God as the true cogito
The shape my four year old drew without a ruler, is imperfect as a triangle. Some would argue it's not even a triangle at all. Resembling a perfect triangle (being an imperfect triangle) and being a true triangle (a perfect triangle) are two different truths.
A) Whatever's perfectly x, is indubitably x (an imperfect triangle's triangularity can either be rejected or doubted. A perfect triangle's cannot).
B) Whatever's perfectly existing, is indubitably existing (just as whatever's perfectly triangular, is indubitably triangular).
We know what it is for x to be perfectly triangular. What is it for x to be perfectly existing? To be, is to exist (to be an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human, is to exist as an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human. Denying this would be both logically and semantically inconsistent). Thus, to be imperfect, is to exist as an imperfect being/existent. An imperfect triangle exists imperfectly as a triangle and as an existent (better triangles and existents than it can be conceived of).
Nothing is better than a perfect triangle when triangularity is the reference or standard. When goodness is the standard, nothing is better than the real God or a really perfect existence. I do not want a pretend/imaginary god on my side because he cannot sustain a really perfect existence for me to exist in. Real good/benefit is better than pretend good/benefit, and pretend evil/harm is better than real evil/harm, unless of course one wants Hell (it takes absurdity/irrationality/insanity/evil to want this). When existing is the standard, nothing is better than God. It is better to be the real God than to exist as just an illusion/image of God (the real God is better than all humans or image/imaginary/pretend gods). We are meaningfully/semantically aware that something perfectly/indubitably exists, semantics dictate that this is the real/true God (of which there can only be one. You cannot have two really/truly omnipotent beings).
Just as we cannot reject three-sidedness as being a semantical component of triangle, we cannot reject existence and realness as being semantical components of God. It is contradictory/irrational to have contradictory (semantically-inconsistent) beliefs.
For more on the above: http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2021/05/03/the-image-of-god-the-true-cogito/
A) Whatever's perfectly x, is indubitably x (an imperfect triangle's triangularity can either be rejected or doubted. A perfect triangle's cannot).
B) Whatever's perfectly existing, is indubitably existing (just as whatever's perfectly triangular, is indubitably triangular).
We know what it is for x to be perfectly triangular. What is it for x to be perfectly existing? To be, is to exist (to be an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human, is to exist as an imaginary human, dream, or "real" human. Denying this would be both logically and semantically inconsistent). Thus, to be imperfect, is to exist as an imperfect being/existent. An imperfect triangle exists imperfectly as a triangle and as an existent (better triangles and existents than it can be conceived of).
Nothing is better than a perfect triangle when triangularity is the reference or standard. When goodness is the standard, nothing is better than the real God or a really perfect existence. I do not want a pretend/imaginary god on my side because he cannot sustain a really perfect existence for me to exist in. Real good/benefit is better than pretend good/benefit, and pretend evil/harm is better than real evil/harm, unless of course one wants Hell (it takes absurdity/irrationality/insanity/evil to want this). When existing is the standard, nothing is better than God. It is better to be the real God than to exist as just an illusion/image of God (the real God is better than all humans or image/imaginary/pretend gods). We are meaningfully/semantically aware that something perfectly/indubitably exists, semantics dictate that this is the real/true God (of which there can only be one. You cannot have two really/truly omnipotent beings).
Just as we cannot reject three-sidedness as being a semantical component of triangle, we cannot reject existence and realness as being semantical components of God. It is contradictory/irrational to have contradictory (semantically-inconsistent) beliefs.
For more on the above: http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2021/05/03/the-image-of-god-the-true-cogito/
Comments (109)
Maybe we are God on a higher level, as some monistic traditions claim. And as implied in the OP title.
We must be more perfect than the god we think / feel.
I think what we have here is the conflation of two distinct ideas that overlap. The idea of God is the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Such a being will be perfect. But it does not follow that a perfect being is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. So, God is perfect, but there can be perfect beings who do not qualify as God. If that is correct, then the idea of God as an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being is not equivalent to the idea of a perfect being. The category of perfect being is larger than the category of omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.
This is important, it seems to me, in undermining your argument (though perhaps not decisively). For what your case seems to depend on, is the idea that existence is a perfection. But even if that is true - and I am not sure it is - that would not show that God exists, rather all it would show is that one way to be perfect includes existing.
If instead we focus on the idea of God - not the more expansive category of perfect being - there seems nothing in the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that essentially involves existence. Someone who wonders if that idea of God has anything answering to it in reality is not confused, even if careful reasoning will reveal that a definitive 'yes' answer can be given to it. And so there seems nothing in the bare idea of God that forces one to acknowledge his existence. Or so it seems to me.
Indeed, it seems to me that reflection on the idea of God reveals that if God exists, God exists contingently and not of necessity. For the idea of God is the idea of a person who can do anything. And a person who can do anything can destroy themselves. Thus such a person does not exist of necessity, but contingently. That is, if they exist, it is possible for them not to. Doesn't that show that the idea of existing is not contained in the idea of God? For if it were, then we would have a contradictory idea on our hands, for it would be the idea of a being who both must exist, and does not have to exist.
The most effective refutation of such kinds of ontological arguments that I know of is the one invented by Kant: existence is not a predicate, or if you prefer Frege: existence is a second order predicate.
If that is true, then it makes no sense to think of existence as a “quality which is better to have”:
[quote= Martin Gardner]Suppose I express my idea of ??a blue apple by painting a picture of five blue apples. I point my finger at it and say, "This represents five blue apples." If later I discover that blue apples really exist, I can still point to the same picture and say, "This represents five real blue apples." And if I can't discover the existence of the blue apples, I can point to the painting and say, "This represents five imaginary blue apples." In all three cases the picture is the same. The concept of five real apples does not contain one more apple than the concept of five possible apples. The idea of ??a unicorn will not get more horns just because unicorns exist in reality. In Kant's terminology, one does not add any new properties to a concept by expressing the belief that the concept corresponds to a real object external to one's mind.[/quote]
Here is a (short) explanation of Frege's criticism
[quote=Wikipedia]The devil corollary proposes that a being than which nothing worse can be conceived exists in the understanding (sometimes the term lesser is used in place of worse). Using Anselm's logical form, the parody argues that if it exists in the understanding, a worse being would be one that exists in reality; thus, such a being exists.[/quote]
This can be reduced to "Whatever is existing is indubitably existing" and therefore it has no informative value as it is a tautology. (The "Whatever" can be perfect, imperfect, green, married or statuesque, it is existing. Its quality has no bearing on the fact that it exits, once it has been established that it exists.)
Take the cogito. That's an ontological argument. Not for God, but for you. From the idea of your self you can conclude that you exist. The idea of my self could not exist absent me, thus if I have the idea of my self, I exist.
Anyone who seeks to dismiss all ontological arguments is, then, misguided from the get go. For some of them - such as that one - clearly work. I really can conclude that I exist from my possession of the idea of my self.
Obviously there are lots of ideas for which this does not work. THe idea of an apple, for instance. Nothing in the idea of an apple seems to entail that the apple exists. And if we make the idea more complex, such as the idea of an existent apple, then though one cannot entertain that idea without taking the apple to exist - for it is the idea of an existent apple - nevertheless the idea of existence can be separated from the idea of the apple.
The question, then, is whether idea of God - that is, the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being - is more akin to the idea of the self, or more akin to the idea of an apple.
No, the thought of my self - so, the idea of my self - is an idea that cannot be entertained absent the existence of the self in question. And thus it is an idea that, if you have it, you can know has something answering to it. Thus you can know that you exist. Not jsut someone. You.
Descartes' point - later on - is that the idea of God is like this too. So the cogito is an ontological argument par excellence and sets the stage for the divine ontological argument that follows.
Quoting Bartricks
No, the point is that it's challenging the idea that it is better to exist than not to exist, since we naturally think that such a devil would be worse if it existed.
It is complemented also by the “no devil corollary” and the “extreme no devil corollary”:
[quote=Wikipedia]The no devil corollary is similar, but argues that a worse being would be one that does not exist in reality, so does not exist. The extreme no devil corollary advances on this, proposing that a worse being would be that which does not exist in the understanding, so such a being exists neither in reality nor in the understanding. Timothy Chambers argued that the devil corollary is more powerful than Gaunilo's challenge because it withstands the challenges that may defeat Gaunilo's parody. He also claimed that the no devil corollary is a strong challenge, as it "underwrites" the no devil corollary, which "threatens Anselm's argument at its very foundations".
Quoting Bartricks
How do you know that? Can you prove this claim?
If it works, then a maximally bad being would exist. That's what it would establish. And so it wouldn't challenge the idea that a maximally good being exists. Existence makes a good thing better, and a worse thing worse.
Quoting Amalac
I know it because I can prove it (in the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' sense of that term). There is only one way in which a being can be omnipotent: the being in question must be the arbiter of the norms of Reason, for otherwise they will be constrained by them, and only a being unconstrained by such norms can do anything and everything. Thus an omnipotent being will be the author of the norms of Reason - she will be Reason, that is - and as such she will also be the arbiter of good and bad, for what it is for something to be good is for it to be approved of by Reason, and what it is for something to be bad is for it to be disapproved of by Reason. Thus, an omnibenevolent being is a being who is fully approved of by Reason. Reason will fully approve of herself, for she is omnipotent and so if there was any aspect of her she disapproved of, she could change it. Thus it is beyond a reasonable doubt that an omnipotent being will also be omnibenevolent.
This is neither Descartes' or Anselm's ontological argument. Their instincts and intentions may have been right, but their execution not through enough.
I think the argument presented in the OP is solid and clear. Its rejection leads to inconsistencies in semantics. Plus, the link adds more detail to this if you are at all interest in a truly perfect existence.
If you say exactly which specific part you disagree with, I believe I will show you that your disagreement will lead to a contradiction in semantics.
If one is sincere to the semantics that they are aware of, then they are not insincere to the truth. We are aware of the semantic of triangle. We are obliged to acknowledge that three-sidedness is a semantical component of the semantic of triangle. Similarly, we are obliged to acknowledge that reality and existence are semantical components of God, or a truly perfect existence.
We can compare how good something is in terms of triangularity by comparing it to a perfect triangle.
We can compare how good something is in terms of goodness by comparing it to God. Why else do you think semantics are such that true perfection = a truly perfect existence or God? Can you deny this? Can you say there are better things than a truly perfect existence or God? You cannot, just as you cannot deny the three-sidedness of a triangle.
These are the dictates of pure reason and semantics. We do not create semantics, we access them. It is nature of that which truly/perfectly exists (God) that allows us access to an infinite number of semantics.
One just has to be sincere to the semantics that they are aware of without bias and prejudice.
If you think there is/exists something better than God or a truly perfect existence, then you should serve, commit or worship that. But you will not find such a thing.
You can doubt yourselves (check Descartes' cogito's flaws), but you cannot doubt that which perfectly exists. Semantics/reason dictate that this is God (or a truly perfect existence. God and a truly perfect existence amount to the same thing).
We know what it is to be perfectly triangular. I then asked "what is it to perfectly exist?" and the answer is clear:
Real good/benefit is better than pretend good/benefit, and pretend evil/harm is better than real evil/harm, unless of course one wants Hell (it takes absurdity/irrationality/insanity/evil to want this). When existing is the standard, nothing is better than God. It is better to be the real God than to exist as just an illusion/image of God (the real God is better than all humans or image/imaginary/pretend gods). We are meaningfully/semantically aware that something perfectly/indubitably exists, semantics dictate that this is the real/true God
The only people who think being evil is perfection, are those who are absurd/evil/contradictory/inconsistent/incoherent. Only an idiot/fool would want to be pig-like as opposed to god-like. And only an idiot would favour an imperfect existence over a truly perfect existence.
Only one thing is truly existing. The link has more info on the OP if you are interested.
If x is not omnipotent and omnipresent, then x is not a perfect being (or perfectly existing), because better being/existents than it can be conceived of.
Either you recognise this semantically, or don't. If you don't recognise it, then I cannot convince you. But I don't understand how you can say x is truly perfect despite x lacking absolute freedom (omnipotence).
Quoting Philosopher19
That’s quite the jump there, if you are trying to argue that God’s existence is analytic, that could only happen if God was a being whose essence involves his existence, his essence being all the predicates that could be truly asserted of him, these being God’s perfections (otherwise if I take your argument literally I can just say: it would be better for God to exist, but unfortunately not all great things are the case in this world).
This sort of argument fails if existence is not a predicate, for in that case “existence” cannot be predicated of God, therefore it can’t be part of God’s essence and the argument is invalid.
See my other post you ignored here:
Quoting Amalac
I'm well aware of Kant and Descartes. But my argument is different. You are not addressing my argument directly. Quote something directly from the OP and show a problem with it if you are able.
1) Do you think it's better to be in a truly perfect existence or not?
2) Do you think it's better to be God or not?
You cannot say no to 1 and 2 without contradicting or being insincere to the semantics that you are aware of.
"existence is not a predicate" is not a refutation of what I have presented. When I say to you what perfectly exists or what is perfectly triangular? You can answer both. A perfect triangle regarding the latter, and a perfect being/existent regarding the former. To reject the latter or the former, is to contradict the semantics that you are aware of.
Descartes seemed to want to reject pantheism. So he did not equate God with Existence. And given the confusion of western philosophers with regards to the semantic of being and existence, they did not provide a complete ontological argument.
The reason you can tell that x is better than y in terms of triangularity, is because x is greater in resembling perfect triangularity (or a perfect triangle).
The reason you can tell that x is better than y in being/existing, is because x is greater in resembling a perfect being.
It’s not random or magic that you can tell which is a better triangle
It’s not random or magic that you can tell which is a better being.
Good and evil is not a matter of randomness or magic. Evil is that which is insincere to truth, goodness, and God.
Any given theory or belief or statement that is contradictory (semantically-inconsistent), is contradictory or false by definition/semantics. It’s just the way existence is. Anyone who believes in that which is contradictory is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable/evil.
I strongly recommend the link in the OP. I believe it makes this matter (the difference between the true cogito and Descartes') more clearer.
Well, no, I don't believe there exists something better than god, nor there exists a god, for that matter. Quoting Philosopher19
It's the treating existence as a predicate that gets me; saying something exists is not like saying it has three sides. That's why existential quantifiers are not first-order predicates.
Quoting Philosopher19
...or logic, it appears.
Obviously yes, but I don't see how you go from that to «therefore God exists», since you say your argument is not like Anselm’s, or Descartes’s, or Leibniz’s...
Quoting Philosopher19
What do you mean by “perfectly existing”? I understand how a shape could be perfectly triangular (in our minds), but not how something could be “perfectly existing”. Either a thing exists outside the mind or it does not. If God did exist, then he would not exist more “perfectly” than I would (since all that means is that God exists both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind, just like I). It is not comparable to triangularity because there are no degrees of existence outside the mind as there are degrees of a shape approaching an ideal triangle.
You could say God would have a more perfect existence than I in the sense that he would be better than me, but then you are no longer talking about a quality of “existence” in the same sense in which you were talking about a quality of “triangularity” which doesn't involve a perfect triangle being better (morally) than an imperfect one, you are just equivocating the meaning of “perfection”, it seems to me, and so your analogy breaks down.
Triangularity and existence/being/existing are both meaningful, and I believe I have been sincere to those semantics.
If I asked you what's perfectly triangular, an objective answer can be given.
If I asked you what's perfectly existing/being, again an objective answer can be given.
1) Do you acknowledge that it's contradictory to say x exists perfectly when x is not God (or a truly/really perfect existence, or at least existing in a truly perfect existence)?
2) Do you acknowledge that whatever's perfectly x, is indubitably x? Thus, whatever's perfectly existing, is indubitably existing?
Again, Descartes' cogito showed that we cannot be sure of our own being/existence. Yet we cannot deny being/existence. I think the OP and the link provided sheds light on this issue.
Do you agree with the following:
To be an imaginary human, is to exist an imaginary human?
To be a human on planet earth, it to exist as a human on planet earth?
Do you agree that to be imperfect as a triangle, is to exist imperfectly as a triangle?
Do you agree that to be imperfect as a being/existent, is to exist imperfectly as a being/existent?
Note that you cannot say to be a square-circle, is to exist as a square-circle. Such a thing is impossible. Absurdities and contradictions exist, but what they describe (round squares) does not. By definition that which is contradictory is absurd or not true of existence.
If you want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:
Triangle = that which has three sides with its interior angles totalling 180 degrees.
Perfection = that which is perfect. The perfect being. That which perfectly exists.
It is not us who exist. We are sustained by existence (or that which completely/truly/perfectly/indubitably exists). We can doubt ourselves as being/existing perfectly, but we cannot doubt existence as being/existing perfectly.
If you don’t want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:
An imperfect triangle is a triangle, it’s just not a perfect triangle. You cannot doubt the latter's triangularity.
A human is still a being, it’s just not a perfect being. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.
A contradiction is still a being/existent, it's just not a perfect being/existent. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.
It's a common objection; from Kant, who is certainly not my favourite philosopher; and via Frege to Russell and Lewis.
It's your topic - I assume you are familiar with this objection?
Quoting Philosopher19
So, perhaps you are hinting at Alexius Meinong's distinction between existence and being (I'm going to charitably assume that), in that case I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist. If that's what you mean then yes, I agree.
Quoting Philosopher19
Yes, that's another way of saying the same thing.
Quoting Philosopher19
Things with imperfect triangular shapes exist.
Even if triangles existed outside our minds, as platonists hold, they would be ideal triangles, not imperfect ones.
Quoting Philosopher19
Once again, if you are following Meinong, all you are saying is that unicorns have being but don't have existence, since they only exist in the mind, whereas I have existence since I exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind.
Quoting Philosopher19
They have “being” in Meinong's terminology, yes (though this is a little more dubious).
Quoting Philosopher19
No, you are now equivocating “is” as a copula and “is” as a synonym of “exists”.
Yes, and I believe I addressed it.
Where? I went looking and could not see mention of predication. You did say: Quoting Philosopher19
...which seems to me to conflate the first order "triangles have three sides " with the second order "triangles exist".
Help me out here.
How is that not contradictory?
Does a Sherlock Holmes exist on this planet? Unknown (very unlikely).
Does a Sherlock Holmes at least exist as a character (perhaps in a story)? Yes.
Is Sherlock Holmes an imperfect being/existent? Yes.
Quoting Amalac
If we take the absolute approach (no degrees), then no, you don't have existence. Descartes' I think therefore I am established that something indubitably exists. It did not establish that that thing was him. (Hence why I have titled this thread God as the true cogito).
If we take the non-absolute approach (varying degrees), then imperfect triangles and perfect triangles are both triangles. But perfect triangles are maximally triangular. They cannot be any more perfect or complete in terms of triangularity. Here you do not reject the triangularity of any triangle.
Imperfect beings (Sherlock and Biden included) and God are both beings. But only God cannot be any more complete/perfect as a being. Here, you do not reject the existence of any meaningful thing/existent/being.
Either we take an absolute approach with regards to existence, or we take a non-absolute approach. If we do the former, then only one thing truly exists: God (see the OP for this). If we do the latter, then any given meaningful thing exists (including Sherlock Holmes and unicorns). This is a predicate of all meaningful things because we can compare them to absurdities such as round-squares. Whilst absurd concepts exist, what they describe does not exist. On the other hand, meaningful concepts exist (as well as what they describe).
To say "existence is not a predicate" is to say what is contradictory. It implies that the semantic "existence" does not say anything about a particular concept. The concept of "round-square" is absurd. Why is it absurd? Because round-squares do not exist (or are not true of existence depending on how you want to word it). They do not take the predicate of existing in existence[/I] or [i]being related or tied to existence.
Quoting Philosopher19
There's nothing contradictory about it (though the way Meinong expressed his ideas is peculiar).
But since it seems like that's not what you are talking about, I'm going to translate it so as to make it clearer: What we are interested in here is existence outside the mind, right? So in that sense, a merely imaginary man does not exist, and neither does a unicorn.
And it seems you are again confusing “is” as a copula with “is” as a synonym for “exists”: when saying “Sherlock Holmes is an imaginary character” that does not imply that one assumes that Sherlock Holmes exists in the same way I do.
Quoting Philosopher19
When most people talk about existence, it is usually implied that it is “outside the mind”. At any rate, Sherlock Holmes certainly does not exist in the same sense in which I exist.
Quoting Philosopher19
If we use Meinong's terminology, then yes, I do have existence. If you are not using that terminology, then clearly you are assuming here that existence is a predicate (“I have/ don't have existence”) and can therefore be refuted by Kant's objection.
All that “I have existence” (in Meinong's sense) means is that I exist, nothing more and nothing less. No degrees of existence involved here.
Quoting Philosopher19
It established that thoughts exist (meaning: “there are thoughts” or “thinking is happening”), not that God exists.
Quoting Philosopher19
There are only 2 degrees of existence according to this “approach”: existing in the mind, and existing outside the mind, there is no other level of “perfection of existence”. So if God exists outside the mind, then God's existence is more “perfect” than the existence of a unicorn because unicorns don't exist outside the mind, but his existence is not more “perfect” than mine because I too exist outside the mind.
Plus:
Quoting Amalac
I said it is not a first-order predicate - you know, it's second order, predicating over other predicates, like in predicate calculus. No contradiction - standard practice since at least Frege.
Quoting Philosopher19
SO things are absurd because they do not exist? But that's not right, since three-dollar notes do not exist, but are surely not absurd.
Much better to suppose that the notion of a round-square is a contradiction, and hence cannot exist. that is, the revers of your proposal - round square do not exists because they are absurd.
That way we can have things that are not contradictions but nevertheless do not exist.
SO again, existence is a second-order predicate, but you treat it as a first-order predicate.
(oh - and that first paragraph - what was that about? was it intended for @Amalac?)
So you say:
[i]I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist.[/I]
Going by the non-absolute standard:
You're saying the imagined human does not exist. Which means that the human I just imagined now does not exist as the human I just imagined now. Do you see the contradiction? If I imagined a unicorn, then the unicorn I imagined existed when I successfully imagined it. For you to say "no, that unicorn did not exist" is for you to say that there did not exist a unicorn that I imagined (which is contradictory given that I successfully imagined one).
Quoting Amalac
I am interested in having a semantically consistent belief system or philosophical theory. Either one takes the absolute approach (only God truly/indubitably exists), or the non-absolute approach (many things exist). If I've understood you right, you seem to have opted for the latter, but somehow rejected God's necessary existence in the process, whilst acknowledging your own being as amounting to existence, or meaningfully/semantically qualifying as existence. This is the equivalent of accepting an imperfect triangle's triangularity, yet rejecting a perfect triangle's triangularity. Such a move is contradictory (semantically inconsistent).
If Descartes' cogito showed us anything, it's that we cannot be certain of our own existence. But reason/semantics dictate that we cannot reject the existence of existence. So whilst we recognise that we can doubt our own being-ness, we cannot doubt the being-ness or existence of that which perfectly exists. Semantics dictate that this is God (as demonstrated in the OP).
I believe the link in the OP illustrates this truth further with greater depth and breadth.
The mind is not independent of existence (or that which perfectly exists). The semantics that the mind has access to mean what they mean and they should be treated as such. That which perfectly exists, should be treated as that which perfectly exists. To say a perfect being/existence does not exist or is not real or the reality, is to contradict the semantics that the mind is aware of.
Quoting Amalac
No it can't. If you can't meaningfully distinguish between a perfect being or existence and an imperfect being or existence, then you could say "existence is not a predicate". But you cannot do this.
That which is perfectly triangular is triangular.
That which is perfectly existing, is existing.
In the above two sentences, both existing and triangular are predicates. That which perfectly exists, and that which is perfectly triangular are both objectively meaningful.
Three dollar notes exist (not in your mind or my mind because we (or our minds) are not the sustainers of an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. God is. We just have access to these semantics or hypothetical possibilities that existence (God) sustains or grants us access to, kind of like a computer having access to the internet, yet not being the sustainer of all the files available on the internet). Three dollar notes are hypothetically possible, which means they exist as hypothetical possibilities in existence). They do not physically (by our standards of physical) exist in the America of our what we call our waking reality or timeline or universe as far as I am aware. Round squares do not exist at all. Finally, existence/God is omnipresent. He sustains all realities/possibilities. His non-existence is as contradictory as a triangle's two-sidedness. He is necessarily at least as real as us (just a a perfect triangle is necessarily at least as triangular as an imperfect triangle), because that which perfectly exists (the omnipresent) is necessarily at least as real as us. We cannot say reality exists independently of existence (and only God can meaningfully/semantically qualify for the semantic of existence in an indubitable or absolute sense).
Quoting Banno
That leads to contradictions when you take the non-absolute approach (many things exist). It will not lead to contradictions when you take the absolute approach (only that which perfectly exists, actually exists. That being God).
Perhaps you meant that they are possible.
But you haven't addressed the criticism from Kant, you've gone off on a tangent instead. Your notion of existence is at odds with the whole of mathematical logic.
There may be a view that being omniscient and/or omnipotent is not a feature of the perfect being. We, humans, assume that; but it can't be proven, therefore it is not a matter of truth, but a matter of human opinion acquired by human intuition.
Where did you get that? It's simply not true. You certainly exist; I certainly exist; we are one and the same? Then how come we disagree?
One can make the point another way. God does not have to be perfect. For the concept of God is the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Whether having those properties makes one perfect is a matter an omnipotent being would have control over - and so it would be beyond a reasonable doubt that they would be - but still, it would remain possible for God to be God and not be perfect and for a perfect being not to be God, and thus once more you cannot get from a perfect being's existence to God's existence.
Do you accept that an omnipotent being does not exist of necessity, but contingently? Reflection on the concept of omnipotence reveals this - for being able to do anything includes being able to destroy oneself - and so someone who denies it is not really thinking of God.
But if you acknowledge that God exists contingently, then it is hard to see how you can get from the concept of God to his reality.
God's omnipotence is going to block your path everytime. For in effect ontological arguments are attempts to show that God 'must' exist. But that is to suppose that reality forces existence upon God - that there is some supreme law of laws that determines his existence and that you are trying to uncover - which of course it does not do, for the order of dependence is the other way around. God does not 'have' to do anything, as reflection on the concept reveals. And there is no law that God is subject to. All laws are subject to God, not God to them. And thus understanding God means understanding the hopelessness of trying to show otherwise.
Ontological arguments are not doomed to fail in all cases, or indeed any case but God's (ironically). We are not omnipotent and so that is why we can conclude that we ourselves 'must' exist if we have the idea of ourselves (and thus that the idea of one's self is one that we can conclude has something answering to it). But even the cogito fails in God's case. That is, there is one being who does not have to conclude he exists if he has the idea of himself: God. For once more, God can do anything. And so though you and I must conclude we exist if we think of our selves, God does not have to.
I think I have addressed Kant. Again, what I am proposing is not what Descartes proposed.
I make a distinction between that which perfectly/truly exists and that which does not. Descartes did not do this. Descartes just assumed that it's better to exist. The first time I saw Descartes' ontological argument, I got could see something, but I could also see that his argument was not right. I liked his cosmological argument much more and I cannot believe how lazy western philosophers were in addressing that argument.
Given a truly perfect existence, it's better to not exist if one is evil because perfection entails that evil really suffers. But given our lack of omnipotence, it's not us who decide who lives and who dies and who dreams of what and who suffers what nightmare.
Also, if you are interested, have a look at my reply to Amalac here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/545714
or follow the link in the OP for a greater illustration of what it is to indubitably/truly exist.
if x is possible, then x exists as a hypothetical possibility. if x is perfect, then x exists perfectly. One cannot doubt the existence of that which perfectly exists. One cannot doubt that existence encompasses/sustains all realities (if we are to differentiate between realities). One cannot say x is independent of existence when x is not an absurdity (like a married-bachelor).
If x is not omnipotent and omniscient, then x is not truly free. Nor is he able to ensure that everyone gets what they truly deserve. If x is not omnipotence and omniscient, then a truly perfect existence is impossible.
There is no way you can describe x as being really perfect without describing it as being really/truly omnipotent and omniscient. There is no way you can describe x as being a really perfect existence, without x being completely real. Real good is better than imaginary good. And imaginary evil is better than real evil (unless of course, one is evil. Only evil/irrational people would say real evil is better than imaginary evil. In that sense, real evil is better for evil/irrational people, because that is what they have sought. And even if they have not sought it, it is what they deserve.
My focus here is on what is rational and what is irrational. What is semantically consistent, and what is semantically inconsistent.
Quoting god must be atheist
I get your instincts on this. But do you agree that it is not us who instantiate existence (as in do you agree that we are not our own sustainers and that we are contingent on a self sustaining thing/being/existent?). And do you agree that we can doubt ourselves as being who we think we are (we cannot say with certainty that our world is truly real. We cannot say with certainty we are who we think we are).
Consider following the link in the OP. Alternatively, look at the problems with Descartes' cogito (though I advise the former). At the very best, you can say that both you and I (whatever or whoever we may be) belong to that which perfectly/indubitably exists. You cannot doubt that the existence of that which perfectly exists (just as you cannot doubt that the triangularity of that which is perfectly triangular).
We do not instantiate existence (contrary to mainstream solipsism), and when we take an absolute approach, we are not that which indubitably exists (contrary to Descartes' cogito).
If x is not perfect, then x is not the true/real God. You cannot be lacking in might and call yourself THE God. x might call himself a god if he thinks he is the most powerful person on the plant, but x would not be the true God because he lacks power.
God is that which no greater than in being/existence/existing can be conceived of (not unlike how a perfect triangle is that which no greater in triangularity than can be conceived of)
Answer the question: can an omnipotent being make anything perfect?
God cannot create himself. God cannot create an omnipotent being. God cannot create a round-square or a married-bachelor.
Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable
Creating round-squares, or creating God is not something that is doable, therefore, it is irrelevant to omnipotence.
Who decides what everyone truly deserves? A perfect decision maker. The perfect decision maker also makes the rules of how to decide things.
In this sense there is a system which is governed by a director, who makes up the rules, and expects compliance with the rules. However, if you yank this decision maker out of his position, and put in his place a different decision maker, who has different criteria and rules for what's expected and how to reward the achievers, then you have a different system which is equally as perfect, except it's different. It's not different from the first one in perfection, but the rules and the system of rewards are different.
And let's say our system is perfect: let's assume that given how it operates, the rewards are given to the best possibility of the perfect giver and judge.
But if you introduce a different judge with a different set of expectations and a different set of rewards, you may have an equally perfect system, and the two can't battle it out.
Yet in your definition perfection is that which is the greatest. Well, given two or more equally great systems, neither or none of them are greater than the others.
God can do anything. A being who can create himself is more powerful than one who can't. So you are profoundly confused if you identify omnipotence with the latter and not the former.
Is it doable to move any amount of weight? Yes.
Is it doable to create a weight that is so heavy that it's not movable? Yes.
So if the perfect thing can move the weight, he fails in the doable creation.
So if the perfect thing cannot move the weight, he fails omnipotence in the doable action of moving the weight.
Omnipotence in and by itself is a construct that is self-contradictory, therefore impossible.
This precision-truth renders this of your claims false, since one of the criteria can never be attained:
Quoting Philosopher19
I just showed you that your thing you call god is not perfect, because he is not omnipotent; and as he is not omnipotent, he is not perfect, because the perfect existence is impossible.
But wait! You defined "perfect" as the "greatest of which none is better." So if god can't have omnipotence, and nobody else can either, then god can still be the best and greatest than which none is better.
So you are back in square one, if you only would be willing to throw out the "omnipotent" bit.
You cannot have more than one perfect being because you cannot have more than one omnipresent being.
I think you fail to treat contradictions as contradictions, and as a result of this, you present contradictory objections as though they are non-contradictory objections.
I suggest you consider the following:
http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2020/08/12/the-first-item-of-knowledge/
Yes, but only for non-God beings.
Any weight that any non-God being can lift, God can lift that weight plus more. So God can create a rock so heavy that you cannot lift, but neither you nor God can create a rock so heavy that He cannot lift. A rock so heavy that God cannot lift is as absurd as an omnipresent rock. Here's a passage from one of my posts:
Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable (completely perfect/absolute power/freedom). That which is Omnipotent cannot be expected to "create a round square" because creating a round square cannot be classified as a doable thing. Since it is not a doable thing, it is irrelevant to Omnipotence. For something to be meaningfully classed as being doable (and therefore expected of an Omnipotent being to be able to do), it must at least be meaningful (semantically consistent). If one absurdly insists that an Omnipotent being should be able to do absurd things like create something from nothing, or create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift, or move forwards and backwards at the same time, then the absurd answer of "yes he can", can be given. Maintaining such absurd standards, one can then go on to insist that they have made sense of "an Omnipresent rock", "a rock so heavy that an Omnipotent/Omnipresent being cannot lift", "round squares", "1 + 1 = 3" etc. and then use them in "rational" discourse as though they are meaningful objections.
Link:
http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2021/04/03/why-it-is-impossible-for-gods-attributes-to-be-contradictory/
Anyway, you're profoundly confused about the nature of omnipotence and your proof of God does not work for reasons I have already explained to you.
Since when? This you declare categorically, without any proof or attempt at it.
But an omnipotent being can make a non-doable into a doable. Otherwise he or she is not omnipotent. An omnipotent can do a round square, easily.
You grossly underestimate the quality of omnipotence, my dear friend.
Why not? You come out with these cockamamie declarations that 1. don't make sense 2. don't have any reference and 3. don't have any proof.
If we followed your argument style, we could say that god is not omnipotent, not just, not anything.
Well, you can't argue, because you expect us to take and accept your haphazardly constructed baseless claims, so in turn you must accept OUR haphazardly constructed, baseless claims. Fair is fair, my only true friend.
If you think creating round squares is "something" that an omnipotent being should be able to, then consistency would have you believe that geometry should encompass "shapes" like triangular pentagons or round-squares.
Quoting Bartricks
We cannot have a meaningful/rational (semantically consistent) discussion if we accept contradictory statements (semantically inconsistent statements) as being meaningful (semantically consistent) objections.
Because it is semantically inconsistent for there to be two omnipresent beings. For there to be two omnipresent being, non-existence would have to separate them. In order for non-existence to separate them, non-existence would have to exist. Non-existence existing in contradictory. Hence why existence is infinite and omnipresent. This is why an infinite number of hypothetical possibilities or semantics are in existence. A finite existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of semantics.
Quoting god must be atheist
See my reply here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/546051
Quoting god must be atheist
If that's how you feel, then I don't think there's any point in you and me discussing the OP any further.
I shan't even try to add anything. This is perfect as it is.
I especially love this sentence:
A finite existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of semantics.
This is not a feeling, my only true friend. My remark was a reasoned opinion. There are no feelings involved in there at all.
. Cogito is that whose nature knows limitation ...
. God ... not the theological one ... that one ... is just mind projection ... a mythical creation of Man ... but Godliness ... the quality of divinity ... is that whose nature is boundless ... whose nature cannot be defined ... whose nature is ... therefore ... the unnameable ... and God ... are one ... an unity ... an oneness ...
. Therefore ... Cogito and God ... are ... diametrically opposite realities ...
. One exists ... God ... while ... other ... is a mind's creation ... a mind's projection ... Cogito ...
. God is a presence, not a person. Hence all worshipping is sheer stupidity. Prayerfulness is needed, not prayer. There is nobody to pray to; there is no possibility of any dialogue between you and God. Dialogue is possible only between two persons, and God is not a person but a presence – like beauty, like joy.
. God simply means godliness. It is because of this fact that Buddha denied the existence of God. He wanted to emphasize that God is a quality, an experience – like love. You cannot talk to love, you can live it. You need not create temples of love, you need not make statues of love, and bowing down to those statues will be just nonsense. And that’s what has been happening in the churches, in the temples, in the mosques.
. God is the ultimate experience of silence, of beauty, of bliss, a state of inner celebration. Once you start looking at God as godliness there will be a radical change in your approach. Then prayer is no more valid; meditation becomes valid.
. Martin Buber says prayer is a dialogue; then between you and God there is an “I-thou” relationship – the duality persists.
. Buddha is far closer to the truth: you simply drop all chattering of the mind, you slip out of the mind like a snake slipping out of the old skin. You become profoundly silent. There is no question of any dialogue, no question of any monologue either. Words have disappeared from your consciousness. There is no desire for which favors have to be asked, no ambition to be fulfilled.
. One is now and here. In that tranquility, in that calmness, you become aware of a luminous quality to existence. Then the trees and the mountains and the rivers and the people are all surrounded with a subtle aura. They are all radiating life, and it is one life in different forms. The flowering of one existence in millions of forms, in millions of flowers.
. This experience is God. And it is everybody’s birthright, because whether you know it or not you are already part of it. The only possibility is you may not recognize it or you may recognize it. The difference between the enlightened person and the unenlightened person is not of quality – they both are absolutely alike. There is only one small difference: that the enlightened person is aware; he recognizes the ultimate pervading the whole, permeating the whole, vibrating, pulsating. He recognizes the heartbeat of the universe. He recognizes that the universe is not dead, it is alive.
. This aliveness is God! This aliveness is awe ... Tao ...
First of all, regarding your argument, one must keep in mind that it
"can be linked with a realist view of God only via platonic metaphysics, which takes a realist view of abstract entities. Take it out of that context, and it does not imply a realist view of God at all. On the contrary, it suggests that God is just ideal." (Cupitt, Don. Taking Leave of God)
In addition, one must be careful in the discussion that value judgments do not unintentionally and secretly sneak into the whole thing without being justified.
Quoting Philosopher19
The question is also whether your four-year-old had the intention of drawing a triangle. One can only argue about whether the drawing is a triangle if it was intended to be a triangle. Perhaps the drawing perfectly represents some other geometric figure. Maybe a whole new geometric figure that your four-year-old has earlier formed a definition for in her mind.
Resembling a perfect triangle is not necessarily identical to being an imperfect triangle.
If it was never meant to be a triangle, what entitles you to claim that it is objectively an imperfect triangle. A true triangle is given if it was intended to be a triangle and if it conforms to the general definition of a triangle without being too meticulous or splitting hairs.
Quoting Philosopher19
The jump from A) to B) is problematic. Because triangularity is a property, existence may not be one. At least it is controversial. So your proof of God is based on a controversial premise. It is also based on a specific Platonism, which can be rejected outright. In addition, existence is probably neutral to perfection. Indeed, you should define your basic concepts like existence beforehand.
Quoting Philosopher19
This phrasing could create misunderstandings. To be an imaginary human is to exist in the mind or imagination as a property of the mind or imagination. To exist as an imaginary human sounds as if there is a human who perhaps exists as an imaginary human. But this is nonsense. Because the question what exists as an imaginary human is obviously odd. One would have to rephrase the question to make it appear reasonable.
The expression: to be an imaginary human is no better and equally misleading. It makes it seem as well that a subject can be an imaginary human. But this is also semantically nonsensical. An imaginary human is an image, a representation of a subject. But itself is not a subject.
Quoting Philosopher19
‘Good’ is an adjective. The notion of pure goodness is linguistically tempting to take it as a real thing. It was introduced into philosophy by Plato, who places the Idea of Good at the summit of the metaphysics of his Republic. The notion was severely criticized by Aristotle.
Your argument should first of all prove the existence of a Platonic "heaven", then it must clearly define its concepts and then one can see further.
Then what I should have said is if that's what you call reasoning...
I'm not trying to discuss religion here (though I value religion). Just matters of pure reason.
We can doubt ourselves, but we cannot doubt God's existence. This is the only thing I'm trying to highlight here.
My argument is purely focused on semantics. If x is a contradictory (semantically inconsistent) belief/theory/statement, then x is certainly false and we are rationally obliged to recognise it as being false and treat it as such. Realism and plato take nothing away from this rational obligation of ours.
Quoting spirit-salamander
If x is existing, then it has the property of existing. Is it not contradictory to say x is existing, but it does not have the property of existing?
Quoting spirit-salamander
Again, to me, if rejecting x results in a contradiction or inconsistency in semantics, then I'd see myself as being rationally obliged to acknowledge x as being true. Where you view existence as a property, the OP demonstrates that God certainly exists. I don't see how you can reject existence as being a property. Also, I'm not trying to advocate a theory of forms here. I'm trying to highlight that the following beliefs are contradictory:
1) God does not exist.
2) God is not at least as real as we are (there is nothing more real than that which perfectly exists because it encompasses and sustains all lesser realities/beings (imperfect beings/realities or non-God beings).
Quoting spirit-salamander
To be an imaginary human is to exist at least as a hypothetical possibility in existence. Santa is a hypothetically possible being (as opposed to a necessary one). Whether he is in our world/universe or not, is another matter. He (or something that resembles him) may be in dreams that some people have.
That which perfectly exists sustains all hypothetical possibilities, realities, worlds/universes and so on. There is nothing more real than that which perfectly exists because it encompasses all realities and hypothetical possibilities.
We are not the sustainers of the items of thought we imagine, or the dreams/nightmares we have. A finite being or existence cannot sustain an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. Only an infinite being/existence sustains an infinite number of semantics or hypothetically possibilities.
Doesn't follow. Again, you don't seem to understand what omnipotence involves. It doesn't involve actually making round circles or actually making the law of non-contradiction false. It involves having the 'power' to do those things.
So, the law of non-contradiction is true. Okay? It is 'true'. Not false. True.
But Reason - whose law it is - can make it false. She has the power to rewrite any and all laws of Reason, for they're her laws and that's how they became laws in the first place.
So, a square circle is not currently a thing, because Reason forbids it from being so. But precisely because that is why it is not a thing, Reason and Reason alone has the power to make it a thing and make one. See?
And that's why meaningful discussion is possible: for I am not saying taht any of the laws of logic are false, rather I am saying that there is one amongst us who has the power to make them false, and that person is Reason herself, who is God.
What you are doing in trying to show that God exists of necessity, is offending God. For you are saying that she 'must' exist - that there is something higher than God that keeps her, indeed forces her - into existence. And that's very, very confused. ANd like I say, heretical. You have actually made her less powerful than yourself in an important respect, for you can take yourself out of existence whereas you're insisting that she cannot. How offensive is that? And how silly is that - how silly to think that God can't take herself out of existence if she so wishes. And how silly - and so obviously contradictory - to think that being constrained by logic makes one more powerful than a being who is not so constrained! The absurdity is so absolute it hurts. And the irony - it is you, matey, not I, who is violating the law of non-contradiction.
I have explained why your ontological argument fails, and why any ontological argument for God will fail. It fails, for God does not exist of necessity but contingently.
We'll have to agree to disagree.
I refuse to agree with you. I don't see you as having a choice in this matter. This is why I suggested that we agree to disagree. If I choose to disagree with you and you do not choose to agree with me, then we either agree to disagree, or we continue to discuss. But I am refusing to continue to discuss.
How you interpret your empirical experiences, is your responsibility. It is not my concern.
Man's perfectibility - if we limit what we will to what we know we will never err. An immortal thinking thing with Descartes method for solving for any unknown will in time will unerringly.
Knowledge of perfection - Descartes argues that the idea of perfection cannot come from something imperfect. But note in the Fifth Meditation he argues that God's non-existence would be to lack a of perfection. The idea of perfection then can, and in fact does, arise from imperfection. We see that a thing is not perfect because it lacks something. We do not need the idea of perfection in order to see that something is not perfect.
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm not sure how you came to this conclusion. The OP shows that God's non-existence is as semantically/meaningfully contradictory as a perfect triangle's non-triangularity.
It is only meaningless if you begin by defining God as perfect.
You define something other than God as a perfect being/existent without running into contradictions (if you are [I]meaningfully/semantically[/i] able to), and you will have proven the following wrong:
Only God (the infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent towards good, omnimalevolent towards evil) is truly perfect (or exists perfectly).
Defining something into existence is frivolous, but I will play along. Since nothing constrains God's existence there is nothing to prevents the existence of an infinite numbers of Gods.
You don't define something into existence. You simply acknowledge the existence of that which perfectly exists. You don't define something into being triangular. You simply acknowledge the triangularity of that which is perfectly triangular.
Quoting Fooloso4
You cannot have more than one existence. For you to have more than one existence, non-existence would have to separate one existence from the other. Non-existence existing is contradictory. Thus you cannot have more than one existence.
You cannot have more than one perfect being because you cannot have more than one omnipresent or omnipotent being (both omnipresence and omnipotence are semantical components of being perfect, just as interior angles adding up to 180 degrees is a semantical components of being triangular).
No, you don't. But that is exactly what you are trying to do.
Quoting Philosopher19
But you can have more than one thing that exists.
Quoting Philosopher19
You do not know that perfect thing exist anywhere but the imagination.
Quoting Philosopher19
Perfect triangularity is either a hypothesis or part of a formal system.
Quoting Philosopher19
That is an assertion. You require your perfect, omnipotent God conforms to logic and the limits of your understanding. You seem to be using spatial terms for something that does not have a spatial dimension.
EDITED.
When I say 'existence' I am referring to that which is omnipresent. Non-existence has never existed and will never exist. You are not existence nor do you sustain it (contrary to solipsism). You are sustained by existence. You are sustained by God. You are contingent on God. Existence = the existence of God and only God. This is when you take semantics in an absolute manner.
If you take semantics in a non-absolute manner, then all meaningful things exist, but only God exists in a real and complete manner. A perfect triangle is really triangular, an imperfect triangle is not really as triangular. The perfect being is really existing, an imperfect being is not as real in its existing. That which is completely/perfectly triangular is at least as triangular as an imperfect triangle. Correction, only that which is completely/perfectly triangular is really triangular in an absolute sense. Nothing else is really triangular. In comparison to God, nothing else is really real/perfect/complete/good.
Quoting Fooloso4
Then you have not understood the OP. I know that that which exists perfectly exists omnipresently, and I know that only God is omnipresent.
Quoting Fooloso4
The semantic of triangle is the semantic of triangle. Again, if we are to be non-absolute with our semantics, we can talk about varying degrees of triangularity and being. If we are to be absolute with our semantics, then only God (that which perfectly exists) exists, and only triangles (that which is perfectly triangular) are triangular.
Quoting Fooloso4
Depends on whether you take the absolute approach to semantics or not. If not, then yes, but this does not change the fact that God is more real in its existing than you or any one or any thing/existent else. If you take the absolute approach (which is what you should do), then only God exists. You are just sustained by His existence. It's not your existence or reality (contrary to solipsism), it's God's. You are a part of it.
Quoting Fooloso4
I am being sincere to my awareness of the semantic of true perfection (of which omnipresence and omnipotence are both semantical components of). If you do not recognise this semantic or are unaware of it, then we cannot discuss it.
Unfounded assertion on top of unfounded assertion does not amount to more than a bunch of unfounded assertions.
Your notions of meaning and existence do not correspond to anything other than what you imagine they must be, as if, because you have convinced yourself of the truth of such matters therefore that is the way things must be.
They don't, but they give you an ontological basis. Otherwise, according to an extreme skepticism of language, your argumentation might proceed only in your head without any correspondence to experienced reality.
You will not be able to deny that you believe in a real given pure semantics of a logical language, which dwells in a kind of separate world, a realm of meanings.
Your appeal to semantic consistency must somehow be supported by something platonically real. Because, as already indicated, without Platonism your arguments could be pure subjective fantasies with abstract words, pure tautologies and pure hypnotically conditioned word superstitions.
Quoting Philosopher19
I don't think it's contradictory. I can say that object X has many color properties and also say that object X exists precisely because I am perceiving it. Properties are predicated, existence is indicated. Two different things.
Quoting Philosopher19
Aristotle (Analytica posteriora, 92bl3f) thinks that existence cannot be a characteristic of being because it applies to everything that is there.
Aristotle says:
‘since being is not a genus, it is not the essence of anything.’
‘existence can never belong to essence; being can never belong to the essence of a thing’
So the definition of a thing and the proof of its existence are two different and eternally separated things.
Quoting Philosopher19
So you believe in Meinongian nonactualities. From these non-actualities you get to God. And they are justified in this way:
Quoting Philosopher19
I would dispute the latter: namely, that there are an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. There is only a limited number currently in the minds of all humans or perhaps extraterrestrial intelligent life forms.
Do I understand your concept of existence correctly? That which actually exists, or synonymously, perfectly exists, or exists at all, is that which exists completely independently and self-sufficiently? Humans would not exist perfectly because they would be dependent on something. The most imperfect existing would be the completely dependent one. Is that your definition? If not, please give us a clear definition of (perfectly) existing.
Since you attach great importance to semantic consistency, perhaps you can bring your proof of God into a formal structure like 1. or A) to 2. or B) with the conclusion: Therefore there is the perfectly existing, which we call God.
Because your explanations seem to be a little chaotic and not quite comprehensible for a non-initiated person.
You wrote:
Quoting Philosopher19
I have replied:
Quoting spirit-salamander
You seem to be saying that to resemble a perfect triangle is to be an imperfect triangle.
I say that this may be true only subjectively, but not objectively, because the resembling may not represent a triangle at all. You haven't said anything about that yet.
We'll have to agree to disagree.
Is it not the case that any given theory, belief, or statement that is semantically inconsistent (contradictory) is false by definition? Can you give me an example of something that is contradictory, yet not impossible or false at the same time?
Quoting spirit-salamander
Is non-existence not devoid of the property of being/existing? Can you give me any thing that is an x, that does not have the property of being an x?
Quoting spirit-salamander
Right, and if you tried to perceive of a round-square, what happens? You fail because round-squares do not exist in any way, shape, or form. Which means that they do not have the property of existing in any way, shape or form.
You do not say a triangle is not a shape (or does not have the property of being a shape) just because the semantic of 'shape' encompasses the semantic of 'triangle' (as well as all other shapes). The semantic of existing/existence encompasses all meaningful things (including the object X which you perceived). I think you are rejecting the semantic of existence as being a property just because it encompasses ALL meaningful things (shapes included). Not only is there no need to do this, but doing so results in contradictions. I do not think rejecting existence as being a property to be a semantically consistent move.
Before I address any of the other points in your post, I think it most efficient that we clear up this key issue first because everything hinges on this and we have not yet agreed on it.
In general, I agree with you, although in the history of philosophy there has always been a dispute about what is semantically inconsistent and what is not. But keep in mind, some say that there can be no fixed rules for the correct, i.e. absolutely correct use of language. They might say that logic is based on the law of contradiction, but contradiction exists only in words.
Quoting Philosopher19
There is a theological doctrine or model of God that says that He is a divine simplicity, which means that He has no distinct properties. Omnipotence would be the same property as goodness. Or to put it in other words: being omnipotent and being good would be different senses for the same property:
"Our minds can only have a clear grasp of intellect, power, goodness, etc., as distinct attributes, since they exist distinct from one another in the things of our experience. But in God they exist as one: God’s power is His intellect, which is His goodness, and so forth[.]" (Feser, Edward - The last superstition: a refutation of the new atheism)
For our mind such a teaching is contradictory, but nevertheless not necessarily false and impossible.
Hegel apparently raised contradiction to an ontological principle:
"For Hegel, all finite concepts are inherently ‘contradictory’ because they are always partial and one-sided and usually derive their meaning from opposed ideas." (The Hegel Dictionary - Glenn Alexander Magee)
"Hegel also often speaks not just of thought as involving contradiction, but reality as well." (The Hegel Dictionary - Glenn Alexander Magee)
So there are at least different views on this topic.
Quoting Philosopher19
Here the mistake is committed to regard non-existence or nothingness as a real, actually available thing. But the non-existence simply does not exist. So non-existence or nothingness is neither devoid of the property of being/existing nor not devoid of the property of being/existing. I think you are making the mistake of reification. You seem to equate the nothing with the something. You probably believe that there is no thing without its corresponding word and no word without its corresponding thing and therefore the thing designated by nothing must also be something. But I hope you agree with me that it is really quite childish to conclude from the existence of a concept or word the reality of the thing that has been thought in the word. Accordingly, non-existence cannot be understood as an imperfect existence or as the most imperfect existence. To understand it nevertheless in such a way is clearly semantically and logically inconsistent.
Quoting Philosopher19
Indeed, there are those who clutter ontology with entities such as The False. Thus, they believe that false propositions also hang around in an extra-temporal realm, that is, somehow exist. This is just to be said by the way. You are right, I cannot successfully perceive a round square, yet the false idea of one exists in my mind. Or to accommodate you, I say that the false idea has the property of existing in my mind, even if this sounds semantically weird. But a visually round square can never exist. That is true.
Quoting Philosopher19
I agree.
Quoting Philosopher19
What do you mean by meaningful things? Do you want to say that existing beings exist, which would be a pure tautology? Do you understand by existence the epitome, the totality of all being (all existing things)?
Quoting Philosopher19
Can you make a case for this, perhaps using Kant's thalers as an example?
"A hundred real thalers do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers" (A599/B627, AW 822a).
"We do not add anything to a concept by claiming that it exists. Thus, Kant mentions the 100 thalers. Kant says that the real and possible thalers must have the same number of thalers in order that the concept be the concept of that object. If there are more thalers in the real thalers, then the concept and the object would not match. So, we do not add thalers when we mention that the thalers exist."
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Modern_S10/Notes/28-Kant5n.pdf
Still, I think you should put your argument into some kind of syllogistic framework so that people can see more clearly what you're getting at.
I don't think that from your own definition of everything you can clearly and unquestionably prove that God exists. I certainly think that definitions contain only concepts of our head, but that our head grasps many things that do not exist. Therefore, I do not see how to come from your concept of everything to the existence of God.
The conclusion from the existence of a concept to its real existence ist just false. From this language superstition then quite logically the ontological proof for the existence of God has emerged. One abstracted further and further, one generalized further and further, until one arrived at the empty or absolute concept of essence or being; and this very emptiest concept should still be brought under the concept of cause, the existence should be cause or effect of being. It is really inconceivable.
I also agree with Michael Martin's following critique of the ontological proof of God:
"Mackie has suggested that even if one grants that existence is a property and is part of the intrinsic greatness of God, the argument does not work. Anselm appears to suppose that the fool's concept is that of a nonexisting being than which no greater being can be conceived, where the entire italicized phrase represents the content of his concept. Given this concept and the assumption that existence is part of the intrinsic greatness of God, the fool does indeed contradict himself. However, the fool need not and should not conceptualize the situation in this way. The fool may simply have the concept of a being such that no greater being can be conceived. He does not include nonexistence within the concept, although he believes that the concept has no application in the real world. Viewed in this way, the fool does not contradict himself. But can the fool afford to admit that existence is part of the concept of a being such that no greater one can be conceived of? There is no reason why he cannot admit this, for he can still insist that such a concept has no application to reality. To put this in a different way, the argument can be undermined by noting the following: Suppose the fool admits that existence is a property of an entity, that existence would add to the greatness of any being, and that God is a being such that no greater being can be conceived of. The fool could say definitionally that God exists in reality. Or to put it in still a different way, "God is nonexistent" would be a contradiction. But the fool would not be forced into admitting that God in fact exists in reality and not just in his understanding. He could insist that the following is not a contradiction: "It is not the case that God exists" or "There is no God."
To say something exists definitionally and not in fact means that by virtue of the way a certain concept is defined, existence is part of the concept. For example, one can define a Loch Ness monster as a large sea animal that inhabits Loch Ness and define a real Loch Ness monster as a Loch Ness monster that exists in reality. Such a creature would then exist definitionally, since existence would be part of the definition of a real Loch Ness monster. But whether a real Loch Ness monster in fact exists is another question. Further, it would be a contradiction to say that a real Loch Ness monster did not exist. But one would not be uttering a contradiction by saying: "It is not the case that a real Loch Ness monster exists" or "There is no real Loch Ness monster." Similarly, if the fool said that God exists definitionally but not in fact, he would in a way be acknowledging Anselm's point that God exists by definition while insisting that the concept that includes existence need not apply to the real world." (Michael Martin - Atheism)
Quoting Philosopher19
You did not write this to me, but I still have a question. Doesn't that imply that everything that is not God does not exist, thus is nothingness?
I studied philosophy at university, and the thing that I notice now that I did not notice as much back then, is that western philosophers do not seem to treat absurdities as absurdities as forcefully as they ought to. By this I mean some will entertain or accept something like Pyrrhonian scepticism as a form of "scepticism" despite it being as contradictory/absurd as something like multishapism "geometry" (mutishapism "geometry" deals with the study of "shapes" like round-squares and triangular pentagons). Any rational person ought to treat that which is absurd as absurd. Unknowns are unknowns (is there is a 10th sense?) and absurdities are absurdities (round squares). This distinction is clear. Thus, our obligations are rationally clear. If we clearly recognise that rejecting belief x is contradictory, then we must acknowledge belief x as certainly true.
Quoting spirit-salamander
But if this is contradictory, then it is surely false and therefore surely impossible to be real in any way, shape, or form. One is not maximally good in an absolute sense if one is not omnipotent. But clearly, the attributes of omnipotence and goodness are not the same, nor are the attributes of creativeness and infiniteness. If divine simplicity states that they are the same, then divine simplicity is clearly absurd (not meaningful or understandable) and must therefore be rejected.
Quoting spirit-salamander
I think this statement is contradictory. We cannot recognise something as being contradictory, yet at the same time, consider it as not being impossible. If x is contradictory, it is certainly impossible. No two different attributes can be the same attribute. No one thing can be two different things at the same time. No x can be not x at the same time. Nothing can sit and stand at the same time etc. These are all clear impossibilities. Whether or not something with a 10th sense exists or not, that is an unknown. Absurdities should be treated as absurdities, and unknowns as unknowns (just as triangles should be treated as triangles, and not as squares).
Quoting spirit-salamander
Contradictions and absurdities and lies exist, what they describe does not. There are no contradictions in reality (this is understandable). Now consider the alternative: There are contradictions in reality (is this understandable for one to say they have meaningful understood it?). One cannot see a round square, and one cannot understand reality as being contradictory.
I'm not sure what example Hegel has produced to justify such a statement, but even if he had, he could not have understood the statement because it would be contradictory.
Quoting spirit-salamander
Yes, but we must not allow ourselves to view a view that is contradictory, as being a reasonable view. The irrational and the rational are not the same. No psychologist or scientist would adopt a clearly contradictory theory (unless they were irrational), yet to my understanding, this is happening in mainstream philosophy and maths (see how mathematicians reject the set of all sets).
Quoting spirit-salamander
I mean anything that is not contradictory or unknown. Round squares do not exist in any way. Unicorns exist at least as hypothetically possible beings. A 10th sense is either an absurdity, or it is at least a hypothetical possibility (we don't know which), but that which is omniscient does.
Existence exists everywhere. Thus, existence (or that which is omnipresent), exists [i]necessarily[/I], as opposed to just a hypothetical possibility. This is because existence (that which is omnipresent) encompasses and sustains all realities and worlds. Unicorns and humans don't have the same ontological necessity as the omnipresent or existence. It is that which perfectly exists that is necessarily absolutely real, whereas unicorns do not perfectly exist, so they are not necessarily absolutely real. They are not perfect beings and there is only one perfect being. That being God.
Because I take the absolute approach, I describe God as instantiating existence, and unicorns as being in existence (as in it is possible for existence to produce and sustain unicorns, but it is not possible for existence to produce and sustain round squares). We must rationally account for why existence is such that round squares are clearly absurd, and why unicorns are not. And the only explanation is that it's just in the nature of existence...that nature being perfect (infinite and omnipotent). A perfect existence accounts for all semantics (including perfection and imperfection, infinite and finite), and imperfect existence cannot account for all semantics (hence why it is contradictory to view existing as finite or imperfect). In an imperfect existence, perfection would be as impossible and absurd as a round square, yet, we recognise that round square is absurd, whilst perfection is clearly meaningful (as is infinity despite us not being infinite). We cannot reject attributing infiniteness and perfectness to existence without running into clear contradictions.
Quoting spirit-salamander
Pretend/imaginary money and real money (real in terms of what we call our waking physical reality) are both in existence. If we take the absolute approach with regards to semantics, then neither the real money or the pretend money are themselves existing because they are sustained by God (which truly exists. Self-exists or is self-contingent). So here, existing or existence is still a property (one that only applies to God).
If we take the non-absolute approach to semantics, then both the pretend money and the real money have the property of existing purely because they are both meaningful. Anything that is absurd (like round-squares) is devoid of the property of existing. Or if I am to put it in the absolute way, is not true of existence. It is not true of existence that it is finite. It is not true of existence that it encompasses round squares in any way, shape, or form. It is true of existence that it can produce unicorns (because existence is infinite. A finite existence cannot accommodate an infinite number of hypothetical possibilities or semantics. And it is contradictory to say x is hypothetically possible and yet not hypothetically possible at the same time. Again, we must account for why unicorn is meaningful, whilst married bachelors are not. I think the conclusion is clear. It's all down to the nature of existence).
Quoting spirit-salamander
If we take the absolute approach, then only God is existing because God is instantiating existence. We are in existence, but we are not existence because we do not instantiate it. But I recognise the difficulty in saying x does not exist when x is not a contradictory thing. But what the flaws in Descartes' cogito conveys, coupled with what the OP proposes, is that if we are to be certain of the realness or existing of anything, it is God. Everything else could be a dream, or just not truly real. By semantics/reason, God is necessarily existing and real (we are not necessarily real and existing like God is).
Quoting spirit-salamander
Give me an example. Because if you take the absolute approach, then only God qualifies as really or certainly existing. And if you take the non-absolute approach, then God is the most real existent (see my point about omnipresence encompassing all realities). The concepts in our head are not sustained by us. The concepts in our head do not pop in and out of existence because it is absurd for x to enter existence from non-existence, or to exit existence into non-existence. Thus, we simply access, or focus on one or more of an infinite number of concepts sustained by existence (God's existence to be more precise).
Quoting spirit-salamander
None of this applies to the OP. Both Descartes and Anselm took existing to be a good thing without justifying this move. I do no such thing. I ask what perfectly exists, and I provide the answer, and that answer is God (or a truly perfect existence). This is different to saying it's better to exist than to not exist, therefore God exists. Given God, if one is evil, it is better to not exist than it is to exist because a truly perfect existence is such that potent evil suffers Hell. God Punishes evil (perfection) and Rewards good (perfection). Clearly, it is better to not exist if one is evil. Or simply, it is better to not exist if one is going to be miserable and depressed, and this will never change. Thus, it's better for evil to not exist. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that existing is a good thing. But it is necessarily the case that existence (that which exists omnipresently) is perfect. Or it is necessarily the case that God is truly real (the omnipresent encompasses all realities).
Quoting spirit-salamander
I can define a visible to my eyes unicorn as existing in my room now. But that definition will not be true of existence because there is no such unicorn in my room. Thus that definition will be contradictory. However, I cannot deny the existence of existence without being contradictory the process. I cannot deny the existence of that which is omnipresent. I cannot deny only God absolutely exists (as demonstrated in the OP). Per the flaws in Descartes' cogito, the following conclusion was established: something is existing (or thinking is occurring as some philosophers say) but it is not necessarily us. Something is existing; as demonstrated in the OP, that thing is necessarily God.
Obviously, a circle is a geometric figure that has a two-dimensional base. This is also true for a square, which is a geometric figure with the essential property of being square. Now it should be clear that even no god can produce on a two-dimensional surface a geometric figure that is at the same time perfectly circular and flawlessly square.
For geometry has to do primarily with illustrativeness and only secondarily with translatability into mathematical formulas with numbers and equations.
I think what you are saying is that Reason or God, like human beings, is able to entertain a false idea in the mind. An idea that is obviously contradictory. And when you say that God can make a square circle a thing, it means that He can create the idea of a square circle, but not that He can create real one on a two-dimensional surface.
I agree with you, the questions are just how is logic derived and what is its ontological status. I can say that logic can be derived from the things of the world. This would make abstract logic something secondary and the things of the world that can be experienced would be primary. Or the abstract logic is the foundation of reality, thus precedes it ontologically. These are questions, which every form of ontological proof must clarify in advance.
Quoting Philosopher19
Maybe you're right about what you've said here. But to me it all sounds very much like pantheism, or at least it could apply to pantheism. I don't think, however, that you want to argue pantheistically, do you?
This is not meant to be an objection, but your model of God is very vague so far, and the name God could possibly be exchanged with the name nature in a Spinozistic way.
Quoting Philosopher19
What do you say to the following example:
A shepherd divides his sheep according to the property of the coat color - black and white. He could separate them according to all kinds of characteristics.
But to divide his sheep according to existing and non-existing ones seems abstruse. Therefore, existence is possibly not a property.
Quoting Philosopher19
I will read your blog post in time to understand you better. In addition, I am not a native English speaker, so the discussion is not very easy for me.
Perhaps your version of the ontological proof of God is a successful one. Then you should write a paper and have it published so that it is discussed by the scholars.
A non-pantheistic (or non-omnipresent) view of God (the perfect being) is contradictory. So both monotheism and pantheism are true because there is only one existence (God's existence), and it exists everywhere. This is another way of saying the omnipresent sustains all realities and nothing is more real than Him.
Quoting spirit-salamander
Yes, but it does not alter the fact that there are things that we can describe as not existing (meaning that they do not have the property of existing) and things that are existing (which must mean they have the property of existing as opposed to not having it). An absolute example of something that does not have the property of existing, is a round square. The absolute example of something that has the property of existing, is God. As highlighted in the OP, God's existence is not susceptible to doubt, whereas ours is. Again, the flaws in Descartes' cogito highlight this.
If we don't deal in absolutes, then it is the case that we meaningfully distinguish between things that exist in different ways (the dream exists as a dream, thus, it has the property of existing first, then the property of being a dream), and things that don't exist at all (round squares, or me standing right now when I'm actually sitting right now). We could not do this (distinguishing between things that exist and things that don't) if existing was not a property.
Also, it might be worth noting that whilst the dream exists as the dream, only one thing exists as existence (or the omnipresent). That thing is God. Everything that exists, does so in existence or because of existence. In other words, everything exists, because existence exists. Only existence exists because it itself exists. Only existence is a member of itself as an existent. Only existence is self-existing or not contingent on anything else whilst everything else is contingent on it. This is why God is the first thing that we should be acknowledging as being truly real or truly existing. This is why only God's existing qualifies as existence in an absolute sense. It's not our existence. It's God's, and we sustained by it.
Your write like a native speaker. I could not tell that you were a non-native English speaker.
I am trying to make it mainstream that the rejection of God's existence is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable. Hopefully I will succeed one day. If I do, it will be because it was perfection for me to succeed. If I don't, it will be because it was not perfection for me to succeed. But given all that I have seen a priori and a posteriori, I strongly believe that I will succeed.
There is no non-question begging way of arguing against this claim, for all you're going to be able to do is point out the contradictory nature of the idea in question. Yet that is not in dispute. And nor is it in dispute that the law of non contradiction is true. All we are talking about is what an all powerful being 'can' do. And the answer to that is easy: anything. And what my theory shows is just how that can be: God is Reason and thus God and God alone has the power to rewrite Reason's rules, for Reason's rules express her will.
It only seems that way because I use a very good translation program that respects grammar and spelling and syntax.
Quoting Philosopher19
I wish you much success with it. It is probably very difficult to establish new ideas against the spirit of the times, especially regarding proofs of God. Here is an appropriate quote from a German philosopher, which I have also translated:
"[i]Up to now it has simply not been possible to give a reason for the only being of an object as which there cannot possibly be a more perfect one. Nevertheless, I am afraid, the ontological proof of God, even if such a justification should be found once, will not even convince those who understand it of the existence of God (rationally); they will rather not accept the premises of the justification. The reason for this is: They are not ready, even if they are believers in other respects, to be convinced by a proof, but feel it as an epistemological imposition that one wants to force them "as in the Middle Ages" by rational reasons to acknowledge the existence of God, "as if Kant had never existed". According to their epistemological feeling they assume apriori that the existence of God cannot be proved. What proof - ontological or any other - is supposed to convince them? It could only be one that starts from presuppositions that are absolutely indubitable, and I doubt very much that one can find such presuppositions; for even if the existence of God is an analytic truth, it is certainly not a logical or mathematical one (in the strict sense). For a proof to be convincing, one must give it a chance to be so, and in the foreseeable future one is, in my opinion, not inclined to give proofs for the existence of God a chance. For this to happen, the intellectual-historical situation, as it exists essentially since Kant, would have to change fundamentally.
The epistemological prejudice against proofs of God drives apparently grotesque blossoms: One experiences that the same people, who resist tooth and nail against every presented proof of God, acknowledge without proof with the greatest nonchalance the existence, even the necessary existence of the empty set and other abstract entities. Admittedly, they would not be at a loss for a justification of this behavior: "Abstract entities have a theoretical function; we need them in our theories about the world; God, on the other hand, has none; we do not need him in our theories about the world." Accordingly, the essential step in building receptivity to proofs of God would be to give God back his theoretical functions. To do this, it would have to be shown that the natural sciences, which view the world to the exclusion (not denial!) of the God hypothesis, leave open a number of theoretical questions for which the very God hypothesis would provide a satisfactory answer. The project of metaphysics must, in other words, be approached anew - now equipped with the means of modern logic, the best organon philosophy has ever possessed.
In spite of the intellectual-historical situation, one is gladly and recently increasingly occupied with the proofs of God, above all with the most fascinating among them - the ontological proof of God. For this interest might be decisive that one is led by the proofs of God to a wealth of profound logical, ontological and epistemological problems, while in them at the same time a proposition of highest importance is aimed at; in them "something is at stake"; this results in a certain additional thrill. But a proof of God is probably not seriously considered possible by anyone. Some may have a certain gold-digger or alchemist mentality, which lets them hope to find one day the gold mine, the philosopher's stone, the irrefutable proof for the existence of God; but such hopes are rather kept to themselves - for fear of the laughter of the philosophical guild.[/i]" (UWE MEIXNER - Der ontologische Gottesbeweis in der Perspektive der Analytischen Philosophie; [The Ontological Proof of God in the Perspective of Analytic Philosophy])
I am also no exception, with me reservations, resistances and prejudices are instinctively given against proofs of God.
In its generality, your thesis seems halfway plausible at first glance. Nevertheless, it should be allowed to ask what this looks like in concrete terms.
When you say that God can make a square circle, the question is what this divine product will end up representing figuratively.
After all, it wouldn't look like that:
square circle
Because then people could also create this geometric shape and give it the name "square circle" or "round square".
I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality aimed at the other than God. If God cancels this law, he cannot intend anything anymore, not even a circle, let alone a square one.
Quoting Bartricks
The idea of a square circle in God's mind, will have no resemblance for us to our idea of a circle and our idea of a square.
Why should we still give the name "square circle" to the God idea of the square circle. This seems to be absolutely arbitrary. I could also just call it "babig". There is no reason not to do that, on the contrary. It is even more appropriate for us, because for us a square circle has nothing to do with either a square or a circle.
If God makes a square circle, how should it be verified that it is a square circle. It would be only an empty assertion which is based on the very general thesis that God can do everything because he can cancel the logical laws.
To this I believe that geometry has only secondarily something to do with logic. It deals with spatialities. Also a God can produce a two-dimensional line only if he starts from a point and extends this point or draws the line from it.
I am not talking about the abstract idea of a line, but about an ideal extended object.
If you say that God can generate a line without extending a point, I think that is absurd. But you will hopefully agree with me that God cannot create a square circle, which we, as long as we stay on earth, would recognize as such a special circle. God may make everything possible for himself and give all possible names to the results, but in philosophy it is also about the mediation and communicability and demonstrability on behalf of others or towards other minds.
How am I to know that your God is not a deceiver or a conjurer or trickster?
My position is not that we can conceive of a square circle. We are not omnipotent, after all.
My position is that Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason. And thus Reason is omnipotent and can do anything at all, including all those things that our reason tells us cannot be done.
Like I say, I can see no way to refute my view without simply assuming it is false for the purposes of refuting it - which is to beg the question.
Note as well that I do not deny any of the laws of Reason. I do not deny the law of non-contradiction. And I am every bit as certain as you are that there are no square circles.
But Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason, for they are her laws. And that's why she can do anything, including rendering the law of non-contradiction false.
The law of non-contradiction is true. I am as certain of it as the next person. You won't find a person in the world who is more certain of the truth of the law of non-contradiction than me. I just don't think it is necessarily true.
I think this is a valid argument:
1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q
But I don't think it has to be. It just is. And so on. (And that's why I can still reason about things - and do. The laws of reason only need to be true in order successfully to guide us, they do not 'have' to be true - that they are actually true is good enough).
God can do anything. And that means there are no necessary truths. There are truths and there are falsehoods. But there are no 'necessary' truths. And we're none the worse for that.
Why call this thing a "square circle"? And not rather "babig"?
How do I know that God is not caught in self-deception, should He make something like supposedly square circles?
God may say, "I am not because I am all-knowing and all-good," and "I can because I am all-powerful.
To this you could reply, "People talk a lot of hogwash to pass the time".
Quoting Bartricks
That's where our positions diverge. Should reason once not be bound by the laws of reason, it would no longer be reason. You seem to assume something that somehow ontologically precedes reason, and yet somehow remains proto-reasonable.
I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality. When you do something, you intend something according to the law of non-contradiction. This is my premise which is axiomatically opposed to yours.
Quoting Bartricks
This is because your theory is the total epitome of self-immunization. You either accept it or you don't. But not accepting it does not imply a contradiction.
Quoting Bartricks
Except God Himself as a necessary truth, right?
Thank you, and thank you for that which you translated and shared. It was good to read about the writer's interpretation of the attitudes of the western world towards an ontological argument.
Quoting spirit-salamander
I appreciate the honesty. I lived with the belief that existence is perfect since around 2013. But it wasn't until around 2018 that I really, genuinely, and sincerely committed to this premise. When I did, the empirical evidence for Karma being absolute, full, and extensive, was overwhelming. Again, this was something that I had understood a priori sincere 2013, but did not really empirically embrace because of the way the world looked to me. I thought with all that I hear in the news, there's no way Karma is absolute here. It's probably absolute when Heaven and Hell enter the equation. But my experiences in 2018 and onwards had brought me closer and closer to seeing this clearer posteriori such that I now conclude Karma is absolute. Everyone gets exactly what they truly deserve in this life (and not just in Heaven and Hell).
My point with this is that I discovered whenever I abandoned the a priori because I was to weak to handle the a posteriori (the appearance of things), or because I just had the belief that it can't be this good (because it looked really unlikely from what people would say and the news would report, rather than what I'd actually experience), I felt like I could have received better if I had held onto the a priori better.
My belief is that If you recognise something as being a priori true, then commit to it more strongly than you would commit to anything else. I have come to this belief both from just reflecting on matters of pure reason, and from actual experiences. There is nothing more certain and more reliable than the a priori (or matters of pure reason). It is absolutely the case that one cannot be blamed for refusing to yield to anything other than the a priori, or to their sincerest conception of goodness (though I think the former has more authority than the latter but they lead to the same thing).
Thank you for participating in this discussion. I wish you the all the best for the future.
No, God is not a necessary truth (that doesn't make sense - propositions are true, not objects). God exists. But he does not exist of necessity. If he did, then he would be incapable of not existing, which is a restriction.
God can do anything. That means he can destroy anything. So nothing exists of necessity. And there are no necessary truths.
Do you think there are necessary truths? If so, what are their truth makers?
Truth is related to propositions in the usual sense, that is true. But truth could also be equated with actuality, reality. That would be a different philosophy.
Necessity for me is a relative, conditional term. The statements "God dictates what is logical and what is not." or "God can do anything." or "God exists" are necessary truths in your system, relative to your system.
Truth is a property of propositions.
Now, bearing in mind that I think there are no necessary truths and that the very notion makes no sense, explain to me what the truth maker of a necessarily true proposition is.
1 + 1 = 2 is a necessary truth as long as your God wants it to be so.
‘a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines’. The truth maker is the principle of identity.
‘no body is without extension’. The truth maker is the principle of contradiction.
‘no one can accept something as true without knowing why’. The truth maker is the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.
These examples I have from Schopenhauer are necessary truths.
And as long as your God sets the truth makers they remain necessary truths.
God is indeed the arbiter of truth. But there are no necessary truths. You keep asserting that I think they are. Odd. I think there are not. Not hard to understand. There are no necessary truths. And you don't know what one is anyway - no one does. 2 + 2 = 4 is true so long as God asserts it to be; thus it is not necessarily true, but just true.
Why? The necessity is obvious. The sentence 'a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines' is a truth that everyone who is not insane will consider necessary. It is enough for the truth maker to be recognized as true for the judgment to be considered necessary. As a definition of necessity I take that of Schopenhauer:
"For necessity has no other genuine and clear sense than the inevitability of the consequent when the ground is posited."
Quoting Bartricks
That would lead to an infinite regress.
In both cases, either way, your God sets the truth maker. And what God sets as necessary is necessary according to your philosophy. You would agree with me there, wouldn't you?
You will also see a difference between the sentences "All swans are white" and "The bachelor is an unmarried man". The first is not necessary. The distinction is legitimate, even if your god can turn it around at will.
Apart from everything, your God is an identity, right? The logical principle of identity must then be applied to God, right? The world is not God, so the theorem of contradiction can be applied here. If your God is not an entity with identity, then He is at most a relative nothing for us, but probably rather an absolute nothing.
I have always assumed that in your favor. Quoting Bartricks
But you will admit that it makes sense to make a distinction even within the framework set by your God between:
necessary truths like:
Quoting Bartricks
and non-necessary empirical truths like "the universe is expanding".
My starting point is a pragmatically practical sense.
Since the word "necessary" exists in normal language, you can use it and reinterpret it according to your theology. That is, you can weaken it in its meaning so that you have an unsubstantial "necessary".
With it you can also make differences in your theology, like necessary truths in contrast to contingent truths.
I know, in a strict sense everything is contingent according to your theology.
Moreover, the necessary truths I spoke of are such only in relation to humans, but not in relation to your God.
In relation to your God, everything is contingent. In relation to us, there are both necessary and non-necessary truths.
You agree with me there, don't you?
We do have the word 'necessary'. But it has two quite different meanings. One is metaphysical and makes no real sense at all- you will not be able to say what this kind of necessity is without going in a circle (as you demonstrated when you tried to do so).
The other meaning is the one it has when we typically use it in every day life: it expresses an adamant attitude. It is synonymous with 'must'. It is necessary that you wash your hands before preparing food. That word necessary expresses the importance its utterer attaches to that activity.
You 'must' come over. Again, expressing a strong desire, not describing a metaphysical bond.
There is, then, that which we wish to emphasize, and that which we do not. And words like 'necessary' serve to emphasize importance.
There are things God emphasizes to us. Such as that 2 + 2 = 4 and that no true proposition is also false. And it is those truths that we call necessary. But they are not necessary in any inexplicable metaphysical sense. They are contingent, for all truths are. But the God is emphasizing these truths. And is giving us them independent of experience. But they are not 'necessary' in the philosopher's sense - which is no clear sense at all.