Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position.
AGNOSTICISM IS THE MOST RATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE DEFAULT POSITION.
Aim
The purpose for defending the proposition at issue is in the hope that those who participate, including myself, may be afforded the opportunity to consider new perspectives, reveal any problems with our reasonings, with the logical structure and contents of our arguments, and above all, to find common ground. One of two possible outcomes will result from this; each of which rendering largely favorable effects. Either increasing awareness to the errors of our thinking, or otherwise increasing confidence from surviving the assault of such critique.
Focus
The focus is on epistemic rationality with regards to the amount of ontological commitments we make, the eloquence, coherence and intelligibility in which our goal is to believe in only true propositions.
Disambiguation
Agnosticism generally is used with theistic and atheistic connotations from the terms derivative usage since it was coined in the late 19th century by English biologist T.H. Huxley. According to the terms more ancient entomological meanings that derived from Hellenistic vocabularies Greek and Latin roots: agnostic comes from "ágn?stos", which means without knowledge in ancient Greek. In contrast, the Greek word "gnosis" means knowledge.
I however use the term to denote a position of uncertainty regarding the truth-value of any proposition or its negation. I take an agnostic position in most cases on the grounds of insufficient evidence. My concern is whether or not I have sufficient epistemic justification to hold such claims to knowledge. In an epistemological sense, the term "agnosticism" is extended beyond the theism\atheism dichotomy or likewise to any other metaphysical concerns of what is or can be; to refocus on epistemic concerns of what can be known regarding agnosticism through a great many such related positions, depending on the "positive epistemic status" at issue.
Quoting Anthony Kenny (1983: 84–85)
Main argument:
P1. If all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty, then the subset of humans must by default begin from an agnostic position.
P2. All (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty.
C. Therefore, the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.
Argument 2; supporting P2 of argument 1:
P1. If most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world, then all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance.
P2. Most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world.
C. Therefore, all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance.
Argument 3; supporting P2 of argument 2:
P1. Innate knowledge functions at the level of reflexes and instincts and excludes learning through experience.
P2. Basic general knowledge functions beyond the level of reflexes and instincts and requires the accumulation of a body of common knowledge learned through experience.
P3. Specialized knowledge functions beyond the level of basic general knowledge and requires mastering through disciplined investigation and study.
C. Therefore, most knowledge is learned through experience.
Argument 4; supporting P2 and P3 of argument 3.
P1. If all knowledge beyond the innate requires humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information, then basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge require humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
P2. All knowledge beyond the innate requires humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
C. Therefore, basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge require humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
Argument 5; supporting P2 of argument 4:
P1. If humans are fallible, then humans must reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
P2. Humans are fallible.
C. Therefore, humans must reason between accurate and inaccurate information
Aim
The purpose for defending the proposition at issue is in the hope that those who participate, including myself, may be afforded the opportunity to consider new perspectives, reveal any problems with our reasonings, with the logical structure and contents of our arguments, and above all, to find common ground. One of two possible outcomes will result from this; each of which rendering largely favorable effects. Either increasing awareness to the errors of our thinking, or otherwise increasing confidence from surviving the assault of such critique.
Focus
The focus is on epistemic rationality with regards to the amount of ontological commitments we make, the eloquence, coherence and intelligibility in which our goal is to believe in only true propositions.
Disambiguation
Agnosticism generally is used with theistic and atheistic connotations from the terms derivative usage since it was coined in the late 19th century by English biologist T.H. Huxley. According to the terms more ancient entomological meanings that derived from Hellenistic vocabularies Greek and Latin roots: agnostic comes from "ágn?stos", which means without knowledge in ancient Greek. In contrast, the Greek word "gnosis" means knowledge.
I however use the term to denote a position of uncertainty regarding the truth-value of any proposition or its negation. I take an agnostic position in most cases on the grounds of insufficient evidence. My concern is whether or not I have sufficient epistemic justification to hold such claims to knowledge. In an epistemological sense, the term "agnosticism" is extended beyond the theism\atheism dichotomy or likewise to any other metaphysical concerns of what is or can be; to refocus on epistemic concerns of what can be known regarding agnosticism through a great many such related positions, depending on the "positive epistemic status" at issue.
Quoting Anthony Kenny (1983: 84–85)
I do not myself know of any argument for the existence of God which I find convincing; in all of them I think I can find flaws. Equally, I do not know of any argument against the existence of God which is totally convincing; in the arguments I know against the existence of God I can equally find flaws. So that my own position on the existence of God is agnostic.
Main argument:
P1. If all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty, then the subset of humans must by default begin from an agnostic position.
P2. All (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty.
C. Therefore, the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.
Argument 2; supporting P2 of argument 1:
P1. If most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world, then all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance.
P2. Most knowledge is learned through experience, and humans are born prior to experiencing the world.
C. Therefore, all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance.
Argument 3; supporting P2 of argument 2:
P1. Innate knowledge functions at the level of reflexes and instincts and excludes learning through experience.
P2. Basic general knowledge functions beyond the level of reflexes and instincts and requires the accumulation of a body of common knowledge learned through experience.
P3. Specialized knowledge functions beyond the level of basic general knowledge and requires mastering through disciplined investigation and study.
C. Therefore, most knowledge is learned through experience.
Argument 4; supporting P2 and P3 of argument 3.
P1. If all knowledge beyond the innate requires humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information, then basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge require humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
P2. All knowledge beyond the innate requires humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
C. Therefore, basic general knowledge and specialized knowledge require humans to reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
Argument 5; supporting P2 of argument 4:
P1. If humans are fallible, then humans must reason between accurate and inaccurate information.
P2. Humans are fallible.
C. Therefore, humans must reason between accurate and inaccurate information
Comments (55)
Agnosticism means uncertainty as you say, however, since atheism requires a lack of belief, these two are compatible. An agnostic atheist lacks a belief in God but cannot be sure as to whether God exists or not. While a gnostic atheist also lacks a belief in God but they lack this belief because they believe they know that there's no God. An agnostic theist might not be sure about whether there's a God but they choose to believe there is one despite not knowing for sure. A gnostic theist believes in God and is sure that there is a God.
However, I'm not even sure if you're providing a stance on agnosticism vs gnosticism because you talk about "beginning from the default position". Which implies that upon learning more, we could switch from the default position to a position of gnosticism, as we learned more. Could you clarify, if a human values intellectual honesty, what exactly are you asking them to do?
[quote=(excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata](ax. 1) If theism is realist-cognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are demonstrably true or not true.
(ax. 2) If theism is nonrealist-noncognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are mere poetry (i.e. figures of speech). [from ax. 1]
(def. 1) In general agnosticism denotes knowledge, or a decidable truth-value, is lacking which therefore warrants doubt with respect to the claim at issue.
(def. 2) Specifically agnosticism, with respect to a claim that "the Abrahamic Deity exists", denotes warranted doubt in the absence of evidence to decide whether this claim has a positive truth-value or negative truth-value – whether "the Abrahamic Deity exists" is true or not true. [from ax. 2, def. 1]
(def. 3)The evidence is decidable (i.e. probable though not conclusive). Nature, I submit, provides sufficient evidence to decide the issue. [from ax. 1, def. 2]
(prop. 1) Any claim that "the Abrahamic Deity exists" entails that nature is "supernatural", or that its otherwise law-like regularities are arbitrarily, purposefully, changed (suspended). [from ax. 1]
(prop. 2) However, there has never been recorded in history any publicly – directly or indirectly – observed "supernatural", or arbitrarily, purposeful, changes to (suspensions of) nature's law-like regularities. [from def. 3, prop. 1]
(prop. 3) Yet there must be such observable evidence (e.g. corroborable scriptural "revealed" accounts) if "the Abrahamic Deity exists" is true. There isn't, and therefore "the Abrahamic Deity exists" cannot be true. [from prop. 1, prop 2]
(prop. 4) On these basic grounds (though neither exclusively nor exhaustively), it is considerably more reasonable (warranted) than less to assent to "the Abrahamic Deity exist" claim has a negative truth-value – is not true – and, therefore, that agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity", does not obtain. [from prop. 3][/quote]
Your exposition of the thesis and the argument is overlong and unnecessarily formal. Basic logic is like basic arithmetic: once you acquire competence in it, you rarely have a need to explicitly apply textbook rules and procedures; you just do it. And you should expect similar competence of your peers. Those who would find it difficult to follow your argument when it is stated informally (but clearly and fluently) will likely experience even more difficulty if instead you frog-march them through a page of definitions and syllogisms.
In my experience, when I see such overuse of formalism, it is either a novice, fresh off a logic class and eager to show off their newly acquired prowess, or someone trying, perhaps unconsciously, to puff up a weak or banal argument. (And I have seen this even in academic papers written by prominent philosophers.)
I would suggest that you state your thesis and its supportive arguments in a couple of paragraphs - that should be enough to encompass the substance of what you have written in the OP. And you can omit pedantic qualifications, such as "the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty." You can assume that your peers value intellectual honesty, because if they don't, then they are hardly your peers in this conversation, and why would you even want to discuss philosophy with them?
First, I would like to clarify that I am taking the positive position and thus affirming the debate proposition captured in the contents of the title. This would be the proposition that any objections would be raised to, and with the inclusion of the arguments I have provided, any contention would want to re-direct focus upon the premises of the arguments since they are (mostly modus ponens) logically valid.
Quoting Judaka
This depends upon how we define atheism. Atheism is most generally defined in terms dichotomous of theism, which is the affirmative position regarding a positive claim (namely, the proposition, "At least one god exists,"). A proposition is a statement that is making a claim (either an assertion or a denial) which can be either true or false. This means that every proposition (e.g., "There is [exists] at least one god,") has it's negation (e.g., "There is [exists] NOT at least one god,"). In this context, atheism refers not to a lack of belief (as in the attitude or psychological state of believing) but rather to the propositional content of belief.
(Take note of the aim heading of the OP: I'm seeking a good epistemic position relative to a proposition. This means holding strong epistemic verification and justification with regards to the truth of a proposition. That should such a situation arise in which we are requested to provide any positive epistemic considerations (e.g., grounds, warrants) for the truth of the proposition, that we would most likely have them.)
In these terms, theism is the assertion of a positive claim, thereby taking a position which is affirming the proposition "P" ("God does exist"); whereas atheism is the denial of theism making an opposite (negative) claim, thereby taking a position which is denying the proposition "P". In other words, atheism, in the context of the propositional content of the belief denoted by theism, is a position which is denying a proposition which is equivalent to the logical qualities of a position which is affirming the negation of that proposition. Therefore, to deny the proposition "P" ("God does exist"), has the same logical qualities as the equivalent denial of those affirming the [negating] proposition "-P" ("God does NOT exist")
Most logicians agree that denying a proposition is essentially reducible to affirming a negation. The speech act of denial admittedly has some contention, however in denying that God exists, we are essentially making an equivalent statement affirming that it is not the case that God exists, which is essentially affirming that God does not exist. (See "the denial equivalence," in the above link.)
This way it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against it.
Quoting Judaka
Im affirming the proposition captured within the contents of the title.
Quoting Judaka
Yes.
Quoting Judaka
In the argument, I am making a conditional, conjuntive statement ("if p and q, then r"). If a subset of humans [who already value intellectual honesty] wish to maintain the intellectual honesty that they value, then they should begin, initially by default, from a position of agnosticism with regards to the truth-value of a proposition (which includes the propositions negation). Im asking nothing. Im drawing inferences between propositions in a way that best maintains consistency.
(I did consider constructing that portion of the argument into a biconditional statement "if and only if" (shortened as "iff") and may edit that in later).
Lottery
[quote=Wikipedia]The purchase of lottery tickets cannot be accounted for by decision models based on expected value maximization. The reason is that lottery tickets cost more than the expected gain, as shown by lottery mathematics, so someone maximizing expected value should not buy lottery tickets[/quote]
So, announce/hold a lottery. Those who play are likely to be agnostic because they're clinging as it were to the possibility of winning [God is possible]. Those who refuse to play are atheists because they know of the improbability of winning [God is improbable].
Your response is quite eloquently put, however it does not address the argument which I have provided. There is an argument on the table and if it is not addressed, thus not refuted, then the argument will remain standing unchallenged. The argument is deductive and logically valid, thus in order to refute the conclusion one must refute one of the premises. I'll provide an example using your QED argument.
Cognition or the lack thereof doesn't entail whether or not a claim is true or not. Cognition is a human (in this context) mental process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through internal reasoning or external direct sensory experience. Demonstrability denotes an ability to be demonstrated via logical/mathematical proofs or empirical verification. Truth does not hinge on whether or not humans possess the cognitive capacity to acquire knowledge of it, nor does it require the quality of demonstrability with regards to limited and fallible human senses and thought processing.
The overall state of affairs of the planets orbiting tje Alpha Centauri star system is not something capable of being demonstrated, thus we are denied any cognition with regards to such, and this is the case regardless of whether or not there is indeed a state of affairs on those extraterrestrial celestial objects - though who would deny such? Uncertainty entails agnosticism.
Also, with the addition of such ontological commitments entailed with postulating the abrahamic deity, you limit the scope of my argument. Agnosticism is not restricted to theological positions, though it was coined as such. Postulating the abrahamic deity, notwithstanding the necessity of particular interpretations, I would likely hold a position of atheism on the grounds of the entailment of logical contradiction.
Do address the argument.
All human knowledge begins with opinion. That is why Aristotle typically begins with the opinions of others and why Descartes begins by rejecting the opinions of others and seeks something certain. Plato's divided line begins with the imagination and moves up to trust or opinion (pistis). Kant and others begins with experience.
To Quoting TheMadFool of a proposition is to admit uncertainty and thus take an agnostic position.
I find theology uninteresting, I reference agnosticism in a much broader scope. I am almost entirely uninterested in whether or not there is a god. Would you care to challenge the argument?
Quoting Fooloso4
Im referring to humans on the individual level. At conception and birth we are blank slates except for some genetic precursors that predispose us to behave instinctively (innate knowledge). Before your conception and subsequently your birth, you had no opinions. You had no language. You derived some meaning, in a primitive sense, from exposure to gestational sensory perception as your nervous system developed. You certainly had no knowledge beyond the innate (if you even want to grant that as knowledge).
During our gestation and likewise before our conception (sans existence) we had no knowledge of philosophy of any kind. Be it Aristotelian, Platonic, Cartesian, Kantian, etc.
I am certainly in the position of seeing the whole question of God or the lack of God as central to my philosophy. I have looked at your thread several times, and only replying to it today, for the first time.
Partially, I am in agreement with you about agnosticism as a default position, but my only objection is labels because I see the whole area as being one of contemplation because I don't want to be put into a box. I am not sure if there is any higher power beyond us, but I don't categorical myself as agnostic because I think that it is too much of a category, implying certain limitations in whether there is a God, or underlying source, and I see it as being beyond a spectrum beyond the definitions of theism, atheism or agnosticism. I think that we need look beyond the categories which seem to arise religion and philosophy, in order to open to new ways of seeing the numinous, and trying to frame the many aspects of human experience.
I think agnosticism, meant in the broadest definition possible, as an automatic default position is self-defeating. If we take it to simply mean uncertainty, then doesn’t that mean we must be uncertain about our uncertainty as well? It creates an infinite regress of uncertainty. Doesn’t agnosticism have to be arrived at like all other knowledge? If so, how can it be arrived at without certainty? The agnostic is necessarily certainly uncertain.
In either case, there seems to be an underlying assumption that truth exists prior to agnosticism. We assume causation, some sort of realism, that words/language have meaning, etc. Perhaps we shouldn’t, but if we didn’t we wouldn’t even make it to cogito ergo sum, much less knowledge beyond that.
I generally take the view that a responsible atheist is atheist in regards to belief and agnostic in terms of knowledge. You can't choose what you believe, and even where knowledge of god is technically uncertain, in practical terms you are likely to maintain disbelief.
So am I.Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
We are not. Anyone who has children knows this. It has been a long time since I read the literature, but the last I looked the idea of a tabula rasa had been rejected by developmental psychologists.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Children do not begin by doubting or with uncertainty, they begin by making associations, just like other animals. A bit later they then begin to tell themselves stories. They are quite convinced by their stories.
As Wittgenstein said, there can be no doubt without certainty.
Im not interested in debating the existence of God. I tried to separate agnosticism from its theological connotations and etymology in the OP. I refer to agnosticism in the broader sense (a position of uncertainty warranting epistemic doubt with regards to the truth-value of a proposition or its negation "P or not -P").
For example, I am agnostic with regards to whether or not there is life elsewhere in the universe. This is not to say that I don't consider it a high probability that there is life elsewhere, since given the sheer volume of the universe and mathematical calculations it seems there is a reasonable expectation that there is life elsewhere.
This is a bayesian interpretation of probability, though. It functions as an extension of propositional logic insofar as it enables us to reason further through conjecture and draw hypothetical inferences. The key difference is that, unlike with deductive propositions that represent the highest epistemic state afforded to knowledge, bayesian propositions are (methodologically speaking) based on models with random variables and thus render knowledge in the form of a probability distribution.
Therefore, a position of uncertainty, whereby the truth or falsity of a proposition unknown, is warranted on the grounds of incomplete data, absence of empirical evidence, and (once random variables are removed) logically invalid inferences drawn. These aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties render vain the requisite justification on the grounds of insufficient information; it follows, then, that such uncertainties are too insufficient to hold such claims to knowledge at the standards of logical necessity or empirical verification.
Quoting Fooloso4
You are omitting the original context in which the whole of my statement relies upon for justification. Consider the statement as a whole, rather than as a mere contextomy.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Im not arguing for tabula rasa and my arguments are consistent with Innatism.
Of course, it may be rational for people to stay undecided before they explore the available evidence, but that's just "I don't know, I haven't read and thought about it enough yet" That isn't a philosophical position. You can call that Agnosticism starting by default, but that's pretty uninteresting and I don't think that's the topic of issue we're interested in.
You can also choose to be agnostic about an issue and not rationally justified towards such position, if the topic at matter at hand for instance (going back to my previous post) poses concepts that can be shown to be incoherent or contradictory with available evidence.
Quoting Fooloso4
We are not children at conception nor at birth but rather we are a zygote and newborn, respectively. Concept formation is not the same as opinion formation and both fall tremendously short of epistemic knowledge or true justified beliefs, derived from justified foundational beliefs rather than an incoherent set of beliefs held by children.
Children doubt more than any other stage of human development. Why else would they question everything? I find this seemingly natural forming proclivity in children to engage in an unsophisticated form of the socratic method in dialogue quite refreshing and find myself wishing that more adults could unentrench themselves so easily.
I see, well our main disagreement is based on your definition of atheism. Theism as a proposition is based on belief or faith and is not strictly a claim of knowledge, that is gnosticism.
Mariem-webster definition:
belief in the existence of a god or gods
dictionary.com
belief in the existence of a god or gods (opposed to atheism).
These are the definitions I subscribe to and the second definition even includes how this relates to the definition of atheism. The opposite of belief in the existence of God is a lack of a belief in the existence of God. If we can't agree on this, then we can't go anywhere because you are misconstruing every single position in the debate around theism.
If you revise the definitions as I have suggested then agnostic atheism seems to be the most reasonable default position. This means having the stance that you do not know if God exists and you do not believe he does. It is natural to have a stance of non-belief in the case of being uncertain or uninformed, really your argument doesn't change at all.
I agree with @Saphsin if we're talking about agnosticism as in, an inability to progress beyond knowing whether Gods exist and an unwillingness to say you either believe or don't believe because you don't know, you need to have evaluated all the evidence beforehand. This position cannot be reached when you are completely in the dark.
Replace agnosticism with agnostic atheism.
Quoting Saphsin
You have certainly never seen my watch. If I ask you what it looks like, what default position would you begin from with regards to the observable features of my watch? If you were to walk across a street, you would likely look both ways first. Would this be a function of possessing knowledge prior to your observations? Why would you look if you began from a position of certainty?
Does uncertainty require justification?
Quoting Saphsin
Does one have to be familiar with philosophy in order to engage in philosophical inquiries? I think not. Such is the case for agnosticism as well. It may not be as philosophically interesting, I'll subjectively grant, but it nonetheless is a position. Every stand a subject or agent of philosophical inquiries takes, notwithstanding philosophical ignorance, even if only an idiosyncratic one held by one individual, is nonetheless a position. What other qualifications would you require to accept another persons views on a matter? I never claimed to be defending a robust philosophical position with a rich history of chronological or paradigmatic literature; however, an argument could be made I presume.
Agnosticism at the meta-level is a philosophical position that takes the view that there are ineliminable epistemic possibilities that a proposition is true and ineliminable epistemic possibilities that the propositions negation is true. A meta-agnostic holds that there is an ineliminable epistemic possibility that agnosticism is true and an ineliminable epistemic possibility that agnosticism is false.
Quoting Saphsin
This is why the argument includes the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty. Otherwise, it would be a bad-faith, sophistic position rather than an authentic agnostic position. Assuming that such a person is indeed engaging in motivated reasoning or is otherwise unscrupulous and not just very confused.
Also, there are some propositions whose truth it is not reasonable to be agnostic about. For instance, the proposition "I am thinking" and "I exist" and "there are reasons to believe things".
Most people will agree with you, however. For they are weak and want always to have an excuse not to follow an argument to its conclusion, for often arguments lead to conclusions we dislike and people do not like finding out that the world is not as they want it to be.
I defined the terms of my position in the OP. If you take a semantic issue with the term then just go by the definition that I provided. There is no consensus in defining these terms and though I appreciate semantics, I prefer to stay focused on the thesis point and avoid tangential ones. I'll humour this one briefly. According to the SEP:
Quoting Paul Draper
See: 1. Definitions of “Atheism,” and 2. Definitions of “Agnosticism” for more (though still not exhaustive) relevant philosophical definitions.
Im talking about an initial default position that is malleable and receptive to new information and takes into account Bayesian probability (the prior probability distribution of available information until more data becomes available, then a subsequent calculation is made as the posterior probability distribution, which then becomes the new prior). Bayesian probability is not sufficient grounds for justification of a belief, but then again agnosticism is a claim to knowledge rather than belief.
Yep. Pretty much what I said.
Atheist - lacks a belief in god, generally because no convincing reason has been presented to support the proposition. This addresses a person's belief.
One can be an agnostic regarding any knowledge of God, but remain an atheist in terms of belief. Knowledge is fraught. We cannot know for certain that there is not a teapot orbiting Mars.
Im agnostic with regards to many propositions not limited to the existence of God or gods. Referring to atheism and theism only serves to reduce the full scope of my meaning and my argument. Notice that no terms regarding theism or atheism appear within the actual argument itself. I defined my terms so no appeal to dictionaries are required. If you take a semantic issue, then address the concept illustrated by the description and definition that I provided. Im happy to provide clarification. Once clear, if you still take issue, then challenge a premise of the argument. If not, then the argument goes unchallenged and thus unrefuted.
Quoting Bartricks
I agree. I would not hold an agnostic position with regards to those propositions because they are grounded in sufficient epistemic justification. I think agnosticism is the best initial default position when considering any philosophical inquiry, however some can be substantiated, and sometimes quickly seem to substantiate themselves (e.g., "I exist"). There is always room for doubt epistemologically and metaphysically speaking, but I assume the laws of inference in logical space to be the best we have towards proof or justification.
And thus sound argument serves as epistemic justification of knowledge. If I cannot provide a sound argument logically warranted and grounded in either empirical data for objective claims or psychological/phenomenological data for subjective claims, then I maintain an agnostic position until further information is acquired. Is this self refuting? Im operating in logical space.
Quoting Bartricks
What is the argument for that? Provide the grounds for your assertion please? I'll formalize it so just use natural language.
Im interested in learning and I want my flaws exposed to me, thus (pedantics aside) I present my argument formally. I am fairly new and would love it if a veteran logician offered their critiques, be it the syntactic form and structure of my formalized argument, or the semantic contents therein. I appreciate your criticism and understand some of your points. Perhaps I am over ambitious, but that is precisely what is required of me in trying to understand this place we find ourselves, and with just a few decades to do so.
On a side note, if you were to formalize your critique of the second antecedent in the conditional conjuntive statement of P1 of the main argument, which is asserted again in P2, then you would realize flaws in your own reasoning. One, it is in the form of modus ponens which is tautological in nature, so it is actually just a specialized construct of logical syllogism rather than pedanticism on my part.
Also, the argument does not assume the psychological state of potential readers but rather, in fact, must include the conditional statement in order to be logically consistent. To say that one should initially take by default the position of agnosticism in order to maximize intellectual honesty, is to assume that intellectual honesty is virtuous, or otherwise a positive normative value, or that it is moral. That assumption bites off more than I can chew, so I navigated the argument around such an unnecessary presupposition.
There are two ways to address an argument: (1) criticism by analysis and (2) criticism by providing a stronger, alternative / counter argument. I chose (2), others have chosen (1). Yeah, it's your OP, Ct-puppet, but the topic is not about you.
Thanks, Fool.
As far as reasoning to 'play or not play' a lottery goes, the agnostic does not play because s/he can't decide whether or not its worth the risk, the theist plays because "with g/G everything, including the jackpot, is possible" and the atheist plays because, no matter how improbable, it remains possible to "win" an extraordinary return on a deminimis investment – white swans do happen! :smirk: :up: – otherwise, not winning is an absolute certainty guaranteed by not playing. The agnostic, seems to me in this instance, is the least rational actor.
Thanks for clarifying.
I don't entirely disagree, however it would not be unreasonable to say that certain propositions are easier to be agnostic about - the nature of the claim being less unlikely or fraught. Not all proposition are weighted evenly. Would this same logic strictly apply to any claim that can be made?
I see you've ordered your usual, "confuse the hell out of TheMadFool". :up: :clap: Gimme some time to process this gem of pure logic will ya?
Quoting Tom Storm
It supports agnosticism broadly as the default stance with regards to any initial or long-standing inquiry to determine the truth-value of a proposition wherein the truth-value has yet to be determined on the grounds of insufficient evidence. It is true that one will develop certain attitudes or biases one way or another on many issues. For example, I am agnostic in regards to Russell's celestial teapot because, though I do not believe there exists a microscopic teapot between the orbits of Mars and Earth, I cannot justify my believing that there is no teapot is to be true as it rests purely upon my assumptions rather than resting upon much good evidence.
I do not require absolute certainty nor perfect reasoning or direct access to objective reality unconstrained by human sensory perception. I simply require a consistent system of logic resting upon a solid foundation such as an axiom that one must presuppose and that is on the whole uncontroversial (e.g., that there is exists something rather than nothing). I would accept any proposition derived by such axiomatic proof or on the grounds of verifiable empirical evidence (e.g., the moon orbits the earth).
This becomes increasingly difficult with regards to negative claims (e.g., there is no celestial teapot) but I don't see why there is such a fuss about requiring negative claims to shoulder a burden of proof. Because others assert that there is such a God, a celestial teapot, or other such extraordinary claim? Its ridiculous. That which can be asserted without proof can and should be dismissed without proof. This is Hitchens razor. If there is no substantiation, no demonstration, no argument, etc. for a claim, then it is equally unwarranted to consider or appreciate on just those grounds.
To me, the assertion of a claim that is neither axiomatic or derivative from a logical sequence of inferences drawn from such axioms or necessary assumptions, then it is just as meaningless as a contradiction and as compelling as a tautology. Why so many people concern themselves with such is both a mystery and the problem (the latter because your concern extends them a platform and the illusion of a genuine issue).
Quoting 180 Proof
That is an irrelevant conclusion which is a form of relevance fallacy.
[quote="Arthur Ernest Davies, "Fallacies" in A Text-Book of Logic;https://archive.org/details/afx7162.0001.001.umich.edu"]Ignoratio Elenchi, according to Aristotle, is a fallacy that arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". To refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ignoratio elenchi. Since Aristotle, the scope of the fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point ... "I am required to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy ... For instance, instead of proving that 'this person has committed an atrocious fraud', you prove that 'this fraud he is accused of is atrocious'"; ... The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely related to it and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do not really support the substituted issue, it only calls attention to the fact that they do not constitute proof of the original one… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms. But whenever it occurs and whatever form it takes, it is brought about by an assumption that leads the person guilty of it to substitute for a definite subject of inquiry another which is in close relation with it.[/quote]
You are ignoring refutation and instead offering a conclusion that fails to address the issue in question. I presented you with a proposition. Propositions can only be true or false on this logic. According to the law of excluded middle, "For every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true," and the law of non-contradiction, "Contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time," thus either the proposition entailed through the logic of my argument is true, or the propositions negation is. Which one is it?
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Whoosh!
Oh well, maybe it's just a phase you have to go through. On the other hand, I saw an earlier thread of yours - it was much better.
Nothing is absolutely certain, and most things are not absolutely uncertain. You can only do your best to accurately assign degrees of certainty to the propositions which are relevant to you.
You have provided no counter argument to my thesis statement (T), "Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position," nor to the conclusion drawn from my main argument (C), "The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," but rather you conclude (-A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' cannot be true," and (-O) that, "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' does not obtain."
Those are not are not refutations to either my thesis statement or the concluding proposition in my main argument. Those are obviously the negations of their own respective propositions: (A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is true," and (O) "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' obtains." These are, again, obviously not the propositions that I argue for in the OP.
You need to conclude with the negating propositions presented by the OP, (-T), "Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position," or (-C), "[It is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," in order to avoid committing a fallacy of relevance as I tried to point out before. An example of what a relevance fallacy looks like and how one may occur can be elucidated within the pattern of the following argument:
Interlocutor 1 asserts proposition (P), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of a proposition, or that propositions negation on the grounds of insufficient information is warranted."
Interlocutor 2 argues against a superficially similar proposition (B) by asserting that propositions negation (-B), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of the proposition (P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism exists,' or that propositions negation (-P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism DOES NOT exists,' on the grounds of insufficient information, whenever you feel as if there is sufficient information to warrant the propositions negation (-P), is NOT warranted,"
falsely, as if an argument against (B) were an argument against (P).
Lets isolate all the concluding propositions and negations presented by us both so far and include their respective counterparts (opposing propositions and negations):
(T) Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position.
(-T) Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position.
(C) [it is the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.
(-C) [it is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.
(A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is true.
(-A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is NOT true.
(O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," obtains.
(-O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," DOES NOT obtain.
Now, the wording doesn't necessarily have to be identical to these example representations (e.g., (-A) could be written as, "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is FALSE," rather than, ". . . NOT true.") but they do however have to retain and not omit relevant context. In other words, we cannot exclude, exchange, or include extra context (e.g., "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity'. . .") to the proposition in question if we want to provide a refutation of it. By changing the relevant context of a proposition, it is no longer the proposition in which our aim (hopefully) is to represent and subsequently refute. It becomes a type of straw man, essentially - a member of the family of fallacies known as 'relevance fallacies' - and I hope that I have clarified this issue for us, in that regard.
Next, I want to represent your entire (attempted counter) argument and offer my critique as well as raise your attention to any issues of relevant context that I find.
I briefly mentioned a few things that immediately jumped out at me as being problematic with this conditional statement. First, it is not 'axiomatic' as implied by (ax. 1), because an axiom is "an unprovable statement generally held as a first principle which is granted as true because it is self-evident. The statement, "A whole is greater than it's parts," for example, is an axiom. The argument to substantiate this claim also serves to expose an error in reasoning, which is a good segue into my second issue.
Second, it is not self-evidently true that if a thing is "cognitive" (capable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) that the thing must be "demonstrably true or not true" (a demonstrable fact or quality which can be shown to be true or not true). For example, the number of birds in the sky at precisely this moment is a cognitive quantification (i.e., it is simple arithmetic), however it is not demonstrable. There surely is some number of birds in the sky at a given moment in time, but that number cannot be demonstrably shown to be true, and it would be irrational to say that because the total number of birds in the sky is something that can be known, yet isn't, and thus cannot be demonstrated or proved, that therefore there is no such number of birds in the sky at a given moment.
Third, notice all of the context added and omitted. I am arguing for a broad and universal applicability for agnosticism which includes all contexts and varies between subject to subject, agent to agent, and the information available to both. For example, it would be rational to be agnostic regarding the existence of the sun if you spent the entirety of your life underground without any information about it. When you include specific context by using terms such as 'theism,' 'Abrahamic Deity,' and the concept of 'existence' you take away from the broad universal scope and narrow it down to one that is specific and particular.
First, besides the aforementioned added context, just because something is "noncognitive" (incapable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) doesn't mean that it is "mere poetry" (i.e., figures of speech). I understand that poetry is an expression of emotions and feelings that doesn't render empirical factual knowledge, but neither does motivational speeches. Motivational speeches are not poetry. There are also forms of cognitive poetry. Second, if you are not using these terms literally, then you are using them rhetorically (which is hilarious given the context of this critique).
Not necessarily, it is to claim that there is a metaphysical realm which has extra-spatial and extra-temporal dimensions. Both this proposition and its negation are well beyond our capacity to suppose or even ask well formed questions of so to begin to generalize. This is essentially an argument from ignorance. Just because there is an absence of evidence does not mean there is evidence of absence. Aphorism aside, that is a legitimate refutation.
I think I'll stop here before this starts to resemble a textbook rather than a critique.
:fire:
There are two ways of looking at possibility and they are,
1. Nonmathematically: Suppose I roll a die that has two 6's instead of one 6 like standard issue dice. It's possible to get either, say, a 1 or a 6. That's all we can know without math and if you were asked to bet in a game that depends on rolling a 1 or a 6, you wouldn't be able to make a decision because all you know is that both 1 and 6 are possible
2. Mathematically (Probability math): The probability of getting a 6 is 2/6 = 1/3. The probability of getting a 1 is 1/6. We know 1/3 > 1/6 i.e. the odds of rolling a 6 is greater than that of rolling a 1. Imagine now that you're asked to play a game of chance based on whether you roll a 1 or a 6. Since you now know getting a 6 is more likely than getting a 1, you can make a sound decision how to best spend your money, assuming gambling is a good way to spend your money.
Note: Once you know or can find out the mathematical probability of an event X, it would be unwise/irrational for you to act in ways that ignore that piece of information.
We know that God is possible according to agnostics but "what is the mathematical probability that God exists?" is the question whose answer can help us make the best possible decision in re adopting theism or atheism.
However, it's one thing to say the issue can be put to rest with a calculation and another to actually calculate it. I'm going to respond to this with the standard reply of a British railway information officer when asked for information, "well, don't ask me!"
Make what you want of what I said. Sorry, I've reached the perimeter of what I [s]know[/s] think I know.
I can't think (failure of imagination?) of what better evidence there could be of the "supernatural" than the natural world itself which is purportedly affected by a "deity"; such affects cannot, even in principle, be explained as natural occurrences or explained away as misrecognitions / frauds, but only accounted for as uniquely inexplicable exceptions to, or arbitrary violations of, (at least known) natural laws – that is, "divine fiats" as "revealed" in sacred scriptures as signs ("miracles") of a theistic (e.g. "Abrahamic") deity. Theism cannot be true without such truth-making evidence, can it? And lacking evidence in the natural world entailed by theism, (1) this entails that theism is untrue and, (2) therefore, that agnosticism does not obtain.
If my reasoning is wrong, show me, Fool. :nerd:
This appears self-contradictory. Theism is true iff G/g exists and false iff G/g doesn't exist. It doesn't seem possible to separate them in any meaningful way to allow duscussion of one independent of the other. If my track record is any indication of my having got this right, I'd tell myself, "try again."
Quoting 180 Proof
This has left me scratching my head for a long time. There seems to be two, what appears to be, mutually incompatible standpoints on the matter of the so-called natural order (the laws of the universe) vis-à-vis alleged miracles.
On the one hand, we have religious scientists, one being Isaac Newton, who were/are of the opinion that all they were/are doing amounted to deciphering God's will by discovering how the natural order was effected (the laws of nature).
On the other hand, there are non-scientists but of the faith who are not in the least bit impressed by the natural order and have gone on record demanding only suspensions/violations of the natural order [miracles] as sufficient warrant to infer a deity.
What's up with that?
Yeah, but which g/G? Truisms but red herrings. The "divine predicates" ("revealed" in sacred scriptures) entail claims about the world which can be investigated and falsified. This approach digs down to the bedrock issue of what you can know about the / any theistic deity at issue. Where theism is noncognitive, g/G need not exist in order to warrant 'belief in g/G' (vide Don Cupitt, Paul Tillich, Ludwig Feuerbach, Immanuel Kant, et al).
The rest of your post ... :roll:
Excellent! So, you're saying there are 3 things at play:
1. G/g exists/not
2. Belief in G/g [Theism/atheism]
3. Claims about the world that can be verified/disconfirmed, allowing us to make a rational decision regarding theism/atheism.
3 has a direct bearing on 2 because 2 is ultimately a claim to knowledge and thus needs justification (3). It feels almost like you want to draw attention to the epistemological aspectz (belief, justification) and away from the metaphysical ones (G/g exists/not) of religion. Am I right?
Again:
• theism – claims about creator-intervener g/G are true
• atheism – theism is not true
• agnosticism – theism can be shown to be equally true and not true (but not 'cannot be shown to be true or not true' because the impossibility to show that 'theism is true', given the ubiquitous scope of so many scriptural claims, is indistinguishable from, in fact, showing that 'theism is untrue')
If theism is realist-cognitive (makes truth-claims) and using the natural world (searching for truth-makers), I/we can show that theism is untrue and, therefore, (theistic) agnosticism is unwarranted, incoherent, does not obtain.
Quoting 180 Proof
It is. It also is with regards to the question of 'pepperoni lovers' or 'triple pepperoni' pizza's taste-value; or with regards to the question of the tooth fairy's tooth-value; or with regards to the question of 'Michael Shermer's woo-value. . . .Or with regards to the question of why would you make such a vacuous statement? The OP is only sound & relevant to the question of whether or not agnosticism is the most rational default position - as that is the only thing the OP claims to be.
Quoting 180 Proof
Hold on. Your argument does not stand divergent to mine if you are attacking theism or agnosticism in a very specific context wherein sufficient grounds warrant a negative claim and thus an atheistic position. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.
I repeat. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.
Third parties whom are competent in logic and argumentation could perhaps offer insights one way or another. However, I have demonstrated that your arguments miss the point entirely and this is obviously the case because you do not reach an opposing proposition of either my concluding statement nor my thesis statement, but rather the opposing statements to propositions that are not found within the OP, that I do not particularly hold or find tenable, and that fail to address a single premise of my argument.
For example, If I argue that "(P1) Noodles is a cat. (P2) Not all cats are black. Therefore, (C) Noodles may not be black. And you respond with (P1) If Noodles was instead a raven, then she would be black because all ravens are black. (P2) Noodles is actually a raven. Therefore, (C) Noodles is actually black because all ravens are black.
It is painfully obvious that the proposition "Noodles MUST be black because all ravens are black," is not opposing the statement of "Noodles may NOT be black because not all cats are black." These propositions require their respective negations (e.g., "Noodles actually is NOT black," and "Noodles MAY be black.")
Quoting 180 Proof
Then why present an argument? Why engage in philosophy? And how is persuasion sophistic? And why do you appeal to the "verdict of the jury"? Do you have interests in persuading them? If not, then why are you presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions you take?
Do you realize that both of our arguments are mutually compatible with one another? It is possible to be agnostic by default with regards to a good many propositions, and yet at the same time be atheistic with regards to the Abrahamic God of monotheism? If this is the case, then how in the [....] are your arguments a refutation of mine?
No real need to have a debate about semantics, but if what you call atheism means gnostic atheism and what you call agnosticism means uncertainty without coming to any conclusion, then when I say agnostic atheism, I mean uncertainty with a lack of belief. If you take agnosticism to mean agnostic atheism then we agree. Can you clarify your stance on agnostic atheism?
Secondly, can you define "God"? I feel the problem in this debate is how vague the actual claim is.
one merriam-webster defines "God" as:
the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped (as in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism) as creator and ruler of the universe
It seems the only thing people actually agree on when it comes to the claim of theists on "God" is that he's an intangible, invisible, undetectable being that we barely know anything about and exists.
What he can or can't do is debated by theists, his qualities are debated, what he has done is debated, disproving any of these claims is insufficient for proving God doesn't exist.
It is true that we can't disprove the existence of God but that we're uncertain about a claim which is foolproof against being proven false is pretty unavoidable. It is fundamentally meaningless to point out that a claim which is foolproof against being proven false hasn't been proven false. It means nothing. What matters is how we deal with the situation - what matters is belief. That is why agnostic atheism is a meaningful position and agnosticism isn't. The default position should be a lack of belief, do you disagree?
Quoting TheMadFool
I wouldn't say possible, though that is technically true, it is a bit deceiving too. Agnosticism, in the context of the existence of God or gods, is generally not aiming to retain the possibility that God or gods exist, but rather lacks sufficient grounds to warrant a negative claim to the existence of God or gods.
You are asking me what the mathematical probability is that God exists without defining the term in question. The term "God" is one of the most ambiguous terms there are and thus I would first need your definition (which will almost certainly need to be analyzed down and recasted once full clarification is satisfied (why I have such little interest in this tedious task). I will need to know your interpretation of relevant scriptures and doctrines, your personal interpretation, all universal qualities that I can render from you, etc.
After possibly quite a bit of work I can usually piece together a concept of God (or whatever other deity that you are arguing for) by constantly drawing information from you with clarification as to what this information means to you. Once I have a sufficient set of information which has been satisfactorily clarified by you and of which contains either a (less so compelling) physical impossibility (e.g., that the universe was created in less than 10,000 years ago) or a (more so compelling) logical impossibility (i.e., logical contradiction) (e.g., that God is omnipotent, omni-benevolent, and omniscient - in combination to you granting the existence of 'evil' and providing a typical theistic definition therein), then I move from my prior, default agnostic position to an atheistic position regarding your particular model of a god or deity.
I most often remain undecided but also largely confused as to what my interlocutor was trying to describe to me, but often enough I do reach a threshold and advance from agnosticism with regards to a specific interaction with a particular person. When this does happen it has always been a shift towards atheism and never towards theism, though I have heard quite coherent and rational arguments that are necessary for such a logical pathway, it seems many and quite extraordinary leaps are taken of which I cannot reasonably follow.
Yes, I agree. Those are two legitimate opposing propositions too.
Quoting 180 Proof
These can be formalized into propositions and their negations.
(S) It is the case that the sun goes around the earth.
(-S) It is NOT the case that the sun goes around the earth.
(E) It is the case that the earth goes around the sun.
(-E) It is NOT the case that the earth goes around the sun.
What seems to be the problem here is that whenever you hear someone claim that "God exists" your assume to understand the term 'God' whereas I have no freaking idea and must go on a hermeneutic (literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogical) adventure with my interlocutor until sufficient information is extracted and clarified so that I may advance from my initial default agnostic position and (at least every time so far) shift epistemologically towards an atheistic position regarding the particular theistic concept of a specific individual theist.
Does this bridge any gaps for us?
Quoting Judaka
Sure. I just tire of this discussion (of agnosticism) being chained to the rocks of theism and atheism. This is because I view the dichotomy on the whole utterly uninteresting and endlessly exhausting. I also do not take pleasure in attacking sacrosanct beliefs held not rationally in hopes of constructing an accurate personal epistemology, but emotionally in hopes of constructing a sustainable niche in reality wherein maximal psychological comfort can be achieved.
I definite agnosticism (with perhaps a bit too many idiosyncrasies) as, "an epistemological position of an initial default or of a forthcoming retraction wherein a reasonable suspension of judgment is warranted on the grounds of an apparent lack of good independent evidential support for a hypothesis or proposition."
Hypotheses measure probability in terms such as: impossible, unlikely, possible, even chance, likely and certain probabilities; whereas propositions measure truth-value in terms of true or false. Hypotheses are sufficient in supporting either a positive (P is the case) or negative (Not P- is the case) belief but since it factors epistemic and logical possibilities, it falls short of the standard of knowledge as a justified true-belief.
Propositions are primary truth bearers insofar as their references (relationship between a symbol that signifies a thing) accurately capture the obtaining state of affairs of their referents (the thing signified). A proposition maps language to thought, concepts or representations in each agent's mind transmitting cognitive meaning between a sender and a recipient. However, a true proposition must be justified and the justification of a proposition consists in appealing to something independent of the subject - the World.
So, in terms of epistemic justification, our language, thoughts, and concepts must be grounded in the objects, entities, or things empirically substantiated or logically instantiated as a referent component of the obtaining states of affairs. Under certain circumstances in which the available evidence no better supports a proposition (P) than it supports it's logically incompatible negating proposition (-P), one ought to suspend judgement between both propositions (P) and (-P).
Agnostic atheism is an epistemological position that is both atheistic (because it is to withhold belief in the existence of God or gods) and agnostic (because it is to claim that the existence of God or gods is either unknowable or not known as a fact). This is a fine position, I just don't like the further restrictive denotations alongside the already problematic theistic connotations.
I don't have a particular definition of God or of gods. I have a basic ambiguous conception of God that is unique to me and my life's experiences. Some may define God as "the universe." Some as "all of existence," or "the entirety of the reality itself." These can hardly be argued against since it is essentially a semantic issue. Others define God as "A Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness," which can be clarified and revealed as a logical contradiction.
I hope that helped.