Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole
I think that all the categories are applicable but moral decisions involve such a complex interplay of these. We live in social contexts in which the norms vary, but we also make moral decisions individually. There is a subjective aspect, but also objective measures, involving the use of reason.Moral choices can be extremely difficult sometimes involving balancing so many different, often conflicting variables.
1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity.
2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance).
3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us.
It can be all at once. There can be morality out of our empathy, which could be considered an objective truth of the human condition. Then there can be morality that is subjective, invented differently by different cultures, religions, and so on. And therefore much of morality becomes relative.
The hypothetical true moral system has answers for all three. It makes a synthesis of all.
Morals are subjective in the sense that they're existentially mind-dependent.
Morals are objective in the sense that they're not random (ad hoc, arbitrary, discretionary, mere matter of opinion).
So I just voted subjective. Not convinced that subjective-versus-objective is all that relevant, though.
By and large, we (humans) have two legs. Exceptions are rare, and we might explain them in some way. Does that mean "two-legged-ness" itself exists wholly and independently of all else...? Not really, at least not in any discernible way, and it's not necessary anyway. Similarly, morals can be existentially mind-dependent and shared among such minds, without existing independently thereof.
Does it make sense to speak of morals for ...
• a person torturing a rock? No (bit creepy though)
• a rock torturing a person? No
• a rock torturing another rock? No
• a person torturing another person? Yes
Which suggests that morals are of and applicable to persons, to experiencing social minds.
Reply to jorndoe good example there, but...
if morals are not objective (same for all humans in regard to all living and the planet) then murder is okey sometimes? And if and when it is okey we will not be bothered by our conscience and we would not be bothered if someone did to us what we just did to them?
1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity.
Morality is partly objective because it is inherent to religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics - and the ideological architecture of society, and so objective with respect to the individual. Historically, in a hunter gatherer state of nature, morality was intrinsic to the structural relations of the kinship tribe. Further, one can speculate that morality devolves ultimately to the causal relations between the organism and reality, likely via the pain/pleasure reward circuitry.
3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us.
Morality is subjective insofar as the individual is imbued with a moral sense; like humour or aesthetics. The moral sense precedes human reason in evolutionary history - and such it is, we know right from wrong instinctively. The moral sense is related, but not identical to a capacity for moral reason, we find expressed as religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics; wherein, morality is objectivised.
2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance).
I do not agree to the formulation of relativism suggesting that there is no right and wrong; most basically morality is a sense. We know right and wrong instinctively - and this moral sense precedes intellect in evolutionary history. The intellectual articulation of moral values - their expression by you and by me, makes them relative expressions of values. However, insofar as our expressions of values feed into things like religion, philosophy, law, politics, economics - that are means by which to establish objective values (and so allow for multi-tribal society and civilisation) relativism is resolved.
Objectively, not merely subjectively or relatively, all persons suffer. The first fact of life (Buddha, Epicurus). Thus, the consequences of a sufferer's actions either increase another person's / her own suffering or it does not (Hillel the Elder), and though each person suffers subjectively, unless deliberately isolated, persons do not suffer alone and are always surrounded by, in the company of, other suffering persons. Furthermore, each person knows that others suffer in the same ways as she does and she knows how to increase or not increase, even reduce, another's suffering as well as her own (P. Foot). Groups of suffering persons, therefore, depend on one another to act in ways that do not increase, and as often as possible reduce, suffering. This kind of grouping is eusocial: basically a truce or implicit promise each suffering person is committed to, by her mere presence and having once had been a suffering child dependent on suffering adults (Arendt), to not increase other suffering persons' suffering – and a promise, per John Searle, is an institutional fact that entails a manifest ought – and therefore is objective. Morality is objective because all suffering persons depend on one another to keep the implicit (eusocial) promise both to not harm one another and to help reduce each other's suffering whenever possible (Spinoza).
Reply to Iris0 "Physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective.
Physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective.
So that "sort of objectivity" is thus no applicable to the laws of moral? Like do not murder?
The regress of asking why things are bad eventually has to end with the honest answer "because I feel it is". For example: Q. why is undue violence a bad thing?, A. because it causes suffering, Q. why is suffering a bad thing, A. ??? - Even if that's not where the regress stops for you, it will eventually have to stop at "because I feel it is" (subjective)?
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole How is that any different from the infinite regress that comes with “is” questions? At some point you just say “it just looks like it’s that way!” Observation is subjective too.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole You conclude what you've assumed, it seems to me. If one asks "why", then only a "subjective" answer (re: intentions) will suffice – thus, age old category mistakes like asking e.g. "why does the world exist"– but objectively the "subject" is the rider and not the elephant, so to speak. "Feeling" guides but does not ground, or explain, objective morality; only human suffering and eusocialityfactually ground moral agency ... just as our bodies systemically enable-constrain our "feelings" (affective cognition).
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 21, 2021 at 21:24#5546890 likes
How is that any different from the infinite regress that comes with “is” questions? At some point you just say “it just looks like it’s that way!” Observation is subjective too.
I think there is objective foundation for non-moral beliefs. For example "X usually happens when I do Y, therefore now I am doing Y, X is likely to happen". That's an objective fact.
"The apple is likely to drop to the ground when unrestricted as it has always dropped to the ground when unrestricted before". You are justified in predicting based upon a pattern you have observed.
This is objectively true, and I don't believe you need further reasoning for the belief.
Whereas
The only ultimate explanation for why "suffering is bad" is that we feel it is.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole And the only ultimate explanation for why "observation is reality" is because it looks like it is. In both cases we're appealing to our experiences: experiences of things seeming true or false, or experiences of things seeming good or bad. The only differences is that you accept sense-experience as a valid reason to believe something or not, but you don't accept appetitive experience as a valid reason to intend something or not. What reason do you have to accept one over the other? If someone just refuses to accept that observation has any bearing on reality, what then? NB that I think there is a sound response to that kind of skepticism, but then that response also defeats moral skepticism in the same blow.
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 23, 2021 at 10:46#5554470 likes
You conclude what you've assumed, it seems to me. If one asks "why", then only a "subjective" answer (re: intentions) will suffice – thus, age old category mistakes like asking e.g. "why does the world exist"– but objectively the "subject" is the rider and not the elephant, so to speak. "Feeling" guides but does not ground, or explain, objective morality; only human suffering and eusociality factually ground moral agency ... just as our bodies systemically enable-constrain our "feelings" (affective cognition).
I think we still have the same problem if we remove the "why". If one asserts "suffering is a bad thing" they still have to have a basis for this belief.
You say "human suffering and eusociality" factually grounds moral agency. Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"?
Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"?
I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal.
Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? Matter of fact if it is religious you then get into the subjective preferences of what moral behaviour you think a god wants. A muddle of subjective choices.
BitconnectCarlosJune 23, 2021 at 11:35#5554700 likes
I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal.
Taking "human flourishing" as one's main goal is so ripe for exploitation. Dictators massacre thousands and do it in the name of human flourishing on a longer time control scale and who knows: they could be right about it! We'll never know because their visions were never "properly implemented."
The way that I approach it the purpose of morality is first and foremost to inform concrete, practical action; not to set a perfect, flawless starting point that can never be questioned or reasonably applied to concrete action.
I'm having trouble processing human flourishing. Would it mean that if I saw you with a cheeseburger I should slap it out of your hand to stop you from eating something unhealthy? Or should I just lecture you about it? Why not start there: You see a fat person eating something unhealthy.
Reply to BitconnectCarlos I agree. But we have the science of medicine based on the equally vague idea of 'promoting health' a subject that obviously looks different for everyone. It seems to work as a science.
Would it mean that if I saw you with a cheeseburger I should slap it out of your hand to stop you from eating something unhealthy?
Like anything, we need to separate out the goal from the methods of that goal's promotion. Not sure anyone would advocate this kind of vigilante interference in other's lives. But here is a more telling question - should a surgeon have the right to say 'I am not operating on anyone who is a smoker because if they can't take care of their own wellbeing why should I provide care for them?'
I tend to choose my behaviour based more on a virtue ethics position these days - morality is performative. It's loose but I can't think of anything else.
I'm having a Zen moment here. Just a second! Why do some people get excited/anxious about nothing? Any ideas? Is it because nothing is better/worse than sex/torture? Something worth pondering upon, yes/no?
Excerpt from recent thesis on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:
Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to
satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek
explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the
consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.
Morality is objective because all suffering persons depend on one another to keep the implicit (eusocial) promise both to not harm each other and to help reduce each other's suffering whenever possible (Spinoza).
But then the question here is why not antinatalism, or why don't we all embrace a suicide pact so as to end the suffering? If not either of those, then it sounds like the implicit assumption is that it's a moral good that humans continue to exist, even though that will guarantee a certain amount of suffering, even if we do our best to limit it.
In short, I don't see what the objective morality is here, other than most humans wish to continue to live. But that's just a biological imperative. We wish to continue living because evolution wired us that way, because otherwise our ancestors wouldn't have survived. Which is the problem when we tie morality to biology. What makes any evolutionary strategy moral?
1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity.
Your points for morality being all three options make a lot of sense, but the question about the objective part is if it's not independent of humans, then what argument is there that we should accept our sense of moral necessity, other than most of us just do. Say if you're arguing with a sociopath who doesn't feel that necessity, being one of the edge cases, what argument is going to convince them that they should? A utilitarian one?
What argument is going to counter the antinatilist? That most want to have children and feel that it's morally right to do so? Because biology wired us that way? Or how about an extreme environmentalist who sees humanity as plague that needs to be eradicated? Or for that matter, the opposite view that we should do whatever we want to nature, as long as humans prosper? Or to take it beyond biology, the view that Mars should be kept pristine instead of colonized, because pristine Mars has some inherent value.
The concern here is that the objectivity of a biological underpinning for morality won't settle certain moral questions, because there's no moral evolutionary reason for human morality. It's just a survival strategy. But so is parasitism, which is something humans find morally repugnant, except of course for the edge cases.
Count Timothy von IcarusJune 24, 2021 at 12:14#5560170 likes
I think you're getting at a weakness there with the anti-natalism, but not via the direct route to "why?" The issue is when. How do you scope your moral calculus of harm? Providing humanity with petroleum science in 1600 would help alleviate suffering on a massive scale, perhaps for centuries, but would also help spur on massive population growth and pollution. When the two intersect, as they are now, you now get harm on a gargantuan scale from the same actions that reduced harm.
The US had this very issue with grain donations after WWII. The US grows a massive food surplus. Donating food to nations with starving people helps reduce harm. However, it then undercuts the price of domestic agricultural products in those countries, which in turn causes poverty and retards economic growth, creating harm.
The harm principal may appear to be grounded in something objective, but any sort of attempt at utilitarian analysis to pick between mutually exclusive moral actions shows it to be grounded in a subjective perception of the estimated effects of our actions.
We don't say someone is immoral because they tried to reduce suffering and unknowingly increased it, nor do we call someone moral if they intentionally try to increase suffering, but their actions actually reduce suffering down the line. So objective suffering doesn't actually seem to have anything to do morality, only our subjective predictions on how our choices might effect future suffering. Objective suffering is another thing in itself we can never truly grasp, we can only grope around the edges, at our perceptions of probable outcomes.
Even if we leave grounding aside, you still have an issue of scope. There is no objective reason to prioritize the end of suffering today against the suffering of ten thousand years from now. However, if you take a long enough view, you could justify acts of extreme harm to others today on the premise that they would reduce harm tomorrow.
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Anyhow, I would take it in a different direction. Altruism at the species level is based on the logic of reciprocity. The rules of reciprocity can be shown using game theory. Morality can be objective in that one could define optimal strategies for reciprocity that result in maximum benefit.
Generally speaking I’m inclined to answer ‘Yes’ to all three. A more specific question might help more, or maybe this is exactly the kind of response you wanted?
Say if you're arguing with a sociopath who doesn't feel that necessity, being one of the edge cases, what argument is going to convince them that they should? A utilitarian one?
A sociopath can completely agree with the description, agree even that to that extent they are faulty, and still choose to live antisocially (i.e. to not attempt to mimic social persons) since the _reason_ for behaving socially does not impact them personally. And why should it?
Once upon a time there would have been personal repercussions for antisocial behaviour: you were known to everyone who might be impacted by that behaviour. Now it's pretty much an advantage to be antisocial; in fact for many it's a virtue. So the answer is: an unsuccessful one :)
The nearest I have to a more optimistic answer is to look at current trends. Thanks to levelling processes like democracy and the internet, social behaviour is reasserting itself: we are mostly becoming more egalitarian, more altruistic, more socially conscious. The world is telling itself to do better and is sometimes listening, nudging itself closer to what makes us distinctly human. That doesn't help in individual problems like the one you describe, but individual problems can be dealt with by individual solutions.
What argument is going to counter the antinatilist?
I've never seen a rational antinatalist argument, but does there need to be a counter-argument? The origins of our moral thinking may be universal bar accidents, but it doesn't mean it's appropriate for the world we find ourselves in. In a thread I started last year, I argued that moral problems are an artefact of having moral biology evolved in one environment but being born into a completely different one. It was an oversimplification but it caught the right sense imo. If we share an understanding of what's right but have no means to realise it, we're in an existential situation. As long as the antinatalist isn't hypocritical, it's difficult to say they're wrong on moral grounds.
The concern here is that the objectivity of a biological underpinning for morality won't settle certain moral questions, because there's no moral evolutionary reason for human morality
It's more than a concern. It seems to me a fact. If it could, there'd be no reason to augment it with anything: it would be an objective thing only.
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 24, 2021 at 17:03#5561120 likes
"The apple is likely to drop to the ground when unrestricted as it has always dropped to the ground when unrestricted before". You are justified in predicting based upon a pattern you have observed.
This is objectively true, and I don't believe you need further reasoning for the belief.
Whereas
The only ultimate explanation for why "suffering is bad" is that we feel it is.
And the only ultimate explanation for why "observation is reality" is because it looks like it is. In both cases we're appealing to our experiences: experiences of things seeming true or false, or experiences of things seeming good or bad. The only differences is that you accept sense-experience as a valid reason to believe something or not, but you don't accept appetitive experience as a valid reason to intend something or not. What reason do you have to accept one over the other? If someone just refuses to accept that observation has any bearing on reality, what then? NB that I think there is a sound response to that kind of skepticism, but then that response also defeats moral skepticism in the same blow.
I am sympathetic to the case you're making. As I said in the brain-in-a-vat thread, there is no reason to believe we are even in reality. Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact (even if only in an illusory world) that the apple is likely to fall to the ground when unrestricted - with the pattern in the sensory input the basis for the belief.
My views are already wacky enough, don't tempt me towards nihilism :lol:
But then the question here is why not antinatalism, ...
This reductio is absurd and moronic – the vast majority of us are not "wired" for suicide; almost all aspects of culture function as prophylactics against death and extinction (E. Becker). Besides, eliminating the problem does not solve the problem. Okay for individuals (I'm a conscientious antinatalist) but misses the forest for the trees as a policy. Yeah, no doubt, throughout history there have been groups who've sought to "save the village by destroying the village" but the species imperative, like that for all living things, is homeostatic: as much as possible, reduce suffering of the living without eliminating the living.
... or why don't we all embrace a suicide pact so as to end the suffering?
Same reason, I suppose, why we all don't "embrace" peace or nonviolence or altruism ...: not enough of us are "wired" for it.
My views are already wacky enough, don't tempt me towards nihilism :lol:
I'm definitely not trying to; if anything, the opposite. My point here is that you're already a moral nihilist if you think there's no objective morality, and that the same arguments against objective morality would be just as effective against objective reality... except that there is a defense against those arguments, that salvages objective reality, but in the process it also salvages objective morality, because it defends objectivity generally, not just in one particular domain.
Even your own "Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact" can work just as well for morality: you can just decide that reducing suffering for everyone just is what it means to be objectively good. That kind of defense has some obvious weaknesses in either case, but it works as well for one case as it does for the other.
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 24, 2021 at 20:15#5562300 likes
I did want to push the respondents to give the best label for morality as a whole.
For example, some people say that although the goal (wellbeing etc) is subjective, morality is best labelled as objective on the basis that our means of achieving the goal are objective. Others believe as I do that if the foundations are subjective, they, and everything stemming from them are best labelled subjective.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole Subjectively desiring chocolate cake is not itself a sufficient condition for actually – objectively – having or eating chocolate cake. :yum:
I don't see what the objective morality is here, other than most humans wish to continue to live. But that's just a biological imperative. We wish to continue living because evolution wired us that way, because otherwise our ancestors wouldn't have survived. Which is the problem when we tie morality to biology. What makes any evolutionary strategy moral?
:up: :clap:
Don't agree with anti-natalism, though. We don't choose to be born, we're born because of reasons well beyond any kind of conscious choice, and we can't decide to simply not be.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole I think it would probably help to assess biology and related terms like ‘law’ and ‘ethics’.
The underlying principle is our biological make up. For that reason it seems an error to assume subjective begets subjective and objective begets objective. Your question is more epistemic than ethic as it deals with abstract ideals in the form of ‘objectivity’ & ‘subjectivity’.
Down The Rabbit HoleJune 25, 2021 at 11:22#5564250 likes
If you ask what something is, then you are asking how it is actually instantiated in the world (ie. this is a question of empirical ethics). There is no doubt that there are people who treat it as objective, as subjective, and as relative. Now if you had asked, ought morality to be.....
All this talk about morality and, unless I have missed it, I rarely see an example of a system in practical use by anyone. Is killing a small child wrong? Discuss...
If it's murder (i.e. intentional / negligent homicide of a defenseless human being by another human being), then it's not only 'illegal' but also immoral. A moral act is, as I understand it, conduct that responds to (the prospect of) harm by preventing or avoiding it, or reduces net harm as much as one is able as described in this ethical framework.^
These constant debates on morality are interesting. They veer into the abstract and the ivory towers.
Morality is really a word for a code of conduct for self and other.
Nobody wants to be robbed or beaten against their will.
Therefore certain aspects of human desire are absolute.
So some morality is absolute.
Now whether people universally follow these rules is obviously not always. But no one disagrees that they themselves personally should be harmed against their will.
Lastly,people can agree with certain moral principles but in reality break them and lie about their motives. That's life in the real world outside of theories.
Killing, raping, and stealing are all obviously, objectively bad. People who say that it's subjective are the people that want to do those things to others.
Excerpt from recent thesis on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion:
Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to
satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek
explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the
consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.
I skimmed through your post. Sorry, I was in a hurry and what caught my eye was the word "metaphysics" and suddenly a light bulb goes off in my head - pragmatism. What difference does the answer to "Is morality - objective, subjective, or relative?" make in our moral conduct? Is the OP claiming that if morality's subjective, fae'll go on a killing spree or if morality's relative, fae'll marry an 8 year old girl? Now that I think of it, the OP is claiming that! :chin:
So your moral system starts with suppositions that empiricism is true and you can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system.
No, none of that. Making use of empirical observation does not commit one to empiricism. And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it.
Reply to Herg Your argument presupposes moral truths and so doesn't tell us whether morality is objective or subjective. Premise 1 in your first argument helps itself to appropriateness. But to say it is appropriate to have this or that feeling is to say it is right to feel it.
Reply to Herg Thanks. I don't entirely understand syllogism one. But I understand the others. I held a view very similar to this. I see your reasoning. You're essentially adding texture to some utilitarian notions.
One issue to consider (and you may have done so) is whether you take a situational or deontological view of these principles? Is it wrong to cause suffering for a greater good - eg - was taking down Hitler ok even if it involved mass violence?
I'd be interested what others would say about the soundness of the argument.
And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it.
Having good reason rests on the supposition that reason is a sound arbiter, which in itself relies upon reason and is a circular argument. Anyone using the laws of logic or logical axioms (identity; non-contradiction and excluded middle) needs to presuppose that reason is sound. I don't disagree with this, but it is located in a particular approach.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole Morality is subjective. But 'relative' is not an alternative to objective or subjective. The opposite of relative is 'absolute'. So there's whether morality is objective or subjective. And then there's a different question - is it relative or absolute. The answer to the former can help answer the latter, but they're distinct questions.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective.
If the child is expected to have a happy life, then by killing it, since happiness is a good, you're expecting to replace net good with nothing, which is a bad thing to do. OTOH, if the child is expected to have a miserable life, then you're expecting to replace net bad with nothing, which is a good thing to do. However, in practice it is very hard to be sure what the future happiness of a child will be, so this simple calculation usually can't be made.
When one can't do the proper calculation, one has to fall back on rules of thumb. A good rule of thumb is that people, even children, usually have a much better idea of whether their lives are happy or miserable than other people do, which suggests that it would be better to leave the decision whether to stay alive to the person themselves. Another good rule of thumb is that a child is not yet a properly formed human being, so it would be a good idea to let it grow up and find out how happy it was. Another good rule of thumb is that if we once allow child-killing, it could get out of hand (children can be very annoying).
I'm going to say that for all these reasons, in practice, killing a small child is almost always wrong.
But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything.
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. It just is the case that, for example, if you have a pain, you want the pain to stop. The negative value you place on the pain does not originate in your mind, it is imposed on your mind by the demands of the pain.
Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use.
Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it".
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature.
So you think the mindless natural world values things? How does that work?
I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.
And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well? This is the stuff of madness.
Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness). EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 01, 2021 at 22:25#5599110 likes
I should explain why morality is subjective.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective.
That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right.
I think @TheMadFool is concerned about where this leads us. Why is it wrong to cause suffering? If there's no articulable reason, why should a psychopath refrain from causing it if they can get away with it?
Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it".
No, it doesn't. But that isn't what I said. Please try to answer what I actually write, instead of changing it to something else and than answering that.
That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right.
Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.
I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.
I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.
So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.
Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.
Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party.
Reply to Herg What are you saying, then? IF I say that something is 'inappropriate' I am not reporting how a word is used, am I? So drop the word inappropriate and express premise 1 in an unambiguous way.
?Herg
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature.
— Herg
So you think the mindless natural world values things?
Again, I didn't say that.
I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.
True, but again, not what I said.
And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well?
And again.
This is the stuff of madness.
No, this is your collection of straw men.
Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness).
It's not ambiguous. You are begging the question against ethical naturalism. The point of the first premise is to point out that a value claim can also be a claim about natural properties. Your characterisation of that as 'ambiguous' rests entirely on your own tacit assumption that this cannot occur. But it does.
EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.
It shows that nature sometimes dictates what our values are to be.
Reply to Herg How am I begging the question against the naturalist? The naturalist identifies moral properties - such as rightness and goodness - with natural features, yes?
But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?
And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?
Here are two statements:
"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"
They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not. So they are not equivalent. Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind. So it is false.
?Herg How am I begging the question against the naturalist? The naturalist identifies moral properties - such as rightness and goodness - with natural features, yes?
Yes.
But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?
My argument explains that.
And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?
I'm not claiming that it does. You're confusing the action of valuing a thing with a thing having value.
Here are two statements:
"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"
They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not.
True.
So they are not equivalent.
True.
Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind.
False. Naturalism asserts that they are already statements of both kinds. 'We ought not to inflict pain' = 'there is an obligation not to inflict pain', and this is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Q; Why do we have anaesthetics?
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers.
You are committing the naturalistic fallacy. The word 'is' in 'Because pain is bad' is ambiguous. It could mean that pain and badness are one and the same. That would be the 'is' of identity. Or it could mean that pain 'has' badness (in the way that 'ice cream is cold' doesn't mean ice cream and coldness are identical, but that ice cream has coldness as a property).
Now, what the naturalist does is thinks "oo, pain is bad" - which is (normally) correct, if the 'is' in that sentence is the is of predication. Normally pain does indeed have badness. But then they conclude that pain 'is' bad as in 'pain and badness are one and the same. And that's to commit the naturalistic fallacy - to equivocate over the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication.
That doesn't by itself establish that pain and badness are distinct, it is just a fallacious way of arriving at a conclusion.
Are pain and badness one and the same? No, for if they were then it would be impossible for there to be pain that is not bad. Yet sometimes pain is not bad, for instance when it is deserved.
Furthermore, for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable. So, for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued. But pain could not itself 'be' the badness, because that would require that pain disvalue itself. Which is insane as pain is a mental state and is not in the business of valuing or disvaluing things.
So, anyway, you're wrong. Subjectivism is true, albeit divine subjectivism.
Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.
I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.
I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.
So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.
Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.
Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party.
When I say "feelings" I am referring to our intuitions. That our intuitions are the only basis we can have for moral beliefs, is surely a reason for labelling them subjective?
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole No, because the intuitions are 'of' morality and do not compose it. It's to confuse a vehicle of awareness with its object.
So, I can see a chair. The visual impression is in my mind. It doesn't follow that the chair is.
All states of awareness are mental. It doesn't follow that everything we are aware of is in our mind.
Morality is subjective, but that's a fallacious way of arriving at the correct conclusion.
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 03, 2021 at 20:06#5609140 likes
When I say "feelings" I am referring to our intuitions. That our intuitions are the only basis we can have for moral beliefs, is surely a reason for labelling them subjective?
No, because the intuitions are 'of' morality and do not compose it. It's to confuse a vehicle of awareness with its object.
So, I can see a chair. The visual impression is in my mind. It doesn't follow that the chair is.
All states of awareness are mental. It doesn't follow that everything we are aware of is in our mind.
Morality is subjective, but that's a fallacious way of arriving at the correct conclusion.
If our intuitions are subjective, it follows that everything stemming from them including our values are too?
In any event, our intuitions are the sole basis for us holding our values, whereas unmoral facts have a basis outside of our individual minds. I think this in itself justifies a difference in labelling.
Reply to Down The Rabbit Hole No, it doesn't follow from the fact our intuitions are subjective that morality is subjective.
My belief that I have a partner is subjective. For beliefs are mental - they exist as states of mind. Does it follow that my partner is subjective? No, obviously not.
Why not? Well, because my belief is 'about' my partner and does not constitute her.
Likewise, moral intuitions are 'about' morality and do not constitute it. After all, I cannot make xing morally right just by creating in myself the intuition that it is right.
The mistake you are making is, like I say, to conflate a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness.
I know about Napoleon from a book. It doesn't follow that Napoleon is made of paper and ink.
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 05, 2021 at 22:55#5619140 likes
I was arguing from the grounds that our intuitions are the only basis that exist for moral beliefs. In which case the moral beliefs are not based on objective facts, but subjective intuitions - and are best labelled subjective as a result.
I was arguing from the grounds that our intuitions are the only basis that exist for moral beliefs. In which case the moral beliefs are not based on objective facts, but subjective intuitions - and are best labelled subjective as a result.
That simply doesn't follow. If the only basis I have for believing in Napoleon is a book I read about Napoleon, that doesn't mean Napoleon is made of paper and ink.
Our moral intuitions are how we are aware of morality. They do not compose it.
That's why it is possible that morality doesn't exist. There's no doubt moral beliefs and intuitions exist. But that doesn't by itself entail that morality itself exists - because morality is not made of beliefs and intuitions.
Morality 'is' subjective. But you have arrived at the correct conclusion fallaciously. Note too, that the conclusion you will have arrived at is that morality is made of our individual or collective subjective states, yes?
That's obviously false: if I have the intuition that Xing is right, that does not entail that it is right, does it? Yet on your view it would. That's absurd.
SO, morality is subjective. Why? Not because our intuitions and beliefs are subjective - that's true of 'all' intuitions and beliefs, and so would make 'everything' subjective!! It is subjective because morality is made of commands and values and only a subject - an agent - can issue a command or value anything. Thus morality is made of a subject's commands and values.
Not yours though, and not mine. Why? Because it is manifest to reason that if I value something that doesn't entail that it is morally valuable, and that if I command something to be done this does not entail that it is morally right to do it.
So, morality is made of a third party's commands and values. Thus it is subjective.
Down The Rabbit HoleJuly 06, 2021 at 14:30#5621240 likes
I completely understand and agree with your reasoning for morality being subjective. Our disagreement is academic rather than practical, and I appreciate you engaging.
That simply doesn't follow. If the only basis I have for believing in Napoleon is a book I read about Napoleon, that doesn't mean Napoleon is made of paper and ink.
But it would be different if the only basis we can have, the only basis that exist for believing in Napoleon is the book you read about Napoleon. Then he would ipso facto be made only of paper and ink.
I was arguing from the grounds that our intuitions are the only basis that exist for moral beliefs.
I am thinking of a sinking ship. Although the passengers are not the ship, as the ship is their only basis they too are sinking, and there are no other ships or helicopters (basis) to save the passengers from their fate. Our ship, our intuitions, are subjective, the beliefs they support share the same fate.
That's obviously false: if I have the intuition that Xing is right, that does not entail that it is right, does it? Yet on your view it would. That's absurd.
Either it's subjectively right, or moral rights and wrongs don't exist.
That's why it is possible that morality doesn't exist. There's no doubt moral beliefs and intuitions exist. But that doesn't by itself entail that morality itself exists - because morality is not made of beliefs and intuitions.
Oh, so you're mad. Nature issues prescriptions. I see. Stones speak to you do they? What are the molecules telling you to do today?
I have on my shelves this book (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13624497-ethical-naturalism) which contains essays by thirteen present-day ethical naturalists. Twelve of them are university professors, one is a fellow. Which is more likely: that these thirteen professional philosophers are all mad, or that you don't understand ethical naturalism?
There is more to nature than stones and molecules.
?Herg
Q; Why do we have anaesthetics?
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers.
— Herg
You are committing the naturalistic fallacy. The word 'is' in 'Because pain is bad' is ambiguous. It could mean that pain and badness are one and the same. That would be the 'is' of identity. Or it could mean that pain 'has' badness (in the way that 'ice cream is cold' doesn't mean ice cream and coldness are identical, but that ice cream has coldness as a property).
Now, what the naturalist does is thinks "oo, pain is bad" - which is (normally) correct, if the 'is' in that sentence is the is of predication. Normally pain does indeed have badness. But then they conclude that pain 'is' bad as in 'pain and badness are one and the same. And that's to commit the naturalistic fallacy - to equivocate over the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication.
That doesn't by itself establish that pain and badness are distinct, it is just a fallacious way of arriving at a conclusion.
Another straw man. I don't hold that pain and badness are identical. When I said 'pain is bad', I meant that pain (or, more precisely, the unpleasantness of pain) has the property of being bad. My ethical naturalism is not founded on an equivocation over 'is', it's founded on the fact that pleasantness and unpleasantness of experience to some degree dictate our evaluations, so that the evaluations are not entirely subjective. If you read the three syllogisms I posted earlier, you will see that.
Yet sometimes pain is not bad, for instance when it is deserved.
When it is deserved, it is deserved precisely because it is bad. That's the whole point of retributive punishment - it repays bad with bad. More precisely, it repays intrinsic badness with intrinsic badness which, because it is (considered to be) deserved, is (considered to be) instrumentally good. Rehabilitative or reformatory punishment, by contrast, generally repays intrinsic bad with treatment which is both intrinsically good and (intended to be) instrumentally good.
Furthermore, for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable.
I agree with this, but it isn't very helpful. All it says is that for an object to be bad is for it to have negative value. What it doesn't say is why any object would have negative value. My theory explains this: an object has negative value if it influences us to value it negatively; unpleasantness of experience influences us to value the experience negatively; and thus an unpleasant experience has the property of badness.
So, for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued.
I disagree with this. It's inconsistent with your assertion in the previous sentence: "for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable" means that the badness consists in the object having the property of negative value, whereas "for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued" means that the badness consists in the object being valued negatively. Roughly speaking, the first is objectivist, the second subjectivist.
I have asked you who is issuing the directives constitutive of moral directives. And your answer was the insane 'nature'. So nature - mindless objective nature - issues instructions and orders?!?
And your reply to that? The utterly lame 'but, but, there are professors who defend naturalism....so it must be true".
Morality is subjective and situational. But not objective and not relative.
The reason it is subjective: We all experience morality through our own subjective lense, it just so happens, as a society, we have generally agreed upon the moral system of things.
The reason it is not objective: No morality exists inherently in nature without thinking agents who deem it so.
The reason it is not relative: The morality of things do not change. Slavery, for example, was justified at times in the past, but that doesn't mean it was moral for those times. It means they had the wrong understanding or simply justified it.
How it can be situational: Stealing, we decided, is morally unfair. But, to use one example, if someone is dying and there is a respirator in the store next to you, stealing it to save a life would be morally justified.
Comments (103)
I think that all the categories are applicable but moral decisions involve such a complex interplay of these. We live in social contexts in which the norms vary, but we also make moral decisions individually. There is a subjective aspect, but also objective measures, involving the use of reason.Moral choices can be extremely difficult sometimes involving balancing so many different, often conflicting variables.
Perhaps you should compose a list of things I might avoid saying!
Going into a bit more detail:
1. Human morality is partly objective because humans share biological traits that underlie their sense of moral necessity. It is not objective in the sense of being independent of humans, but is in the sense of being common to all humans (barring edge cases) and humanity being objectively distinguishable from non-humanity.
2. Morality is also relative insofar as much of it is also mediated by inherited socialisations which differ across time and space. Historically, those socialisations have been optimised to maximise our ability to apply our social hardware to daily living, which is why there is so much similarity between the cultures of immediate-return hunter-gatherer groups. More recently, those socialisations have evolved to counteract that innate behaviour (serfdom, slavery, individualism), and even more recently they're evolving to reassert that innate morality on a global scale (equality, diversity, tolerance).
3. Morality is subjective insofar as it is still us as individuals who inherit that biology and culture, and us ultimately that have to make moral decisions, gain experience based on those decisions and their outcomes, and grapple with moral problems specifically for us.
The hypothetical true moral system has answers for all three. It makes a synthesis of all.
Morals are objective in the sense that they're not random (ad hoc, arbitrary, discretionary, mere matter of opinion).
So I just voted subjective. Not convinced that subjective-versus-objective is all that relevant, though.
Maybe not the best examples, but, anyway, ...
:-)
if morals are not objective (same for all humans in regard to all living and the planet) then murder is okey sometimes? And if and when it is okey we will not be bothered by our conscience and we would not be bothered if someone did to us what we just did to them?
So intersubjetivo?
Morality is partly objective because it is inherent to religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics - and the ideological architecture of society, and so objective with respect to the individual. Historically, in a hunter gatherer state of nature, morality was intrinsic to the structural relations of the kinship tribe. Further, one can speculate that morality devolves ultimately to the causal relations between the organism and reality, likely via the pain/pleasure reward circuitry.
Quoting Kenosha Kid
Morality is subjective insofar as the individual is imbued with a moral sense; like humour or aesthetics. The moral sense precedes human reason in evolutionary history - and such it is, we know right from wrong instinctively. The moral sense is related, but not identical to a capacity for moral reason, we find expressed as religion, law, philosophy, politics, economics; wherein, morality is objectivised.
Quoting Kenosha Kid
I do not agree to the formulation of relativism suggesting that there is no right and wrong; most basically morality is a sense. We know right and wrong instinctively - and this moral sense precedes intellect in evolutionary history. The intellectual articulation of moral values - their expression by you and by me, makes them relative expressions of values. However, insofar as our expressions of values feed into things like religion, philosophy, law, politics, economics - that are means by which to establish objective values (and so allow for multi-tribal society and civilisation) relativism is resolved.
Are the laws of science objective or subjective ...
So that "sort of objectivity" is thus no applicable to the laws of moral? Like do not murder?
Objective-as-in-universal
as in not
subjective-as-in-relative
but also
subjective-as-in-phenomenal
as in not
objective-as-in-transcendent.
For morality just as for reality.
The regress of asking why things are bad eventually has to end with the honest answer "because I feel it is". For example: Q. why is undue violence a bad thing?, A. because it causes suffering, Q. why is suffering a bad thing, A. ??? - Even if that's not where the regress stops for you, it will eventually have to stop at "because I feel it is" (subjective)?
Quoting Pfhorrest
I think there is objective foundation for non-moral beliefs. For example "X usually happens when I do Y, therefore now I am doing Y, X is likely to happen". That's an objective fact.
So you believe that:
It is the case that X
because
It is the case that Y
and
It is the case that if Y then X
Why do you believe those latter two things? (Infinite regress incoming...)
And how is this any different than if I believe that:
It ought to be the case that A
because
It ought to be the case that B
and
It ought to be the case that if B then A
?
"The apple is likely to drop to the ground when unrestricted as it has always dropped to the ground when unrestricted before". You are justified in predicting based upon a pattern you have observed.
This is objectively true, and I don't believe you need further reasoning for the belief.
Whereas
The only ultimate explanation for why "suffering is bad" is that we feel it is.
Quoting 180 Proof
I think we still have the same problem if we remove the "why". If one asserts "suffering is a bad thing" they still have to have a basis for this belief.
You say "human suffering and eusociality" factually grounds moral agency. Is there a way to articulate this position to support your belief (I presume you hold) that "suffering is a bad thing"?
I can't speak for 180 Proof but many models of morality start with a supposition - e.g., that human flourishing should be the goal. This is not objective but objective standards can be built relative to this goal.
Is there a moral system that doesn't start with a supposition - whether it be religious or secular? Matter of fact if it is religious you then get into the subjective preferences of what moral behaviour you think a god wants. A muddle of subjective choices.
Taking "human flourishing" as one's main goal is so ripe for exploitation. Dictators massacre thousands and do it in the name of human flourishing on a longer time control scale and who knows: they could be right about it! We'll never know because their visions were never "properly implemented."
Quoting Tom Storm
Nope, and if someone does then beware.
Look at the poll results. :point: Wisdom Of The Crowd.
Wisdom Of The Crowd from our previous discussion in the The Twilight Of Reason thread.
I agree. But for me all humans can do is set goals. The fact that goals can be hijacked is always a risk.
The way that I approach it the purpose of morality is first and foremost to inform concrete, practical action; not to set a perfect, flawless starting point that can never be questioned or reasonably applied to concrete action.
I'm having trouble processing human flourishing. Would it mean that if I saw you with a cheeseburger I should slap it out of your hand to stop you from eating something unhealthy? Or should I just lecture you about it? Why not start there: You see a fat person eating something unhealthy.
Quoting BitconnectCarlos
Like anything, we need to separate out the goal from the methods of that goal's promotion. Not sure anyone would advocate this kind of vigilante interference in other's lives. But here is a more telling question - should a surgeon have the right to say 'I am not operating on anyone who is a smoker because if they can't take care of their own wellbeing why should I provide care for them?'
I tend to choose my behaviour based more on a virtue ethics position these days - morality is performative. It's loose but I can't think of anything else.
Who wants to be a millionaire?
Lifelines:
1. 50:50 (Fifty-Fifty)
2. Ask a friend
3. Ask the audience OR Wisdom of the crowd OR POLL: Is morality - objective, subjective, or relative? :point: Look at the poll results and what you said,
Quoting 180 Proof
They match - the % of people who believe morality is objective is highest (comparatively).
Gives me goosebumps but that's probably just me getting all excited for nothing!
:sad: but hey, nothing is better than sex! :lol:
I'm having a Zen moment here. Just a second! Why do some people get excited/anxious about nothing? Any ideas? Is it because nothing is better/worse than sex/torture? Something worth pondering upon, yes/no?
Matchless wit!
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1282&context=philosophy_theses
But then the question here is why not antinatalism, or why don't we all embrace a suicide pact so as to end the suffering? If not either of those, then it sounds like the implicit assumption is that it's a moral good that humans continue to exist, even though that will guarantee a certain amount of suffering, even if we do our best to limit it.
In short, I don't see what the objective morality is here, other than most humans wish to continue to live. But that's just a biological imperative. We wish to continue living because evolution wired us that way, because otherwise our ancestors wouldn't have survived. Which is the problem when we tie morality to biology. What makes any evolutionary strategy moral?
Your points for morality being all three options make a lot of sense, but the question about the objective part is if it's not independent of humans, then what argument is there that we should accept our sense of moral necessity, other than most of us just do. Say if you're arguing with a sociopath who doesn't feel that necessity, being one of the edge cases, what argument is going to convince them that they should? A utilitarian one?
What argument is going to counter the antinatilist? That most want to have children and feel that it's morally right to do so? Because biology wired us that way? Or how about an extreme environmentalist who sees humanity as plague that needs to be eradicated? Or for that matter, the opposite view that we should do whatever we want to nature, as long as humans prosper? Or to take it beyond biology, the view that Mars should be kept pristine instead of colonized, because pristine Mars has some inherent value.
The concern here is that the objectivity of a biological underpinning for morality won't settle certain moral questions, because there's no moral evolutionary reason for human morality. It's just a survival strategy. But so is parasitism, which is something humans find morally repugnant, except of course for the edge cases.
I think you're getting at a weakness there with the anti-natalism, but not via the direct route to "why?" The issue is when. How do you scope your moral calculus of harm? Providing humanity with petroleum science in 1600 would help alleviate suffering on a massive scale, perhaps for centuries, but would also help spur on massive population growth and pollution. When the two intersect, as they are now, you now get harm on a gargantuan scale from the same actions that reduced harm.
The US had this very issue with grain donations after WWII. The US grows a massive food surplus. Donating food to nations with starving people helps reduce harm. However, it then undercuts the price of domestic agricultural products in those countries, which in turn causes poverty and retards economic growth, creating harm.
The harm principal may appear to be grounded in something objective, but any sort of attempt at utilitarian analysis to pick between mutually exclusive moral actions shows it to be grounded in a subjective perception of the estimated effects of our actions.
We don't say someone is immoral because they tried to reduce suffering and unknowingly increased it, nor do we call someone moral if they intentionally try to increase suffering, but their actions actually reduce suffering down the line. So objective suffering doesn't actually seem to have anything to do morality, only our subjective predictions on how our choices might effect future suffering. Objective suffering is another thing in itself we can never truly grasp, we can only grope around the edges, at our perceptions of probable outcomes.
Even if we leave grounding aside, you still have an issue of scope. There is no objective reason to prioritize the end of suffering today against the suffering of ten thousand years from now. However, if you take a long enough view, you could justify acts of extreme harm to others today on the premise that they would reduce harm tomorrow.
------
Anyhow, I would take it in a different direction. Altruism at the species level is based on the logic of reciprocity. The rules of reciprocity can be shown using game theory. Morality can be objective in that one could define optimal strategies for reciprocity that result in maximum benefit.
Generally speaking I’m inclined to answer ‘Yes’ to all three. A more specific question might help more, or maybe this is exactly the kind of response you wanted?
A sociopath can completely agree with the description, agree even that to that extent they are faulty, and still choose to live antisocially (i.e. to not attempt to mimic social persons) since the _reason_ for behaving socially does not impact them personally. And why should it?
Once upon a time there would have been personal repercussions for antisocial behaviour: you were known to everyone who might be impacted by that behaviour. Now it's pretty much an advantage to be antisocial; in fact for many it's a virtue. So the answer is: an unsuccessful one :)
The nearest I have to a more optimistic answer is to look at current trends. Thanks to levelling processes like democracy and the internet, social behaviour is reasserting itself: we are mostly becoming more egalitarian, more altruistic, more socially conscious. The world is telling itself to do better and is sometimes listening, nudging itself closer to what makes us distinctly human. That doesn't help in individual problems like the one you describe, but individual problems can be dealt with by individual solutions.
Quoting Marchesk
I've never seen a rational antinatalist argument, but does there need to be a counter-argument? The origins of our moral thinking may be universal bar accidents, but it doesn't mean it's appropriate for the world we find ourselves in. In a thread I started last year, I argued that moral problems are an artefact of having moral biology evolved in one environment but being born into a completely different one. It was an oversimplification but it caught the right sense imo. If we share an understanding of what's right but have no means to realise it, we're in an existential situation. As long as the antinatalist isn't hypocritical, it's difficult to say they're wrong on moral grounds.
Quoting Marchesk
It's more than a concern. It seems to me a fact. If it could, there'd be no reason to augment it with anything: it would be an objective thing only.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
Quoting Pfhorrest
I am sympathetic to the case you're making. As I said in the brain-in-a-vat thread, there is no reason to believe we are even in reality. Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact (even if only in an illusory world) that the apple is likely to fall to the ground when unrestricted - with the pattern in the sensory input the basis for the belief.
My views are already wacky enough, don't tempt me towards nihilism :lol:
This reductio is absurd and moronic – the vast majority of us are not "wired" for suicide; almost all aspects of culture function as prophylactics against death and extinction (E. Becker). Besides, eliminating the problem does not solve the problem. Okay for individuals (I'm a conscientious antinatalist) but misses the forest for the trees as a policy. Yeah, no doubt, throughout history there have been groups who've sought to "save the village by destroying the village" but the species imperative, like that for all living things, is homeostatic: as much as possible, reduce suffering of the living without eliminating the living.
Same reason, I suppose, why we all don't "embrace" peace or nonviolence or altruism ...: not enough of us are "wired" for it.
I'm definitely not trying to; if anything, the opposite. My point here is that you're already a moral nihilist if you think there's no objective morality, and that the same arguments against objective morality would be just as effective against objective reality... except that there is a defense against those arguments, that salvages objective reality, but in the process it also salvages objective morality, because it defends objectivity generally, not just in one particular domain.
Even your own "Nonetheless I think it is best labelled as objective fact" can work just as well for morality: you can just decide that reducing suffering for everyone just is what it means to be objectively good. That kind of defense has some obvious weaknesses in either case, but it works as well for one case as it does for the other.
I did want to push the respondents to give the best label for morality as a whole.
For example, some people say that although the goal (wellbeing etc) is subjective, morality is best labelled as objective on the basis that our means of achieving the goal are objective. Others believe as I do that if the foundations are subjective, they, and everything stemming from them are best labelled subjective.
:up: :clap:
Don't agree with anti-natalism, though. We don't choose to be born, we're born because of reasons well beyond any kind of conscious choice, and we can't decide to simply not be.
The underlying principle is our biological make up. For that reason it seems an error to assume subjective begets subjective and objective begets objective. Your question is more epistemic than ethic as it deals with abstract ideals in the form of ‘objectivity’ & ‘subjectivity’.
I did predict that most respondents would vote morality is not objective, but I am surprised the majority of those voted it is relative.
EDIT: Subjective and Relative votes are equal now. I'm still surprised so many voted relative.
If you ask what something is, then you are asking how it is actually instantiated in the world (ie. this is a question of empirical ethics). There is no doubt that there are people who treat it as objective, as subjective, and as relative. Now if you had asked, ought morality to be.....
My moral system starts with two things: an empirical observation, and a thesis about the meaning of words. So yes, there is.
I'll explain my moral system to you if you like, but you won't agree with it. No-one ever does.
So your moral system starts with suppositions that empiricism is true and you can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system.
Can you do it in a few dot points? I'm interested.
If it's murder (i.e. intentional / negligent homicide of a defenseless human being by another human being), then it's not only 'illegal' but also immoral. A moral act is, as I understand it, conduct that responds to (the prospect of) harm by preventing or avoiding it, or reduces net harm as much as one is able as described in this ethical framework.^
(continued here)^
^For further elaboration scroll down each respective thread for my follow-up posts.
Morality is really a word for a code of conduct for self and other.
Nobody wants to be robbed or beaten against their will.
Therefore certain aspects of human desire are absolute.
So some morality is absolute.
Now whether people universally follow these rules is obviously not always. But no one disagrees that they themselves personally should be harmed against their will.
Lastly,people can agree with certain moral principles but in reality break them and lie about their motives. That's life in the real world outside of theories.
I skimmed through your post. Sorry, I was in a hurry and what caught my eye was the word "metaphysics" and suddenly a light bulb goes off in my head - pragmatism. What difference does the answer to "Is morality - objective, subjective, or relative?" make in our moral conduct? Is the OP claiming that if morality's subjective, fae'll go on a killing spree or if morality's relative, fae'll marry an 8 year old girl? Now that I think of it, the OP is claiming that! :chin:
No, none of that. Making use of empirical observation does not commit one to empiricism. And although I do believe that I "can use language to arrive at meaning and a moral system," this is not a supposition, because I have good reason to believe it.
One issue to consider (and you may have done so) is whether you take a situational or deontological view of these principles? Is it wrong to cause suffering for a greater good - eg - was taking down Hitler ok even if it involved mass violence?
I'd be interested what others would say about the soundness of the argument.
Quoting Herg
Having good reason rests on the supposition that reason is a sound arbiter, which in itself relies upon reason and is a circular argument. Anyone using the laws of logic or logical axioms (identity; non-contradiction and excluded middle) needs to presuppose that reason is sound. I don't disagree with this, but it is located in a particular approach.
To say that something is objective is to say something about its mode of existence. More specifically, it is to say that it exists outside a mind's mental states. So, the 'objective physical world' denotes a place that exists outside anyone's mind.
By contrast, if something is subjective, then it exists inside a mind or minds- that is, it exists as mental states; states of a subject.
Morality is subjective because morality is made of prescriptions and values. But only minds can issue prescriptions or value anything. Thus morality exists as the prescriptions and values of a mind. And thus it is subjective.
If the child is expected to have a happy life, then by killing it, since happiness is a good, you're expecting to replace net good with nothing, which is a bad thing to do. OTOH, if the child is expected to have a miserable life, then you're expecting to replace net bad with nothing, which is a good thing to do. However, in practice it is very hard to be sure what the future happiness of a child will be, so this simple calculation usually can't be made.
When one can't do the proper calculation, one has to fall back on rules of thumb. A good rule of thumb is that people, even children, usually have a much better idea of whether their lives are happy or miserable than other people do, which suggests that it would be better to leave the decision whether to stay alive to the person themselves. Another good rule of thumb is that a child is not yet a properly formed human being, so it would be a good idea to let it grow up and find out how happy it was. Another good rule of thumb is that if we once allow child-killing, it could get out of hand (children can be very annoying).
I'm going to say that for all these reasons, in practice, killing a small child is almost always wrong.
Where exactly do I presuppose a moral truth?
Aa I say, it's a thesis about how 'bad' is actually used. I don't think that's helping myself, I think I'm just reporting a fact about language use.
That's similar to my premise 1, but IMO not as plausible; and you don't provide any grounds for believing this.
The point of my first syllogism is to show that there are values built into nature. It just is the case that, for example, if you have a pain, you want the pain to stop. The negative value you place on the pain does not originate in your mind, it is imposed on your mind by the demands of the pain.
Oh, in that case your argument is unsound, as premise 1 is obviously false. "That's morally bad" does not mean "a lot of people use the word 'inappropriate' to refer to it".
So you think the mindless natural world values things? How does that work?
I value things. You value things. My chair doesn't. That rock over there doesn't.
And does 'nature' issue prescriptions as well? This is the stuff of madness.
Your first argument does no such thing, incidentally. It's first premise is ambiguous between a substantial moral claim and a claim about how people use a word (that is, you want both to say how the word 'appropriate' is used, and help yourself to actual appropriateness). EIther way it doesn't show that 'values' are built into nature.
Quoting Bartricks
That's a good way of putting it. The only honest answer for why someone holds their moral axioms is because they feel the axioms are right.
I think @TheMadFool is concerned about where this leads us. Why is it wrong to cause suffering? If there's no articulable reason, why should a psychopath refrain from causing it if they can get away with it?
No, it doesn't. But that isn't what I said. Please try to answer what I actually write, instead of changing it to something else and than answering that.
Although that's a psychological claim rather than a metaethical one and is not equivalent to what I am saying.
I am not saying that morality is subjective because we feel some acts are right and some wrong and feelings are subjective states. That would be to commit the fallacy of confusing a cause of a belief or impression with what it is 'about'.
I am saying that morality is subjective because it is made of prescriptions and values and only subjects - minds - can issue prescriptions and value things.
So, I believe some acts are wrong. I believe Xing is wrong. What, exactly, am I believing when I believe X is wrong? Well, I believe that the act is one we are commanded not to perform. So, what would it take for my belief to be true? Well, there would have to be a command not to perform the act.
Would a command of my own do the trick? Well, no. For in order for my commands to be capable of rendering moral beliefs true, I would need to be responsible for everyone - now and throughout history - getting the impression of moral commands. And I am not responsible for that - i have had no hand in it at all. And so the truth maker of my moral belief that Xing is wrong is not my own commanding activity.
Thus, the truth maker of moral beliefs must be the subjective states of some third party.
Do you think the mindless natural world can issue prescriptions and value things? If so, then are you not mad?
Or do you think that morality is not composed of prescriptions and values? If so, then are you not misusing the word morality?
Again, I didn't say that.
True, but again, not what I said.
And again.
No, this is your collection of straw men.
It's not ambiguous. You are begging the question against ethical naturalism. The point of the first premise is to point out that a value claim can also be a claim about natural properties. Your characterisation of that as 'ambiguous' rests entirely on your own tacit assumption that this cannot occur. But it does.
It shows that nature sometimes dictates what our values are to be.
But for an act to be right is for it 'to be done'. That is, there is a prescription enjoining us to do it. How does a natural feature issue a prescription?
And for something to be morally good is for it to be morally valuable. How does a natural feature value anything?
Here are two statements:
"Xing is wrong"
"Xing has natural feature P"
They are very different. Both are descriptions, but the first describes a prescription, whereas the second does not. So they are not equivalent. Yet naturalism turns all moral statements into statements of the second kind. So it is false.
Yes.
My argument explains that.
I'm not claiming that it does. You're confusing the action of valuing a thing with a thing having value.
True.
True.
False. Naturalism asserts that they are already statements of both kinds. 'We ought not to inflict pain' = 'there is an obligation not to inflict pain', and this is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Nature.
A: Because pain is bad. Everyone knows this, except a handful of subjectivist philosophers.
Quoting Herg
Oh, so you're mad. Nature issues prescriptions. I see. Stones speak to you do they? What are the molecules telling you to do today?
You are committing the naturalistic fallacy. The word 'is' in 'Because pain is bad' is ambiguous. It could mean that pain and badness are one and the same. That would be the 'is' of identity. Or it could mean that pain 'has' badness (in the way that 'ice cream is cold' doesn't mean ice cream and coldness are identical, but that ice cream has coldness as a property).
Now, what the naturalist does is thinks "oo, pain is bad" - which is (normally) correct, if the 'is' in that sentence is the is of predication. Normally pain does indeed have badness. But then they conclude that pain 'is' bad as in 'pain and badness are one and the same. And that's to commit the naturalistic fallacy - to equivocate over the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication.
That doesn't by itself establish that pain and badness are distinct, it is just a fallacious way of arriving at a conclusion.
Are pain and badness one and the same? No, for if they were then it would be impossible for there to be pain that is not bad. Yet sometimes pain is not bad, for instance when it is deserved.
Furthermore, for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable. So, for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued. But pain could not itself 'be' the badness, because that would require that pain disvalue itself. Which is insane as pain is a mental state and is not in the business of valuing or disvaluing things.
So, anyway, you're wrong. Subjectivism is true, albeit divine subjectivism.
Quoting Bartricks
When I say "feelings" I am referring to our intuitions. That our intuitions are the only basis we can have for moral beliefs, is surely a reason for labelling them subjective?
So, I can see a chair. The visual impression is in my mind. It doesn't follow that the chair is.
All states of awareness are mental. It doesn't follow that everything we are aware of is in our mind.
Morality is subjective, but that's a fallacious way of arriving at the correct conclusion.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
Quoting Bartricks
If our intuitions are subjective, it follows that everything stemming from them including our values are too?
In any event, our intuitions are the sole basis for us holding our values, whereas unmoral facts have a basis outside of our individual minds. I think this in itself justifies a difference in labelling.
My belief that I have a partner is subjective. For beliefs are mental - they exist as states of mind. Does it follow that my partner is subjective? No, obviously not.
Why not? Well, because my belief is 'about' my partner and does not constitute her.
Likewise, moral intuitions are 'about' morality and do not constitute it. After all, I cannot make xing morally right just by creating in myself the intuition that it is right.
The mistake you are making is, like I say, to conflate a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness.
I know about Napoleon from a book. It doesn't follow that Napoleon is made of paper and ink.
I was arguing from the grounds that our intuitions are the only basis that exist for moral beliefs. In which case the moral beliefs are not based on objective facts, but subjective intuitions - and are best labelled subjective as a result.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
That simply doesn't follow. If the only basis I have for believing in Napoleon is a book I read about Napoleon, that doesn't mean Napoleon is made of paper and ink.
Our moral intuitions are how we are aware of morality. They do not compose it.
That's why it is possible that morality doesn't exist. There's no doubt moral beliefs and intuitions exist. But that doesn't by itself entail that morality itself exists - because morality is not made of beliefs and intuitions.
Morality 'is' subjective. But you have arrived at the correct conclusion fallaciously. Note too, that the conclusion you will have arrived at is that morality is made of our individual or collective subjective states, yes?
That's obviously false: if I have the intuition that Xing is right, that does not entail that it is right, does it? Yet on your view it would. That's absurd.
SO, morality is subjective. Why? Not because our intuitions and beliefs are subjective - that's true of 'all' intuitions and beliefs, and so would make 'everything' subjective!! It is subjective because morality is made of commands and values and only a subject - an agent - can issue a command or value anything. Thus morality is made of a subject's commands and values.
Not yours though, and not mine. Why? Because it is manifest to reason that if I value something that doesn't entail that it is morally valuable, and that if I command something to be done this does not entail that it is morally right to do it.
So, morality is made of a third party's commands and values. Thus it is subjective.
I completely understand and agree with your reasoning for morality being subjective. Our disagreement is academic rather than practical, and I appreciate you engaging.
Quoting Bartricks
But it would be different if the only basis we can have, the only basis that exist for believing in Napoleon is the book you read about Napoleon. Then he would ipso facto be made only of paper and ink.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
I am thinking of a sinking ship. Although the passengers are not the ship, as the ship is their only basis they too are sinking, and there are no other ships or helicopters (basis) to save the passengers from their fate. Our ship, our intuitions, are subjective, the beliefs they support share the same fate.
Quoting Bartricks
Either that or it doesn't exist. There is no evidence of an alternative.
Quoting Bartricks
Either it's subjectively right, or moral rights and wrongs don't exist.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
So you believe morality is subjective but it's possible it doesn't exist? Do you see evidence of any alternatives?
I have on my shelves this book (https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/13624497-ethical-naturalism) which contains essays by thirteen present-day ethical naturalists. Twelve of them are university professors, one is a fellow. Which is more likely: that these thirteen professional philosophers are all mad, or that you don't understand ethical naturalism?
There is more to nature than stones and molecules.
Another straw man. I don't hold that pain and badness are identical. When I said 'pain is bad', I meant that pain (or, more precisely, the unpleasantness of pain) has the property of being bad. My ethical naturalism is not founded on an equivocation over 'is', it's founded on the fact that pleasantness and unpleasantness of experience to some degree dictate our evaluations, so that the evaluations are not entirely subjective. If you read the three syllogisms I posted earlier, you will see that.
Quoting Bartricks
I haven't said that pain and badness are one and the same.
Quoting Bartricks
When it is deserved, it is deserved precisely because it is bad. That's the whole point of retributive punishment - it repays bad with bad. More precisely, it repays intrinsic badness with intrinsic badness which, because it is (considered to be) deserved, is (considered to be) instrumentally good. Rehabilitative or reformatory punishment, by contrast, generally repays intrinsic bad with treatment which is both intrinsically good and (intended to be) instrumentally good.
Quoting Bartricks
I agree with this, but it isn't very helpful. All it says is that for an object to be bad is for it to have negative value. What it doesn't say is why any object would have negative value. My theory explains this: an object has negative value if it influences us to value it negatively; unpleasantness of experience influences us to value the experience negatively; and thus an unpleasant experience has the property of badness.
Quoting Bartricks
I disagree with this. It's inconsistent with your assertion in the previous sentence: "for something to be 'bad' is for it to be disvaluable" means that the badness consists in the object having the property of negative value, whereas "for pain to be bad is for pain to be disvalued" means that the badness consists in the object being valued negatively. Roughly speaking, the first is objectivist, the second subjectivist.
Quoting Bartricks
Once again, I haven't said that the pain is the badness.
Quoting Bartricks
And I never said it was.
Quoting Bartricks
Theism intruding into ethics? Dear me.
Shall we recap? Moral norms are directives.
I have asked you who is issuing the directives constitutive of moral directives. And your answer was the insane 'nature'. So nature - mindless objective nature - issues instructions and orders?!?
And your reply to that? The utterly lame 'but, but, there are professors who defend naturalism....so it must be true".
The reason it is subjective: We all experience morality through our own subjective lense, it just so happens, as a society, we have generally agreed upon the moral system of things.
The reason it is not objective: No morality exists inherently in nature without thinking agents who deem it so.
The reason it is not relative: The morality of things do not change. Slavery, for example, was justified at times in the past, but that doesn't mean it was moral for those times. It means they had the wrong understanding or simply justified it.
How it can be situational: Stealing, we decided, is morally unfair. But, to use one example, if someone is dying and there is a respirator in the store next to you, stealing it to save a life would be morally justified.