Philosophical Plumbing — Mary Midgley
Is philosophy like plumbing?
https://philpapers.org/archive/MIDPP.pdf?fbclid=IwAR39W1KkUzVUpVWJrI-eswVYpjKlMhlK3fAlb5QbkNCutbJEGYwNguIkH2k
Another article of Midgley's that is interestingly provocative. The metaphor is that like plumbing, philosophy is taken for granted until it goes wrong; then we are obliged to call in the experts and clean up the mess.
The given example is the notion of a social contract. This is now accepted so broadly as to be unquestioned. But we find lately that it is not working so well, that "distinct patches of damp have been arising round it, and there have been some very dubious smells". How do social contracts apply to animals and to children? To oceans and rainforests? We find ourselves needing to address such issues, and yet not noticing that the plumbing of social contracts is inadequate to the task. Enter the philosopher, who can get down beneath the sink and sort out the bottle trap and ball valves.
Witness the plethora of threads hereabouts rejoicing in the individual, blithely unaware that those old lead pipes are killing us.
In addition to the plumbing being generally ignored, there is the problem of it's being thought complete. We find that in the histrionic misapplication of philosophical doctrine, be it Kant, Hegel or Wittgenstein. As if philosophy were a doctrine, not a process.
It follows that Midgley does not offer a solution, although she indicates a few alternatives. She instead admonishes us to engage in sorting out the conceptual confusions that we otherwise take for granted.
(Edit: by way of full disclosure, see also Midgley vs Dawkins, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Mackie, Rand, Singer...)
https://philpapers.org/archive/MIDPP.pdf?fbclid=IwAR39W1KkUzVUpVWJrI-eswVYpjKlMhlK3fAlb5QbkNCutbJEGYwNguIkH2k
Another article of Midgley's that is interestingly provocative. The metaphor is that like plumbing, philosophy is taken for granted until it goes wrong; then we are obliged to call in the experts and clean up the mess.
The given example is the notion of a social contract. This is now accepted so broadly as to be unquestioned. But we find lately that it is not working so well, that "distinct patches of damp have been arising round it, and there have been some very dubious smells". How do social contracts apply to animals and to children? To oceans and rainforests? We find ourselves needing to address such issues, and yet not noticing that the plumbing of social contracts is inadequate to the task. Enter the philosopher, who can get down beneath the sink and sort out the bottle trap and ball valves.
Witness the plethora of threads hereabouts rejoicing in the individual, blithely unaware that those old lead pipes are killing us.
In addition to the plumbing being generally ignored, there is the problem of it's being thought complete. We find that in the histrionic misapplication of philosophical doctrine, be it Kant, Hegel or Wittgenstein. As if philosophy were a doctrine, not a process.
It follows that Midgley does not offer a solution, although she indicates a few alternatives. She instead admonishes us to engage in sorting out the conceptual confusions that we otherwise take for granted.
(Edit: by way of full disclosure, see also Midgley vs Dawkins, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Mackie, Rand, Singer...)
Comments (151)
:up: :100:
Since I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit, if not also the letter, of Midgley's paper, I've nothing to add until others come along and earnestly clog-up the pipes with their (youtubed) "doctrines".
I think that this debate about philosophy plumbing applies to the discussion which has just taken place on the thread on the meanings of the term morality and ethics. It may be that some of the pipes of the academic elite have become corroded and clogged. Some serious heavy plumbing is needed to clear out all the decay and gunge, in order for ideas to work in the twenty first century.
This self-contained, scholastic philosophy remains an impressive feat, something which may well be worth doing for its own sake, but it leaves a most dangerous gap in the intellectual scene. For it cannot, of course, prevent the other aspect, the poetic aspect of philosophy, from being needed. The hungry sheep who do not get that creative vision look up and are not fed. They tend to wander round looking for new visions until they find some elsewhere [e.g. youtube]. Thus, a good deal of poetic philosophising has been imported lately from Europe and from the East, from the social sciences, from evangelists, from literary criticism and from science fiction, as well as from past philosophers.[/quote]
:clap: :clap: :clap:
You mean someone who knows a lot more than you do told you how things were and you didn't like it?
Ethics means the same as morality. One's Greek, the other Latin.....for the same thing. Easy. Not something experts discuss. Ever. It's just what they mean. Get over it.
It's apparent why.
Obviously, that debate is going on in the other thread, but what I got a bit worked up about was your view that philosophy is simply about experts being seen as having knowledge because they are the experts.
I lay great emphasis on the critical component of philosophical method. But I recognise the myth-building component, too - the "showing"; Midgley addresses this, in the last few pages of the article, and with far greater clarity than I could muster.
I thought of you as I read the piece you quote.
So where to now? Plumbing is not laying just any pipe; they have to be up to the task. Some sort of balance is needed.
I'm sorry for being so thin-skinned. I will continue with that piece, haven't finished it yet.
Yeah, I didn't say that though, did I. I didn't say anything about what philosophy is about. But experts know things. And the experts in ethics know that 'ethics' and 'morality' are synonyms.
Pilot: pushing that lever will stall the plane and we'll crash
Jack: I think there's disagreement over whether it will
Pilot: no there isn't. It'll stall the plane and crash it. There's no disagreement over it.
Jack: Well, that's your opinion. But I think there is. When I asked people in the passenger tube some said they thought it would crash the plane and others said it wouldn't.
Pilot: It's not my opinion. It's universally acknowledged among the experts - pilots - that it'll stall the plane and crash it. The people you consulted were passengers, not pilots.
Jack: Well, I think everyone's view is equally valid and just because you spent years learning to fly doesn't mean you know more than I do about what these buttons and levers do.
Pilot: It does mean that. I do know more than you. I fly planes. You don't.
Jack: what annoys me is this idea that being a pilot is just about knowing pilots telling each other what levers do.
Pilot: er, what?
Okay, can we leave it there. I am about to go to bed and we don't wish to derail this thread.
Please stick to the topic.
Yes, no fun in that, hey?
But I wonder what you make of her comments regarding social contracts. Do you have sympathy for returning to a more organic metaphor? Or water, which she mentions briefly, or dignity. This last echoes Martha Nussbaum, but her interpretation of Rawls stands at odd with Midgley's criticism of social contracts. Something's in need of resolution.
Can philosophers and, presumably thinkers more broadly, really work on identifying the patterns inherent in ostensibly contradictory ideas and see how they can fit together? Almost sounds utopian.
When Midgley talks about the need to see the 'unconsidered mass' that lies behind our ideas I wonder how this plays out more broadly. Her example of unpacking the social contact is intriguing. I can't say if her analysis is right but it does resonate (especially on children/the mentally ill, the 'outcasts').
Is there not a risk that in adopting a plumbing approach like this that philosophical debate will shift to an illimitable and perhaps confusing exploration of what the unconsidered mass consists of?
What's your sense of her criticism of social contacts?
It actually makes a lot of sense until someone decides to contort it into something ridiculous.
It might be helpful to consider that it comes from a different era, and it was meant to address a problem most of us don't have.
Perhaps over time, there have been efforts to force the idea to be useful for a new era. This creates a sense of working with old plumbing.
Perhaps the old idea is actually working pretty well for its original purpose.
Maybe new problems call for new ideas.
That's what I said the first time. Did I really have to spell all if that out?
Quoting Tom Storm
She was a disarming grandmotherly figure, it seems, quietly pointing to the blocked drain.
She points out that Social contract replaced divine right, as @frank repeated, but without showing he'd troubled to do some reading.
She points out that social contract theory implies individuality, since it is an individual who enters into a contract. "The only possible source of civic duty was tacit agreement among rational citizens, each concerned for their own interest—an agreement regularly tested through voting." This "slipped under the floorboards" of our culture, but can be seen in the presumption of many a discussion - anything from @NOS4A2 will suffice as an example. But it is an assumption - or perhaps better, a presumption; it was used to dispose of kings, and now perhaps stands in need of disposal itself.
All sorts of things count as individuals in the eyes of Roman-style law. So, no.
Here's the critique you might choose to address.
I did address it. Apparently I'm not the only one who doesn't read.
I'm tired. Bye
Not substantively. Sleep well, I'll continue the goading in the morrow.
It's just that even defining philosophy is difficult. There are just so many ways of thinking about it and even applying it. And it's not trivial to say that speaking of philosophy is such or such a tradition is wrong, we may not share the assumptions they have.
And when it comes to ethics and especially political matters, I think that the topics can often be devilishly difficult. We no longer live in a time when a person could be very knowledgeable on all topics, there's way too much to cover.
Yet we need it, like she points out. Jeez... I'm tying myself in knots here...
Is it the case that when society works it is because the underlying philosophy works? Perhaps we only notice philosophy when there's clear conflict.
Good!
Yes, philosophy is hard. The start might be in seeing problems such as the example she cites; that the presumed notion of a social contract has its limits. Only then we can look for something better.
The example she rejected using - "but it is now wallowing in too many kinds of difficulty to deal with in this article" - was the Machine Model, presumably of the mind. Another favourite hereabouts, with many a thread taking it for granted only to find itself stinking and leaking.
There's a tension between system building and critical evaluation in philosophy. Perhaps the system builders - your Kant, Hegel, Russel - thrive when the basis of society is unthreatened; and the critics - Socrates, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein - in what might be called "interesting times"?
But perhaps not.
But I will place myself on the side of the critics.
The social contract has its limits. I'm currently not seeing a big state showing something different on a large scale. There may be scattered examples of, say, worker co-operatives and similar institutions based on voluntary cooperation and the like, but not on a large scale.
As we've sadly seen with COVID, we can't even co-operate with a damn virus which isn't even very deadly. This forebodes a very bleak future with the urgent case of climate change.
But people will care about that only when they can't find food in the super markets or they can't go outside for too long or they'll suffer heat stroke.
Instead of thinking about how we could perhaps work at an international level on climate change or nuclear weapons, people's imaginations are caught in this whole AI stuff and wanting to go to Mars. This is being done by Important People like Musk and Bezos. So this is individualism on steroids.
So - how to proceed? I can argue why I think most of the promises of AI aren't plausible or I can talk about evidence relating to climate change, but if people don't care about facts anymore, what gives? It's not like speaking of caring for Mother Earth really moves people, outside of certain sensibilities.
Ugh.
Not necessarily. People just buy the myth and carry on, but when things go to shit, then we start questioning fundamentals such as the 2008 market crash or the Pandemic now.
People are now even using the word "capitalism" to discuss the ideas that sustain it.
The critics are system builders themselves, although not builders of traditional metaphysical systems in the case of writers like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein or Derrida.
Quoting Banno
I think it’s the other way around. We find something better and only then do we see the limits of the previous approach. The old thinking only stinks in retrospect , and there’s no necessity for it to crumble under the weight of its own limitations, given that those limitations only emerge from a new vantage of thinking , which isn’t guaranteed.
We don’t need philosophy for this. Every modality of culture ( the arts , politics, the sciences) evolves past its previous presumptions without the direct help of philosophy. What philosophy can do is make explicit what is only held as implicit within other modes of thought.
Perhaps. My take is that people look for scapegoats more than questioning fundamentals. Being able to comprehend what has gone wrong may well be out of reach of many people for reasons of education/aptitude/bias - whatever it might be.
It also intrigues me how people often want to replace ideas (revolution) that aren't working well rather than repairing/adjusting them (assuming this is possible).
Are you saying that the role of philosophy is essentially descriptive? How do you assess Midgley's paper?
It's hard to say, absent seeing polls. My impression is that you tend to get both, though maybe not in equal amounts.
That is to say some people think the fundamentals are wrong, others think we need to change what we already have, that is to stabilize our to reinforce the pillars, as it were.
I think that these views "capitalist", "socialist", "anarchist" and so on, though important in that they offer a pattern of ideas or a tendency to reach certain conclusions about certain systems best suited for people, at this point in intellectual life, obscure more than clarify.
On an issue by issue basis, it's easier to speak on important topics, even if disagreement is inevitable on many topics. But if we start saying "capitalism" or "communism" is excellent or horrific, we just lose a large portion of the potential audience.
Really?
I think Midgley right in pointing to social contract theory as the broken pipe in the foundation, and I don't see that there is a clear solution; so I don't agree with you. If you were correct that we see the rot only from the vantage of a new philosophical system, that system would be apparent and ubiquitous - as Hegel two hundred years ago. Rather the philosophical landscape is in a state of upheaval, while simultaneously fighting to justify itself in the face of it's own creation, economic utility.
The role of philosophy is creative , as is the role of all
other cultural modalities. I don’t disagree with Misgley’s claims concerning philosophy , but I would want to add that any field of endeavor changes its underlying assumptions over time , it’s ‘plumbing’. Most fields don’t pay attention to this fact , and science in particular has until recently had a habit of denying that there is any underlying plumbing, just models attempting to mirror the ‘real’ world.
Most Conservatives in the U.S. wouldn’t know what on earth you are taking about. They would claim that there is absolutely nothing wrong with social contract theory. Why is this? Because they are living within the old philosophical system. The rot you are talking about doesn’t exist for them, just as the limits of behaviorism didn’t exist for Skinner, the limits of Hegelianism don’t exist for today’s Marxists, the limits of realism don’t exist for most of today’s physicists.
They are useful in articulating the situation in terms of ‘smell and fetid pooling’ , but that language isn’t the only form of conceptualization that will change the situation. It will change anyway from within , but the changes will be seen by insiders only in a fragmented and localized way, not as a change of plumbing. As an analogy, Kuhnian philosophers of science will say that the whole edifice of Newtonian physics was turned on its head by relativity, which recognized the smell and fetid pooling of the old paradigm. But scientists will instead say that Relativity and more recent developments only added to Newton in a piecemeal fashion, so no smell or pooling was involved.
For me this characterization of the situation is absurd; economic utility grows out of the complacency brought about by prosperity. When you are economically comfortable, then you can safely begin to think in terms of mere profit, Philosophy has nothing to do with it, except perhaps as a provider of ad hoc justifications, and these are only required by intellectual idiots; who think the way things are can or could be rightly justified or repudiated; the bulk of humanity couldn't care less.
Quoting Banno
Thanks for this. I haven't read the article yet but glad to see Mary Midgley and her thoughts being picked up and discussed here. Finally, being given her due in the Main Discussion.
Previously in the 'Lounge': https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4326/death-of-mary-midgley
@Wayfarer's thread gives a bit of perspective to her background.
I look forward to hearing more from Wayfarer, also anything @180 Proof might care to add:
Quoting 180 Proof
Quoting Banno
Glad you added 'It seems'.
2yrs ago, I included this in Wayfarer's thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/301836
I read the linked article, and I thought that it was impressive. What I thought was good was the criticism of the constructs which people take for granted, such as society. I think that Midgely does relate the idea of social contract with the concerns of where humanity is going, based on tangible aspects of real life. A really good quote in the article is,
'It may even be possible for our species to admit that it is not really a supernatural variety of Lego, but some kind of animal.'
I think that this is useful to think about because human beings have thought that they are in the position of dominating nature. How much control do we have, or should we have?
Midgely also says that philosophers should 'stop imitating Hegel.' I am not sure about this because I have not read that much by him, and was planning to read his, 'Phenomenology of Mind', shortly. However, I think she is right to emphasise the importance of distinguishing the literal from the symbolic, saying, 'Myths are stories symbolizing important patterns.' I think that I first became aware of this when trying to understand the Book of Genesis with Darwin's ideas. It seemed important to understand that the Biblical creation accounts were handed down stories about origins, and I am amazed how, even today, some people take the creation stories so literally, as if they were written by newspaper reporters. I do believe that when religious or other sacred texts are being read it is important to be aware that they are based upon symbolic levels of understanding.
Russell memorably wrote that Hegel's work 'illustrates an important truth, namely that the worse your logic, the more interesting the circumstances to which it gives rise.'
I will remember that, but I do feel that I do wish to read some, if not all, of Hegel's book.
I'm not trying to diminish anybody's grinding angst, rant away. I only comment because there's a point if significance for me in it.
Hobbes was a monarchist, so the idea of a social contract isn't cemented to voting or individuality, in fact, at base it's the simple recognition that we need each other. The social contract is in our flesh and bones. We're more together than we would be apart. This is why we put up with the ills of society and civilization: because we can't separate ourselves from it.
No society could survive without the general consent of the people. There could never be enough police to force that consent.
The misanthrope who indulges in vague condemnations is missing the divine father.
Midgley means business! First impression is the last impression as far as I'm concerned.
[quote=Mary Midgley]When the concepts we are living by
function badly, they do not usually drip audibly through the ceiling orswamp the kitchen floor. [u]They just quietly distort and obstruct our thinking[/quote]
[quote=Mary Midgley]Great philosophers, then, need a combination of gifts that is extremely rare. They must be lawyers as well as poets. They must have both the new vision that points the way we are to go and the logical doggedness that sorts out just what is, and what is not, involved in going there.[/quote]
I thought lawyers were rhetoricians disguised as logicians. Anway, gets the point across well. Logic + Creativity = Philosopher.
[quote=Mary Midgley]Plainly, social contract thinking is no sort of adequate guide for
constructing the whole social and political system. It really is a vital means of protection against certain sorts of oppression, an essential defence against tyranny. But it must not be taken for granted and forgotten, as a safe basis for all sorts of institutions. It needs always to be seen as something partial and provisional, an image that may cause trouble and have to be altered.[/quote]
In true scientific spirit! Birthing science has paid handsome dividends to philosophy.
[quote=Mary Midgley]Freedom, here, is no longer
being viewed as a necessary condition of pursuing other ideals, but as being itself the only possible ideal[/quote]
Reminds me of money! It's become an end unto itself. With money, you can buy, I kid you not, everything and anything. Freedom must be like money.
[quote=Mary Midgley]This ought to make it
easier to admit also that we are not self-contained and self-sufficient, either as a species or as individuals, but live naturally in deep mutual dependence.[/quote]
Yeah, but my aunt doesn't agree!
[quote=Mary Midgley]But if we can once get it into our heads,that a model is only a model[...][/quote]
What's wrong if "...a model is only a model..."? :chin:
[quote=Mary Midgley]The alternative to getting a proper philosophy is continuing to use a bad one [...][/quote]
Tough call, philosophers (men, women, and children)!
[quote=Mary Midgley]That realization seems to be the
sensible element at the core of the conceptual muddle now known as Postmodernism [...][/quote]
Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (1998; UK: Intellectual Impostures)
[quote=Mary Midgley]Myths are stories symbolizing profoundly important patterns, patterns that are very influential, but too large, too deep and too imperfectly known to be expressed literally. [/quote]
A uniquely interesting point of view on mythology. Myths aren't falsehoods, they're truths too deep for language. Am I reading this as intended?
[quote=Mary Midgley]Examples like these led Enlightenment thinkers to denounce all myths and to proclaim, in Positivistic style, a new age free from symbols, an age when all thoughts would be expressed literally and language would be used only to report scientific facts. But the idea of such an age is itself a highly fanciful myth, an image quite unrelated to
the way in which thought and language actually work. All our thinking works through them. New ideas commonly occur to us first as images and are expressed first as metaphors. Even in talking about ordinary, concrete things immediately around us we use these metaphors all the time, and
on any larger, more puzzling subject we need constantly to try out new ones.[/quote]
Ironic, don't you think? That there is no myth is the greatest myth! :chin:
[quote=Mary Midgley]Thought is incurably powerful and explosive stuff [...][/quote]
:up: This was a thought :point: (Tsar Bomba October 1961)
[quote=Mary Midgley]That is the way people often do interpret this kind of claim, and it is particularly often brought forward as a reason for doing science. But Socrates [the unexamined life is not worth living] was surely saying something much stronger. He was saying that there are limits to living in a mess.[/quote]
What a fine mess we're in! I would've screamed in frustration but it seems I'm not alone and it's not polite at all to vent like that, right?
[quote=Mary Midgley]But wisdom itself matters everywhere [...][/quote]
Everybody knows that, right?
[quote=Mary Midgley]It may well be that other cultures, less committed to talking, find different routes to salvation, that they pursue a less word-bound form of wisdom.[/quote]
What the literal can't do, myth (metaphor) can; what myth can't do...
[quote=Ludwig Wittgenstejn]Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must shut our gob[/quote]
[quote=Lao Tzu]Those who speak don't know. Those who know don't speak.[/quote]
Most of us, I think, have long lost our umbilical cords, and so too the last connection each of us have had with another human being. So there is no “real joining-together of the parties”; we really are separate entities. One doesn’t have to be a hermit or a piece of lego under the couch to see this.
Since no amount of figures of speech can replace the real connection the umbilical cord once provided, why try? A relationship can only ever manifest as relations between separate, individual entities. So why must we pretend we are connected in order to have one? I depart with Midgley on her organic model of personal relations for these reasons, and because she conflates individualism with isolation. I depart with it also because it can be extended to organic models of the state, which have already soaked the 20th century.
The social contract theory may provide the best justification for state power, at least as far as statism is concerned, but no state actually lives up to it or was formed in such a manner.
Midgley is plumbing with duct tape here.
The cells that make up your blood are independent in exactly the same way. They aren't connected to anything. Each has its own journey round the cosmos.
But the corpuscle who celebrates its independence might be a little blind, huh?
Quoting NOS4A2
That stretchy silicone tape works though.
Human beings are like blood cells, then? I struggle to see it.
More like macrophages because we can move in our own. Still, yes. You are a product of a highly advanced society. What have you accomplished all in your own?
Unlike a macrophage I am the product of two individual mammals. Just this morning I picked 5lbs of spruce tips.
Quoting 180 Proof
:up:
I mostly agreed with the essay too. Here's an attempt to unclog one of its pipes.
Near the conclusion you see:
Perhaps I'm reading into it more than reading it, but there's a hint of uniqueness there - a suggestion that philosophy alone is a remedy for "shocking malfunctions", despite that the essay highlights a broad spectrum approach:
I appreciate that the author aligns philosophy with wrestling with problems in general; a "handmaiden of thought and practice" as it were, but that doesn't really get into why philosophy is necessary. It seems to be necessary by fiat - characterised as that discipline which deals with the rough edges and deep structure (ambiguity, plumbing) of thought.
So while the essay makes a good case for the necessity of "wrestling with questions", especially in interesting times as Banno put, one hole in the argument is that it doesn't sufficiently distinguish philosophy as a discursive practice from the rough edges and social/political/conceptual/discursive plumbing systems which are its fuel:
Which seems to me to present an unpleasant fork for the paper; either philosophy is commonplace enough to arise (more or less well) to fix breakdowns in plumbing and is done autonomously using domain understandings and general processes of reasoning, or alternatively it forms a necessary constituent of those disciplines (spurred on by their rough edges) from the get go. Either way, the unique vantage point and skillset of philosophy gets dissolved into (abstractions from) domain understandings.
Which I'm fine with - but it does rather go against the unique position of philosophy as a problem solver for conceptual plumbing systems, as it's almost definitionally the practice of this problem solving. Like I'm 30cm tall if I redefine 30cm to be my height.
You pointed to your lack of physical connection to any other organism to prove your independence. Now it's that you're a mammal?
You said I was a product of a highly-advanced society. I corrected that.
Interesting! Without having read Midgley's article yet, I commented in another thread where Banno mentioned it in response to something I said, that:
Quoting Pfhorrest
Glad to see a real philosopher (Midgley) espousing a similar thought.
Quoting Janus
Interesting juxtaposition.
Who invented bottle traps? Useless things. Thank goodness for silicon tape.
There's something funny going on under your sink if there's a ball valve there. That reminds me, you might want to check out Murun Buchstansangur.
Janus has a point in so far as no one asked anyone I know if they wanted to be part of any contract.
Not implying that social benefits aren't most welcome and most badly needed - but for it's a very misleading picture.
When Scotty from Marketing set out his approach with the slogan "If you have a go, you get a go", he was espousing the social contract Midgley critiques; he disenfranchises those who cannot, or will not, as he puts it, 'have a go' - children, the disabled, indigenous communities, the poor. He fails to account for the place those who have a go have in the environment, as evident in his attitude towards climate change, species decline and environmental degradation. He places the ideology that is economics first.
There's an evident failure to see the myth for what it is.
Murun should put on his trousers in public.
Midgley says as much.
Yes. Others too, such as the Anthropologist David Graeber have also pointed this out. I get it, if we are to live in a large society, we need some kind of arrangement to take care of things that everybody needs.
The problem lies in the solution. One thing is to correctly point out, as Midgley does, that we need philosophy to help us address issues like these. A whole other thing is how to do it.
How do you get people who don't care too much about these things, to think about the social contract or philosophy? For many, religion takes care of much of the philosophy or it serves as a placeholder so that they don't have to think about the issues. But honestly, I wish I could give good reasons for people to care about these things. What's sad is that there should be a need to do so in the first place, instead of it being obvious why such matters should be interesting "by themselves", as I think they are.
I reject the idea of a social contract, as I have said, and as you have acknowledged, so I have no idea why you are now saying that I insist on it.
We have laws, as we must in a complex society, to protect what are deemed to be the rights of individuals. Within the framework of those laws we may contract with one another. The fact that contractual law and practices exist does not entail that there is a social contract in the sense of some overarching agreement that every individual signs up for in order to be part of society. Contractual laws and practices have not been designed and drawn up from scratch by any person or group of persons; they have evolved as needed, just like any other social practice. They do not constitute a "social contract", they are simply contractual laws and practices, and no one can reasonably deny that they exist, or deny the need for them.
The idea that there are precisely identifiable malfunctions of the social system that philosophers could fix, analogously to the way in which plumbers fix problems of water supply and drainage is simply ludicrous and an example of the overweening hubris that philosophers can be capable of. Humanity lives in a mess and always will. Life, all life, not just the human, is messy; it is not precisely systematizable; it is a complex system that evolves as it evolves, and not to a plan. Individuals, and not only philosophers, can have input to varying degrees; they can have their influences on the system, and they inevitably do, however small that influence might seem.
The question I would put to critics of individualism is 'what would you put in its place?'. Individualism is the keystone of democracy, so if you reject it, it seems to me that you must be proposing some form of totalitarianism.
Note: I'm not advocating extreme forms of individualism a la Ayn Rand, so hopefully you will be able to see beyond black and white thinking.
Hence my puzzlement that Joshs thinks "We find something better and only then do we see the limits of the previous approach". Recognising the problem seems an essential first step.
Midgley calls it a myth; Žižek talks of ideology. The important task is pointing to the contradictions in the assumed certainties.
I would not say we find something better as though it were already implemented. Instead I would say we see a better way, and then we fight to implement it. It is a matter of vision and compassion. How often are such changes brought about by philosophers?
Quoting Banno
"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines". Emerson from Self Reliance
Sure, but even in that rejection you continue to assume that individuals have primacy in social processes. For you the ideology of individualism remains unchallenged.
Quoting Janus
Indeed, that's the very question Midgley is asking - although you put it somewhat differently. We ('merica, 'Stralya, Britain) don't live in a democracy; it's an oligarchy. But the myth persists. Perhaps there is room between or around pretend democracy and totalitarianism; something different.
And of course it is not the role of philosophers to "fix" stuff; but there is a place for conceptual analysis in the ongoing process.
Yes. Žižek gives interesting examples of this.
But these things can and are pointed out by journalists or teachers. Philosophers can play a role, but I think it's something that anybody can do, once they see through the PR.
I think the key point is that people must care enough to change what is unjust or cruel. If religion achieves the aim of inducing compassionate responses then it has served a purpose. I don't see much of philosophy doing that at all. Things will only change if the majority of individuals care enough to bring about change, or if they are not informed enough and/ or don't care enough to notice that change is being brought about.
I think that a lot of people, in philosophy and other disciplines are genuinely interested in better alternative ways of social life, but in some ways they remain as dreams. I think that part of the problem is that while people come up with ideas, life is so unpredictable, and people are often thrown into dealing with the immediate and competing demands that life throws at them. Life doesn't wait for the philosophers to devise better answers. It is possible that the ideas discussed may be able to do be translated into practice in some ways, but it seems likely that what would happen in practice may be very different from the original ideas conceived. For this reason, I think that any ideals about change have to incorporate an understanding of uncertainty and unpredictability. It is hard to know to what extent life is reactionary and how much can be planned for social practice in the face of uncertainties.
The penultimate paragraph:
Spot on.
I'll put undue emphasis on the plural - it's people, not individuals. Morality begins when one takes the Other into consideration. An ideology built on individuals - see the example Scotty from Marketing gave above - does not begin to address moral issues.
That's the criticism I've addresses to @NOS4A2 a few times.
You seem to reject the idea that there is and should be a range of views, opinions and responses to questions of social order. It is not ideology, but simply a recognition that people differ in their views and in their degrees of care. That diversity is what must be dealt with if it is not be quashed from above.
Now this is not to say that most or even many have informed opinions and compassionate responses. That people don't have informed opinions and compassionate responses is the general problem, which is not a malfunction like blocked pipes but a natural characteristic of human life, not something that can be fixed, but something that must be worked around as best as is possible.
I'm bothered that one can set out "the natural characteristics of human life" on the one hand and yet accept there "should be a range of views, opinions and responses to questions of social order" on the other.
Folk are malleable. As is set out in the article, once to was a commonplace that Kings had the right to obsequies obedience. It ain't so anymore.
People generally seem to need some inducement, usually religious faith, to feel that they should care about those strangers who are less fortunate than themselves and to contribute charitably. It's true that the more educated may be induced by ethical reasoning to be motivated to concern about human, environmental and animal rights causes. But concern is one thing and action another.
It is common enough for people to be disturbed by seeing those they consider to be innocent, children and animals, being mistreated and suffering. There are already a plethora of agencies playing on those kinds of feelings, but the level of charitable contribution remains relatively low, even among the most affluent nations.
I'm being reminded of Thomas Paine here: Power over people is acquired in but one of two ways. It is either usurped or it is granted by consent.
The social contract seems to me to have everything to do with that kind of power.
Sure, that's an idea, an ideal, but I don't think it reflects the reality, wherein people simply have whatever influence they have acquired via their social relations. If they are acting within the law, then who's going to take their power and influence, whatever it's level might be, away from them?
Good example - more footnotes to Thatcherism. Discourse shifted from community to individuals and then the idea that an ideal individual was best conceptualised as a consumer. A good sign of leaking, stinking pipes. The entire 'user pays' model has almost replaced the notion of the 'common good'. Seems that some people are so poisoned by those leaking pipes they think this trend is a promising sign of increasing liberty.
Communities are still 'useful' to some political discourse, but only for marginalising them - now visualised as out groups - the homeless; the unemployed; the refugees, etc.
Indeed. But one might adopt an ideology that discourages compassion. If one were to advocate behaviours that worked for one's own profit, for example, or that promoted competition rather than cooperation. One might develop a myth that greed necessarily leads to greater overall wealth, and maintain faith in such a myth in the face of the evidence; or a myth that the very laws of nature demand conflict. Over time such views can become unquestioned.
Except for the occasional grandmotherly figure we might never question our myths.
Yes.
In matters of politics it's often a brute fact, the more you theorize about a specific problem, the less reality-as-other-people-see-it will accommodate your views.
But being interested broadly in philosophy can very much help. Again, this depends on what someone takes "philosophy" to be.
Sure.
The problem is when other philosophies come in and entrance people, such as followers of Mises or Hayek. I think there is some sophistication in this school of thought. I think a lot of it is wrong, but once people get into it, it's hard to get out.
But the same thing can be said about the left and Marx.
Mark Blyth says that socioeconomic problems are always explained in terms of the chosen solution.
The chosen solution is an idea that was in the back burner waiting for a catastrophe to solve.
The opposing view is that mass events are fusions of diverse agendas and historians draw in ideas over the facts for the purpose of a meaningful narrative. I believed this until I read Mark Blyth's view.
Hence, the need for philosophical style approaches to the matter...
That's another question altogether.
However, if the issues of not caring about those over whom an individual wields such power are clearly presented as such and supported by what's actually happened, is happening, or what the individual wants to happen, then in a democratic form of government, the citizens remove those people from power by virtue of voting against them or voting for people who will remove such people from power, should they not be elected officials, but some other private individual offering a public good or service in the American marketplace.
Of course, free and fair elections are totally dependent upon a well informed electorate, and that seems to be a major problem nowadays.
Notice how, when Boris and Biden got together to admonish him over climate change, it was portrayed as "Hey look! Our PM got to sit with the Big Boys!"
It seems obvious that the best strategy for any healthy society is cooperation not competition, because the latter inevitably seems to cause conflict. But it also seem to be the case that some people are naturally more competitive than others. One of my dogs is more competitive than the other. I think that can just be down to natural diversity. The same goes for aggression and compassion. I don't believe human natures in all their differences and similarities are entirely socially constructed.
Sure. You have heard the apocryphal Indian myth of one's soul being like two wolves? Which do we feed?
Seems as there is much need to build the common wealth.
Sure, but you can't force philosophy on people. France has philosophy taught in school. I think that's a good idea, but do you think France is a better society for it? I'm not sure.
Quoting creativesoul
True.
Yes, I think that it is about juggling so many factors and it would depend on what group of philosophers. It is not as if they agree, and even though the philosophers are important, would this exclude those in related fields, such as the social sciences and humanities? Another problem is that if it were philosophers, or even other academics, they might be elite, and lack diversity of race, gender and other aspects of difference, so it would seem that these factors would need to be taken into account. Aspects of inequality are on many political agendas, but thinking of solutions is an ongoing process.
Also, it would depend on what countries were involved, because there are such varying politics and social circumstances. If it was international we would end up with all kinds of conflicts, and I am not sure that a one world government would work.
For this reason, I think that the idea of philosophical plumbing is a useful concept, and even the questioning of the social contract is an interesting area for thinking about, but the reality is so much more complex. Hopefully, the ideas of the philosophers can be of importance, and part of the problem is that such ideas are marginalised anyway. But, I think that while social change is important and worth thinking about, it is more of an organic process.
Nor need we force anything on anyone...
Governmental policy is all about what ought and/or ought not be done. Politics is all about government. All political positions on the role of government are inherently philosophical. Thus, whenever a politician(or anyone really for that matter) openly degrades philosophy, they ought very well be taken to task.
What can be done is provide the American public with an accurate timeline of events showing which policies resulted in unwanted consequences for Americans overall, and which politicians voted for those policies, as a means to produce a well informed electorate.
The problem is that philosophy is not a monolith; so it might not be all that easy to decide who is "degrading" it. If philosophy is being degraded it is always according to some perspective or other. The right might accuse the left of degrading philosophy when they advocate social security and universal healthcare, for example, because such things do not accord with their philosophical vision of how society ought to be.
Quoting creativesoul
You would need to get consensus on what constitutes "unwanted consequences". You would already be assuming a particular vision in order to determine that.
My advocacy of individualism is only to the extent that the individual has the right to hold opinions and positions that may be very different to mine, with the caveat being that they should not be anti-social. I don't agree that the sovereignty of the individual extends to the point where he or she can be said to owe nothing to society, since that would be absurd, given that all individuals depend so much on society, if they don't choose to live in the wilderness.
It's useful to have some idea or orientation in mind, while being aware that in some crucial respects some of our ideas will be way off the mark in relation to how other people react to them.
The issue I'm not clear on, which you discussed quite well, is that I'm not sure what is specifically philosophical about critiquing, say, the idea of the social contract. David Graeber was an anthropologist, and he also mentioned the same thing, in less detail though.
It's not that reading or thinking about matters in a broad manner isn't helpful, on the contrary, it can be a heuristic, if nothing else. But currently -I'm not as confident on this as I used to be - I'm not sure what's specifically philosophical about critiquing these ideas.
On the other hand, if the critique is based on a tradition such as the skeptical, empirical or rationalist tradition, or pragmatism, then I do see the philosophy.
He as actually a committed anarchist too.
I know. He did extremely interesting work. It was so sad when he died out of the blue really.
What I think could become very complicated in this discussion thread is if the idea of philosophical plumbing, and the social contract, lbecomes a general discussion about how philosophy should be a basis for changing politics. I think that is far too wide because there are so many philosophical perspectives and individual voices, but we will have to see how Banno wishes to develop the thread really. It may be more of a brainstorming exercise, but I thought it the focus was intended to be more of a critique of Midgely's idea of philosophical plumbing.
If the discussion is about philosophical plumbing, I think that, so far, it points to how complicated it is, especially in relation to the idea of the social contract. It seems like trying to remove the pipes and cut off the water supply if it simply about trying to overhaul the social contract, which is more of an implicit assumption. I am sure that the social contract is problematic because it has not been negotiated fully, but if it was just replaced with one that is decided by a group of people, we would end up with something which may be artificial, and I am sure that it would end up needing to be worked upon. So, I think that the idea of philosophical plumbing is best seen as a metaphorical one for thinking about ways to improve upon ideals, especially in the application to politics.
Yeah, good point. It can get too wide for the purposes of this thread.
It is a good metaphor and I think that it is ripe for much speculation based on the idea of plumbing, as in how philosophy could be used as a replacement for religion, which is to say open to mysticism or profound experiences albeit within a roughly rational context.
No I mean, her approach looks to me to be quite solid. It's just that based on what it says, it's hard to know what to do next.
Sometimes, a language, despite its immense capabilities, lacks the word that matches the feelings/ideas going through our hearts/minds and then, what usually happens is we choose (have to) the next best word. I believe the concepts rhetorics and art are like that - they're good, good enough, as they say, for government work but deep down, we know they're not it.
Mind you, I'm not saying that you're off the mark (inaccurate); all I mean to say is there's room for improvement.
All that said, I suppose we're on the same page.
Another advantage is that it helps combat concept fetishism. You can point at the concepts of philosophy as tools, as means to an end. So the next time some guy tells you that a given concept is illegitimate or inappropriate and that you really shouldn't use it, remember the plumber comparison. Only a very confused plumber would waste his time telling OTHER plumbers to NEVER use a wrench, because wrenches are "unclear". And if a plumber would try to cancel the wrench, other plumbers would just ask him: "what do you replace it with? Do you have something better to propose?"
Part of my series: Fake philosophers - how to spot them and avoid them.
Ah, I know what you mean. Ball-cocks or float-valves are sometimes call ball-valves, but not any more it seems.
I agree that her approach does seem solid. I think that what her metaphor does point to is the importance of rethinking of basic concepts, and it is at this level that philosophy can be important, even though the practical applications of ideas is so complex. Replacing the idea of the social contract may not be completely possible because it is an implicit assumption, but fuller consideration of such an idea does mean that more thought can be applied to what is happening in social life.
This may enable the questioning of the underlying ideological narrative structures, and contribute to the evolution of ideas about the practical aspects of living in social groups. But, on a funnier level, perhaps we don't really wish, in becoming plumbers, to just end up in the toilets and urinals of philosophy, but rise to the heights of best ideals about living.
Surely we don't want that. :)
They are necessary and we cannot live without them and art has been made of toilets and urinals. So maybe we need newer redesigned models, which are more reliable and visionary in scope: beautiful toilets and beautiful philosophy.
Or maybe we could speak of architecture instead.
You are fine to speak of whatever metaphors you wish, but I just think that Midgely's plumbing one gives so much scope. The reason for this it draws on ideas of dirt and cleanliness. My own feeling is that in the history of philosophy we had a puritanical strand, arising from Kant. Then, we had the whole exploration of taboos in the advent of psychoanalysis, which was drawn upon in postmodernist philosophy.
But, I don't wish to draw out the plumbing imagery and sidetrack from the point about ideas of a social contract. But, I am about to log out shortly because I am so hot that my hands are too sticky to hold my phone to write.Besides, I don't wish to dominate the discussion, especially as I love playing with metaphors and imagery. For the time being, I will let you and others get on with the hardcore excavation of concepts at the architectural level.
Nothing in individualism forbids addressing moral issues. And I would think any ideology that emphasizes the moral worth of individuals necessarily considers others, each with their own lives, personalities and dignity.
Thinking collectively is worthwhile for ease of thought and economy of language but piss poor for addressing moral issues. Once one starts thinking collectively he does so abstractly, considering the thoughts in his head long before manifesting any concern for the flesh-and-blood human beings outside of it. At any rate, it does not not follow that thinking generally, pluralistically, collectively leads to concern for others. More often than not it has led to the in-group/out-group, "othering" type of stuff as collectivist ideology has consistently proven.
It only can be seen as a problem when one has already made an incipient , perhaps only vaguely articulated step beyond the borders of the old conceptual scheme. The explanatory power of the old scheme represses the discovery of anomalies. Potential internal inconsistencies seem mere errors in interpretation. But eventually the very success of the worldview plants the seeds of its destruction.
Seems to me I need to make the point again. Morality is not about collectives, it's about the Other. The poverty of the myth of the individual is that it just fails to address the Other, and so fails to enter into moral discussion. Self-interest cannot form the basis for morality, because morality begins when one puts the interests of an Other ahead of one's own interests. In this sense individualism is the antithesis of morality.
The Other is not a collective; it is the person before you, now. The plurality is not a collective, but the Other.
It just ain't always so. Preemptively assuming that it is so doesn't look a good policy.
That's an elegant way to put this, B.
On the contrary, Žižek is quite well known within left academia in the US. Just look at the amount of speeches he's given at US Universities and several left leaning channels.
Of course, this doesn't mean he gets into "mainstream" news, but hardly any leftists get exposure in CNN, MSNBC and the like. Sometimes such figures appear, but briefly and are usually quite hated, like Sanders was before Biden beat him.
Žižek's problem, as I see it, is that he suffers from quite serious problems in terms of scholarship. He often cites dubious sources - random tabloid magazines - or he makes up stories. I've seen several instances, after having watched too many of his conferences. He for example says that Israel is one of the most "aethistic" countries in the world, which is false.
He's said he's spoken to Chomsky by phone, which is not true. He reviews movies he has not watched, which is misleading and so on.
This doesn't meant he is not worth listening to. He is and is also quite entertaining. But I'd take him with a grain of salt.
Quoting Manuel
Oh, perhaps you are right, but I'm not sure that matters. Random tabloid articles and fictitious accounts are the tools of the iconoclast. Žižek uses them to set out the ideologies he seeks to undermine. His application of Hegelian dialectic is second to none.
He's perfectly fine for ideas. And his documentaries are quite entertaining, aside from his books.
While philosophers might explicitly address the myths and ideologies the rest of us take for granted, there are others who do the same, if perhaps less directly. It's the domain of art, or humanities more broadly, to contextualise the assumptions we make and hence to put them to the test. More effective examples that philosophy can be found in journalism, comedy, activism, authors of fiction, and advocacy than in philosophical dialogue.
So while at first I was gladdened to see a defence of the need for philosophising, I don't think Midgley succeeds in her defence. Philosophy remains unavoidable rather than necessary or useful
I believe that she does provide a useful metaphorical perspective for reflection. However, it has its limitations, in translating it into specific analysis. It is a memorable discussion and next time I have a blocked drain, I will probably think of philosophical plumbing.
:100:
We ('merica, 'Stralya, Britain)
Straya*
What is it, then, that is at least sufficient to cause the unavoidedness of philosophy? Seems to me if philosophy remains unavoidable, it is necessarily so.
Quoting Banno
Perhaps because philosophizing is more an egotistical desire, than a pathological need.
Quoting Banno
If there are logically coherent moral discussions predicated on the individual alone, then they are not necessarily myths. If such discussions have no need to address the Other because it is concerned with the individual alone, it is not a poverty by exclusion, but a consistency with it.
The necessity for inclusion of the Other in moral discussion makes explicit moral judgements are at least meaningless, and at most impossible, by an individual with respect to himself alone, an absurdity for which no one has argued successfully.
Rhetorically speaking.....
Individualism is the anthesis of collectivism, not morality. It also stresses that others have self-interest too, not to mention rights, feelings, desires, volition, autonomy, and often competing moralities. Anyone devoted to "The Other" might try remembering this before he ingratiates himself before another's self-interest, that is if he is still able to distinguish between one "Other" and the next.
I think the problem has to do with the notion of the domain of the philosopher.
Quoting Banno
Although these are not what is generally thought of as the domain of the philosopher, the are not devoid of reasoned thought and self-reflective deliberation.
I agree with her criticism of academic philosophy and like the metaphor of plumbing, but I think the idea of calling a professional philosopher to fix our thinking the way we would call a professional plumber to fix the pipes is a bit comical. A professional plumber will fix the pipes, I am not sure a professional philosopher will fix anything.
A "professional philosopher" is a hidden oxymoron. A philosopher is a lover of wisdom and therefore necessarily an amateur.
The only professionals in philosophy are academics, and nobody would call an academic plumber to fix their pipes; you need an experienced practitioner.
So, what seems to be the problem?
Just checking.
Hence my comment:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting unenlightened
The problem is the notion that an academic/professional philosopher is going solve our problems. There is no reason to think that they are better qualified than others.
Nuh. In Canberra, we pronounce the "L".
Blasphemy.
I agree philosophy is unavoidable.
I have just come across a review of a republication of Mary Midgley' s final book, 'What is Philosophy For', by John Shand, in 'Philosophy Now' (June/July 2021), so I thought that it may be relevant to your thread discussion.
I believe that the book was her final one, written at age 99. Shand suggests that her view is that 'philosophy stands at the apex of the multitude of ways that we can think about the world because it lays out how these ways of thinking about the world and about our ways of fitting into it'. Midgely's philosophy has
'two functions, somewhat related. One is to create some kind of ordered whole for thought. The other is to work against being locked into one viewpoint such that we cease to consider all others. This does not mean that we accept all the views as equally justified or true- it's not an open door for relativism- but it does mean that we know how to place our views within a greater structure.'
Shand argues that Midgely's philosophy is about
' taking up and talking in two hands and talking and encompassing both which is the role of philosophy, allowing us to think about a problem in a more illuminating way, rather than futilely and battering away from one position.' This idea certainly makes sense to me, because it does seem that many people get locked into one mode of thinking, like a form of tunnel vision.
In criticism of Midgely's perspective, Shand suggests that one problem of her thinking is that 'she seems unable to pull off what she advocates', and this could be seen to apply to the idea of philosophical plumbing, in that it is not sufficiently analytical enough. However, what Shand is pointing to, and what I would agree with, is how her outlook is useful for considering the basis of how we approach and frame ideas, from narrow to larger pictures.
We were taught in highschool that philosophy is about how one thinks and talks about things, not about coming to definitive conclusions about things.
Lyotard has a theory according to which there are essentially just two periods in cultural history: classicism and modernism, one repeatedly following upon the other, as a reaction to the other. So if the Ancient Greek culture was classicism, the Ancient Roman culture was modernism, and so on.
The classical periods are exemplified by stability, certainty, order, moderation (e.g. Ancient Greek, Classicism, Realism), while the modernist ones are exemplified by lack of stability, doubt, excess (e.g. Ancient Roman, Baroque, Romanticism, Postmodernism). (Of course, the names of the cultural periods will vary somewhat depending on the specific country/culture one observes.)
He hadn't read much of Greek history, then.
Poorly worded on my part. I meant only to note that many many politicians will degrade a position by calling it "philosophical' or 'in theory' or words to that effect/affect.
Just sayin'.
I would submit we ought start by eliminating the infinite regresses, starting with empiricism. It seems like there are no perfect sources or ways to look and absorb knowledge directly. If the truth of complex things are not simply the product of manifest truth then why does philosophy concern itself with over simplifications of the world. But, in a non-dogmatic sense. A lot of things are obvious and don't benefit from volumes of semantic analysis. Is that the direction the essay intended to point?
*shrug*
In other news I did finally get an important looking piece of paper from a degree granting institution, so thanks for the assist.
But congratulations, a worthy achievement.
If (conceptual) confusions could be sorted out, they would've been by now - philosophers have been at it, day in day out, for now 2.5k years - and since they're still around, alive & kicking, in texts, audio, videos, it means we have a wicked problem on our hands. We'll just havta learn to live in this mess of a house, oui mon ami? Some of us will die, others will go cuckoo, still others will suffer, but that's just life! C'est la vie!
That's right, we ought not limit our investigation of such problems just to "science or religion". The majority of "conceptual confusions" which we tend to take for granted, but are massive logical cesspools, leaky as a sieve, and spewing waste over the entire planet, are to be found in mathematics.