Kant's Fundamental Epistemic Criterion
What fundamental epistemic criterion, if any, did Kant use to distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental characteristics of phenomenal objects? By the way, this question does not involve the noumenon, or thing-in-itself.
Comments (73)
Three hours, no bites.
What do you think......nobody knows, or nobody cares?
My brain froze when I was told I can't bring up the noumenon.
ah ok. then it couldn't be the sense-able objects ...
If there are causal explanations, then empirical.
If no causal, then transcendental ???
To put that in a more Kantian way is to say that "objects" are a result of our perception and cognition of what we encounter in experience. If you were "given" these objects as themselves, you wouldn't have to go to all the trouble of distinguishing pure reason from the practical.
Have you read any Kant?
I am not asking to be intimidating but to know how to reply.
Watch the trap.
Fundamental epistemic criteria.
Ground. What comes first, not last.
Yes, just a little introduction.
I am planning to read something more substantial.
The deep dive is to just go ahead and read The Critique of Pure Reason. It is not a three hour tour.
The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics assumes you have read that but addresses some of the general topics brought up most often in recent (the last 100 years or so) of academic discussion in response.
Will go with the CPR then. Thanks for your info and advice. Much appreciated.
A transcendental characteristic MUST be exhibited by ALL phenomenal objects with no exceptions, because the human mind, which is the original source of the transcendental characteristic, must bestow it upon all phenomenal objects in the very process of knowing them.
If a characteristic of phenomenal objects exhibits only LIMITED NECESSITY and RESTRICTED UNIVERSALITY, then that characteristic is empirical.
An empirical characteristic is exhibited by only SOME phenomenal objects, but not others. The human mind is not the source of the empirical characteristic and it does not bestow the empirical characteristic upon any phenomenal objects.
Never mind. I see now Charles has something else in mind.
I was going to guess space and time.
The mind bestows all upon the noumena, but the relationship between the mind apart from phenomena to the noumena of the world is the question Reinhold, Fitche, and the other Germans tried to work out after Kant laid the foundation down for them.
The human mind does not bestow all upon the noumena because it is impossible for the human mind to step outside of itself to see itself doing this.
Then why didn't you say so??
It sees itself bestow necessity and universality on noumena. Whether the noumena of us is the noumena of the world is the Pandora box question opened by little Kant way back then
By the way, are Plato's Forms/Ideas transcendental or empirical?
They are not empirical but are either the noumena of the world or the noumena of our minds. In either case they are transcendental
The human mind only encounters phenomenal objects and, retroactively, it ASSUMES that it contributes to them those characteristics which are necessary and strictly universal.
For example, the Idea or Form of an Elm Tree or of a Tiger has nothing absolutely necessary or strictly universal about it. As species, their existence is just as possible as their non-existence. Also, both Ideas/Forms do not apply to all phenomenal entities without exception. For this reason, they are empirical, not transcendental. They are not products of our minds.
I think you mean transcendent.
Yes the Ideas/Forms are in things and in the mind. But is that all there is or is there true matter?
What are some examples of this case?
Phenomena are “the undetermined objects of empirical intuition.” (A20/B34)
The empirical characteristics of any intuition is the matter of the object that affects sensibility, and is called sensation.
Phenomenal objects of intuition have no transcendental characteristics; they are undetermined.
“Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.” (A50/B74)
Absolute necessity and strict universality are transcendental principles contained in a priori cognitions. Undetermined objects of empirical intuition....phenomenal objects....are not a priori cognitions, therefore do not themselves exhibit these principles as characteristics.
The transcendental in phenomena, is “that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations” (A21/B35). The transcendental in phenomenon is not a characteristic of it, but merely represents the conditions under which the content and its arrangement are related.
The fundamental epistemic criterion (properly, criteria) of phenomenal objects rests in how they are treated by the human system of pure reason, therefore the criteria does not reside in the characteristics they have, but in the determining conditions by which they are known.
Kantian transcendentalism is more a methodological justification for, and less a rational characteristic of, speculative metaphysics.
Not that anybody cares..........
Excellent summary of the matter.
Thanks. Still, just because that’s how I understand it, doesn’t mean that’s how The Good Professor meant it to be understood. I wish, but I don’t know.
Space and Time, the Forms of Sensible Intuition, and the Categories of the Understanding.
I think I said "Intuition" somewhere. Would Cause qualify too? You never perceive causes via senses, but postulate them?
Stage I
Phenomenal objects, by their very definition, i.e., as phenomenal, must first be experienced in a spatio-temporal context contributed to them with necessity and strict universality by human sensibility. If a phenomenal object is not situated in this necessary and strictly universal spatio-temporal context, then it is impossible for it to be intuited by the senses; i.e., it cannot be sensed.
Stage II
The above having been accomplished, the sensed phenomenal object, in order to also be a phenomenal object known by the understanding, must undergo several syntheses accomplished by the categories of the human understanding, each of which is also necessary and strictly universal.
Cause, or Cause and Effect, is one of Kant's Categories of the Understanding. Kant asserted there were twelve such categories.
I used to think space and time was the condition for all perceptions in Kant, and cause and effect were something to do with the transcendental world. But wasn't too sure. Interesting stuff. Thanks for your confirmation.
Stage 1. Close enough. Closer examination reveals inconsistencies, but.....close enough.
Stage 2. Again, close enough. The synthesis is not done by the categories; it is done by the intellectual imagination which relates the categories to phenomena, as a reproductive judgement.
The principles of strict universality and absolute necessity refer to the general human condition, whereby every human cognitive system operates in exactly the same way. These principles do not represent characteristics of phenomena, but are only the inherent characteristics of the system by which phenomena are possible entirely a priori, given an intuitive/discursive system of knowledge.
One more incidental: universality is not a category, as is necessity, which serves as further support for the rejection of strict universality as a condition of sensed objects and thereby a transcendental characteristic, or criterion, of phenomena. Necessity, yes; universality.....ehhhhhh, not so much.
Or, better yet, I suppose, I don’t see the need for it. I mean, absolute necessity refers to the spatial-temporal context, as you call it, but what would universality refer to, that necessity hasn’t already?
Universality is talked much about by Kant's successors
Agreed. The OP, however, specifies Kantian fundamentals. People been elaborating on them ever since, to be sure.
Yes, and no. Perceived, but not by us, because our space-time intuitions prevent it. Only a non-representational, non-intuitive system might perceive things-in-themselves as such, but......how would we ever be able to tell? Dolphins might, whales, any given alien system....who knows? We wouldn’t understand them no matter what.
Very interesting. Kant truly started philosophy imo
The Platonists will certainly jump all over you up for that. Any of the pre-Socratics, too, maybe. But even they must grant that he single-handedly caused a paradigm shift in how metaphysical philosophy is done.
Kant had his intuitions and his guiding imagination. The imagination was governed by understanding the the higher power of reason/intellect. (knowledge was gained from all the above)
The successors of Kant went from Reinhold to Fitche to Schelling to Hegel to Schopenhauer. They all thought there were aspects of intellect that Kant failed to take into consideration and so they tried to build on Kant with newer, more exotic ideas. I think all their attempts are great but they do not contradict what Kant laid down. Their many pages and arguments return back to what Kant said every time
I've never thought of Platonist as Kantian but maybe they are. Does...:
Matter=phenomena
and
Ideas=noumena?
I loosely think this way but I wonder if they are an exact correlation.
And did Kant read Plato?
There is a section in CPR where Plato’s specific terminology is advocated as being taken as Plato intended. And holding the logic chair at Konisberg for years, one would suppose he was well-read in classical Greek generally.
Quoting Gregory
This is Platonic, in that phenomena are matter and form. Matter is from sensation, but form resides a priori in the mind, in contradistinction to Plato, who held that form as well as matter are both external. Kant did this in order to refute Hume, who denied a priori pure reason, and the only way to prove the possibility of it, is to move form from the external to the internal, thereby making it the sole discretion of the mind, more properly, pure reason, thus having nothing whatsoever to do with matter. That which has nothing to do with matter can have nothing to do with experience, and that which has nothing to do with experience, is a priori. But moving it was not enough; he still had to justify the move, which he did by proving that the logical ground of the science mathematics, given certain conditions, is necessarily a priori.
An idea, in Kant-speak, is “a concept formed from notions a priori and transcending the possibility of experience, that is, for which no corresponding objects can be given by sensibility" (A327/B384). From that it could be said that noumena are ideas, because noumena can be concepts formed from notions a priori. But noumena come from the concepts of understanding, whereas ideas come from the concepts of reason. There’s much more to it, but....you know....nutshell.....so to speak.
If the world is put in relation with the mind, then the result can be correctly stated by saying the mind (subjectivity) and its object are really the same. But it is also true to say they are in themselves different. These are both correct and incorrect! Paradox? Trying to express these matters perfectly is impossible in (normal) communicative language, but as Wittgenstein said about the world and self: "everything is open, nothing is hidden".
I beg to disagree. Also, in this regard, read Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Focus especially on Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's confusing use of terminology.
By definition, a phenomenal object of empirical intuition must exhibit spatio-temporal (transcendental) characteristics (be determined by the forms of human sensibility) in order for it to be both phenomenal and objective.
By definition, a non-phenomenal object of empirical intuition, does not exhibit spatio-temporal (transcendental) characteristics (is undetermined by the forms of human sensibility) and, therefore, is neither phenomenal, nor objective.
Question: Does a Platonic Idea become a phenomenal object of empirical intuition (get instantiated, as they say) only after it is determined (processed) by the spatio-temporal forms of human sensibility?
Is the noumena in our minds (subjective), outside us (objective), or both, or neither? I wonder about this a lot. "The mind as concept realizes it too is the universal, is one totality returned into itself, whose distinctions are equally this totality and the object" writes Hegel
Regarding Kant and Plato, The Critique of Judgment discusses the origin of life in the section upon Teleological judgments. There is a very interesting part where evolution is recognized as possible from an a priori standpoint but experience is said to suggest that the situation is more like the perspective established in the dialogue of Philebus, where the source of of things points more to the existence of an intelligence as part of the cause rather than whatever not having that might mean.
Yet he also says in the work that we see purpose in the world with judgment just as we follow morality with practical reason, but all the same pure reason can prove none of it
I am not sure how you are presenting that observation as a response to mine. Kant did not ask that the CPR prove what he believed as a Christian.
Or are you contesting that view?
EDIT: Wait, I should have just have expressed the first thought. Too much presumption involved with the latter.
There are two different meanings that can be given to the phrase "outside the mind" when used in the context of Kant's CPR. Let me try to explain.
The human mind can be said to create a three-dimensional space WITHIN ITSELF wherein it can project and visualize the phenomenal objects of sensible intuition. Such a space "appears" to be outside the mind, but it and the phenomenal objects it contains always remain wholly within the mind. It and its objects are transcendental, not transcendent.
The human mind also tries to conceive of a space located completely outside of itself. Such an impossible space, if it existed, and whatever existed in it, would be wholly outside the mind. It, and whatever existed in it, would be transcendent, not transcendental; the purported realm of noumena or things-in-themselves.
Kant says the “sure sign of sagacity and wisdom”, is to refrain from asking questions for which there is no rational answer. In other words, frame inquiries in such a manner as to prevent the inception of paradoxes.
That, is probably what Schopenhauer was talking about, when he said this:
“....still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid Hegel...”
(WWR, v2, App, pg8, 1818, in Haldane/Kemp, 1884)
I mean....really? A concept that realizes??? If mind as concept, what makes it so?
Schop was pretty harsh, but still......
As you wish. It’s your thread.
CJ is an even tougher read than CPR. I’m ok with the aesthetic part, probably from its ground in CPR, but don’t find much favor with the teleological.
Sorry Mww! My "I beg to disagree" was actually meant to only address Gregory's concerns about noumena. I didn't mean for you to be referenced.
All good.
For Hegel there is mind as receptive and mind as concept. At least read one of his books before you criticize, geez
Which presupposes I never have.
I didn’t criticize; Schopenhauer did.
Which book did you read? If you didn't understand it you need a commentary. I've read most of Hegel and understood it all. I could write a paragraph by paragraph commentary if I had the time. Schopenhauer attacked Hegel, Schelling, and Fitche because they had the respect of others which he lacked. Their philosophies are all the same, all additions to Kant, which is why they are all called German idealists
Pinkard’s Phenomenology of Spirit. No commentary needed, thanks.
I read that too. He has another book on Hegel too. But neither are by Hegel
It was Kant who cut us off from previous philosophy and the scholastic method. But some are not satisfied with him. Kant added ideas about morality and aesthetics to his philosophy but others have continued to add more and more, although they accept that phenomena is a totality and the transcendent is unproven
Are you saying Pinkard’s translation of Phenomenology of Spirit isn’t Hegel because it should have been translated as Phenomenology of Mind?
I thought you meant Pinkards commentary on that work. But the Phenomenology is not an easy work. I had to read it 4 times before I understood it fully, after which I could go on to Hegel's other books. People dismiss Hegel as "written mental illness" but I can vouch for him by saying that he does not contradict himself and he does make sense; he just uses a difficult style to say what he wants and not many people understand it
I’ve been fortunate enough that my understanding has served me well. I do use commentaries sometimes, to check up on it, though. Sorta like....see if my understanding still works like it used to.
I dismiss Hegel just because I disagree with him, and I guess, in all honesty, I disagree with him because somebody else beat him to being the ground by which everything else of like kind is judged. Guy’s gotta acknowledge his own prejudices, right? Otherwise he’s simply fooling himself.
I don't find much favor with the teleological part COJ either, especially where he brackets Spinoza as an error of theism rather than a challenge to his view of causality.
But maybe the enterprise does reflect upon the distinction between methodology and "speculative" metaphysics that you commented upon previously. He says things like: I can't rule this out on the basis of my previous work but opine thusly anyway.
As I understand it, according to Hegel, nature and humanity are the self-alienation of God and a dialectical process is occurring whereby, ultimately, God is able to recognize and re-integrate his alienated nature in and through the self-consciousness of humanity. Also, this entire process is logical, not temporal. It goes through what are called logical moments.
Question: Why is the divine nature alienated from itself in the first place? Perhaps, as Ludwig Feuerbach claimed, it is humanity's nature, rather than the divine nature, that is alienated from itself.
This latter insight, in a reworked form, became a basic principle of the left-wing Hegelians and, ultimately, of Marxism.
As I understand Hegel, we know about human nature epistemically by learning about God. God is not a consciousness apart from us although with Kant we can think it is. Hegel pushes us to understand human consciousness itself as deeply as possible
His point is that we are noumena and thus the Selfhood of God. But this also means we are phenomena and not the noumena of the world as matter. Understanding objectivity and subjectivity in relation to what we "construct" and what we find "read at hand" is a constant process of paradox that never reaches a completion in understanding be needs to higher intellect realizing itself as identical to the Godhead (what the Indians call Brahmin)