I would add "introspection" as a major one. There are others (e.g. the sense of balance).
But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus).
One city, one name: New York. This unique name (aka concept) can be written down in an infinite number of different ways.
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name?
I think a particular city is a poor example of what is meant by 'universals'. Bertrand Russell's example of 'the relation of Edinburgh and London' is a much better example.
Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
(I would say that the relation 'is north of' depends on perspective - it pertains to the relation between those two particulars, which neither of them possess in their own right. Perspective is what an observer brings to the picture. He goes on:)
[quote=Bertrand Russell, Universals; https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm#link2HCH0009] This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.[/quote]
Reply to Kenosha Kid Thanks, but failing to see how that is germane to the attempt to explain reason in terms of sensation.
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name?
The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name.
That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal.
It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.
None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist.
The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either.
I see, now it makes sense. There's been a lot of confusion about what's at issue. In order to necessitate a separate existence (substance or property dualism), universals have to be an entity, which, according to the law of identity, has to be identical with itself. So to make the argument work (and I'm claiming it doesn't work), the concept needs to be completely identical in every way because it is an indivisible unity, an identity according to the law of identity.
Since we can identify no single self-identical unity which is 'the concept of New York', or 'the letter A', we must reject the argument. How close the myriad individual concepts are to each other is immaterial, though it helps to explain why we feel as though there might be a single universal concept.
It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.
None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist.
It does apply. The letter A can be posited a philosophical entity which may or may not exist. You say there exist practical examples of As. I say there are practical examples of universals, in concepts that function as near-universal, such as (precisely) the letter A, or the number Pi.
If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be?
A's can be good enough for you, but absolutes can't be good enough?
So, this 'hidden states model' is not applicable to scientific reasoning? By what criterion do you distinguish scientiific judgements from the ordinary neural activities which you say comprise mental life, and are based on a model of the mind's hidden states?
I don't. Scientific judgements are a sub category of such inferences which can be supported in a particular way (mainly testable empirical evidence). Science is a kind of public rehersal of the process of inference we have a priori. The publicness of it enhances the process by allowing more models to compete for quality of prediction, increasing the quantity of sensory data to input, speeding up the filtering process etc.
But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties.
You're begging the question. The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition.
If you want to make a distinction between a cortex receiving a signal from a neighbouring network whose terminal dendrite is under your skin from one whose terminal dendrite is in your skull, you'll have to make the case as to why they are different. Sensory neurons are simply those with relatively long dendrites compared to their axons. Any signal derived from a sensory neuron is a sense. Often, long dendritic chains are included in the definition of 'sensory' if they replicate the activities of typical sensory neurons.
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties.
I have no idea what the philosophical implications are, but I would identify self-consciousness with the sense of introspection. We can 'sense' our own thoughts and feel our feelings and access our memories. At least some of them.
Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill.
If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be?
Because, without begging the question, the definition of an A could be that it is sufficiently similar to all other As. The definition of a universal cannot be that it is just sufficiently similar to other examples. That's the definition on nominalism, the opposite of universalism.
Reply to Isaac But that 'definition' is not a definition; it is a tautology... "Any A must look like a A". Sure, but where's the definition?
Letters and words are symbols, they are more than just drawings that look like other drawings. They are made to be understood, to carry meaning from one mind to the next. And therefore they do need a degree of universality in order to function.
We're going round in pointless circles as you keep conceding points and then raising them again a few posts later as if nothing had been said on the matter. I shan't continue this nonsense.
Horse noun
\ ?h?rs \
plural horses also horse
Definition:
1a: Anything that looks sufficiently like a horse.
For those wondering what "look" and "sufficiently" mean in the above definition, they denote whatever resembles "looking", and "sufficiently", respectively.
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus
The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name.
I thought you were arguing that the fact that there is one name of the city, just as there is one city, entails that the name is changeless.
I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name.
The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition.
The distinction between sensation and reason doesn't belong only to philosophy, it's also a matter of common sense, and you haven't addressed it at all. Even empiricists have to use reason, and reason is something for which there need be no neurobiological explanation.
Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill.
It also requires the ability to abstract, to understand symbolic meaning, as you keep pointing out. There's a book by Chomsky and Berwick on the genetic roots of language on my must read list. https://g.co/kgs/t2stKT
Reply to DrOlsnesLea This is a philosophy site. There are plenty of science sites to contribute to. I ask the occasional question on Physics Forum myself.
I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name.
They are all identifiable as saying the same words: 'New York', even by one who never heard of the city. Are words embodied?
What would that be? The idea that scientific theories exist?
From a lecture Karl Popper gave on the subject:
I now come to the discussion of my central problem. Are world 3 objects, such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation, real objects? Or are they mere fictions, as both the materialist monist and the dualist assert? Are these theories themselves unreal, and only their embodiments real, as the materialist monist would say; including, of course, their embodiments in our brains, and in our verbal behaviour? Or are, as the dualist would say, not only these embodiments real, but also our thought experiences; our thoughts, directed towards these fictitious world 3 objects, but not these world 3 objects themselves?
My answer to this problem -- and, indeed, the central thesis of my talk -- is that world 3 objects are real; real in a sense very much like the sense in which the physicalist would call physical forces, and fields of forces, real, or really existing. However, this realist answer of mine has to be defended, by rational arguments.
There is perhaps a danger here that my central problem, the reality or existence of world 3 objects, may degenerate into a verbal issue. After all, we can call whatever we like ‘real’ or ‘existent.’ I think that we can get rid of this danger, by starting from the most primitive idea of reality, and by adopting the physicalist’s own method of generalizing this idea, and, ultimately, of replacing it altogether.
I suggest that all of us are most certain of the existence or reality of physical bodies of medium size: of a size such that we can easily handle them, turn them round, and drop them. Such things are ‘real’ in the most primitive sense of the word. I conjecture that a baby learns to distinguish such things; and I suppose that those things are most convincingly real to the baby that he or she can handle and drop, and can put into his or her mouth. Resistance to touch also seems to be important; and some degree of temporal persistence.
Starting from a primitive idea of real things like this, the
physicalist extends the idea by generalizing it. I suggest that the materialist’s or physicalist’s idea of real physical existence is obtained by including very big things and very small things, and things that do not persist through any length of time; and also by including whatever can causally act upon things, such as magnetic and electrical attraction and repulsion, and fields of forces; and radiation, for example X-rays, because they can causally act upon bodies, say, upon photographic plates.
We are thus led to the following idea: what is real or what exists is whatever may, directly or indirectly, have a causal effect upon physical things, and especially upon those primitive physical things that can be easily handled.
Thus we may replace our central problem of whether abstract world 3 objects such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation have a real existence, by the following problem: can scientific conjectures or theories exert, in a direct or indirect way, a causal effect upon the physical things of world 1? My reply to this question will be: yes, they can indeed.
My fundamental argument in support of world 3 [ideas] realism is very simple. We all know that we live in a physical world 1 which has been greatly changed by making use of science; that is to say, by using world 3 conjectures or theories as instruments of change. Therefore, scientific conjectures or theories can exert a causal or an instrumental effect upon physical things; far more so than, say, screwdrivers or scissors.
Reply to Olivier5 I took the import of your poster of the name New York printed in different typefaces, not to be about anything to do with New York whatever. It could have been any city, or indeed any word. The point is, that although the representations all differ, they all mean the same. That's the point I thought you were making. Was I wrong about that?
It could have been any city, or indeed any word. The point is, that although the representations all differ, they all mean the same.
Yes. The point was to show that there is a difference between the name or concept of "New York" and any of its many possible materializations in print or drawing. Hence there is an degree of independence between the name and the material prints of the name.
As the article you posted indicates, this seems to apply to smells as written down on neurons as well.
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and [u]Paul the Octopus[/u,]).
You're well-read and also well-informed. How do you find the time? Frankly, my mind is blown.
Paul The Octopus made headlines for accurate predictions in the 2010 Soccer World Cup.
[quote=Wikipedia]This species is known for using plant material to create stick and leaf tools to capture prey hiding in cracks and crevices.[/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]The New Caledonian crow is the only non-primate species for which there is evidence of cumulative cultural evolution in tool manufacture. That is, this species appear to have invented new tools by modifying existing ones, then passing these innovations to other individuals in the cultural group.[/quote]
No language? How'd they do that?!
[quote=Wikipedia]Meta-tool use is using one tool on another tool to achieve the objective of the task. It is generally considered to be a behaviour requiring more complex cognitive ability than the use of just a single tool. Studies show that New Caledonian crows are capable of meta-tool use, at a level rivalling the best performances seen in primates.[/quote]
Bird-brained? Go to New Caledonia!
However, it isn't all good news:
[quote=Wikipedia]New Caledonian crows have shown they are able to process information from mirrors, a cognitive ability possessed by only a small number of species. By using a mirror, wild-caught New Caledonian crows are able to find objects they cannot see with a direct line of sight. However, the crows were unable to recognise themselves in the mirror - other corvids have tested positive for this capability.[/quote]
There seems to be cognitive gap between ability to use/manufacture tools (engineers) and self-awareness (philosophers). Makes sense in a vague way - roughly speaking, engineering is about what's outside and philosophizing is about what's inside.
The question is, why aren't blue whales with their humongous brains more intelligent than humans?
Reply to Janus See the bolded passages in this post, which address this exact point. Bertrand Russell, in particular, points out the ambiguity of the word 'idea' in this context, which at once refers only to one's own mental content, but also to something which is the same for every observer, even though it is conceptual in nature.
Reply to Wayfarer OK, I read it, but I couldn't find any explanation of how concepts or universals are thought to exist beyond the instances of their being thought, spoken or written, in anything but a merely formal or stipulational sense. The concept is only the same for each "observer", in my view, insofar as it can be specified in language.
Take the triangle; it is specified as a space enclosed by three conjoined lines; and anyone who is familiar with and understands that specification can visualize a triangle. But each person's visualization will be different, unless the triangle is an equilateral, and even then it seems plausible to think the visualization process would be different in each case.
People delight in using that example to say See! Animals can reason! What makes you think humans are special!?
Try explaining the concept of prime to a crow.
To play the devil's advocate, my response would be that in corvids (crows) the basic cognitive component (logic) seems advanced enough to compare to our ancestors H. habilis (the first tools). Let a coupla million years go by and we could see corvids doing advanced math, philosophy, all the intellectual activities we engage in. Having said that, a coupla million years is a collossal, mind-boggling, amount of time - there's many a slip between the cup and the lip.
Note that in this lecture Popper challenges both the monist and dualist views and proposes, instead, "a pluralist view ... a view of the universe that recognizes at least three different but interacting sub-universes": the physical world; the mental world; and the world of ideas and cultural artifacts.
Because it’s not about size - it’s about what you do with it...
I was thinking if a bird (the New Caledonian Crow) can manage such feats of intelligence, why not a blue whale? The size difference between a crow brain and a whale brain is so great that size should matter. Remember humans fall between the two and there's a noticeable upward trend in intelligence. Are you saying the pattern breaks down abruptly?
Don't forget we're assuming blue whales aren't as if not more intelligent as/than humans. No evidence of that as far as I know. Who knows? Blue whales might've already found the solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
Reply to Olivier5
I would certainly say that scientific theories exist and that the author implies description of reality by them. Of course, the theories enter the discussion of science as they are made. Time, Hypothetico-Deductive Method (HDM) and credibility of the theories will determine which theories that best describe reality, whom of the authors are the "winners". One may say that scientific theories have efficacy in effectuating changes in the World toward a scientific ideal of perfection.
As such scientific realism is completely open in discussing all that's subject to proof. I can't imagine ways any dualism is supposed to limit scientific realism. To commit to science is to commit to scientific realism. Any limiting ideas of the scientist represents a barrier against conducting the best science, a scientist's handicap which is deeply negative, a kind of stupidity. The ideal scientist has no such barriers.
Reply to TheMadFool I’ve been watching a TV series on whales, and their level of intelligence seems pretty high to me. They appear to have quite complex language use and evidence of learned cultural norms. Not enough to compare with humans, but I think they’d hold their own against most other mammals.
I do think size is only part of the story. Computers started out with their complexity correlating with size, and then at some point this correlation seemed to reverse.
If nobody on earth thinks of the alphabet for one full minute, did the alphabet disappear for one minute?
Disappear in what way and from where? In any case the alphabet is instantiated in countless texts, bur apart from that and from people thinking and speaking in alphabetically constituted words, what kind of existence do you think it has?
Note that in this lecture Popper challenges both the monist and dualist views and proposes, instead, "a pluralist view ... a view of the universe that recognizes at least three different but interacting sub-universes": the physical world; the mental world; and the world of ideas and cultural artifacts.
I don't deny there is a mental world, or more accurately there are mental worlds, nor that there is a world of ideas and cultural artifacts. But these worlds are not hermetically sealed from, or independent of, the physical world. Actually I agree with Markus Gabriel that worlds don't really exist, and I quite like his term for these "worlds": which is 'fields of sense'.
So, in this kind of sense there is the world of fashion, the world of football, the world of advertising, and so on; there are countless worlds in this sense, and they all have a different kind of existence. The important point though, relating back to the thread from which this thread was created, that these worlds do not have a substantive existence as the physical field of sense does. This point seems to create a lot of confusion, as shown in your question, conceptualized in physical ( visual) terms, about the alphabet disappearing, which to me seems like a kind of category mistake.
The 'substantive existence' of the sensable world is in constant flux, arising and perishing from moment to moment. In the vastness of cosmic time, it is a mere shadow, a lightning flash, a bubble on a stream. That is why philosophers have sought the reality of the imperishable.
Over breakfast I found a splendid book about this. (The Google edition was the best-priced.)
Reply to Olivier5
The Popper remark about being able to change things reminds me of Cratylus 387a
"Socrates
Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing?"
The 'substantive existence' of the sensable world is in constant flux, arising and perishing from moment to moment. In the vastness of cosmic time, it is a mere shadow, a lightning flash, a bubble on a stream.
I don't see it that way at all. The substantive existence of things is obviously not changeless, but, taken as a whole, it is virtually, perhaps actually, everlasting. According to physical theory the atoms that constitute your body were formed billions of years ago in stars and are virtually indestructible.
When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle. See for instance the thread about the Phaedo. Obviously the conception of philosophy changes over time, but science itself is, or was, principally concerned with discovering the underlying universal principles and laws. That is why Stephen Hawking wrote, with his typical hubris, that science sought to 'know the mind of God' (even though he didn't believe in God). In my view, where it has come unstuck is the exclusive emphasis on empiricism, meaning that only what can be seen and measured by sense and instruments, and mathematical conjecture bound to those perceptions, is accepted as real.
[quote=Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism; https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/jm0112.htm] For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses*. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize.[/quote]
* a fact which was abundantly illustrated in the thread which this discussion split from.
Reply to Olivier5
To decide on "pluralism", I say that science lights the way in such a fashion that an Atheist physicalist can become, by science, both religious and a believer in ghosts and spirits.
See phenomenology? In a sensitive and ethical/moral way, all comes under science insofar it can be studied systematically. If science says something exists, it exists! It's not more complicated than this.
, in this kind of sense there is the world of fashion, the world of football, the world of advertising, and so on; there are countless worlds in this sense, and they all have a different kind of existence. The important point though, relating back to the thread from which this thread was created, that these worlds do not have a substantive existence as the physical field of sense does
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus).
I don't see how reasoning could be separate from sensation. Reasoning is a sensation, no? How do you know when you're reasoning and when you're not, if not by sensation?
Not only that, but what are you reasoning with, or about? What form does your reasoning take? And what is reasoning if not processing sensory information to achieve some goal?
Philosophy is ultimately a way of socializing and impressing others with the artful use of big words, hence most of the problems of philosophy are derived from the use of language in this way.
Yep. And with a healthy dollop of metaphysical reductionism applied to info processing, one decent enough answer to the thread title distills out quite nicely.
The reminds me of the story of Zhuangzi's butcher, cook Ting, whose knife never dulls because he cuts between the joints of the oxen, that is, according to the natural division of things.
When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle. See for instance the thread about the Phaedo.
My reading of the dialogue is that the Forms are hypothetical, the way Socrates arranges the world in order to make sense of it. That the world is and how it is in accord with his hypothesis is something he does not address.
My reading of the dialogue is that the Forms are hypothetical, the way Socrates arranges the world in order to make sense of it.
No, I don't think that is so. I think the forms are understood to be real, in the sense that principles are real. Where do you see principles? They can only be grasped by reason.
No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation. The most elementary steps of linguistic reasoning are not sensations. This doesn't mean that reason and sensable impressions are entirely separate. But as said previously many animals have far greater sensory abilities than humans, but they don't reason. (I know this is not a fashionable opinion.)
Reply to Olivier5 Objects of the five senses. Ideas don't have substantive existence except in their physical instantiations. This is not to say they don't possess non-physical attributes. For me this is the point of aspect dualism; from a human perspective (at least some) things possess both mental and physical attributes or aspects, but it does not follow that anything is substantial in a mental sense. To be substantial is, to my way of thinking, to be an object of the five senses and their augmentations.
No, I don't think that is so. I think the forms are understood to be real, in the sense that principles are real. Where do you see principles? They can only be grasped by reason.
I don't want to turn this into a second discussion of the Phaedo, so I will only say a couple of things. Further discussion I hope will occur in the Phaedo thread.
The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real.
So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)
I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.” (100c-e)
Socrates is unable to say what the relationship between Forms and things of that kind is. He later calls this safe answer an ignorant one (105b-c) and introduces physical causes such as fire and fever. Things that cannot be known without the senses.
When it comes to philosophy, the subject was always been seeking out the imperishable, changeless, the first principle
That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". I don't believe such a thing can ever be found in any determinate sense. It may be alluded to via art or poetry, or meditated upon; but that wouldn't constitute determinate rational knowledge. The fact that past philosophers have mistakenly taken "the imperishable, changeless, first principle" to possess substantive existence is no reason to follow them in their (understandable) error.
That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness".
It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics.
The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real.
From the analogy of the divided line:
[quote] There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).
Plato describes CD, the "lower" of these, as involving mathematical reasoning (??????? dianoia) where abstract mathematical objects such as geometric lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be confused with the drawings of those lines, which fall within the physical world BC). However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of philosophical understanding (?????? noesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):
"And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses – that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole (511b)."
So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?
It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics.
Physical objects and processes do have substantial reality, though; as they act on us in substantial ways. To my way of thinking that's all it means to say that the physical is substantive, and the so-called "massive conundrums" of theoretical physics have no bearing on that lived reality.
So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?
I think the whole thing is an image and is identified as such. I don't think we transcend opinion when it comes to matters of the just, the beautiful, and the good. I think Plato instills the opinion that they are things that can be known because otherwise some type of relativism prevails. He thinks that such truths are best kept from those who are not suited to deal with them.
No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation. The most elementary steps of linguistic reasoning are not sensations. This doesn't mean that reason and sensable impressions are entirely separate. But as said previously many animals have far greater sensory abilities than humans, but they don't reason. (I know this is not a fashionable opinion.)
But what is it like for you to add two plus two? How do you know you are adding two plus two? Do you see numbers in your head, or hear sounds, "two plus two equals four"? Again, what form does your reasoning take, and isn't your reasoning always about things?
Linguistic reasoning involves the manipulation of words or numbers, but words and numbers are visual scribbles on a page, or sounds you hear from your professor. So I don't see how any steps of linguistic reasoning does not involve the manipulation of memorized sensations.
You are asserting that animals can't reason without properly defining reason. Are animals conscious? Well, we'd need a definition of consciousness, too. Definitions, please.
Assuming you are self-conscious, you can sense what you are thinking and thus you should consider your thoughts substantive, in your way of thinking.
No, I said that what I consider to be substantive is what can be an object of the five senses. I might add to that the proprioceptive sense, and sensations and bodily feelings, but to speak of sensing thoughts is a step too far. In my own experience I directly am aware of thinking only in the act of thinking itself, which is a kind of internal speaking and listening. Most of thinking seems to be more of the internal speaking kind, absent the self-conscious listening.
Thoughts are elusive and are not determinate objects of attention as bodily sensations, sounds, smells, visual and tactile objects are. Perhaps that should not be surprising, given that we have no sense of neural processes, as we do have a sense of for example digetsive processes.So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive.
There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues.
In both traditions, the connection is different from what has been established as "scientific" since then.
So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive.
I feel differently. For me, my thoughts and sensations are a first layer of reality. Then other people and things are a second layer of reality, slightly less obvious.
No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation.
I'm not so sure. This has been bothering me for a while and I'd like to pick your brains regarding the issue of mind as a sensory organ. My reasoning is rather simple: just as the eyes sense light, just as the ears sense sound, and so on, the mind sensespatterns (numbers are patterns, ethics too, truth is all humans think about are patterns). Put simply the mind is a sensory organ like the eyes, nose, ears, tongue, and skin are; it's a pattern sensor
How different is mental info processing from that which takes place in the eyes when it sees something?
Completely different. I've been through with others, why mathematical reasoning is more than pattern recognition - for example with respect to the sequence of prime numbers. They don't form a pattern but are grasped by reasoning, by understanding the concept of 'divisible' - which is also not a pattern.
Read up on concepts of rationalism and empiricism.
I'm somehow not convinced. Pattern detection (sensing) is what the brain/mind literally does - the laws of nature (science) are patterns in the behavior of matter & energy, consequentialism is an ethical pattern (greatest happiness principle), I could go on but you get the idea.
Completely different. I've been through with others, why mathematical reasoning is more than pattern recognition - for example with respect to the sequence of prime numbers. They don't form a pattern but are grasped by reasoning, by understanding the concept of 'divisible' - which is also not a pattern.
Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself. There maybe no patterns in a list of all prime numbers and that squares perfectly what I said - our brains/minds being pattern sensors can't accept that, it's like switching off the lights for the eyes, or putting earplugs in our ears, so on. Thus prime numbers are of great interest to mathematicians, they want to uncover a pattern in it.
Reply to Wayfarer It's more of a pattern or algorithm given that, unless I am mistaken, you can program computers to generate novel prime numbers; and computers cannot understand concepts.
Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself.
— TheMadFool
That is not a pattern - it’s a concept.
A concept is a pattern. For e.g. the concept of love, I chose a hard one, is, on the whole, a positive attitude - that's a pattern of emotions/feelings that can be found in those who love. Essences, the meat and potatoes of concepts, are nothing more than patterns.
For an object the properties of which are perceived as arranged in a certain way, reason describes, e.g., the conception of a sphere. For the exact same object the properties of which are arranged in the exact same way, but perceived from a different perspective, reason constructs the conception of a circle.
Just as the pattern of the Fibonacci sequence, or of primes, can never be inferred from the conceptions of numbers alone, the conception of a circle can never be inferred from the perception of a sphere alone.
The patterns perceived are termed assertorial conceptions, in that we name the pattern determined by the object given to us, a logical inference. The patterns reason constructs of its own accord, are termed mathematical conceptions, in that we name the pattern as it is determined by us, a logical deduction.
I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise. If, in the metaphysical estimation of human cognition, the notion of synthesis is granted, then either patterns fall out of such operation logically, or, patterns are necessary for the operation to logically manifest in the first place.
There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues.
Good point. The artisans are one of only a few groups that Socrates allows knowns anything.
By this reasoning, eagles are smarter than us because they have better eyes.
Non sequitur. Nothing I said would imply that. All that needs to be borne in mind is that both vision and thought are information processing - the eyes process visual data and the brain pattern data.
I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise.
Remember the Rosetta stone? It was a breakthrough because it contained a Greek tranlation of Egyptian hyroglyphs, which up until then had defied any attempt to decipher. The Mohenjo-Daro script from pre-Vedic India remains untranslated to this day. So, what is the pattern behind Egyptian hyroglyphs? Is there one?Or behind any language, for that matter? This sentence? Language, generally? They're irregular forms. There's no pattern in the alphabet or in regular speech. Poetry uses patterns of sound to create rythmic cadence, but poetry is much more than simply patterns or pattern recognition.
Remember, the source of this particular contention was questioning the difference between reason and sensation. I am somewhat flabbergasted that this is something that has to be argued for. When I did undergraduate philosophy, one of the first subjects that was dealt with was 'rationalism versus empiricism'. At the time I found it quite hard to appreciate the distinction, but over time I realised it was fundamental in Western philosophy. But modern culture is so thoroughly (and often unknowingly) conditioned by empiricist philosophies that it can't see the forest for the trees. That is why I frequently refer to Jacques Maritain's essay, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism.
As a philosophical conception, Empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect.
Indeed. Especially if you are right that ideas do not really exist.
I didn't say that ideas don't really exist; I said that they don't have substantive existence, and that they don't exist apart from the thinking of them.
"Algorithm design refers to a method or a mathematical process for problem-solving and engineering algorithms. The design of algorithms is part of many solution theories of operation research, such as dynamic programming and divide-and-conquer. Techniques for designing and implementing algorithm designs are also called algorithm design patterns,[42] with examples including the template method pattern and the decorator pattern."
So, what is the pattern behind Egyptian hyroglyphs? Is there one?Or behind any language, for that matter? This sentence? Language, generally?
The letters themselves are patterns, the alphabetic sequential arrangement is a pattern, and unless words were arranged in recognizable patterns, comprehension of language would be impossible.
"Algorithm design refers to a method or a mathematical process for problem-solving and engineering algorithms. The design of algorithms is part of many solution theories of operation research, such as dynamic programming and divide-and-conquer. Techniques for designing and implementing algorithm designs are also called algorithm design patterns,[42] with examples including the template method pattern and the decorator pattern."
The point about pattern is repetition. Ripples in sands, banded patterns on animals, crystals form patterns. But a sentence such as this is not a pattern. The alphabet is not a pattern of characters, it could be arranged in any random sequence and still have the same basic meaning. If you say that any arrangement of anything is a pattern, then sure, at the cost of the definition being so broad as to be meaningless.
I mean, the example you have given doesn't prove your point. That there are 'examples' of algorithm design techniques that refer to patterns, doesn't show that algorithms are simply patterns as such. An algorithm is 'a process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a computer.' You can write an algorithm to generate patterns - I imagine that is computer science 101. But it doesn't prove your point.
That could be repeated indefinitely, and it is very easy to identify it as 'a pattern'. But it's also meaningless. Whereas a simple sentence, like this one, has no regular pattern of characters whatever. Sure, there are 'patterns of speech' in the metaphorical sense but as already stated, you can't infer meaning from the pattern. That is how encryption works.
(Although I might concede that this argument is part of a pattern. :roll: )
For me, philosophy begins with epistemology. Subjectivism and metaphysics are sophistry, not philosophy.
I feel that they are all important part of Philosophy. Epistemology without metaphysics would be meaningless. Objectivism doesn't exist without subjects.
I feel that they are all important part of Philosophy. Epistemology without metaphysics would be meaningless. Objectivism doesn't exist without subjects.
The subject cannot exist but in a rightful relation to objective reality. It follows from the design of DNA, to the physiology of organisms, to the behaviours of animals - that the surviving organism must exhibit rightness to reality to survive. It's why bird's build nests before they lay eggs, why organisms appear designed, and designed to fit into a complex environment. This then sets a premium on the subjects knowledge of objective reality, over even, knowledge of self revealed via contemplations upon the nature of being.
This then sets a premium on the subjects knowledge of objective reality, over even, knowledge of self revealed via contemplations upon the nature of being.
But if you didn't exist, how would it matter to you? How could you have known it, or even written that post?
I mean, the example you have given doesn't prove your point. That there are 'examples' of algorithm design techniques that refer to patterns, doesn't show that algorithms are simply patterns as such. An algorithm is 'a process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a computer.' You can write an algorithm to generate patterns - I imagine that is computer science 101. But it doesn't prove your point.
All sentences are patterns. Take that sentence and produce a different pattern. Sentences patterns all are. Or, Lla secnetnes era snrettap. Those are still close enough to be decipherable, But consider: Lasl teen scen raep teat snr; not so easy to decipher that pattern, eh?
Algorthms are sets of ordered instructions, just like sentences. The difference being that if you change the arrangement, the pattern, of the instructions the algorithm will not work at all.
(Although I might concede that this argument is part of a pattern. :roll: )
You don't seem to be able to accept that others disagree with you without imputing lack of comprehension or bad faith on their part. You need an actual argument that is cogent to attempt to refute other views or show that they are inadequate; flippant comments like the above do nothing more than make you like you are are not really interested in discussion at all.
But if you didn't exist, how would it matter to you? How would you have known it, or even written that post?
It matters to me now, while I exist - that I belong(ed) to a species with a future. I would find my existence intolerably masturbatory were there not the prospect of genetic, intellectual and economic legacy. Even while I'm likely to die before society faces the consequences of my failure to even try for a better future; in silence I'd be burdened by guilt and self loathing I need not suffer if it is true that technology applied now, could provide for a long term future. It matters that I try to exist; and that's why I wrote the post.
Did I answer your question? I'm not quite sure I understood it.
Sentences are collections of symbols ordered according to syntactical and semantic rules. Patterns have a repeating structure. Semantics, semiotics, grammatical structures, are not repeating structures. Sure, linguists and grammarians can detect patterns in language, but that still doesn't mean that sentences are patterns. Repeating a falsehood does not endow it with truth.
Patterns obviously exist and are fundamental to nature in some sense. I'm not denying that. But there's more to language and reason than can be explained in terms of pattern recognition. It is simple-minded reductionism.
Actually a couple of more examples. The sequence of natural numbers is a pattern, obviously - take each number, add one. The alphabet is not a pattern, it is arranged purely by convention. It could be completely re-ordered and it would make no difference, in that all letters would still be represented by it (and leaving aside the problem of re-organising alphabetical order all over the place.)
Second point - when some mathematicians claimed to discern a pattern of prime numbers, it made news. And why?
A clear rule determines exactly what makes a prime: it’s a whole number that can’t be exactly divided by anything except 1 and itself. But there’s no discernable pattern in the occurrence of the primes. Beyond the obvious — after the numbers 2 and 5, primes can’t be even or end in 5 — there seems to be little structure that can help to predict where the next prime will occur.
Read the article to find out why these particular researchers declared that they found 'a strange pattern' - one that other researchers don't necessarily agree exists!
And yet, anyone here will understand what the concept of prime is. And it's a concept - not a pattern.
This is where your confusion lies: some patterns have repeating structure.
The word has a wide range of uses. From the Cambridge Online Dictionary:
Pattern
noun
uk
/?pæt.?n/ us
/?pæt?.?n/
pattern noun (WAY)
B2 [ C ]
a particular way in which something is done, is organized, or happens:
The pattern of family life has been changing over recent years.
A pattern is beginning to emerge from our analysis of the accident data.
In this type of mental illness, the usual pattern is bouts of depression alternating with elation.
Many behaviour(al) patterns have been identified in the chimp colony.
More examples
Recent months have seen a pattern of tit-for-tat killings between the two sides.
It is difficult to discern any pattern in these figures.
Damage to the ozone layer has caused a change in weather patterns.
Changing patterns of agriculture are threatening the countryside.
Genetic engineers should not be allowed to play God, interfering with the basic patterns of Nature.
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
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pattern noun (ARRANGEMENT)
B1 [ C ]
any regularly repeated arrangement, especially a design made from repeated lines, shapes, or colours on a surface:
Look, the frost has made a beautiful pattern on the window.
The curtains had a floral pattern.
picture of pattern
Stefan Cristian Cioata/Moment/GettyImages
More examples
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern noun (EXAMPLE)
[ C usually singular ]
something that is used as an example, especially to copy:
The design is so good it's sure to set the pattern for many others.
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern noun (DRAWING)
B2 [ C ]
a drawing or shape used to show how to make something:
a knitting pattern
a dress pattern
Cut out all of the pieces from the paper pattern and pin them on the cloth.
These are words often used in combination with pattern.
Click on a collocation to see more examples of it.
apparent pattern
The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
basic pattern
The basic pattern is alternating odd-syllable stress, with the primary stress falling word-initially.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
behavioural pattern
In the absence of any other knowledge we should design for this behavioural pattern.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
It's not undeniable though, that's the point. I could be a figment of your imagination for all you know. From your perspective, I'm just someone passing by in a crowd unnoticed, and the wild thing is, you're the same to me - a passer by in my movie, of which I'm the star.
That so, nonetheless, it seems that like me, other people are able to establish valid knowledge of reality with a rationale, and logic independent of both our subjectively conceived and centred experiences. That shared valid understanding of reality is logically prior to our individual experience. It's the difference between statistics and anecdotes.
But there's more to language and reason than can be explained in terms of pattern recognition. It is simple-minded reductionism.
I haven't said there isn't more to language and reason; obviously there is a semantic element too, which is encoded in the arrangement or patterned order of the symbols, but which is obviously not merely the pattern, but is also the response the pattern evokes.
It's not undeniable though, that's the point. I could be a figment of your imagination for all you know. From your perspective, I'm just someone passing by in a crowd unnoticed, and the wild thing is, you're the same to me - a passer by in my movie, of which I'm the star.
If you are doubting about Existence, I think you are practicing Metaphysics.
That so, nonetheless, it seems that like me, other people are able to establish valid knowledge of reality with a rationale, and logic independent of both our subjectively conceived and centred experiences. That shared valid understanding of reality is logically prior to our individual experience. It's the difference between statistics and anecdotes.
Comments (113)
But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus).
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name?
https://www.livescience.com/60752-human-senses.html
(I would say that the relation 'is north of' depends on perspective - it pertains to the relation between those two particulars, which neither of them possess in their own right. Perspective is what an observer brings to the picture. He goes on:)
[quote=Bertrand Russell, Universals; https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm#link2HCH0009] This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.[/quote]
Thanks, but failing to see how that is germane to the attempt to explain reason in terms of sensation.
Quoting Wayfarer
*gives essay about more than five senses*
Quoting Wayfarer
:meh:
The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name.
It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.
None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist.
Quoting Olivier5
What does it fail at?
I see, now it makes sense. There's been a lot of confusion about what's at issue. In order to necessitate a separate existence (substance or property dualism), universals have to be an entity, which, according to the law of identity, has to be identical with itself. So to make the argument work (and I'm claiming it doesn't work), the concept needs to be completely identical in every way because it is an indivisible unity, an identity according to the law of identity.
Since we can identify no single self-identical unity which is 'the concept of New York', or 'the letter A', we must reject the argument. How close the myriad individual concepts are to each other is immaterial, though it helps to explain why we feel as though there might be a single universal concept.
It does apply. The letter A can be posited a philosophical entity which may or may not exist. You say there exist practical examples of As. I say there are practical examples of universals, in concepts that function as near-universal, such as (precisely) the letter A, or the number Pi.
If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be?
A's can be good enough for you, but absolutes can't be good enough?
I don't. Scientific judgements are a sub category of such inferences which can be supported in a particular way (mainly testable empirical evidence). Science is a kind of public rehersal of the process of inference we have a priori. The publicness of it enhances the process by allowing more models to compete for quality of prediction, increasing the quantity of sensory data to input, speeding up the filtering process etc.
Quoting Wayfarer
Can't really beat what @Pfhorrest, @Olivier5 and @Kenosha Kid have already posted.
Quoting Wayfarer
You're begging the question. The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition.
If you want to make a distinction between a cortex receiving a signal from a neighbouring network whose terminal dendrite is under your skin from one whose terminal dendrite is in your skull, you'll have to make the case as to why they are different. Sensory neurons are simply those with relatively long dendrites compared to their axons. Any signal derived from a sensory neuron is a sense. Often, long dendritic chains are included in the definition of 'sensory' if they replicate the activities of typical sensory neurons.
I have no idea what the philosophical implications are, but I would identify self-consciousness with the sense of introspection. We can 'sense' our own thoughts and feel our feelings and access our memories. At least some of them.
Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill.
Because, without begging the question, the definition of an A could be that it is sufficiently similar to all other As. The definition of a universal cannot be that it is just sufficiently similar to other examples. That's the definition on nominalism, the opposite of universalism.
Letters and words are symbols, they are more than just drawings that look like other drawings. They are made to be understood, to carry meaning from one mind to the next. And therefore they do need a degree of universality in order to function.
Quoting Isaac
We're going round in pointless circles as you keep conceding points and then raising them again a few posts later as if nothing had been said on the matter. I shan't continue this nonsense.
Mmmokay... If that's the sum total of nominalism, we certainly can do better.
Horse noun
\ ?h?rs \
plural horses also horse
Definition:
1a: Anything that looks sufficiently like a horse.
1b: Any other thing that may in one way or another look sufficiently like a horse.
For those wondering what "look" and "sufficiently" mean in the above definition, they denote whatever resembles "looking", and "sufficiently", respectively.
I thought you were arguing that the fact that there is one name of the city, just as there is one city, entails that the name is changeless.
I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name.
Positivism! Who'd have thought?
Quoting Isaac
The distinction between sensation and reason doesn't belong only to philosophy, it's also a matter of common sense, and you haven't addressed it at all. Even empiricists have to use reason, and reason is something for which there need be no neurobiological explanation.
Quoting Olivier5
It also requires the ability to abstract, to understand symbolic meaning, as you keep pointing out. There's a book by Chomsky and Berwick on the genetic roots of language on my must read list. https://g.co/kgs/t2stKT
Why not simply scientific realism? Science comes down to objective description no matter what that's being studied!
They are all identifiable as saying the same words: 'New York', even by one who never heard of the city. Are words embodied?
What would that be? The idea that scientific theories exist?
From a lecture Karl Popper gave on the subject:
https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/p/popper80.pdf
Also the capacity to "change one's mind", to adopt new points of view, to commit to a new idea.
Thanks for this; that old debate discussion thread was a bit of a zombie indeed.
For the title, i would like to suggest:
New York, New York: Misery of Nominalism
And of course, the thread soundtrack would be:
Do you think the name 'New York' exists apart from it's visual and auditory embodiments?
Yes, I believe the concept exists as well. Signs are meaningful, they are not just what they seem.
Yes. The point was to show that there is a difference between the name or concept of "New York" and any of its many possible materializations in print or drawing. Hence there is an degree of independence between the name and the material prints of the name.
As the article you posted indicates, this seems to apply to smells as written down on neurons as well.
You're well-read and also well-informed. How do you find the time? Frankly, my mind is blown.
Paul The Octopus made headlines for accurate predictions in the 2010 Soccer World Cup.
New Caledonian Crow
[quote=Wikipedia]This species is known for using plant material to create stick and leaf tools to capture prey hiding in cracks and crevices.[/quote]
[quote=Wikipedia]The New Caledonian crow is the only non-primate species for which there is evidence of cumulative cultural evolution in tool manufacture. That is, this species appear to have invented new tools by modifying existing ones, then passing these innovations to other individuals in the cultural group.[/quote]
No language? How'd they do that?!
[quote=Wikipedia]Meta-tool use is using one tool on another tool to achieve the objective of the task. It is generally considered to be a behaviour requiring more complex cognitive ability than the use of just a single tool. Studies show that New Caledonian crows are capable of meta-tool use, at a level rivalling the best performances seen in primates.[/quote]
Bird-brained? Go to New Caledonia!
However, it isn't all good news:
[quote=Wikipedia]New Caledonian crows have shown they are able to process information from mirrors, a cognitive ability possessed by only a small number of species. By using a mirror, wild-caught New Caledonian crows are able to find objects they cannot see with a direct line of sight. However, the crows were unable to recognise themselves in the mirror - other corvids have tested positive for this capability.[/quote]
There seems to be cognitive gap between ability to use/manufacture tools (engineers) and self-awareness (philosophers). Makes sense in a vague way - roughly speaking, engineering is about what's outside and philosophizing is about what's inside.
The question is, why aren't blue whales with their humongous brains more intelligent than humans?
So, does the concept exist apart from the instances of it being thought?
People delight in using that example to say See! Animals can reason! What makes you think humans are special!?
Try explaining the concept of prime to a crow.
Take the triangle; it is specified as a space enclosed by three conjoined lines; and anyone who is familiar with and understands that specification can visualize a triangle. But each person's visualization will be different, unless the triangle is an equilateral, and even then it seems plausible to think the visualization process would be different in each case.
To play the devil's advocate, my response would be that in corvids (crows) the basic cognitive component (logic) seems advanced enough to compare to our ancestors H. habilis (the first tools). Let a coupla million years go by and we could see corvids doing advanced math, philosophy, all the intellectual activities we engage in. Having said that, a coupla million years is a collossal, mind-boggling, amount of time - there's many a slip between the cup and the lip.
If nobody on earth thinks of the alphabet for one full minute, did the alphabet disappear for one minute?
Note that in this lecture Popper challenges both the monist and dualist views and proposes, instead, "a pluralist view ... a view of the universe that recognizes at least three different but interacting sub-universes": the physical world; the mental world; and the world of ideas and cultural artifacts.
Because it’s not about size - it’s about what you do with it...
I was thinking if a bird (the New Caledonian Crow) can manage such feats of intelligence, why not a blue whale? The size difference between a crow brain and a whale brain is so great that size should matter. Remember humans fall between the two and there's a noticeable upward trend in intelligence. Are you saying the pattern breaks down abruptly?
Don't forget we're assuming blue whales aren't as if not more intelligent as/than humans. No evidence of that as far as I know. Who knows? Blue whales might've already found the solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
I would certainly say that scientific theories exist and that the author implies description of reality by them. Of course, the theories enter the discussion of science as they are made. Time, Hypothetico-Deductive Method (HDM) and credibility of the theories will determine which theories that best describe reality, whom of the authors are the "winners". One may say that scientific theories have efficacy in effectuating changes in the World toward a scientific ideal of perfection.
As such scientific realism is completely open in discussing all that's subject to proof. I can't imagine ways any dualism is supposed to limit scientific realism. To commit to science is to commit to scientific realism. Any limiting ideas of the scientist represents a barrier against conducting the best science, a scientist's handicap which is deeply negative, a kind of stupidity. The ideal scientist has no such barriers.
Good?
I do think size is only part of the story. Computers started out with their complexity correlating with size, and then at some point this correlation seemed to reverse.
So you are a pluralist like Popper?
Disappear in what way and from where? In any case the alphabet is instantiated in countless texts, bur apart from that and from people thinking and speaking in alphabetically constituted words, what kind of existence do you think it has?
Quoting Olivier5
I don't deny there is a mental world, or more accurately there are mental worlds, nor that there is a world of ideas and cultural artifacts. But these worlds are not hermetically sealed from, or independent of, the physical world. Actually I agree with Markus Gabriel that worlds don't really exist, and I quite like his term for these "worlds": which is 'fields of sense'.
So, in this kind of sense there is the world of fashion, the world of football, the world of advertising, and so on; there are countless worlds in this sense, and they all have a different kind of existence. The important point though, relating back to the thread from which this thread was created, that these worlds do not have a substantive existence as the physical field of sense does. This point seems to create a lot of confusion, as shown in your question, conceptualized in physical ( visual) terms, about the alphabet disappearing, which to me seems like a kind of category mistake.
Over breakfast I found a splendid book about this. (The Google edition was the best-priced.)
The Popper remark about being able to change things reminds me of Cratylus 387a
"Socrates
Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing?"
Translated by Fowler
I don't see it that way at all. The substantive existence of things is obviously not changeless, but, taken as a whole, it is virtually, perhaps actually, everlasting. According to physical theory the atoms that constitute your body were formed billions of years ago in stars and are virtually indestructible.
[quote=Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism; https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/jm0112.htm] For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses*. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize.[/quote]
* a fact which was abundantly illustrated in the thread which this discussion split from.
To decide on "pluralism", I say that science lights the way in such a fashion that an Atheist physicalist can become, by science, both religious and a believer in ghosts and spirits.
See phenomenology? In a sensitive and ethical/moral way, all comes under science insofar it can be studied systematically. If science says something exists, it exists! It's not more complicated than this.
What do you mean by substantive existence?
Not sure I see the connection. Care to elaborate?
Quoting DrOlsnesLea
By definition.
I don't see how reasoning could be separate from sensation. Reasoning is a sensation, no? How do you know when you're reasoning and when you're not, if not by sensation?
Not only that, but what are you reasoning with, or about? What form does your reasoning take? And what is reasoning if not processing sensory information to achieve some goal?
Very simple. Senses are for info gathering, reasoning is for info processing.
Yep. And with a healthy dollop of metaphysical reductionism applied to info processing, one decent enough answer to the thread title distills out quite nicely.
IMNSHO the thread title is a bit lame and should be changed to: New York New York -- Misery of Nominalism
The reminds me of the story of Zhuangzi's butcher, cook Ting, whose knife never dulls because he cuts between the joints of the oxen, that is, according to the natural division of things.
My reading of the dialogue is that the Forms are hypothetical, the way Socrates arranges the world in order to make sense of it. That the world is and how it is in accord with his hypothesis is something he does not address.
......explains the dearth of commemorations of Roscellinus.
I stole this from someone here, maybe you:
Ockham's razors
No, I don't think that is so. I think the forms are understood to be real, in the sense that principles are real. Where do you see principles? They can only be grasped by reason.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No. Burning your fingers is a sensation. Two plus two is not a sensation. The most elementary steps of linguistic reasoning are not sensations. This doesn't mean that reason and sensable impressions are entirely separate. But as said previously many animals have far greater sensory abilities than humans, but they don't reason. (I know this is not a fashionable opinion.)
I don't want to turn this into a second discussion of the Phaedo, so I will only say a couple of things. Further discussion I hope will occur in the Phaedo thread.
The Forms are hypothetical entities posited as real.
Socrates is unable to say what the relationship between Forms and things of that kind is. He later calls this safe answer an ignorant one (105b-c) and introduces physical causes such as fire and fever. Things that cannot be known without the senses.
That is mistakenly seeking an idea as though it had substance; committing Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". I don't believe such a thing can ever be found in any determinate sense. It may be alluded to via art or poetry, or meditated upon; but that wouldn't constitute determinate rational knowledge. The fact that past philosophers have mistakenly taken "the imperishable, changeless, first principle" to possess substantive existence is no reason to follow them in their (understandable) error.
It would be, if I were mistaking ideas for empirical objects. I am advocating the view that ideas (in the sense I have explained) are of a different order of reality to empirical objects. I say that the world that you assume has 'substantial reality' actually doesn't possess that and that this is borne out by the massive conundrums that now exist in theoretical physics.
Quoting Fooloso4
From the analogy of the divided line:
[quote] There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).
Plato describes CD, the "lower" of these, as involving mathematical reasoning (??????? dianoia) where abstract mathematical objects such as geometric lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be confused with the drawings of those lines, which fall within the physical world BC). However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of philosophical understanding (?????? noesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):
"And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses – that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole (511b)."
So, what do you make of the division between 'lower' and 'higher'? Do you think the image of the soul ('she') 'soaring beyond' hypothesis to symbolise an account of 'opinion'?
Physical objects and processes do have substantial reality, though; as they act on us in substantial ways. To my way of thinking that's all it means to say that the physical is substantive, and the so-called "massive conundrums" of theoretical physics have no bearing on that lived reality.
I think the whole thing is an image and is identified as such. I don't think we transcend opinion when it comes to matters of the just, the beautiful, and the good. I think Plato instills the opinion that they are things that can be known because otherwise some type of relativism prevails. He thinks that such truths are best kept from those who are not suited to deal with them.
Assuming you are self-conscious, you can sense what you are thinking and thus you should consider your thoughts substantive, in your way of thinking.
What use is the brain without senses and what use are senses without a brain? What use is reasoning without anything to reason with or about?
But what is it like for you to add two plus two? How do you know you are adding two plus two? Do you see numbers in your head, or hear sounds, "two plus two equals four"? Again, what form does your reasoning take, and isn't your reasoning always about things?
Linguistic reasoning involves the manipulation of words or numbers, but words and numbers are visual scribbles on a page, or sounds you hear from your professor. So I don't see how any steps of linguistic reasoning does not involve the manipulation of memorized sensations.
You are asserting that animals can't reason without properly defining reason. Are animals conscious? Well, we'd need a definition of consciousness, too. Definitions, please.
That'd be why we have both senses and reason, no?
No, I said that what I consider to be substantive is what can be an object of the five senses. I might add to that the proprioceptive sense, and sensations and bodily feelings, but to speak of sensing thoughts is a step too far. In my own experience I directly am aware of thinking only in the act of thinking itself, which is a kind of internal speaking and listening. Most of thinking seems to be more of the internal speaking kind, absent the self-conscious listening.
Thoughts are elusive and are not determinate objects of attention as bodily sensations, sounds, smells, visual and tactile objects are. Perhaps that should not be surprising, given that we have no sense of neural processes, as we do have a sense of for example digetsive processes.So, if thoughts are not internally linguistically intoned they are like faint traces of cloud, or dimly sensed movements or visualizations; they seem to be anything but substantive.
The similarity is striking.
There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues.
In both traditions, the connection is different from what has been established as "scientific" since then.
I feel differently. For me, my thoughts and sensations are a first layer of reality. Then other people and things are a second layer of reality, slightly less obvious.
I'm not so sure. This has been bothering me for a while and I'd like to pick your brains regarding the issue of mind as a sensory organ. My reasoning is rather simple: just as the eyes sense light, just as the ears sense sound, and so on, the mind senses patterns (numbers are patterns, ethics too, truth is all humans think about are patterns). Put simply the mind is a sensory organ like the eyes, nose, ears, tongue, and skin are; it's a pattern sensor
One might object by saying,
Quoting Olivier5
How different is mental info processing from that which takes place in the eyes when it sees something? No difference, in my humble opinion.
figuratively speaking.
Quoting TheMadFool
Completely different. I've been through with others, why mathematical reasoning is more than pattern recognition - for example with respect to the sequence of prime numbers. They don't form a pattern but are grasped by reasoning, by understanding the concept of 'divisible' - which is also not a pattern.
Read up on concepts of rationalism and empiricism.
I'm somehow not convinced. Pattern detection (sensing) is what the brain/mind literally does - the laws of nature (science) are patterns in the behavior of matter & energy, consequentialism is an ethical pattern (greatest happiness principle), I could go on but you get the idea.
Quoting Wayfarer
Prime numbers are a pattern: numbers that have exactly two factors, 1 and itself. There maybe no patterns in a list of all prime numbers and that squares perfectly what I said - our brains/minds being pattern sensors can't accept that, it's like switching off the lights for the eyes, or putting earplugs in our ears, so on. Thus prime numbers are of great interest to mathematicians, they want to uncover a pattern in it.
That is not a pattern - it’s a concept.
This sentence is not a pattern.
I read a lot of people trying to ‘explain’ reason in terms of pattern recognition on Internet forums. I think it’s nonsense. Nothing further to add.
A concept is a pattern. For e.g. the concept of love, I chose a hard one, is, on the whole, a positive attitude - that's a pattern of emotions/feelings that can be found in those who love. Essences, the meat and potatoes of concepts, are nothing more than patterns.
For an object the properties of which are perceived as arranged in a certain way, reason describes, e.g., the conception of a sphere. For the exact same object the properties of which are arranged in the exact same way, but perceived from a different perspective, reason constructs the conception of a circle.
Just as the pattern of the Fibonacci sequence, or of primes, can never be inferred from the conceptions of numbers alone, the conception of a circle can never be inferred from the perception of a sphere alone.
The patterns perceived are termed assertorial conceptions, in that we name the pattern determined by the object given to us, a logical inference. The patterns reason constructs of its own accord, are termed mathematical conceptions, in that we name the pattern as it is determined by us, a logical deduction.
I don’t think it nonsense to describe reason in terms of pattern recognition, but I might be inclined to claim it is metaphysically lazy not to consider the mode from which patterns arise. If, in the metaphysical estimation of human cognition, the notion of synthesis is granted, then either patterns fall out of such operation logically, or, patterns are necessary for the operation to logically manifest in the first place.
My two rhetorical thalers-worth.......
Good point. The artisans are one of only a few groups that Socrates allows knowns anything.
By this reasoning, eagles are smarter than us because they have better eyes.
Non sequitur. Nothing I said would imply that. All that needs to be borne in mind is that both vision and thought are information processing - the eyes process visual data and the brain pattern data.
Remember the Rosetta stone? It was a breakthrough because it contained a Greek tranlation of Egyptian hyroglyphs, which up until then had defied any attempt to decipher. The Mohenjo-Daro script from pre-Vedic India remains untranslated to this day. So, what is the pattern behind Egyptian hyroglyphs? Is there one?Or behind any language, for that matter? This sentence? Language, generally? They're irregular forms. There's no pattern in the alphabet or in regular speech. Poetry uses patterns of sound to create rythmic cadence, but poetry is much more than simply patterns or pattern recognition.
Remember, the source of this particular contention was questioning the difference between reason and sensation. I am somewhat flabbergasted that this is something that has to be argued for. When I did undergraduate philosophy, one of the first subjects that was dealt with was 'rationalism versus empiricism'. At the time I found it quite hard to appreciate the distinction, but over time I realised it was fundamental in Western philosophy. But modern culture is so thoroughly (and often unknowingly) conditioned by empiricist philosophies that it can't see the forest for the trees. That is why I frequently refer to Jacques Maritain's essay, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism.
I didn't say that ideas don't really exist; I said that they don't have substantive existence, and that they don't exist apart from the thinking of them.
"Algorithm design refers to a method or a mathematical process for problem-solving and engineering algorithms. The design of algorithms is part of many solution theories of operation research, such as dynamic programming and divide-and-conquer. Techniques for designing and implementing algorithm designs are also called algorithm design patterns,[42] with examples including the template method pattern and the decorator pattern."
From here
Quoting Wayfarer
It is most certainly a specific, recognizable. arrangement of letters: a pattern.
Quoting Wayfarer
The letters themselves are patterns, the alphabetic sequential arrangement is a pattern, and unless words were arranged in recognizable patterns, comprehension of language would be impossible.
Quoting Janus
I need say no more.
The point about pattern is repetition. Ripples in sands, banded patterns on animals, crystals form patterns. But a sentence such as this is not a pattern. The alphabet is not a pattern of characters, it could be arranged in any random sequence and still have the same basic meaning. If you say that any arrangement of anything is a pattern, then sure, at the cost of the definition being so broad as to be meaningless.
abc abd abe abf abg abh
That could be repeated indefinitely, and it is very easy to identify it as 'a pattern'. But it's also meaningless. Whereas a simple sentence, like this one, has no regular pattern of characters whatever. Sure, there are 'patterns of speech' in the metaphorical sense but as already stated, you can't infer meaning from the pattern. That is how encryption works.
(Although I might concede that this argument is part of a pattern. :roll: )
I feel that they are all important part of Philosophy. Epistemology without metaphysics would be meaningless. Objectivism doesn't exist without subjects.
:up: Which is the very point that is left out most of the time.
:fire: :fire:
Yeah.....sad commentary, highlighted from the essay, “...high-powered narrowing of the human mind...”
Quoting Wayfarer
(Chuckles to self)
The subject cannot exist but in a rightful relation to objective reality. It follows from the design of DNA, to the physiology of organisms, to the behaviours of animals - that the surviving organism must exhibit rightness to reality to survive. It's why bird's build nests before they lay eggs, why organisms appear designed, and designed to fit into a complex environment. This then sets a premium on the subjects knowledge of objective reality, over even, knowledge of self revealed via contemplations upon the nature of being.
But if you didn't exist, how would it matter to you? How could you have known it, or even written that post?
All sentences are patterns. Take that sentence and produce a different pattern. Sentences patterns all are. Or, Lla secnetnes era snrettap. Those are still close enough to be decipherable, But consider:
Lasl teen scen raep teat snr; not so easy to decipher that pattern, eh?
Algorthms are sets of ordered instructions, just like sentences. The difference being that if you change the arrangement, the pattern, of the instructions the algorithm will not work at all.
You don't seem to be able to accept that others disagree with you without imputing lack of comprehension or bad faith on their part. You need an actual argument that is cogent to attempt to refute other views or show that they are inadequate; flippant comments like the above do nothing more than make you like you are are not really interested in discussion at all.
It matters to me now, while I exist - that I belong(ed) to a species with a future. I would find my existence intolerably masturbatory were there not the prospect of genetic, intellectual and economic legacy. Even while I'm likely to die before society faces the consequences of my failure to even try for a better future; in silence I'd be burdened by guilt and self loathing I need not suffer if it is true that technology applied now, could provide for a long term future. It matters that I try to exist; and that's why I wrote the post.
Did I answer your question? I'm not quite sure I understood it.
Sentences are collections of symbols ordered according to syntactical and semantic rules. Patterns have a repeating structure. Semantics, semiotics, grammatical structures, are not repeating structures. Sure, linguists and grammarians can detect patterns in language, but that still doesn't mean that sentences are patterns. Repeating a falsehood does not endow it with truth.
Patterns obviously exist and are fundamental to nature in some sense. I'm not denying that. But there's more to language and reason than can be explained in terms of pattern recognition. It is simple-minded reductionism.
Second point - when some mathematicians claimed to discern a pattern of prime numbers, it made news. And why?
Read the article to find out why these particular researchers declared that they found 'a strange pattern' - one that other researchers don't necessarily agree exists!
And yet, anyone here will understand what the concept of prime is. And it's a concept - not a pattern.
That is definitely my last word on this subject.
There is an undeniable evidence that you exist.
Quoting counterpunch
Sure. You proved subjectivism is not always sophistry.
This is where your confusion lies: some patterns have repeating structure.
The word has a wide range of uses. From the Cambridge Online Dictionary:
Pattern
noun
uk
/?pæt.?n/ us
/?pæt?.?n/
pattern noun (WAY)
B2 [ C ]
a particular way in which something is done, is organized, or happens:
The pattern of family life has been changing over recent years.
A pattern is beginning to emerge from our analysis of the accident data.
In this type of mental illness, the usual pattern is bouts of depression alternating with elation.
Many behaviour(al) patterns have been identified in the chimp colony.
More examples
Recent months have seen a pattern of tit-for-tat killings between the two sides.
It is difficult to discern any pattern in these figures.
Damage to the ozone layer has caused a change in weather patterns.
Changing patterns of agriculture are threatening the countryside.
Genetic engineers should not be allowed to play God, interfering with the basic patterns of Nature.
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
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pattern noun (ARRANGEMENT)
B1 [ C ]
any regularly repeated arrangement, especially a design made from repeated lines, shapes, or colours on a surface:
Look, the frost has made a beautiful pattern on the window.
The curtains had a floral pattern.
picture of pattern
Stefan Cristian Cioata/Moment/GettyImages
More examples
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern noun (EXAMPLE)
[ C usually singular ]
something that is used as an example, especially to copy:
The design is so good it's sure to set the pattern for many others.
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern noun (DRAWING)
B2 [ C ]
a drawing or shape used to show how to make something:
a knitting pattern
a dress pattern
Cut out all of the pieces from the paper pattern and pin them on the cloth.
ClarkandCompany/iStock/Getty Images Plus/GettyImages
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern noun (PIECE)
[ C ]
a small piece of cloth or paper taken from a usual-sized piece and used to show what it looks like:
a pattern book
Synonym
sample (SMALL AMOUNT)
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
pattern
adjective [ before noun ]
used in compounds to refer to the way in which a particular type of hair loss occurs, affecting mainly the top and front of the head:
50% of men over age 50 experience some kind of male pattern baldness.
Female-pattern hair loss, which is caused by genetic and hormonal factors, is the most common type of hair loss in women.
SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases
(Definition of pattern from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press)
pattern | American Dictionary
pattern
noun [ C ]
us
/?pæt?·?rn/
pattern noun [C] (WAY)
a particular way in which something is done or organized, or in which something happens:
Our weather pattern comes from the northwest.
A whole variety of behavior patterns affect infants.
pattern noun [C] (SHAPES)
a regular arrangement of lines, shapes, or colors:
A human fingerprint can be viewed as a geometric pattern.
A pattern is also a design or set of shapes that show how to make something:
a dress pattern
patterned
adjective us
/?pæt?·?rnd/
a rose and black patterned skirt
(Definition of pattern from the Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)
pattern | Business English
pattern
noun
uk
/?pæt?n/ us
[ C ]
a particular way in which something usually happens or is done:
a pattern of sth A pattern of sluggish consumer demand made growth targets impossibly high.
a pattern emerges A pattern is emerging of a steady reduction in costs and increased sales.
establish/fall into/follow a pattern The decision follows a pattern that has become increasingly common in the food industry.
identify/reveal/show a pattern An examination of official documents shows a pattern of construction cost overruns.
a changing/different/similar pattern changing patterns of employment
a consumption/growth/spending pattern High joblessness and changing consumption patterns will result in moderate sales.
Organizations must address the needs of workers with diverse career patterns and goals.
[ C ]
a way of doing something that other people, organizations, etc. can copy:
set the pattern for sth The talks have set the pattern for trying to solve problems within the industry.
a holding pattern
a situation where there is little activity or change, and people are not doing business, spending money, etc. because they cannot decide what to do next:
be in/go into a holding pattern Several deals went into an immediate holding pattern after the crisis.
pattern
adjective [ before noun ]
HR
uk
/?pæt?n/ us
used to describe an agreement based on similar agreements with other companies:
a pattern agreement/contract The contract was viewed by bargainers as a pattern agreement to be used in negotiations with the car company.
The traditional pattern bargaining that went on in the auto industry has gone.
pattern
verb [ T ]
uk
/?pæt?n/ us
be patterned after/on sth
to be copied from something or to be very similar to something:
The facility will employ 150 people and be patterned after the steel fastener facility in Saint Joe, Indiana.
(Definition of pattern from the Cambridge Business English Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)
Examples of pattern
pattern
Disaggregation of household results by sources of income and expenditure patterns permits a fairly detailed analysis of likely changes in poverty.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
For the arterial trunks, this is an easy matter, since the pattern of branching permits ready distinction of an aorta from a pulmonary trunk.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
More examples
These examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors.
Collocations with pattern
pattern
These are words often used in combination with pattern.
Click on a collocation to see more examples of it.
apparent pattern
The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
basic pattern
The basic pattern is alternating odd-syllable stress, with the primary stress falling word-initially.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
behavioural pattern
In the absence of any other knowledge we should design for this behavioural pattern.
From the Cambridge English Corpus
It's not undeniable though, that's the point. I could be a figment of your imagination for all you know. From your perspective, I'm just someone passing by in a crowd unnoticed, and the wild thing is, you're the same to me - a passer by in my movie, of which I'm the star.
That so, nonetheless, it seems that like me, other people are able to establish valid knowledge of reality with a rationale, and logic independent of both our subjectively conceived and centred experiences. That shared valid understanding of reality is logically prior to our individual experience. It's the difference between statistics and anecdotes.
I haven't said there isn't more to language and reason; obviously there is a semantic element too, which is encoded in the arrangement or patterned order of the symbols, but which is obviously not merely the pattern, but is also the response the pattern evokes.
All the same, no need to talk about things so flicking and impermanent.
The senses are about acquiring information from the world. Do you disagree?
If you are doubting about Existence, I think you are practicing Metaphysics.
Quoting counterpunch
Objectivism is just multiple agreed subjectivism.