No. There is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat, but there is equally no reason to believe we are in base reality - the experience would feel "real" either way.
Reply to Soumadeep Ghosh I am not a brain in a vat, simply because I am self aware, therefore more than a brain. Now I could be a spirit occupying a brain in a vat, but the experiences I am being fed are still real as they are experiences processed through the brain which I occupy.
Count Timothy von IcarusJune 23, 2021 at 13:35#5555200 likes
I think the closer we get to being able to create brains in a vat in this world, the more likely it is that we actually are brains in vats.
There is also the possibility that our simulated universe differs from the "real" one (or at least the universe that is the next level up from us, since we could be a simulation in a simulation) to such a degree that whatever we are is very different from a brain in a vat. Our creators might have generated our world as an experiment to study the evolution of simulated matter that works in profoundly different ways from "real" matter, in which case, we can't extrapolate what we really are as seen by our creators.
It could explain the lack of intelligent life in our very vast "local" area. No need to explore space, a difficult proposition using anything but Von Neumann probes on absolutely massive timescales. Just get a Dyson Sphere going, plug into 2 billion years of power, and spawn a simulated universe.
Count Timothy von IcarusJune 23, 2021 at 13:38#5555220 likes
Maybe 14 billion years of history and four fundemental physical forces is a huge simplification. Our creators could be dealing with 14 trillion years of history and forty fundemental forces working similar to gravity, the strong nuclear force, etc.
Anyhow, Yaldaboath doesn't need to simulate that entire universe, he and his Archons only need to simulate your experience, and really only the self conscious parts, so perhaps only 50 bits at a time. If you assume no free will, they also have a pretty good way to keep ahead of the information required to keep the simulation up, and they can always have you go to sleep to do patch updates.
Reply to Soumadeep Ghosh
The deepest intuition of a mentally healthy person informs us that we're not attached to anything. Thus we're not brains-in-vats. IMO.
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 23, 2021 at 15:03#5555590 likes
Yes, if this were a simulation there is no way for us to know the energy available in the real world. It could be unlimited.
Even going off what we see in this world, a video game character such as in Minecraft or Grand Theft Auto would assume they are in the reality, as even the limits of the map are just part of their "reality" as the limits of the universe are ours.
There is no way for us to tell whether or not we are in base reality.
A global skeptical hypothesis is something which we have no evidence for or against. It's kind of misleading to ask whether it's known to be untrue, because it hasn't really entered into the domain of things you can know are or aren't true yet. Put simply, there's no point talking about it until you have an idea of what evidence for and against would look like.
Reply to 180 Proof If you don't live in the real world, then you have no clue how much detail is normal, easy, necessary, etc. Universe simulators with our level of detail could be a dime a dozen at the corner store. But it's equally possible that the only thing being simulated is what you're thinking about at this very second, which is pretty simple and happens to include a belief that you've existed more than a second and that you're living in a complex universe that you're believing isn't simulated (and your belief is true, in that said universe doesn't actually need to be simulated because it doesn't exist).
Spot on. This world is just too generously rich in infinite details and complexity to qualify as a simulation.
Unnecessary detail and complexity are not really indicators that this isnt a sim, a sufficiently sophisticated sim would have both those things. I think its tempting to think those are indicators of not being in a sim because it’s hard to imagine a sim that isnt flawed in these ways given the existing flawed “sims” with current technology. In principal though, I din’t think its impossible for a sim to be just as rich or richer in complexity or detail than “reality”
, I din’t think its impossible for a sim to be just as rich or richer in complexity or detail than “reality”
Ok but then, if there's no perceptible difference between a sim and reality, if the sim is just as good as reality, then whether you are a brain in a vat in a sim or a brain in a skull in reality makes no difference whatsoever. The question is moot.
Well my point was about complexity and detail not necessarily the indiscernibility between reality and a sim but yes its quite possible it makes no difference. I would say however you that it could, depending on the nature of the sim. If we have a Matrix situation then there are ways of telling the difference, and the difference between sim and reality would be whether or not the human race has been transformed into batteries by robots, that breaking free of the sims is means of survival etc, just as an example.
Also the complexity and detail could be just as rich but there could still be telltale signs of the sim, like everyone is a cartoon or some other obvious sign.
Have you seen the movie “Ready Player One”?
Reply to bert1 You're using "introspection" so loosely it's worthless, bert. I rely on a lack of grounds to doubt and, where otherwise, use hypothetico-deductions tested by observation (Popper et al).
The underlying assumption here is that if something can be imagined then it must be taken seriously as a real possibility.
We have no reason beyond perhaps entertainment value to take seriously the possibility that we are brains in a vat.
If it is possible that I am a brain in a vat then it is possible that we are all brains in a vat, including those who allegedly put our brains in vats. But then they are not really brains in vats at all.
You're using "introspection" so loosely it's worthless, bert. I rely on a lack of grounds to doubt and, where otherwise, use hypothetico-deductions tested by observation (Popper et al).
Oh, OK. If you're a BiV all you have is introspection, loosely defined or not.
Reply to bert1 There are no grounds for me to doubt that I'm not a BiV so the point's moot. The idle doubts upon which 'the BiV speculation' is raised show it's vacuous.
There are no grounds for me to doubt that I'm not a BiV so the point's moot. The idle doubts upon which 'the BiV speculation' is raised shows it's vacuous.
I don't think I'm a BiV either. But I'm not sure why. You haven't established a prima facie reason for thinking you're not.
EDIT: I agree it's somewhat idle. It's not something I seriously worry about. But it's a philosophical niggle. It's like the New Riddle of Induction. I'm totally sure the grass I'm looking at is green and not grue, but justifying that is not straightforward.
Reply to bert1 I have but, apparently, it's not good enough for you. Well, my uncontested (or unfalsified) "reasons" persuade me, which is all that matters. "Justification", btw, is not my game – I'm a freethought 'pragmatist-falsificationist-foundherentist' with respect to epistemology.
Oh yes, I know, which is why I'm not exclusively or primarily a foundherentist (as I point out in my previous post). And I append it to the end my broader epistemic position because foundherenism is inherently fallibilist and focused on beliefs more so than knowledge (i.e. explanatory theories).
As for BiV, there aren't any grounds to doubt 'I'm not a BiV' or for believing 'I am a BiV'. Feel free, however, to share such grounds one way or the other if you can, bert.
Today I got up, heard the birds singing, smelled the toast, trod on a nail. If the computers had not stimulated my brain I would not have had those experiences. I did have them, therefore the computers stimulated my brain just so.
No. There is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat, but there is equally no reason to believe we are in base reality - the experience would feel "real" either way.
That is, your answer to the question "Do you know whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat ..." is actually Yes. You do know. Right? :)
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 01, 2021 at 19:49#5598660 likes
No. There is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat, but there is equally no reason to believe we are in base reality - the experience would feel "real" either way.
— Down The Rabbit Hole
That is, your answer to the question "Do you know whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat ..." is actually Yes. You do know. Right? :)
My answer is No I don't know whether or not I'm a brain in a vat. On the basis that there is no reason to believe either way.
My answer is No I don't know whether or not I'm a brain in a vat. On the basis that there is no reason to believe either way.
If there is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat and also there is no reason to believe we are in base reality, it means you know that neither of them is true. If there is no reason to believe that I am a fool, it means I know I am not a fool. So the answer is anyway "Yes, I know".
What's the essential difference between a skull and a vat?
The brain = "us"
The skull = The vat
What's the essential difference???
:chin: :chin:
If I'm a brain in a vat, everything I perceive is an illusion generated by simply stimulating the right combination/sequence of neurons. I cannot trust my perceptions.
If I'm a brain inside a skull, my perceptions correlate with an external reality that provides the stimuli to my neurons. In other words, there's an external reality of which I become aware of through my sensory apparatus. I can trust my perceptions, relatively speaking (see vide infra)
Intriguingly, if a person is experiencing a complete all-modality sensory hallucination (sounds, sights, touch, taste, smell) then there's no difference between a brain in a skull and a brain in a vat! In both cases, the brain is being fed an illusion.
If I'm a brain in a vat, everything I perceive is an illusion generated by simply stimulating the right combination/sequence of neurons. I cannot trust my perceptions.
You can trust your perceptions to tell you something about this supposedly virtual reality in which you find yourself. Just like if you are a brain in a skull, you can trust your perceptions to tell you something about the supposedly non-virtual reality in which you find yourself. There is no real difference. A skull is essentially the same thing as a vat: a brain container.
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 02, 2021 at 12:02#5601670 likes
If there is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat and also there is no reason to believe we are in base reality, it means you know that neither of them is true. If there is no reason to believe that I am a fool, it means I know I am not a fool. So the answer is anyway "Yes, I know".
No. What's the name for someone that sees no reason to believe there is a god and no reason to believe no god exists? An agnostic. And that doesn't mean an agnostic knows that neither option is true.
As no evidence would prove one way or the other whether we are in reality or an illusion, it's reasonable to be agnostic on the question.
As to your fool analogy. Just because you, the potential fool, see no reason to believe you're a fool, it doesn't mean you know you're not a fool.
You can trust your perceptions to tell you something about this supposedly virtual reality in which you find yourself. Just like if you are a brain in a skull, you can trust your perceptions to tell you something about the supposedly non-virtual reality in which you find yourself. There is no real difference. A skull is essentially the same thing as a vat: a brain container.
There's a difference. In the brain in the vat scenario, conscious experience is no different from an all-modality hallucination. Suppose I'm a brain in a vat and the "evil genius" stimulates my eye neurons and I see an image of a house. Once the stimulation is terminated, there is no house.
If I were a brain in a skull, the image of a house can only form in my eyes if there really is a house. Looking away (terminating the eye stimuli) has no effect on the house - it still is even when my eyes aren't looking at it.
If I were a brain in a skull, the image of a house can only form in my eyes if there really is a house. Looking away (terminating the eye stimuli) has no effect on the house - it still is even when my eyes aren't looking at it.
You can dream of a house; you can imagine a house; you can see a picture of a house; so there are ways in which the image of a house can form within a brain in a skull without an actual, real house being there, outside of same skull.
Vice versa, in a well-conceived and coherent virtual reality, houses would not vanish just because you don't look at them. Otherwise, you could tell that something's not quite right. E.g. when you play a video game, villains don't disappear just because you look elsewhere. They are still able to game you over, even if you pay no attention to them.
You can dream of a house; you can imagine a house; you can see a picture of a house; so there are ways in which the image of a house can form within a brain in a skull without an actual, real house being there, outside of same skull.
Vice versa, in a well-conceived and coherent virtual reality, houses would not vanish just because you don't look at them. Otherwise, you could tell that something's not quite right. E.g. when you play a video game, villains don't disappear just because you look elsewhere. They are still able to game you over, even if you pay no attention to them.
Regarding the firsr paragraph of your post.
Yes, the brain can independently generate conscious experience. I mentioned hallucinations.
Regarding the second paragraph of your post.
Yes, a sim would be designed to give you the illusion of coherency. So, the sim would, like you said, give you the impression that a villain persists even when the villain is outside the field of your consciousness.
However, there's something terribly wrong in saying/believing a brain in a skull = brain in a vat.
It's like this. For a brain in a vat, the body, the skull is part of the sim. Thus the body, the skull, the brain you (can) see - possible with available surgical techniques & fiberoptics - is not your actual body, skull or brain!
If the brain in the skull is a brain in the vat, the body, the skull is not a sim. Your body, your skull, the brain inside it is the real McCoy!
Reply to TheMadFool Still not convinced. Your body is not, actually, the same thing as the way you perceive your body. We have this Kantian incapacity to reach reality as it is, we only see phenomena. In the world out there as theorized by physics, there are no color, only wavelengths. So what you see is NOT what there is, but a representation of it.
The images you see, they are in your head, and you know it.
This is precisely why it is so hard to get rid of the brain-in-a-vat idea: because it is basically true that we ARE brains in skulls watching algorithms, which is much the same thing as brains in vats.
Since when has a mere contingent cognition (belief) justified a certain cognition (knowledge)?
You must not interpret arguments the way you like, because it looks like you either don't really undestand them or that you avoid admitting that yours are false. And in the process, the discussion becomes a game in semantics.
So I will help you by rephrasing my argument: "If I had some reason to believe I am a fool, it would make me doubt about what I currently believe, namely that I am not a fool. Which means I could not claim that I know I am not a fool." Makes better sense?
And please, do not use terms like "contingent cognition". Plain English please. That is, "speak" in the same terms as I do.
Still not convinced. Your body is not, actually, the same thing as the way you perceive your body. We have this Kantian incapacity to reach reality as it is, we only see phenomena. In the world out there as theorized by physics, there are no color, only wavelengths. So what you see is NOT what there is, but a representation of it.
So, you wouldn't be sure about being a brain in a skull just because you look like a brain in a skull! Right? But then you claim brain in a vat = brain in a skull which implies you've seen your actual self (a real brain in a real skull). It doesn't add up.
No. What's the name for someone that sees no reason to believe there is a god and no reason to believe no god exists? An agnostic. And that doesn't mean an agnostic knows that neither option is true.
As no evidence would prove one way or the other whether we are in reality or an illusion, it's reasonable to be agnostic on the question.
As to your fool analogy. Just because you, the potential fool, see no reason to believe you're a fool, it doesn't mean you know you're not a fool.
(Re 'agnostic': I asked you please not to bring up such terms. For one thing, we may have different definitions of them, which means we couldn't discuss on same grounds. That is why I avoid them, except when they are necessary in some way. But here we can very well do without 'agnostic'! :))
Right. If I have no reason to believe that there is a god, I can't say that god doesn't exist. No evidence about something cannot lead to any kind of knowledge about that something, positive or negative in nature.
Yet, this has nothing to do with my "fool" example. (Please notice my quotation marks. Otherwise a fool example means that the example is fool (i.e., foolish, silly)! :)) Because in that case, I am talking about something I know and about which I can bring acceptable (reasonable, conventional, etc.) evidence. So, not only myself but also others would know that I am not a fool.
But then you claim brain in a vat = brain in a skull
No no no, I'm just saying there's no essential difference between the two situations.
If the sim that the BiV is fed looks exactly like some sort of reality that a BiS would possibly live in (it is coherent, rich in details, etc., as you agreed that it could be or even should be for the illusion to work), and if "they" don't wake you up from your sim, whence come the difference? You live in a sim which happens to be your reality. It is as real as any other reality will be.
If in addition there is in a BiS situation a structural, unavoidable epistemic gap between your mind's view of the world and the world itself; if you cannot really access the latter but only images of it (or any other senses' mental output/representation of it), then you DO actually live in a sim even in a BiS situation. Your mental world is a sim of the real world around you.
I believe this thing is on my right side.
I then have a reason to believe that same thing is on my left side.
It is not true that I must now doubt the thing is on my right side, although I might.
It is true I cannot say I know the thing is on my right or on my left.
Descartes 101: that which can NOT be doubted, must be true. You are saying for that which can be doubted, its negation must be true, which does not hold.
Kant 101: no belief is ever sufficient for knowledge. You have no logical authority to claim affirmative or negative knowledge when given only reasons or no reasons to believe. So in effect, under the given conditions, you are correct in saying you cannot claim to know you are not a fool, but you would be equally correct in claiming you cannot know you are.
A brain in a vat is a scenario that is, thank you for reminding me, simply an upgrade of Descartes' deus deceptor thought experiment. It's aim is global, total, and untrestrained skpeticism which, in other words, implies nothing, absolutely nothing about our perception is reliable. So, the belief the brain in a vat = the brain in the skull, insightful though it may be, is founded on perceptions (seeing our own brains in skulls) that the brain in a vat invalidates. In legal terms, you're trying to make your case with the aid of an unreliable witness. Case closed! Court adjourned!
No, I'm saying that it makes no difference from the stand point of the witness. And you are the witness, not the judge.
A brain in a vat means our senses (the witness) can't be trusted. A brain in a skull = a brain in a vat means our senses can be trusted. You do the math.
Oh sorry! Didn't read your question properly. My bad. Firstly, I could be a brain in a vat and ergo, whatever I perceive could be an illusion including the perception that I'm a brain in a skull!
I believe this thing is on my right side.
I then have a reason to believe that same thing is on my left side.
It is not true that I must now doubt the thing is on my right side, although I might.
It is true I cannot say I know the thing is on my right or on my left.
I agree with your reasoning.
But next time please add a quote of my comment so that I can know what you are referring exactly to! (As I do myself here.)
Descartes 101: that which can NOT be doubted, must be true. You are saying for that which can be doubted, its negation must be true, which does not hold.
I don't agree with "that which can NOT be doubted, must be true". First of all, it cannot be doubted by whom? So I will assume that it is me who cannot doubt it. So, if you say to me that you live in Hawaii, I cannot doubt either that you are telling the truth or you are lying. I have no evidence for either case. So, I certainly can't say that it is true!
(I don't quite understand the remaining of the quote you brought up. It looks like it is a continuation of Descartes' quote but it doesn't make much sense ...)
Kant 101: no belief is ever sufficient for knowledge. You have no logical authority to claim affirmative or negative knowledge when given only reasons or no reasons to believe. So in effect, under the given conditions, you are correct in saying you cannot claim to know you are not a fool, but you would be equally correct in claiming you cannot know you are.
1) Re "No belief is ever sufficient for knowledge": I agree.
2) Re "You have no logical authority to claim affirmative or negative knowledge when given only reasons or no reasons to believe.": OK
3) Re "So in effect, under the given conditions, you are correct in saying you cannot claim to know you are not a fool, but you would be equally correct in claiming you cannot know you are.": Again I can't connect this to Kant's quote ...
Please try to differentiate (using quotation marks, italics, etc.) a third person's quote from yours! Otherwise, you only create confusion and your thoughts seem dispersed!
if you say to me that you live in Hawaii, I cannot doubt either that you are telling the truth or you are lying. I have no evidence for either case. So, I certainly can't say that it is true!
You cannot doubt I said I live in Hawaii, so you can say it is true I said it.
You cannot doubt I am telling the truth or I am lying, so you can say it is true I am telling the truth or I am lying.
You can doubt that I live in Hawaii, so, yes, agreed, you cannot say it is true that I do. You also cannot say it is true I do not.
—————
By finding my reasoning agreeable, did it add to, or change, yours?
You cannot doubt I said I live in Hawaii, so you can say it is true I said it.
This is shifting from the content, meaning of the message to pronouncing the words of the message. I didn't say I cannot doubt that you said, pronounced those words. I said that I cannot doubt that you are telling the truth (or lying), namely that you are indeed living there. Please read my statement again. So this argument of yours is evidently irrelevant to what I said, which I believe was very simple and clear.. I don't know if this "switch" is done on purpose (e.g. as a form of avoiding my statement) or not. But the discussion from this point and on is useless for me. I hope you can see that.
Comments (72)
No. There is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat, but there is equally no reason to believe we are in base reality - the experience would feel "real" either way.
Does that mean that there is no conceivable way that I could be a brain in a vat? No.
I'm a brain in a skull in a body in a social ecosystem in a natural ecosystem in a planetary biosphere ... Too much unnecessary detail for a sim.
I mean Yes. I misread the question.
Brains can't produce consciousness, and I am conscious, so I know that I am not a physical brain-in-a-vat.
Spot on. This world is just too generously rich in infinite details and complexity to qualify as a simulation.
I think the closer we get to being able to create brains in a vat in this world, the more likely it is that we actually are brains in vats.
There is also the possibility that our simulated universe differs from the "real" one (or at least the universe that is the next level up from us, since we could be a simulation in a simulation) to such a degree that whatever we are is very different from a brain in a vat. Our creators might have generated our world as an experiment to study the evolution of simulated matter that works in profoundly different ways from "real" matter, in which case, we can't extrapolate what we really are as seen by our creators.
It could explain the lack of intelligent life in our very vast "local" area. No need to explore space, a difficult proposition using anything but Von Neumann probes on absolutely massive timescales. Just get a Dyson Sphere going, plug into 2 billion years of power, and spawn a simulated universe.
Maybe 14 billion years of history and four fundemental physical forces is a huge simplification. Our creators could be dealing with 14 trillion years of history and forty fundemental forces working similar to gravity, the strong nuclear force, etc.
Anyhow, Yaldaboath doesn't need to simulate that entire universe, he and his Archons only need to simulate your experience, and really only the self conscious parts, so perhaps only 50 bits at a time. If you assume no free will, they also have a pretty good way to keep ahead of the information required to keep the simulation up, and they can always have you go to sleep to do patch updates.
Don’t know, don’t care. I have this life or I apparently have this life. Either way, this life is mine.
The deepest intuition of a mentally healthy person informs us that we're not attached to anything. Thus we're not brains-in-vats. IMO.
Yes, if this were a simulation there is no way for us to know the energy available in the real world. It could be unlimited.
Even going off what we see in this world, a video game character such as in Minecraft or Grand Theft Auto would assume they are in the reality, as even the limits of the map are just part of their "reality" as the limits of the universe are ours.
There is no way for us to tell whether or not we are in base reality.
If you don't live in the real world, then you have no clue how much detail is normal, easy, necessary, etc. Universe simulators with our level of detail could be a dime a dozen at the corner store. But it's equally possible that the only thing being simulated is what you're thinking about at this very second, which is pretty simple and happens to include a belief that you've existed more than a second and that you're living in a complex universe that you're believing isn't simulated (and your belief is true, in that said universe doesn't actually need to be simulated because it doesn't exist).
Some brain in a vat told me I'm not, and he should know.
Yes, I know that I am not.
Quoting Olivier5
Unnecessary detail and complexity are not really indicators that this isnt a sim, a sufficiently sophisticated sim would have both those things. I think its tempting to think those are indicators of not being in a sim because it’s hard to imagine a sim that isnt flawed in these ways given the existing flawed “sims” with current technology. In principal though, I din’t think its impossible for a sim to be just as rich or richer in complexity or detail than “reality”
Who's asking?
Ok but then, if there's no perceptible difference between a sim and reality, if the sim is just as good as reality, then whether you are a brain in a vat in a sim or a brain in a skull in reality makes no difference whatsoever. The question is moot.
Well my point was about complexity and detail not necessarily the indiscernibility between reality and a sim but yes its quite possible it makes no difference. I would say however you that it could, depending on the nature of the sim. If we have a Matrix situation then there are ways of telling the difference, and the difference between sim and reality would be whether or not the human race has been transformed into batteries by robots, that breaking free of the sims is means of survival etc, just as an example.
Also the complexity and detail could be just as rich but there could still be telltale signs of the sim, like everyone is a cartoon or some other obvious sign.
Have you seen the movie “Ready Player One”?
You just think you are. Introspection is unreliable.
What is it like?
We have no reason beyond perhaps entertainment value to take seriously the possibility that we are brains in a vat.
If it is possible that I am a brain in a vat then it is possible that we are all brains in a vat, including those who allegedly put our brains in vats. But then they are not really brains in vats at all.
Oh, OK. If you're a BiV all you have is introspection, loosely defined or not.
I don't think I'm a BiV either. But I'm not sure why. You haven't established a prima facie reason for thinking you're not.
EDIT: I agree it's somewhat idle. It's not something I seriously worry about. But it's a philosophical niggle. It's like the New Riddle of Induction. I'm totally sure the grass I'm looking at is green and not grue, but justifying that is not straightforward.
Foundherentism is a theory of justification.
Oh yes, I know, which is why I'm not exclusively or primarily a foundherentist (as I point out in my previous post). And I append it to the end my broader epistemic position because foundherenism is inherently fallibilist and focused on beliefs more so than knowledge (i.e. explanatory theories).
As for BiV, there aren't any grounds to doubt 'I'm not a BiV' or for believing 'I am a BiV'. Feel free, however, to share such grounds one way or the other if you can, bert.
If this is some kind of irreducible compound, I have no idea what you mean by it.
But you explicitly said you knew you were not a BiV.
Scroll up
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
That is, your answer to the question "Do you know whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat whether or not you're a brain-in-a-vat ..." is actually Yes. You do know. Right? :)
Quoting Alkis Piskas
My answer is No I don't know whether or not I'm a brain in a vat. On the basis that there is no reason to believe either way.
If there is no reason to believe we are a brain-in-a-vat and also there is no reason to believe we are in base reality, it means you know that neither of them is true. If there is no reason to believe that I am a fool, it means I know I am not a fool. So the answer is anyway "Yes, I know".
The brain = "us"
The skull = The vat
What's the essential difference???
:chin: :chin:
If I'm a brain in a vat, everything I perceive is an illusion generated by simply stimulating the right combination/sequence of neurons. I cannot trust my perceptions.
If I'm a brain inside a skull, my perceptions correlate with an external reality that provides the stimuli to my neurons. In other words, there's an external reality of which I become aware of through my sensory apparatus. I can trust my perceptions, relatively speaking (see vide infra)
Intriguingly, if a person is experiencing a complete all-modality sensory hallucination (sounds, sights, touch, taste, smell) then there's no difference between a brain in a skull and a brain in a vat! In both cases, the brain is being fed an illusion.
You can trust your perceptions to tell you something about this supposedly virtual reality in which you find yourself. Just like if you are a brain in a skull, you can trust your perceptions to tell you something about the supposedly non-virtual reality in which you find yourself. There is no real difference. A skull is essentially the same thing as a vat: a brain container.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
No. What's the name for someone that sees no reason to believe there is a god and no reason to believe no god exists? An agnostic. And that doesn't mean an agnostic knows that neither option is true.
As no evidence would prove one way or the other whether we are in reality or an illusion, it's reasonable to be agnostic on the question.
As to your fool analogy. Just because you, the potential fool, see no reason to believe you're a fool, it doesn't mean you know you're not a fool.
There's a difference. In the brain in the vat scenario, conscious experience is no different from an all-modality hallucination. Suppose I'm a brain in a vat and the "evil genius" stimulates my eye neurons and I see an image of a house. Once the stimulation is terminated, there is no house.
If I were a brain in a skull, the image of a house can only form in my eyes if there really is a house. Looking away (terminating the eye stimuli) has no effect on the house - it still is even when my eyes aren't looking at it.
You can dream of a house; you can imagine a house; you can see a picture of a house; so there are ways in which the image of a house can form within a brain in a skull without an actual, real house being there, outside of same skull.
Vice versa, in a well-conceived and coherent virtual reality, houses would not vanish just because you don't look at them. Otherwise, you could tell that something's not quite right. E.g. when you play a video game, villains don't disappear just because you look elsewhere. They are still able to game you over, even if you pay no attention to them.
Since when has a mere contingent cognition (belief) justified a certain cognition (knowledge)?
(Sigh)
Regarding the firsr paragraph of your post.
Yes, the brain can independently generate conscious experience. I mentioned hallucinations.
Regarding the second paragraph of your post.
Yes, a sim would be designed to give you the illusion of coherency. So, the sim would, like you said, give you the impression that a villain persists even when the villain is outside the field of your consciousness.
However, there's something terribly wrong in saying/believing a brain in a skull = brain in a vat.
It's like this. For a brain in a vat, the body, the skull is part of the sim. Thus the body, the skull, the brain you (can) see - possible with available surgical techniques & fiberoptics - is not your actual body, skull or brain!
If the brain in the skull is a brain in the vat, the body, the skull is not a sim. Your body, your skull, the brain inside it is the real McCoy!
The images you see, they are in your head, and you know it.
This is precisely why it is so hard to get rid of the brain-in-a-vat idea: because it is basically true that we ARE brains in skulls watching algorithms, which is much the same thing as brains in vats.
Quoting Mww
You must not interpret arguments the way you like, because it looks like you either don't really undestand them or that you avoid admitting that yours are false. And in the process, the discussion becomes a game in semantics.
So I will help you by rephrasing my argument: "If I had some reason to believe I am a fool, it would make me doubt about what I currently believe, namely that I am not a fool. Which means I could not claim that I know I am not a fool." Makes better sense?
And please, do not use terms like "contingent cognition". Plain English please. That is, "speak" in the same terms as I do.
So, you wouldn't be sure about being a brain in a skull just because you look like a brain in a skull! Right? But then you claim brain in a vat = brain in a skull which implies you've seen your actual self (a real brain in a real skull). It doesn't add up.
(Re 'agnostic': I asked you please not to bring up such terms. For one thing, we may have different definitions of them, which means we couldn't discuss on same grounds. That is why I avoid them, except when they are necessary in some way. But here we can very well do without 'agnostic'! :))
Right. If I have no reason to believe that there is a god, I can't say that god doesn't exist. No evidence about something cannot lead to any kind of knowledge about that something, positive or negative in nature.
Yet, this has nothing to do with my "fool" example. (Please notice my quotation marks. Otherwise a fool example means that the example is fool (i.e., foolish, silly)! :)) Because in that case, I am talking about something I know and about which I can bring acceptable (reasonable, conventional, etc.) evidence. So, not only myself but also others would know that I am not a fool.
No no no, I'm just saying there's no essential difference between the two situations.
If the sim that the BiV is fed looks exactly like some sort of reality that a BiS would possibly live in (it is coherent, rich in details, etc., as you agreed that it could be or even should be for the illusion to work), and if "they" don't wake you up from your sim, whence come the difference? You live in a sim which happens to be your reality. It is as real as any other reality will be.
If in addition there is in a BiS situation a structural, unavoidable epistemic gap between your mind's view of the world and the world itself; if you cannot really access the latter but only images of it (or any other senses' mental output/representation of it), then you DO actually live in a sim even in a BiS situation. Your mental world is a sim of the real world around you.
I believe this thing is on my right side.
I then have a reason to believe that same thing is on my left side.
It is not true that I must now doubt the thing is on my right side, although I might.
It is true I cannot say I know the thing is on my right or on my left.
Descartes 101: that which can NOT be doubted, must be true. You are saying for that which can be doubted, its negation must be true, which does not hold.
Kant 101: no belief is ever sufficient for knowledge. You have no logical authority to claim affirmative or negative knowledge when given only reasons or no reasons to believe. So in effect, under the given conditions, you are correct in saying you cannot claim to know you are not a fool, but you would be equally correct in claiming you cannot know you are.
A brain in a vat is a scenario that is, thank you for reminding me, simply an upgrade of Descartes' deus deceptor thought experiment. It's aim is global, total, and untrestrained skpeticism which, in other words, implies nothing, absolutely nothing about our perception is reliable. So, the belief the brain in a vat = the brain in the skull, insightful though it may be, is founded on perceptions (seeing our own brains in skulls) that the brain in a vat invalidates. In legal terms, you're trying to make your case with the aid of an unreliable witness. Case closed! Court adjourned!
No, I'm saying that it makes no difference from the stand point of the witness. And you are the witness, not the judge.
A brain in a vat means our senses (the witness) can't be trusted. A brain in a skull = a brain in a vat means our senses can be trusted. You do the math.
I don't know. That's the point!
I agree with your reasoning.
But next time please add a quote of my comment so that I can know what you are referring exactly to! (As I do myself here.)
Quoting Mww
I don't agree with "that which can NOT be doubted, must be true". First of all, it cannot be doubted by whom? So I will assume that it is me who cannot doubt it. So, if you say to me that you live in Hawaii, I cannot doubt either that you are telling the truth or you are lying. I have no evidence for either case. So, I certainly can't say that it is true!
(I don't quite understand the remaining of the quote you brought up. It looks like it is a continuation of Descartes' quote but it doesn't make much sense ...)
Quoting Mww
1) Re "No belief is ever sufficient for knowledge": I agree.
2) Re "You have no logical authority to claim affirmative or negative knowledge when given only reasons or no reasons to believe.": OK
3) Re "So in effect, under the given conditions, you are correct in saying you cannot claim to know you are not a fool, but you would be equally correct in claiming you cannot know you are.": Again I can't connect this to Kant's quote ...
Please try to differentiate (using quotation marks, italics, etc.) a third person's quote from yours! Otherwise, you only create confusion and your thoughts seem dispersed!
I am aware of the facility of quotation marks. If I didn’t use them, I didn’t quote anybody.
Descartes/Kant 101 merely indicates a synopsis relevant to the topic.
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Quoting Alkis Piskas
You cannot doubt I said I live in Hawaii, so you can say it is true I said it.
You cannot doubt I am telling the truth or I am lying, so you can say it is true I am telling the truth or I am lying.
You can doubt that I live in Hawaii, so, yes, agreed, you cannot say it is true that I do. You also cannot say it is true I do not.
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By finding my reasoning agreeable, did it add to, or change, yours?
OK.
Quoting Mww
OK.
Quoting Mww
This is shifting from the content, meaning of the message to pronouncing the words of the message. I didn't say I cannot doubt that you said, pronounced those words. I said that I cannot doubt that you are telling the truth (or lying), namely that you are indeed living there. Please read my statement again. So this argument of yours is evidently irrelevant to what I said, which I believe was very simple and clear.. I don't know if this "switch" is done on purpose (e.g. as a form of avoiding my statement) or not. But the discussion from this point and on is useless for me. I hope you can see that.
Saw it from the beginning.
Have a good day.