Meet Ariel
A variation on an old theme:
1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional
3. therefore Ariel must be real, since otherwise 1 is contradicted
... wherever she's hiding per se. ;)
The Little Mermaid (1989)
Anyone up for an expedition, maybe Atlantica?
1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional
3. therefore Ariel must be real, since otherwise 1 is contradicted
... wherever she's hiding per se. ;)
The Little Mermaid (1989)
Anyone up for an expedition, maybe Atlantica?
Comments (30)
Goes way back, to 1078 I think, hence why I posted it in this group.
Take it with a smile. ;) Or not.
What's the basis for this? Is a real detective greater than Sherlock Holmes? I think not! Is existence not more so a limitation and an impediment?
She does exist, though, at least. (Check link in opening post.)
Surely real is grrreater than fictional. For example, it means she can also assert her grrreatness herself, independently of human fiction writers.
[sub](PS, should this have been posted elsewhere?)[/sub] :D
I would take it with a smile if I got the joke. I don't even know who you're shooting at.
Say for instance that we want to say that Sherlock Holmes can fly. We can achieve this in one of two ways. We can either change his physical circumstances, or we have to change the thing that he is. We can put him on a plane in modern times, or in some sense his very being must be altered. When we change him to be able to fly, then his limitations become different. No matter where we put Sherlock Holmes, he cannot fly unaided, survive in space, or something like that because of the thing he is. None of that it included in his identity -- and it is this that determines his physical limitations.
So... I would suggest the obvious, that "greatest" here has to just be an evaluation, and can't be a quantifiable difference in affectiveness or potency, or ability, as the capabilities of a thing are implied in its very essence. Existence isn't a predicate.
Just pointing out the subtle difference here. :)
Quoting Wosret
OK OK, I concede. (Logicing, reification, predicate ontologization, ...)
Unless there are any defenders?
Ariel is still grrreat though. And you can meet her, too.
That Ruth is stranger than Richard is itself a happy fantasy. No! Fiction wins every time, and on every measure. It is more potent, more satisfying, more congenial, more complete and more consistent. You have been deceived by fake news. And there is the proof of it.
Hrmph. Ariel might slap you for reducing her to animated fiction if she weren't so grrreat.
1 defines and names Ariel — what's meant by Ariel here — quiddity (definitions are often demanded in arguments).
2 gives a partial metric on grrreater, so that Ariel also can assert (her grrreatness) herself, independently of human fiction writers, self-aware sentient alive, perhaps even has "free will" (though a bit circular here).
3 then follows from 1 and 2 by reductio ad absurdum.
Roughly the usual format of ontological arguments.
Would proponents of Anselm also have to accept Ariel (or vice versa)?
I'm using "fictional" and "real" as contrasts here.
And fictions also exist, they're just not real.
Sorry for any confuzzlement.
Or worse yet, that there isn't actually any different at all between Ariel before and after she is muted.
1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. Ariel would be grrreater if not just fictional
Premise 2 contradicts the definition of Ariel. If Ariel is maximally grrreat then she cannot possibly be made grrreater. Taking this into account, we can conclude that it is therefore impossible for Ariel to ever become non-fictional, or premise 1 is somehow false.
Let me take a different approach:
1 Quixflooper is defined as maximally zanquacious
2 Quixflooper would be more zanquacious if not just gonksploosh
By defining Quixflooper as less zanquacious due to being Gonksploosh in premise 2, you have either contradicted the definition of quixflooper as maximally zanquacious from premise 1, or it is actually impossible for quixflooper to be more zanquacious (by being non-gonksploosh), and here "more zanquacious" refers to some hypothetical impossibility because Quixflooper cannot possibly be non-gonksploosh.
2 theological horse would be more dead if not just fiction
Therefore, theological horse cannot be non-fiction? Seems like it follows to me...
1. Ariel is the maximally great mermaid
2. If Ariel does not exist then Ariel is not the maximally great mermaid
Therefore,
3. Ariel exists
A clearer rendition follows:
1. Ariel is the maximally great mermaid
2. If Ariel is the maximally great mermaid then Ariel exists
Therefore,
3. Ariel exists
Perfect! Even Bertrand Russel gave his seal of approval exclaiming "Great God in Boots!—the ontological argument is sound!"
However...
1. X is a maximally great argument that proves Ariel doesn't exist
2. If X is a maximally great argument that proves Ariel doesn't exist then X exists
Therefore,
3. X exists
4. If X exists then Ariel doesn't exist
Therefore,
5. Ariel doesn't exist
That is all that Ariel is and that is all the Wosret is.
The wosret is many things.
Why? Cartoon Donald Trump, of course.
So, I tried this alternative:
1. define Ariel as a maximally grrreat mermaid
2. a real mermaid is grrreater than a fictional mermaid
3. therefore Ariel must be real, since otherwise 1 is contradicted
Here 2 gives a partial metric on grrreatness, where a real mermaid is independent, self-aware, sentient, alive, which a fictional mermaid is not.
Antinatalists not included; they'll just say that independent self-aware sentient alive is bad. :)
Quoting Wosret
Quoting VagabondSpectre
:D You guys crack me up. Love these posts (whether intended as funny or not).
Quoting Wayfarer
The intent here was a metric on grrreatness that spans fictional and real.
Moreover, so that grrreatness(real) > grrreatness(fictional).
Ariel does have all of those attributes. She's fictionally independent, fictionally self-aware, fictionally alive. An empirical concept, and an ideal/imaginary one are not distinct in some attributable way that bares on the concepts themselves, that's why we have to go out and look for things.
You're just equivocating between two different concepts of "Ariel".