the forest for the trees. 'Concrete entities' is an abstraction. It 'stands for' a particular type of idea which you wish to communicate to me. It's not a matter of where abstraction is in that - it is an abstraction.
Quoting John
Please illustrate to me the process by which you would explain the concept of 'prime number' to an animal. (I think the reason you think that animals are capable of abstraction, is because it is very non PC nowadays to believe that animals and humans have essentially different capabilities. It's one of the consequences of the effect of Darwinism on philosophy.)
Quoting John
Mathematicians devote their entire career to the exploration of mathematical realities. These have nothing whatever to do with visceral processes or sensations. The beauty of maths may evoke feelings, but it is not dependent on the viscera.
How is it an abstraction? "Concrete entities" is, in this case, some marks on the computer screen which elicit felt and visualized associations in me when I see them. It seems to me that you are tendentiously defining it as an abstraction, but apparently cannot explain in what exactly its abstractness consists. There's no point just making the same assertion over and over; you need to explain the logic behind your assertion.
Quoting Wayfarer
You haven't read what I wrote carefully enough. I have already stated that symbolic language is required in order to produce logical analyses and explanations. You are attacking a straw man and ignoring the salient point of my argument; which is the fact that animals obviously can recognize entities without using symbolic language. Why would I claim that animals are capable of abstraction, when I am arguing that abstraction is not really anything even in relation to symbolic language use? As I said before if abstraction is really anything at all it is dependent on symbolic language. But the fact that more is possible with symbolic language does not guarantee that abstraction is really anything significant. In order to show that abstraction is real and significant you need to explain exactly what it consist in. I don't believe you can: I have tried and I am convinced that I cannot.
Quoting Wayfarer
I would say this is plainly wrong. Mathematics is entirely dependent on mathematicians' abilities to see what is self-evident. I can't see how this is anything more than an intuitive, embodied capacity, just as language use itself seems to be. It is learned and developed through embodied experience just as any other skill is.
This is getting ridiculous, John. These 'marks' are letters and words, you are able to read them because you're a human being possessed of language. That is not a 'straw man' argument.
Quoting John
Explaining 'abstraction' requires making use of abstraction. Such general terms are invariably difficult to define, because 'a definition' is 'to describe one thing in terms of another'. It's very easy to explain what a spanner is, but very difficult to define consciousness, or life. In any case, there's quite a good encyclopedia entry on abstraction on Wikipedia, with many references and footnotes.
Quoting John
There's no point in asking the same question over and over.
Quoting John
There was a famous proof that required solving for centuries - Fermat's Last Theorem, I think it was called. According to you, it can't have existed. There are entire university deparements dedicated to solving maths problems, which according to you, should all be self evident.
Quoting John
Animals respond to stimuli and engage in limited communications for specific behaviours.
That is the last thing I am saying on this.
I agree it is getting ridiculous, but not for the reason you think. I haven't anywhere said that I would be able to read text if I was not a human being in possession of linguistic ability.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again you are just presenting something as a self-evident truism without offering any explanation. It might be self-evident to you, but it is not to me, and many others; so what then?
Quoting Wayfarer
There is if I think it is an important question that has not been adequately answered.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again a straw man. Fermat's Last Theorem is recorded, no doubt in countless places, and anyone who wanted to understand it would have to access those written records or speak to someone who had. And I have not argued or even implied that everyone should find the answer to Fermat;s Last Theorem self evident, any more than I would argue that anyone should be able to sit down at the piano and play Bebop. Given enough embodied experience and skill, a suitably talented person might be able to solve the Theorem or play Bebop, both of which abilities would be embodied as the ability to see what is self-evident in the involved in the Theorem and its relation to mathematics in general and in the relationship involved in harmonizing the Bebop scale and its relation to Jazz in general, respectively.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sounds like you think animals are nothing more than biological machines.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's up to Wayfarer. I don't take any of this stuff personally; none of it is of any significance to me beyond its mere intellectual interest.
But you did say that.
Quoting John
and that
Quoting John
I don't think 'animals do the same'. That is the point at issue. Animals have some ability to communicate and rudimentary problem-solving skills, but they're not capable of rational abstraction or language in the human sense (chimp studies, Caledonian crows, and Paul the Octopus notwithstanding).
And they're not 'marks', they're words - attached to which is the whole architecture of language, semiotics, linguistics, grammar, intentionality, and other higher-order intellectual skills that humans have, that animals don't have. And they can't be reduced to 'felt responses', that trivialises the nature of rationality. (If you agree, squeak twice ;-) )
Quoting John
I think animals are animals. They're not machines, and they're also not humans.
Quoting John
OK, from the article I mentioned:
I don't understand what you mean by this question. Can you explain it?
Quoting TheMadFool
I explained in the post to which you were referring that the criterion is that both instances be part of the process that we understand to be the ship of Theseus. If you are instead asking why that is my criterion, it is simply that - according to my empirical observations - that is the way people generally use language.
If you find this confusing, just think of the instance of yourself at noon yesterday, and the instance of yourself at noon today. They are two different locations on the same worldline/process, which is called
How does this bear on the paradox?
If I understand you correctly then it means you think both ships are valid referents of ''the ship of Theseus'' because both of them evolve through time developing relationships with other objects (sailors, ports, events, etc).
You said that process metaphysics ''resolves'' the paradox while object-based metaphysics doesn't.
Imho simply changing perspective doesn't truly solve the paradox.
Just because you alter your gaze from thorn to flower doesn't get rid of the thorns of a rose bush.
Looks like a cop-out to me.
Quoting andrewk
Kindly explain what exactly you mean by ''process''.
As oxymorinic as it sounds it could be a case of reason-based convention, just not arbitrary convention.
The point being that if the paradox has any worth i is the exposure of our poor understanding of identity.
Quoting TheMadFool A process is a subset of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold The ones we are interested in usually have additional criteria such as path-connectedness.
Quoting Wayfarer
You didn't read it carefully. Here is the passage in full:
Quoting John
I am saying that animals see differences and similarities such that they are able to recognize entities, I am not saying that they can read text or use symbolic language.
If abstraction to you is just exactly the same notion as generalization and nothing more, rather than representing some stronger claim about some purported 'reality' of abstract entities, then we have not been arguing about anything. Animals also generalize in the sense I would use it in that they respond in predictable ways to different types of entities. But they are not able, presumably, to be reflexively aware of their generalizations, or of their capacity to generalize, due to their lack of symbolic language. My point is just that from that it doesn't follow that there is anything abstract about symbolic language; it is an immanently embodied acquired skill like playing music; or painting pictures,which animals also cannot do.
I would say that it shows that there never "was" a Ship of Theseus in the material sense, because the existence of relations makes material composition vague and indeterminate.
Yes, there never could have been an absolutely physically invariant Ship of Theseus. If that were the criterion for identity, then identity would be dead in the water from the start..
So, I think that saying that something isn't self identical at t1, and t2, but physically vary between the two times, thus don't share all of the same properties, and can't be self identical is like saying that you're not self identical because your hand varies from your foot in their properties, and aren't self identical with each other, therefore you can't be self identical.
'Immanently', meaning what?
In any case, symbols are abstractions, and language relies on abstractions. If a chick sees a shape like hawk being flown above the nest, it will hide, but not because it recognises a symbol, but because it sees a shape. Responding to stimuli, is a different kind of activity to interpreting symbols.
Quoting John
Concrete, meaning what?
To me it means means it is of the body, and of the spirit. It is something we 'know from the inside', so to speak. I certainly allow that there is spirit as well as body and mind but spirit is as concrete as the body and the mind, I don't see anything "abstract" about it at all.
Quoting Wayfarer
More mere assertion, and no argument: we seem to be going around in circles now, and I don't really think it's that important any way, so it's probably best we leave it here.
Quoting John
What is a 'concrete entity using concrete visual marks and sounds?' They're not actually 'made from concrete', so what is the meaning of 'concrete'?
If you're doing a maths equation, I fail to understand how that can be 'felt internally or viscerally'. I don't think it can even be 'seen in the minds eye'. I'm pretty terrible at maths but when I try and add up numbers, I don't see them replayed in my mind.
So the reason I am being persistent, is because I think this is plainly mistaken, and that it's an important mistake.
The nature of meaning is such that, the same meaning can be conveyed in completely different forms. You can translate a sentence into any number of languages, or represent it in any number of media - even concrete! So how can meaning be 'concrete'? What does 'concrete' and 'immanent' mean? Because, I think language itself is inherently abstract, and that if it weren't abstract, we couldn't actually think.
However your stand on the ship of Theseus paradox is still unclear to me. Kindly share your thoughts on the matter.
It's just another way of saying a physical entity using physical marks and sounds. I mean, there's no way of conveying meaning other than by using physical mediums. And meaning can only be known (so far as we know) by physically embodied entities, and knowing the meaning of something is physical; it's a physical experience involving certain feelings and sensations.
So, I think the mind and the spirit are just the body seen in a different way. There are no mysterious, spooky abstract entities floating around in some realm. This is not to objectify the body, because it is equally mental and spiritual, and neither is it to objectify the mind or the spirit. Objectification is nothing more than a bodily (logical) process that is used for sense-making. As I have come to understand it, it is a case of 'the word made flesh all the way down'.
My initial response was simply that if there are two ships, that they're both instances of the same thing (although at the time my response wasn't informed by having read up on the classical 'Ship of Theseus' problem.)
But in any case the way I resolved it was to say that the identity of the object does not belong to this or that instance of it. In other words, I designated 'Ship of Theseus' as a type, rather than as an individual instance - and so whether there is one, or more than one, of the Ship, is no longer problematical.
But I also acknowledged that if you were a collector that needed to acquire an original 'Ship of Theseus' and not a replica, then it's a different matter - you're concerned with a particular Ship. I suppose, were I a collector, and were it known that the Ship of Theseus had been replicated by having all its planks replaced, then I might take that into consideration and classify the particular one that I am looking for in accordance with that knowledge. ('Oh, Director. You're after The Ship of Theseus, are you? You know there's an issue with provenance in respect of that particular ship, don't you.....')
But that is one of the aspects of the problem - whether the identity of an individual thing is dependent upon it being made of the same material. I'm inclined to say it's not, because I don't see identity in materialist terms.
Quoting John
Well, one response is that the meaning of a sentence can be shown to be independent of both the language and the medium it is represented in. In other words, if I take a particular sentence, with a very specific meaning, that can be represented in a number of languages and retain the same meaning. It can even be represented in codes such as binary codes, or semaphores, or Morse code, and retain the same meaning. So, the physical signal or sign is one thing, but the meaning is another.
Quoting John
I don't know about that at all. I think there are genuine instances of telepathy, and I don't know if that's a physical process; or it's certainly not a process that most people who describe themselves as physicalist would be inclined to admit. But books such as Irreducible Mind have a lot of evidence for non-physicalist accounts of the nature of mind.
And again, abstract ideas are demonstrably not feelings or sensations. Doing a mental calculation doesn't require or invoke a sensation. An insight into an intellectual problem is demonstrably not a sensation, although it may provoke a sensation of exhilaration. Sure, there are physical implications, neuronal activities going on in the brain but I don't agree that it is meaningful to describe those processes as being only physical, unless you obtain to a materialist theory of mind, which you say you don't.
Quoting John
'Realm' is a metaphorical description. There is no literal realm or place, but there is nevertheless, for example, 'the domain of natural numbers' and numbers can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting. They're not 'floating around' in a 'realm', that is an attempt to objectify the idea.
If arbitrary means without reason, then I don't believe there is any truly arbitrary convention, as human beings always act with intention in there somewhere, so there is always reasons for why they are doing what they are doing. The problem is that we are often incapable of determining those reasons, so it's easier just to say that things are arbitrary.
Quoting TheMadFool
I agree with this, and I suggest that it is not really a paradox. Do you recognize that there are two distinct senses of "identity", two distinct meanings of "the same"? One is identity according to a continuity of existence, which we have been discussing. If we can identify a continuity of existence, then despite numerous changes to the identified thing, (even taking it apart and rebuilding it, or changing all the parts of it in repair), we say it remains as "the same" thing. This is the common sense meaning of "the same".
The other is a sense of identity which is more proper to logic. In this sense, identity is a formal description, or formal definition, not a continuity of existence. Identity is determined by a statement of "what" is being referred to. So we could have a description of ship A, and so long as the thing referred to fit that description, it is ship A. But it must fit that description. In this case, then, as soon as we removed one plank from ship A, we'd have to refer to the definition of ship A, and see if it allows for this change. If not, then the ship is no longer ship A.
The appearance of a paradox is created by mixing up these two distinct senses of 'the same". There is an illusion created that "the ship" has a formal definition, in the logical way, that there is a definition of ship A, and we must adhere to that definition, in order that the object is ship A. But no formal definition has been provided, so we are left only with the continuity of existence as our only form of identity. We take this default sense of identity naturally because it is the common sense form of identity. This allows for change to the ship. Change to the ship implies that we may contradict the formal definition of "the ship". But there is no formal definition of "the ship", so there really is no contradiction and no paradox, because we are simply left to distinguish ship A according to prevailing conventions, not any principles of logic. And there is always discrepancies between such conventions. The apparent paradox is just a matter of these discrepancies, not a failure of logic.
I don't believe there absolutely strict determinable meanings; there are rather families of association due to commonalities in the forms of human life.
What kind of reality do you imagine meanings have outside their being understood by body/minds?
Quoting Wayfarer
My experience is that mental calculation very definitely does involve bodily feelings and sensations; inner sounds, images or sensations of movement, for example. So, where do we go from here?
Quoting Wayfarer
'Realm' represents the idea of something like a real domain (although I am not suggesting that the etymology of 'realm' is associated with the etymology of 'real'). You say that "numbers can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting. some animal species are thought to be able to count and yet they do not represent symbolic numbers to themselves. No doubt abilities with symbols vastly extend arithmetical capabilities, because numbers may be physically encoded in signs external to our bodies, such as sounds and marks.
The question is whether number has any reality beyond its instantiations and/or its being perceived or apprehended by body/minds, and if so, what exactly that reality could consist in. You say "apprehended by an intelligence" which is a loaded way of putting it that evokes the notion of a free-floating disembodied intelligence. Inherent in your way of putting it is the presupposition that intelligence is 'something' non-physical that "apprehends" other non-physical things like numbers and ideas. Why must intelligence be non-physical, and why would you think that its being physical rules out its being mental and spiritual? I'm trying to understand where these prejudices come from, and not just in you: they are widespread..
Take scientific laws, formulas, plans, blueprints - any number of those things might have 'strict determinable meanings'. Say it's the formula for some substance used in manufacturing. The ingredients, method of combining them, and way of processing them, might be extremely exacting - get it wrong, and it doesn't work. Get it right, and it produces the exact outcome. But they can be represented in different ways - so the physical representation is different to the information being conveyed. (This is the same basic principle as behind Apo's 'epistemic cut', I think.)
A very simple example - I say to you, 'draw a triangle'. If you do anything other than draw a plane area bounded by three straight lines, then you haven't got it. Concepts are indeed determinate - see Ed Feser's piece, below.
And also, the notion of 'triangle' is not dependent on my thinking about it - a triangle is real in any possible universe. As are the natural numbers, I'm sure.
Recall the Pioneer Plaque, and the reasoning behind it. It was presumed that any alien intelligence advanced enough to discover the Plaque would be able to infer the meaning of the symbols on it.
Quoting John
To your demonstration of how that is relevant, perhaps.
Quoting John
Numbers can only be perceived by an intelligence capable of counting. If you can disprove that, please do so.
This argument is basically about 'whether numbers are discovered or invented'. It is a famously difficult problem, and it is beyond adjutication i.e. there are credible authorities for both views, but I'm generally advocating a form of Platonic realism. It really isn't that outlandish, but it's against the grain of modern culture, that's all.
Quoting John
I suggest you don't know how to envisage the possibility of incorporeal or immaterial truths. This all goes back to the debate between medieval realism and nominalism. The outcome has shaped the way Western culture thinks about it.
About the only modern philosopher I know of who argues for the kind of dualism that I am advocating is Ed Feser (although he's a lot better at it than me, he's a professional). He's neo-Thomist, and Thomism preserves the 'traditionalist' idea of the reality of intelligible objects.
Here are some refs:
Augustine on Intelligible Objects
Think, McFly, Think, Edward Feser.
Well, we're swapping back and forth between verbal language and more determinate mathematical languages, now. Make up your mind what you want to talk about.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's obviously relevant because you say your experience (presumably) tells you that no physical feelings and sensations are involved in calculating and understanding, and I say my experience shows me very clearly that they are involved. So, either someone's right, and the other does not attend closely enough to their own experience,(and how could we demonstrate that?); or we each simply have experience of a different nature. I don't think you're taking much trouble to carefully read and consider what I am saying, which makes for poor conversation.
I think in this case, the burden of proof is on you.
This point is addressed in detail in the Feser blog post I linked to.
Why do you say that when there's no way of proving it either way?
The question of whether maths is 'invented or discovered' is a notoriously thorny problem, and also a metaphysical question. There are many views, often irreconciliable, so there's no ultimate court of appeal. That's what I mean by 'beyond adjutication'.
Quoting John
No, you're just making 'concrete marks', based on 'sensations and feelings'. It's why you think that means something that is problematical. ;-)
It's only problematical to your conception of meaning, which thus begs the question, as I see it. And, relatedly, I think the question of whether mathematics is "invented or discovered" is a malformed one, based on the very kind of preconceptions about reality and meaning I would want to call into question.
Wayfarer is more or less a substance dualist.
For bodily feelings and sensations to be involved means making mathematical thought part of causality. It means understanding or experience of mathematics must emerge out of their body. It requires bodily sensations to cause or inspire me to think of mathematics. In this context, experience because material (or body, in the context of substance dualism)-- states of my mathematical thinking emerge out of state of bodily sensation, which in turn emerged out of my body.
For many, it simply can't be true because it would mean substance dualism is false.
I am, with the caveat that the mind is never an object of cognition, which is the subject of debate in the panpsychist thread.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I would hate to think of what a square root would feel like.
[quote="Wayfarer]I would hate to think of what a square root would feel like.[/quote]
That's a starwman. The argument isn't that the thought of square root is a bodily feeling, but that a bodily sensations cause or manifest with a distinct state of understanding a square root.
The square root doesn't feel like anything. Our bodies feel before or concurrently with us thinking about a square root.
But in the later examples, Theseus is long since passed on, therefore is Ship A or Ship B Theseus' Ship. Semantics is important here, because the words we use necessarily condition our view of the situation. In this case, once Theseus' ORIGINAL ship is torn apart, neither are Theseus' Ship anymore. Ship A is a new ship that takes up the same point in space/time that occupies the point that was once occupied by Theseus' ship. Ship B is a 'reconstructed' sum of the parts of Theseus' original ship.
Not sure if anyone is feeling those answers, but that is a possible outlook after having addressed this problem through multiple lenses and looking for different aspefts embedded in the argument.
If so, consider a pregnant woman and her fetus. They're both part of the same process/worldline. Therefore, according to process metaphysics, they should both be the same person. Yet, we consider the mother and child to be two different persons. What gives here?
I fear ''type'' is a weasel word here. It is more a matter of convenience (to eliminate the paradox) than any real progress to a solution.
Following your line of reasoning there would be no individual identity at all. Everything would simply be a ''type''.
I don't know if identity can be said to be something fixed or absolute. It is something that can be maintained, while still changing over time. IN fact the human being's cells are regularly changed and renewed throughout their life; aging is mainly the slowing of that process, and when you die, all change stops (except decomposition.) I believe the paradox appears because of the need to regard identity as being something fixed or immutable, when it actually never is. So I think I'm defending the 'relative identity' thesis, if you or anyone has any objections to that, I'd be interested in hearing them.
Quoting Wolf
Interesting point. I hadn't thought of it in terms of 'the Cartesian sense of identication'. Perhaps you might elaborate?
I agree with this answer.
It's not so much about description, but about how identity is assigned. If a group of people think of it in the way that you describe above, and assign identity accordingly, then that is the practical meaning of identity for that group of people.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Strickly speaking, there can be no annihilation of an object and a rebuilding of it. That is impossible. It would have to be something else which is annihilated, or something else which has ceased. An object can lose one or more features and be rebuilt, but it can't be annihilated and rebuilt. You could think of one or more of those features as essential, but that would be your thinking, and would be subjective, relating to you, the subject.
Your example of the glass is not an example of an object being annihilated and rebuilt. The object is just broken, melted and reformed, not annihilated. What changes is how we identify with it. I used to be able to drink out of it, but when it smashed into lots of tiny pieces, it lost that function. It was temporarily no longer a tool in this way, and so lost that identity, until it was rebuilt and regained that identity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That "we" is misleading. Some people would describe it that way and others would describe it in a different way which contradicts that way, for example, by saying that it was the same object reformed, not that there were two objects: an old one and a new one, but that there was one object under different forms. That is one common way of identification: a way which maintains persistence of identity over time, despite physical change.
The object wasn't annihilated, so if that's what whoever you're referring to is describing, then, strictly speaking, whoever you're referring to is mistaken. But if that's how they identify with the object, then, practically, it may as well have been annihilated.
Any attempted solution which priorities one way of speaking and rules out others will always have to compete with the opposing proposed solutions which it rules out, rather than reconcile these proposed solutions under a broader encompassing theory which avoids the kind of problems that these proposed solutions face. There are more sophisticated and less problematic proposed solutions to this problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, basically.
What I said early, is that identity in the sense of the temporal continuity of an object, is something which is simply assumed. It has never been proven that an object continues to exist as itself, through temporal duration, so there are no firm principles whereby we determine that an object is the same object through a period of time. However it is a very useful practise, and that practise is shaped by convention, just like language use.
Quoting Sapientia
As I said, it's a matter of convention. I think that when a drinking glass has been broken into a whole bunch of bits, it has been annihilated, you don't.
Problems like this are the reason why we developed a second sense of identity, which I call logical identity. In this sense, we have a defined term, and as long as the object meets the conditions of the definition, it has been identified accordingly. So we could agree on a definition of "drinking glass" and we could agree on a definition of "annihilate", and determine whether or not the drinking glass has been annihilated.
Logical identity has its own problems though. The object is identified through a definition, so it is more likely that a "type" is identified, and unless the description is extremely thorough, it doesn't properly single out a particular identified object. There could be more than one object which fits the description. Following the Leibniz principle, identity of indiscernibles, some effort has been made to define temporal continuity, such that we could determine logically whether something maintained its identity as the same thing through a period of time, but we have no such principles.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Yes I agree, it's a matter of convention, so there will always be disagreement. however, if we could determine the principles which constitute temporal continuity, and we could all learn these principles, and refer to them when deciding whether or not an object continued to be the object which it is, then we'd have much better agreement.
Why do you think that it has been annihilated, rather than just broken? Is it just an exaggeration? Or something else? (Although, if it was just an exaggeration, then you wouldn't really mean what you say, and you wouldn't really think that it has been annihilated).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then let's see if we can do that, because I want to understand your point of view, which seems to differ from my own. It seems to me like you might be moving the goalposts by referring to a "drinking glass". The drinking function ceased, but that is just a subject's way of seeing the object. The drinking part is not a part of the object.
If a certain structure is an essential part of the existence of an object, and that certain structure is destructed, then the object would cease to exist. Is that your thinking?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But one can identify the object in different ways, so as to identify a particular. We're talking about [I]this[/I] cup, not [I]that[/I] cup, or any [I]other[/I] cup. I could point to it or give it a unique name or specify its time or location with enough precision to differentiate it from others.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm. Maybe.
When something is destroyed we can say that it is annihilated. The drinking glass no longer exists, it has been broken, destroyed, therefore I say it has been annihilated. There is no exaggeration. If something comes to its end without being destroyed we might not say it has been annihilated, such as when a human being simply dies we wouldn't say that person was annihilated. But if the human being is blown to bits, like what happens to the drinking glass, we can say that it was annihilated.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
"Drinking glass" has a particular meaning, that's why I used it instead of just saying "glass", so there would be no ambiguity. There is no moving the goalpost, because I intentionally used "drinking glass" from the beginning to avoid such ambiguity. A drinking glass is a glass which is used for drinking out of. Annihilate means to destroy. When the drinking glass is broken to bits, why do you not agree that it has been annihilated?
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
I don't think it's a case of being a "certain structure", it's a case of fulfilling the conditions of the definition of the word. We have certain expectations of what any word refers to, and it could be a certain structure, but in many cases, like "drinking glass" it is mostly a purpose, a use. If the object no long fulfills the conditions expected of the word, it should no longer be referred to by that word. And since the object was broken to bits, we can say it was annihilated.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
In many cases one can point to the object, though right now it would do me no good if you pointed to the object. But what is at issue here is if it is still the same object which you pointed to, after you point to it. Say you point to the object, and this acts as our defining of the object, if we leave and come back later, how do we know that it is the same object we are looking at?
Broken? Yes. No longer serves the purpose of drinking out of? Yes. But how has the object itself been destroyed or annihilated? If the object itself has been destroyed or annihilated, rather than just broken down, then how could it be rebuilt? The object is the sum of its parts, yes? So if the object is destroyed or annihilated, then by implication, so are the parts. If you conceive of it as a drinking glass, then it seems that, if anything, it is your conceptualisation which has been destroyed, rather than anything else, in the sense that it is no longer applicable when the object is broken.
Similarly, when someone is blown to bits, their body isn't annihilated - even though we might say that it has been as an exaggeration or a word which seems appropriate - because it is still there in bits. One change might be that we refer to body parts instead of a human being.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But you also refer to the object, and there is nothing in the object itself which makes it a drinking glass. So it seems that your attachment to your conceptualisation of the object as a tool is getting in the way of talking about the object itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So, are we talking about the drinking glass or the object? If the former, then yes, the drinking glass has ceased to be. But what about the object?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I understand that problem. It relates to the ancient question of whether one can step into the same river twice.
It's not physically identical, but we can nevertheless identify it and categorise it as we did before, if we do not regard physical identity as the be-all and end-all
The answer to this earlier question of yours would be that it hasn't been completely annihilated and it has all the same parts, and they are the criteria being used to conclude that it is the same object.
There's another reason, @Metaphysician Undercover. The glass that is smashed into pieces and then rebuilt from those pieces is an example of something being dissembled and reassembled. It therefore cannot be a destruction.
Objectively, no axe is destroyed and each axe is different. Something about them is always different, even when you don't do anything to them. Time doesn't matter, except in the sense that things change over time, and proportion doesn't matter, since they'll change anyway, and therefore differ, whether the change is minute or large.
Customarily, you could answer in a number of different ways, including by saying that by swapping the heads back, you regained your original axe, and that when the axes swapped heads the first time, they were the same as they were beforehand except for the heads.
Who is this "we"? I reckon that there are a significant number of people who would not identify it as a new glass, but as the old glass remoulded.
Has something made you change your mind since then? If so, what? If not, surely you can help by explaining how you think it's resolved by Kripke.
I'm sure that it makes sense to him. I don't know why the designation "dog" doesn't refer to cats in another possible universe. I mean, the same names refer to all kinds of very different things in this universe...
Well, I think now that different people, who have reached different points of evolution in their thought, have their own views, and it's rarely helpful to debate which is right and wrong, or to advocate one view over another. Kripke's view has a basic description in Wikipedia which is very straightforward and should not require further explanation.
Quoting ernestm
The Wikipedia article on Kripke says that it is proper names that he claims to be rigid designators, and "dog" isn't a proper name. But "Nixon", for example, is a proper name, and I still don't see why that couldn't refer to anyone - or even anything - else. Although I don't know his argument.
But if he's wrong, he's wrong. Why hold back? He himself doesn't seem to do so. He seems to think that Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and Searle got it wrong.
He contrasts rigid designators with non-rigid ones, which he gives as descriptions, and not names at all. "Dog" is not a description.
Not like I know much about him, just read a couple articles about it, nothing significant.
You can't reduce something to nothing, I believe that's impossible. By your logic there is no such thing as annihilation, because you say it's not annihilated if there are still parts left. I don't agree with your definition of annihilation.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
No. it's not my conceptualization of the object as a tool, which is the issue here, it is just my conception of "an object". I believe that when an object is broken up into bits, it no longer exists. So it could be a rock, or any other thing which is broken up. I would say that when it is broken up it no longer exists. What exists is some new objects, the pieces.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Obviously, the drinking glass is the object. That's what's named, and that's what we're talking about, the drinking glass. What did you have in mind as the object, a thing which hasn't been named yet? Why would we be talking about an object which hasn't been named yet, unless we were playing some sort of game? Are you trying to play a game? "Drinking glass" refers to an object, and that object is the drinking class. If you are thinking that the object is something other than the drinking glass, then it probably has another name, and we would be calling it by that other name rather than "drinking glass".
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
I can see that in TheMadFool's example given to me, the ship was taken apart with the intent of rebuilding it, so I assume the parts were labeled and everything was put back the way that it was, so we might be justified in calling it the same ship. But in the instance of the drinking glass, there are just bits of glass, which are remolded into a new drinking glass. Why would you assume that it is the same drinking glass?
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
No it's not such an example, because when we disassemble and reassemble, we remember where the parts go, and put them back in the same place.
There is also a pervasive myopism in considering there is only one mechanism at work. In some cases it is important to identify the ship as Theseus' but in the majority of communications about it, it is simply 'the ship' which is under discussion. So there could be Wittgensteinian and descriptive and causal theories ALL operating simultaneously, and in different situations, one or more of them provide meaning in different ways.
Why not? That's what it means. Complete destruction or obliteration. To destroy something completely so that nothing is left. Destruction is the action or process of causing so much damage to something that it no longer exists or cannot be repaired. These are dictionary definitions. It would be odd if you were to reject this meaning just because it conflicts with some metaphysical notion you have. That would be some kind of backwards logic, like an ad hoc rationalisation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, both are problems, since you think of the object as the tool, which makes sense in an ordinary context, but falls apart under scrutiny.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't told me why yet, and that's what I want to know. I could come up with an answer myself, and I suggested one already, but you rejected it.
What do you think makes that so? Why new? Why objects? These objects were part of the previous structure, so what makes them new, and what made them one (before you acknowledge them as many)?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My goodness. Where to start? It's like you're trying to attack me with a barrage of questionable assumptions and loaded rhetorical questions. You're getting ahead of yourself. I guess I'll start from the beginning, and address each one in order:
1. That's not obvious in the context of a philosophical discussion about identity which attempts a deeper examination of these kind of assumptions.
2. In the context of our discussion, that is just what you've named it, and I have already made clear my objection to this assumed equivalence of yours. So, no, that is not what we are talking about, it is what you are talking about, and by doing so, you are talking past me, and missing the point.
3. I had in mind the object. My objection, as I thought I had made clear, was not so much the glass part, but that you are naming it a [i]drinking[/I] glass, which brings with it the baggage of functionality, which, as I said, is not inherent in the object itself. By the object, I mean the object, and nothing else: not your conception of it as a tool, and not how you relate to it as such.
4 & 5. You could simply call it a glass, and that might just resolve the issue that I've explained to you. We don't have to talk about a nameless object and I'm not trying to play a game, I'm just trying to do a bit of philosophy here.
6. Drinking is not part of the object. I don't know why you apparently aren't getting this. You haven't really addressed what I've said about this. If you disagree, then you should explain why. Simply asserting that the object is the drinking glass doesn't explain why you think that, it doesn't clarify much, and it doesn't explain why you think that my criticism of that claim is wrong.
7. Apparently you haven't noticed, but I have not been consistently calling it that, and have purposefully avoided doing so. I'll call it that when that is what it is, and when I have good reason to do so. That's fine if you want to go no further than this ordinary practical assumption, and do not want a deeper philosophical examination, but that'd just be sticking your head in the sand. I am trying to talk about the object itself, which is distinguishable from the purpose you see in it. If dropping the name "drinking glass" will get you to do that, then let's drop that name, shall we?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why would you assume that it's a new one? Don't answer that. There's actually little point in arguing over this. I can see it from both points of view. I'm just saying that that is one competing interpretation, and that both interpretations are understandable. They just make use of different criteria.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that's not in the dictionary definition. That's something that you're reading into it. I acknowledge that the context may be unusual, but that doesn't mean that this terminology cannot rightly be applied in this context.
So, if identity is not fixed why does our intuition inform us to the contrary? The words ''same'', ''identical'' are evidence that there's a sense of unchanging identity in our minds. Do you think this intuition is mistaken?
Quoting Wayfarer
This is self-contradictory is it not? How can change maintain anything? I have a vague conception of what you want to get at but it's still unclear to me.
I don't think it's exactly mistaken, but reality is not as crisply delineated as are the laws of identity. That of course has been part of philosophy since Heraclitus' 'you can't step in the same river twice'.
As I said in the post you quoted from, the cells in the human body are constantly changing, but we retain our identity nevertheless. But in answer to the question: are you the same person you were when you were a child, you can't really either answer 'yes' or 'no'. You're not the same person, but you're also not a different person.
As I said in my last post, I think that you really can answer 'yes' or 'no' [i.e. to whether it is the same ship, or to whether you are the same person] but it completely depends on the context of the question. There is no correct answer outside of the context. It is the search for an "answer-outside-of-the-context" which leads to the paradox.
Literally, of course you're the same person. You remember experiencing the life back then, no one figures you've been replaced by a duplicate by the martians or Chinese.
I also think that there is a sense in which that very first "you", that awakes around 5-7 remains some part of you forever. The "inner child". They have to be with you, because you were with them. You can recall what they felt like, exactly what it was like to be them. You have access to their "qualia".
I don't see anything like "so that nothing is left" in my dictionary definition. I think that's impossible and ridiculous, rendering "annihilation" a completely useless word, if I accept your definition of it. So I still disagree with your definition. I reject it because this definition isn't consistent with any definition I've read, and it refers to something I've never seen happen, nor heard of, and contradicts the laws of physics. So I think you're just making it up. And unless you can explain some special metaphysical us for it, why you're making up this definition and asking me to adhere to it, I don't see the point. Perhaps you are insisting on a metaphorical use of the word? What's the point?
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Each piece exists separately and independently of the others, it has its own shape and form. It is an entity, a thing with distinct existence, an individual. Therefore I think each piece is an object. Prior to the original object being broken, these entities did not exist as such, therefore they were not objects. So I conclude that at the time of being broken they are produced as new objects.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Right, the object is a drinking glass. Why do you keep insisting that the object is something other then this? It's been identified as a drinking glass. Why do you insist on being contrary, and identifying it as something else. That doesn't make sense, it's my example, I identified the object.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
No, as I said, I wanted to avoid the ambiguity of calling it a "glass". That might refer to a looking glass, or any other form of glass. I've identified a very specific type of glass, but for some reason, you want to create ambiguity. I've intentionally tried to avoid this ambiguity. Why are you intentionally trying to create ambiguity. The only reason to intentionally create ambiguity in an argument is to facilitate equivocation. And then you suggest that creating such ambiguity might resolve the issue. That's nonsense. You are arguing that you cannot identify the object I named, but you are intentionally being obtuse, trying to create ambiguity, to justify your nonsense.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Of course drinking is not a part of the object. That's ridiculous. Just because it's a drinking glass, do you think that it should actually be drinking? See what I mean by your obtuseness. It's ridiculous. "Drinking" is part of the means for identifying the object. It's a glass made to drink from.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
It's my example, and that's what I called the object! Feel free to reject the example and claim that you don't know what I mean by a glass that's drinking, or some other nonsense. But it's nonsense for you to say "I'll call it that when that is what it is". That is what it is! It's been stipulated as part of the example. If you can't understand what a drinking glass is, then fine, we'll move on. But I think your actions are intentionally obtuse.
How can we talk about the "object itself" by dropping the name. If we drop the name, we won't have any idea of which object we are talking about. We have to name the object so that we can talk about it. As I said, we could name another object, and particular rock or something, and have the same discussion. When the rock is obliterated into whatever elements we want to extract from it, it no longer exists as an object. What exists are the new objects which were derived from it.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Are you saying that to "reassemble" something does not require putting the parts back in the same place?
That's part of the very first definition that comes up if you google "destruction", but whatever.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Don't be ridiculous. See for yourself if don't believe me. That was just one definition, and not one that I invented. There are plenty of others which define the meaning of the verb "destroy" as to put out of existence, and other similarly worded definitions. The concept and meaning of destruction and annihilation existed long before our discovery of the laws of physics that you're referring to, and annihilation has a meaning in physics which is different to the ordinary meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you know what? I'm not even going to read any further. Your accusation that I am making this up is too stupid and uncharitable for me to want to continue.
What's the point in lying? I thought we were doing philosophy. What comes up from google is this: "the action or process of causing so much damage to something that it no longer exists or cannot be repaired." There is no mention of "so that nothing is left", not even bits and pieces.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
That's exactly what happens when the drinking glass breaks, it no longer exists. It is put out of existence. What exists is a bunch of bits and pieces of glass. You do not want to accept that it ceases existing unless there are not even any bits or pieces left, but that's ridiculous. As soon as the drinking glass breaks into pieces, it is no longer a drinking glass, it does not exist.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Good, now I won't have to read your blatant lies.
Yeah I know, it's all assumptions, that's where we started in this conversation in the first place. That a thing has a continuous existence in time, is just assumed, and what constitutes this continued existence is a matter of convention, like the conventions of language. I said it's a matter of agreeing on conventions, and Sapientia asked me if it were possible that we could agree on such conventions.
Quoting ernestm
I look at the insult as coming from the other way. Sapientia continually rejected my proposals, of reasonable definitions, and in an insulting way suggested that we define "annihilate" as reducing to nothing in an absolute way, without any bits or pieces remaining, then justifying this nonsense suggestion with a blatant lie. Also, there was the nonsense suggestion that we should talk about an object without naming or identifying that object in any way. Both of these nonsense suggestions, if they are supposed to be real proposals, are an insult to my intelligence.
The two words that I entered into the google search were "annihilation" and "meaning". And this is the result:
If anyone reading this would prefer to uncharitably maintain that I am lying, then so be it. But I won't dignify that with a response. That's the kind of thing that would make me stop reading, stop engaging with that person, and go and look for something more worthy of my time.
I know, right? It was unnecessary, uncalled for, and ruined what might have otherwise been a productive discussion. And coming up with a lame excuse won't change that.
Oh well, if he's going to be like that, then perhaps it's for the best that the discussion has been cut short.
Right. That's that. I'll say no more on the matter. Time to move on.
Actually I think it was quite evident that we were beyond the possibility of a productive discussion. We were nowhere near agreement on the meaning of words like annihilate. And we couldn't even agree that there is a relationship between the name of the object and the named object. I think it was demonstrated that in the context of that discussion, words are useless. But I suppose this might be just another example of us disagreeing.