Against spiritualism
Hello.
I came up with an argument against extreme spiritualism, and would like your thought on the strength of it. Extreme spiritualism: the belief that the physical world does not exist, that all that exists is spiritual, and that the physical world is therefore all imagined.
Argument: We cannot imagine anything that we have not already experienced in the past. EG: a man that is born blind cannot imagine the concept of a colour. Sure, we can imagine "blue grass" or "pink mountains" which do not exist in reality, but we are able to do so because we have experienced its parts in reality: we have experienced the colour "blue", and "grass", and "pink" and "mountains" separately, and we can simply combine the parts together in our minds. But if the physical world does not exist, then we could never imagine it, because we could never imagine any of its parts. EG: How can we imagine a wooden table if its parts, "wood" and "table", do not exist? Therefore a physical world must exist.
I came up with an argument against extreme spiritualism, and would like your thought on the strength of it. Extreme spiritualism: the belief that the physical world does not exist, that all that exists is spiritual, and that the physical world is therefore all imagined.
Argument: We cannot imagine anything that we have not already experienced in the past. EG: a man that is born blind cannot imagine the concept of a colour. Sure, we can imagine "blue grass" or "pink mountains" which do not exist in reality, but we are able to do so because we have experienced its parts in reality: we have experienced the colour "blue", and "grass", and "pink" and "mountains" separately, and we can simply combine the parts together in our minds. But if the physical world does not exist, then we could never imagine it, because we could never imagine any of its parts. EG: How can we imagine a wooden table if its parts, "wood" and "table", do not exist? Therefore a physical world must exist.
Comments (107)
Are you instead arguing against idealism?
Charles Sanders Peirce offered a similar argument for the reality of his universal categories of Firstness (quality/feeling/possibility), Secondness (reaction/will/actuality), and Thirdness (habit/thought/necessity), as well as his synechism - the doctrine that there is real continuity.
[quote=Reasoning and the Logic of Things, pp. 161-162]Whatever unanalyzable element sui generis seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, yet must really be in nature somewhere, since nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such an element sui generis. For example, I may be in a dream at this moment, and while I think I am talking and you are trying to listen, I may all the time be snugly tucked up in bed and sound asleep. Yes, that may be; but still the very semblance of my feeling a reaction against my will and against my senses, suffices to prove that there really is, though not in this dream, yet somewhere, a reaction between the inward and outward worlds of my life.
In the same way, the very fact that there seems to be Thirdness in the world, even though it be not where it seems to be, proves that real Thirdness there must somewhere be. If the continuity of our inward and outward sense be not real, still it proves that continuity there really be, for how else should sense have the power of creating it?[/quote]
Perception on its own is not a proof for reality. I perceive things in dreams but these perceived things are not real. At least, not in the dream itself.
I don't know how you define the spiritual (or the physical) so it's kinda hard to comment.
As long as the blind share our background capacities and language there is little that prevents them from understanding descriptions of colours and imagining what colours are like.
It's relatively easy to imagine things or events that violate the laws of nature, such as shining darkness, ghosts, super heroes, and gods. To imagine these things does not require past veridical experiences, they're fictional, not real. We can imagine almost anything. If something is impossible to imagine it might be direct contradictions, such as 'a sun that shines and doesn't shine at the same time', or impossible things such as square circles.
But whence the assumption that the question whether the world is physical or non-physical would somehow depend on our ability to imagine non-physical things? It doesn't.
How would you describe the colour red to a blind man?
No problem:
Physical: matter and energy.
Spiritual: all that exists which is not physical. EG: living beings such as angels and souls, but also non-living beings such as logic and morality.
Well, as a possible reductio ad absurdum of your reasoning (unless you accept the conclusion), given that we can imagine such things as angels and souls, it must then follow that such things exist?
I would disagree. The blind can understand the theory behind the colour blue, that is, a certain frequency range of light wave, but he could not "see" the colour blue in his mind.
Quoting jkop
Actually it depends on our ability to imagine physical things. Because if we cannot imagine physical things prior to experiencing them, then how can we explain our perception of physical things if these things don't exist anywhere? If we cannot provide an adequate alternative explanation for that phenomenon, then we must conclude that physical things exist.
You seem to be assuming that "physical" is a simple impression, like "blue", but that is doubtful. I have certainly experienced "blue", but how do I know whether I have experienced "physical"?
[quote=Hume]When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as it is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.[/quote]
If no impression, then the term is meaningless.
Do we imagine matter and energy (whatever they are)? Or do we image colours and shapes and sounds and textures and other sensory qualities? The extreme spiritualist could argue that when we imagine things like chairs and tables we're imagining complex arrangements of the latter things, not the former.
I do believe in these things, but I see your general point. The concept of "angels" can be deconstructed into "living beings" and "spiritual", both of which we perceive elsewhere. As for the soul, I think we do not have a clear perception of it. As such, I would not use my argument to prove the existence of these two concepts.
And that's an opening for the spiritualist. They can argue that we do not have a clear perception (or conception) of the physical (i.e. matter and energy) - see Hempel's dilemma - and so our imaginings are not proof of a physical world.
So at best your reasoning can be used to conclude that chairs and tables and trees exist, but not physical things. In fact, the spiritualist might say that the chairs and tables and trees we imagine are spiritual things.
I agree with this. But these concepts (colours and shapes and sounds and textures and other sensory qualities) are physical concepts, not spiritual ones. How can the extreme spiritualist explain where these come from, if not from a physical world?
The spiritualist who denies the physical world probably wouldn't deny colours and shapes and sounds and so on. Presumably they still accept that we have experiences? So they'll say that these are spiritual concepts, not physical concepts.
We do not experience "physical", but "blue", which is a physical concept. As long as you have experienced "blue", you need to explain where this experience comes from, if not from a physical world.
Okay, then "physical" is not a simple impression, but a complex one than can be broken down. But "matter" and "energy" aren't like "blue" or "hot". They aren't simple impressions: clear, lively, vivid sense impressions. They seem more like abstractions which Hume would reject.
How can that be? Spiritual things such as angels, souls, logic and morality do not possess such things as colours and shapes and sounds and textures and other sensory qualities. Can you find a spiritual thing that does?
Well, a tree. Your reasoning rests on the premise that when we imagine a tree we're imagining a physical thing. But a spiritualist might reject this premise and say that when we imagine a tree we're imagining a spiritual thing, being that when we imagine a tree we're not imagining these nebulous notions of "matter" and "energy".
A Humean might think that that word you're using, "physical", is meaningless if it is not itself a sense impression or is not derived from any sense impression. You might as well say that "blue" is a fribbedy concept.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, I don't. I could be sceptical like Hume. I know that I have experienced "blue", because, for example, I can imagine, say, a blue mountain, which I could not otherwise do. That comes from my impression of "blue".
[Quote=Hume]The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions.[/quote]
Why go as far as you and assume a physical world? You seem to be assuming scientific realism. You rely upon these scientific terms which you assume are meaningful and descriptive of reality. But that can be subjected to what is arguably reasonable doubt by, for example, adopting a Humean stance. You take some of Hume's thought and try to lead it elsewhere, which is kind of interesting, but I don't think that it's working very well.
Does this mean that, to a spiritualist, a tree (even imaginary) is a spiritual thing, not a physical one? If so, then how does he differentiate between physical and spiritual things?
I would describe the colour indirectly, by referring to its effects on people who can see it, by how they use the word 'red', describe things in which the colour occurs in nature, and its metaphorical uses etc. To imagine what it's like to see red is not to see anything, recall. Imagination is the evocation of an experience via knowledge of one's past or other experiences. Without any past visual experiences the blind can still use knowledge of other experiences, or knowledge of other people's visual experiences, in order to imagine what it's like to see red.
But when we imagine seeing something we don't really see anything. That's why it is called 'imagination'.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Are you assuming that the world would be made of your perceptions or imaginations? Why else would you claim that the question whether the world is physical would depend on our ability to perceive physical things?
In a physical world it happens to be possible for certain biological creatures to perceive things, invent a language by which they can talk about their perceived things, as well as other things they don't perceive but imagine. It is even possible to talk complete nonsense. In a non-physical world, however, we wouldn't talk nonsense even, because without the recalcitrance of a physical world inhabited by biological creatures there would hardly be any sufficient reason for the invention and use of words.
I'm guessing he was well aware of that, and that that's why he put scare quotes around the word "see".
I think the word "spiritual" is bringing a lot of confusion to this conversation. By my reading of this thread, it appears as if you are arguing against the idea that reality is purely mental, or experiential. This position is commonly refereed to as "idealism"' or more broadly speaking 'anti-realism'.
Anyway, in response to the quote above, a "spiritualist"/idealist doesn't believe that anything is physical. To a spiritualist/idealist there would merely be different kinds of tree experiences - eg, trees experienced in waking life (such as when walking through a forest), trees experienced in dreams, trees that one imagines in their minds eye, fictitious trees referred to in books, images of trees, etc. To the idealist, none of these trees are physical, all of these trees exist only as experiences, but they're differentiated from each other by the kind of experiences that they are - they're all experienced in a clearly different way.
What does "seeing" mean when nothing is seen?
It's a very common metaphor, so I would be very surprised if you were not already aware of its meaning. It's used in that way to mean "to imagine or visualise". [I]To see with your mind's eye[/I]. It's not meant to be taken literally, hence the scare quotes.
Why do you not in return though, need to explain where the physical world comes from? The idealist/spiritualist believes reality exists on an experiential level, with no other 'level' of reality causing or holding/bringing the experiential world into existence. You might gawk and demand an explanation for what on earth is causing the experiential world to exist, but the physicalist is merely bringing the 'uncaused' part of reality out from our experiences into a physical world.
At some point, there must be a 'level' of reality that is uncaused, that just exists with nothing causing it or bringing it into existence. You hold that this is the physical level of reality - the physical world doesn't require an explanation/another level of reality which brings it about, causing it to exist. The idealist holds that this uncaused level of reality is our experiences. That there is no level of reality bringing them into existence, the merely exist uncaused.
Do you see my point? Every position has this same feature - that there is a part/level of reality that does not require an explanation for what is causing it to exist. For you, that level is a physical world. For the idealist, that level is our experiences. Both the idealist and physicalist theories have the very same feature - that some part of reality is uncaused and merely exists with nothing holding it in existence - it just exists by brute force and requires no explanation (because it has none), the only difference between the two theories here is the disagreement over which level of reality is uncaused/exists through brute force.
So when you say "you need to explain where this experience comes from", the idealist can simply respond that his experience is uncaused/it exists through 'brute' force - in the very same way that the physicalist would respond to a question about what causes the physical world to exist.
Why must the idealist give an explanation for the cause of his experiences, whereas you don't have to give an explanation for what is causing the physical world to exist? The only difference between your positions here is what level of reality you believe is uncaused and requires no explanation.
My argument is not from cause to effect, but tracing the effect back to the cause. The effect of our perception of the physical world requires an adequate cause. That cause must be a real physical world. Could it be something else?
Here you're just assuming, or begging the question that what we perceive with our sense IS a physical world, which the idealist disputes. The idealist also disputes that his experiences require "an adequate cause" - which is the exact same thing that you are doing, except in regards to the physical world. You hold that the physical world is a 'cause', and isn't an effect of something else/some other level of reality.
The difference between the two positions is which level of reality is uncaused/requires no 'adequate cause'. So demanding the idealist explain what's causing everything experiential to exist is missing the point - the idealist holds that experiential things are uncaused - there *isnt* some other level of reality (such as a physical world) causing them to exist.
I think your concern misses the mark. If only a spiritual world exists, even if it is uncaused, then we could never perceive a physical world, due the limitation of our imagination, as explained previously. But we do perceive a physical world. If a physical world exists, even if it is uncaused, then it explains the phenomenon of our perception. Now you demand a cause for the existence of the physical world. That is indeed left unanswered, but it stands outside of the original topic of discussion, which was to explain how it is that we perceive a physical world.
As for you argument, that can easily be countered. Just as you reason that things like "blue" are physical, and thus lead to a physical world, I can reason that things like "blue" are perceptual, and thus lead to an ideal (or "spiritual") world.
And as for cause and effect, that can also be rejected, in a sense, insofar as it relates to reason, as per Hume. You've said that there [i]must[/I] be a cause, yet there is no necessary connection between the one and the other. Or, if there is, can you demonstrate this?
There are other things to perceive than physical objects, such as socially constructed objects, which are not so physical, nor are they imagined; they're agreements perceived as things to live by. From the fact that you perceive something it does not follow that the world is physical (unless you'd assume that perception must be the cause of a physical world, but then your argument would be circular and invalid).
As regards the reality of 'physical things', it is feasible to argue that the world is a consistent illusion. That doesn't necessarily imply the reality of spiritual things, but it does undermine the view that everything can be explained in purely physical terms, or that what is physical is intrinsically or inherently real.
And indeed, there is a lot of uncertainty about what 'purely physical' might mean. Back in the day of spiritual seers and seances, it might have been believed that 'physical things' would be explained in terms of measurable entities and forces, such as atoms and electromagnetic fields. However, subsequently, the nature of matter has turned out not to be at all straightforward. Sober scientists nowadays are quite prepared to entertain notions such as 'many worlds' and the like.
As regards 'how we perceive the physical world' - seeing, perception, judgement and so on, are built around cognitive faculties. The question of how or if our cognitive faculties decieve us, or not, is one of the fundamental questions of philosophy. Sceptics nowadays are generally those who maintain that science provides the only arbiter of what ought to be considered real, but originally scepticism called into question the whole domain of sensory experience, on similar grounds to the above - that experience itself might be illusory. That doesn't necessarily mean the sceptics were correct but at least it's worth considering what scepticism originally means, in this context.
Oh really. But 'to imagine' is what I said, recall. The fact that "seeing" is a metaphor does not make its use appropriate, nor innocent, in a context where one argues for a rejection of its literal meaning in talk of imagination.
Well, I perceive a table in front of me. This table is a physical object, even if that object is only imaginary.
Quoting Sapientia
I am not sure I understand this. Can you present the argument?
Quoting Sapientia
Sure. Indeed, the existence of a physical world is not a necessary cause to the effect of my perception of physical things; but it is an adequate cause, thus a candidate. To refute this candidate, we would need to find other adequate causes to take its place. I can think of only one, which is God. Since God (should He exist) can create things from nothing, then He could create the idea of physical things in our minds without physical things existing in the real world.
I don't see how that would work at all. Saying that green is the colour of grass and apples, that red is the colour of strawberries and apples, that cars come in many different colours, and that purple is the colour we associate with royalty and wealth, unless you're in Brazil or Thailand where it's the colour of mourning, won't help a blind person understand what it's like to see colours. How can you think it would?
This is becoming rather tiresome. I'm interested in explanation, not just bald assertion.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Can [i]you[/I]? I was just using analogous reasoning to your own in order to highlight the problem with it. If you have a problem with my argument, then you have a problem with your own.
I perceive a table in front of me. This table has not been demonstrated by you to be a physical object, whether that object is only imaginary or otherwise.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
By what method are you assessing whether or not a candidate is adequate? Explanatory power? If explanatory power were the only criterion, then perhaps. But I don't think that you've adequately explained this candidate. Induction? How then do you resolve the problem of induction?
Perhaps he is blind, and has convinced himself that he knows what colour is like [i]just like[/I] the rest of us. Or perhaps he is a pedant who has missed the point. He seems rather hung up on this issue, which isn't really even an issue in my view. I don't think that anyone here really meant what he's criticising. I see this as an unhelpful digression, although I myself have contributed towards it. (Oops).
If we regard the physical world as the 'cause' of our phenomenal experiences, then the existence of the physical world - thus defined - is an assumption, based abductively (and hence partly subjectively) on our experiences. Immanuel Kant believed in a such a physical world, but argued that its constituents were imperceptible and unknowable - and also, one would imagine, unimaginable. He called them 'noumena'. He went to great lengths in his second version of the Critique of Pure Reason to argue that this did not make him an Idealist (which seems to correspond to what you are calling a 'Spiritualist'), although he would agree to being a 'Transcendental Idealist', a term he made up to describe his position.
I agree with Kant that he was not an Idealist (in the sense typically applied to George Berkeley, although Berkeley called himself an Immaterialist). He believed in the existence of a physical world. He just also believed that it was unknowable.
Knowing that red is used in different ways in different cultures helps us understand what it's like to see red in different contexts. I think you ascribe the blind too many disabilities. A bind person lacks the ability to see; not to understand, nor imagine, what it's like to see.
I've never seen neutrinos, I can't see them, but I know a little about them: for example, that they are difficult to detect, even with sensitive instruments. That alone is enough for me to be able to imagine what it's like to detect them, or see them with my imagined super-naturally sensitive eyes.
Imagination is, unlike perception, an evoked experience which is closely related to perceptual experience but occurs under very different conditions. Instead of direct causal links and interaction with present objects there is knowledge, empathy, and the ability to evoke experiences we call imagination. Do you think that's controversial or false?
I would say they do (unless they were once sighted and have since lost their sight). We once had a blind poster on the old forum who asked us to explain sight to her and she couldn't make heads or tails of it, which is expected.
And when you imagine seeing neutrinos with your super-naturally sensitive eyes, what do you imagine? A tiny little ball, perhaps? I'm no scientist, but I'm pretty sure that would be completely wrong.
But even if it is like a tiny little ball, this analogy fails as you already know what tiny little balls look like. So for this comparison to hold, the blind person must have had some experience that is something like colours for them to understand colours, which they don't.
I think it's controversial and false. How can the blind evoke an experience of a kind they've never had? Not only are the areas of the brain that are responsible for the experience of colour underdeveloped in the blind (and the areas of the brain that are responsible for the experience of colour are also responsible for the imagining of colour), but their brains haven't had the means to connect these areas to the areas that are responsible for imagining things that they do understand, which is why simply telling them that apples are green (or red) won't help them understand what it's like to see something that's green (or red).
I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding here.
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There's an interesting article on blindness by Oliver Sacks called The Mind's Eye. In it he even describes how someone who was once sighted but lost his sight (due to an issue with his eyes, not with his brain) can't even imagine visual things any more (although others who lost their sight could remember - but I think it reasonable to suggest that those who've never experienced sight at all would be like the one who can't remember, given that the information was never in the brain to begin with).
Interesting. I wonder how widespread this phenomenon is among the non-congenitally blind. In cases in which this "imagination blindness" occurs, perhaps it's because the visual cortex is being co-opted by something else (assuming that the visual cortex is even involved in imagining sight to begin with).
I seem to recall reading somewhere yesterday about someone who was blinded later in life and then recovered their sight and after recovery realised that they had completely forgotten a lot of colours and had trouble distinguishing them.
Also, regarding your last consideration, there's this:
Yes, exactly. It is a retroductive hypothesis that provides a very plausible explanation for our experiences, which we can then deductively explicate and inductively evaluate by means of our subsequent experiences. However, we cannot know with absolute certainty that our experiences really do correspond to a physical world; just that they correspond to some kind of external world that reacts with us by resisting our actions and our wills, which is what "existence" means.
Quoting andrewk
Peirce was intimately familiar with Kant's writings, but eventually chose to call himself an objective idealist instead. He understood "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," and stated, "The one intelligible theory of the universe is objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." In other words, he held "matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind," and that "matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit," such that "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death."
Quoting andrewk
By contrast, Peirce believed that the physical world is knowable, precisely because matter and mind differ merely in degree, rather than kind. In fact, Peirce insisted that it was absurd to call anything "real" that was unknowable; the real is precisely that which would be known by an infinite community of investigators after an indefinite process of inquiry.
Begs the question.
As previously stated, I defined "physical" as: matter and energy. I would now add "anything that is perceived by the senses" for further clarity. Now a table is made of matter (atoms). Thus the table I perceive is physical.
Quoting Sapientia
But the definition of perceptual is "involving perception especially in relation to sensory experience", and "sensory" is related to physical things. Thus according to that definition, this would make the perception of "blue" lead to acknowledging a physical world, not idealism, would it not?
Quoting Sapientia
To say that "the existence of X is an adequate cause for my perception of X" is really the common sense hypothesis and is therefore the default position. If you were to object to this, you would have the onus of proof to refute the claim, not me.
I guess not always. But how about perceiving things directly through the senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, ...)? Aren't things that are perceived through the senses necessarily physical?
I defined "physical" as matter and energy. I perceive a table. The table is made of matter, thus is physical. Therefore I perceive a physical world.
Again, you're just begging the question of the nature of things in the world. An idealist would dispute that the table is made of matter.
An idealist can just make the same begging the question argument: "I perceive a table. The table is made of my visual experience of it, thus is experiential. Therefore I perceive an experiential world."
Strange, because usually obscurity inspires people to imagine more, not less. Fiction thrives on it even.
Quoting Michael
Can imaginations be wrong? What is an example of a right imagination of something, anything?
Quoting Michael
Here you're talking about understanding colours, not imagining them. And why would anyone need some experience that is something like colours to understand colours?
One counter argument might be that we can imagine, i.e. experience, fictional things we simply couldn't have had previous, nor similar, experiences of. Unseen colours even. Heard of blind painters?
Quoting Michael
The question is incoherent, because one could not have something of a kind that one has never had.
From the lack of visual experiences it does not follow that the blind would therefore be incapable of imagining what it's like to have them. To imagine is to experience something real or unreal via knowledge, empathy, speculation, abductive reasoning etc.. We may imagine things impossible to perceive, or places impossible to visit and so on.
Quoting Michael
That's trivially true. But to imagine something new is not to remember something old. What do you know about imagination?
(EDITED for clarity, Feb. 22nd)
But science claims that tables are made of matter. Surely I can appeal to the authority of science on this. At the very least, the scientific claims become the default position, and so the idealist disputing the claim agreed upon by science would have the onus of proof, not me.
Science can't really tell you if the world is real or not. It's feasible that the world might be a grand illusion, but an illusion that works consistently, in such a way that it is scientifically predictable. I don't personally subscribe to such a view, but the point is, that is a metaphysical question, rather than a scientific question - in other words, you can't appeal to science to resolve the question.
Secondly, the 'nature of matter' is really rather mysterious in its own right. It used to be thought that matter was ultimately composed of atoms, in the form of indivisible point-particles, but the nature of atoms has turned out to be quite deep question in its own right. That very question is the subject of the Large Hadron Collider, which is the most expensive and powerful scientific apparatus ever made. But at this point in time, there is still no truly 'fundamental particle' that has been found by the LHC.
Investigate what it means for something to be physical, does it leave anything out?
You can't really win an argument by definition like that, because it isn't really a win. It's trivial, and anyone can do it. An idealist could do the exact same thing.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But that could be a controversial premise in the context of this debate, so it can't just be taken as self-evident. Its meaning and logical implications would have to be examined, as well as how you supposedly know this to be the case.
One could form a possible counterargument based on idealism, representationalism or scientific anti-realism, by claiming that "table", "matter" and "atoms" are just ideas, perceptions or concepts, or by claiming that we do not directly perceive any table or matter or atoms, but only representations, and that you therefore do not know what you claim.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The former is not inconsistent with what I said. One can use the adjective "perceptual" to describe it, and one could give it a name like "impression" or "sense-data".
The latter is begging the question again.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If you define "sensory" in such a way as to do so, then yes, but that would be trivial and would miss the point. Obviously, that definition would simply be rejected, and not without good reason. This debate has been ongoing for a long time. It can't be settled that easily.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
You could just read an [I]An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding[/I] by David Hume. He is quite critical of common sense.
I agree with this, but I think there is still a misunderstanding on the term "physical". Let me try to define it another way: A thing is physical if it has spatial attributes such as length, height, volume, etc. It is also physical if it has attributes related to energy, such as speed, force, noise emission etc. Finally, it is physical if it can be detected (by instruments) and measured. Under that new (less than perfect) definition, a table is definitely physical, even if only an illusion. My whole argument is not prove that the table that I perceive is real, but that if the perception of physical things exist, then there must exist a physical world somewhere.
Yes. Concepts such as logic, morality, and justice are not perceived through the senses, and yet are undeniably real (at least logic for most people). They are therefore non-physical things. I would also add spiritual things like souls, angels and God, but these concepts can be controversial and so we can leave them out. If you disagree, what would you consider physical things versus non-physical?
I still think there is a misunderstanding. While it is debatable that the table that I perceive is real or an illusion, the undeniable fact is that I perceive a table. As long as the thing that I perceive has a shape or colour, then it is physical. Even if the table is an illusion, then it is an illusion of a physical thing. In contrast, non-physical things would be concepts such as logic, morality and justice, because they don't have physical attributes such as shape, colour, or energy. If these are illusions, then they would be illusions of non-physical things.
So the only obstacle I see to a mutual understanding is to agree on the definition of a thing being "physical". Once clarified, then the original argument is easily understood.
But I think what would be desired of anything that was truly physical, would be that it is real independently of any perception of it; its reality would not be dependent on it being perceived. Whereas, an illusion can only exist in the mind of an observer, as an illusion is, by definition, an artefact of perception.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
There was a famous philosopher, by the name of Berkeley, who said that what we take to be external objects are really only ideas in the minds of observers. And it seems that at this point, you're on the verge of conceding that he might actually have been correct. And if you wanted an example of what you defined as 'an extreme spiritualist' in the history of Western philosophy, then Bishop Berkeley would be your man.
So, to be honest, I think your argument is in trouble.
You're using the fact that we can imagine as proof of the physical world. According to you we can only imagine things or combinations of attributes of those things that exist in the physical world. You provide an illustrative analogy in the blind man who, having never experienced vision, cannot even imagine the concept of color.
So, what you're saying is:
1. It is not possible to imagine things that don't exist in the physical world
2. If the physical world did not exist then it is possible to imagine things that don't exist in the physical world (IOW: If it is not possible to imagine things that don't exist in the physical world then the physical world exists)
Therefore,
3. The physical world exists
My question is how do you know premise 1 is true? Yes, your analogy of the blind man is good but I have doubts about whether it conclusively proves its point.
[I]1. ''It is not possible to imagine things that don't exist in the physical world''[/i] needs to be restated to reflect the truth of the matter. An examination of the statement reveals that an implicit assumption, unwarranted, is being made in the statement viz. [I]the physical world exists[/i].
For me the correct truthful statement is ''it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived''. This is accurate as it deletes the unwarranted assumption ''the existence physical world''.
Now we can review your argument again:
1. It is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived
2. If it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived then the physical world exists
Therefore,
3. The physical world exists
We can now see that 1 is true but 2 is dubious as there's a possibility that our perceptions could be mentally generated, having no real physical correlate.
I don't think that I have misunderstood. Even what you consider to be an undeniable fact - that you perceive a table - is debatable, [i]if[/I], for example, by that you mean something other than, say, a representation - [i]or[/I], even if you [i]do[/I] mean something like a representation, it's nevertheless still arguable whether or not that is physical. Some people would argue that it is not. Some people contrast the mental with the physical, and take the position that they're mutually exclusive. Some people, in a sense, deny the physical [i]altogether[/I].
I suspect that [I]you[/I] have perhaps misunderstood, since you do not seem to have taken my criticism on board, given statements such as, "As long as the thing that I perceive has a shape or colour, then it is physical".
To that kind of statement, I'll just say again that you can't really win an argument by definition like that. And if that's not what you're trying to do, then let's see how you can show that to be the case, if at all. The common sense hypothesis has already be criticised, so that can't just be assumed. You have a burden to support that position.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
What's your argument for that, then? And how does it deal with counterarguments, like the ones that I have mentioned?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Your [i]conclusion[/I] probably wouldn't be disputed by those who are not physicalists or dualists, even if they [i]did[/I] challenge your premise (the bit were you imply that shape, colour, and energy are physical), so I don't think that that really matters in comparison to your other claims.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Good luck with that. The physical has to do with physics, as most would accept. But some people [i]are not[/I] physicalists or dualists, and [i]do not[/I] consider what it is that we perceive with regards to things which seem to be assumed by you to be physical objects to [I]be[/I] physical objects.
If you only mean that they relate to physics, which, according to Wikipedia, is [i]the natural science that involves the study of matter and its motion and behavior through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force[/I], then I doubt that you'll get much disagreement. Physics does not in itself entail physicalism or the physical side to dualism.
As I understand it, our disagreement lies around the definition of the term "physical". Let's take a step back. Instead of using the term "physical", let's use the term "colour" in the argument, as so:
1. We cannot imagine things we have not perceived in the past.
2. We perceive colours.
3. Therefore colours exist. Not necessarily the ones I directly perceive right now, (because I could be dreaming right now), but these colours must have existed at least in the past in order to enable me to imagine them right now.
Do you agree with the new simplified argument?
There seems to be a logical fallacy in that statement: How can our perception of a thing be always mentally generated, since you agreed in premise 1 that it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived. Let's say I perceive a table. It could be that this table is mentally generated, because I perceived a similar table in the past. How can I explain the perception of the past? It could be that that too was mentally generated from a perception of another table before that, and so on ... But How did I get the very first perception? Logically, the first perception of a table must come from a real table, since we agree in premise 1 that it is not possible to imagine things that have not been perceived. Also, I would rectify the syllogism as so:
1. It is not possible to imagine things that have not yet been perceived.
2. We perceive physical things.
3. Therefore the physical things we perceive exist somewhere. Not necessarily the direct things we perceive, but similar things that would enable us to imagine these direct things we perceive.
It sounds like we will not agree on the definition of the term "physical". What if I simplify my original argument and use the term "colour"? It changes the conclusion a bit, but not really the intent of the argument. Here it is:
1. We cannot imagine things we have not experienced in the past.
2. We perceive colours.
3. Therefore colours exist. Not necessarily the ones I directly perceive right now, (because I could be dreaming right now), but these colours must have existed at least in the past in order to enable me to imagine them right now.
Any objections? If not, then the same argument can be used for shapes, smells, sounds and so on.
I see what you mean. Basically there are two things: perception and the thing being perceived. You seem to think that perception requires a thing that can be perceived and this, per your logic, is the physical world.
However, consider the brain-in-a-vat theory. Stimulating the right centers in the brain could produce all perception in the absence of a physical correlate. How do you solve this problem for your argument?
We may well agree, but I have been raising possible objections.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Lets assume that I accept that without any objections. So what?
Why would you leave out logic, morality etc. from a physical world? Are you thinking that a physical world would have to be some kind of a dense lump of matter without parts? It seems fairly clear that the physical world has different parts, and thus logical relations between them, such as parthood. Likewise, as long as there social creatures in a physical world there are also relations between them which depend on their behaviour. So there is morality in a physical world.
Interesting. I never heard of that theory before. I think I can still refute it, as so: If I perceive a physical thing and my brain is in a vat, then it is possible that I have never encountered that thing in my life. However, that illusion of the physical thing still came from somewhere. In this case, it was created by the designer of the brain-in-a-vat experiment, right? Thus the question is brought back: how did the creator of the experiment come about the idea of the physical thing which I perceive?
I can generalize the problem this way: every effect requires an adequate cause. The effect of me perceiving a physical thing requires a cause. It could be caused by the designer of the brain-in-a-vat experiment. But then, that requires an adequate cause too. Eventually, I think it must come from the existence of the real physical thing (or something similar to it).
So we agree that such things as colours, shapes, smells and sounds exist in the real world. That was the point of my original argument. It refutes the belief that no such things exists, that these are all illusions.
I then categorized these things as physical things, because my understanding of a physical thing is whatever has a spatial, time, or energy component to it; or can be perceived by the senses (sight, smell, touch, hear, or taste). It looks like we disagree on the definition of the term "physical", but that's okay, because at this point, we are merely arguing about labels.
Why is this the "undeniable fact"? What if what we thought you were perceiving was a table, but what you really were perceiving was a desk? How can you say that it's undoubtable that what you perceive is a table when you could be perceiving something else, and incorrectly calling it a table?
Interesting. I never thought of the term "physical" being so general. If your definition of "physical" contains all of these concepts too, then what do you consider non-physical things, if any?
If I perceive a table, then I perceive a table. If I perceive a desk, that I perceive a desk. Calling a desk a table does not change the perception (if I understand you correctly when you say "calling"). If I call a desk a table, then I am dishonest, but that does not change my perception of it.
Looks like I've to call in the big guns...
[I]In the beginning there was nothing. And god said let there be light and then there was light...[/i]
The point being what if mind precedes the physical?
No, that wasn't the point of your original argument, since there is no mention at all of "physical" in this argument.
Colours, shapes, smells and sounds are not the problem. That they exist in the real world is not the problem. And someone who denies the physical isn't necessarily committed to the claim that these things are illusions. None of that is incompatible with the claim that these things are not physical.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And that's the problem.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, it's not okay. It means that you haven't refuted anything unless your definition is accepted, which it probably will not be by most people who deny the physical. Yet aren't these the people who your argument is directed at?
Who wouldn't accept that there are many "things" which can be perceived by the senses? That is a major part of any position in which empiricism has a major part, and that is likely to be true of the people whom your argument is directed. The problem is defining these things as physical. By acknowledging these things, they would not have conceded anything to you.
As for the part about there being a spatial, time, or energy component to these things, that will either be accepted whilst rejecting the claim that this is physical, or it will be rejected on the basis that "space", " time" and "energy" are subjective, not objective, and are just words or concepts. They are not in the object, they are in the subject. They are mental, not physical. You can claim that the mental is physical, but again, that would be rejected by many.
Are you conceding that you cannot refute idealism (as contrasted with physicalism and dualism) on its own terms?
The concept of spiritualism is presented to us as supernatural; magical. But if the whole creation obeys logic, then how can spiritualism, or anything else be beyond logic?
Now, let us see how we apply logic. A child figures life based on its previous experiences, and often comes up funny reasoning. At the age 16 -18, we used to feel that we have all the answers. Then, in a few years we start observing that life is not all black and white. We all have experiences, how a baffling situation becomes non existent, once we find the right answer; what used to matter so much becomes unimportant. We start seeing that our database of accumulated experiences is inadequate.
The discrepancy comes from the difference between brain and the total mind (we call it heart), of which brain is only a small part. Our desires, love hate, instincts, etc. reside in our total mind, not in our brain.
Relaxing the mind takes us beyond brain. This is where answers to baffling situations pop-up from. I feel that brain only knows parameters based on experiences of our life, but integrated mind knows them all. This is how the realities of our baffling problems evaporate; how griefs are dissolved.
To me, to think with the whole mind, in calm state, is spiritualism. It gives me depth in understanding of my self and of people around me. I achieve more tolerance, towards myself and others; I receive more love and respect. It reduces my frustrations, anger, anxiety, guilt and unhappiness. We can call this character building. I don't know whether the universe is real or an illusion. I don't know eventually where or how far my method will take me. But I don't care. When the journey is so beautiful, who cares about the destination?
While I agree with the points you say previously, I disagree with this one. For if space, time and energy are subjective, then they do not exist in themselves in the real world. But my argument refutes that, insofar as we perceive them. Just plug the terms in the syllogism.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
That was my attempt at defining "physical". What is your (or the idealist's) definition then? Maybe we can resume the argument from there.
Quoting Chief Owl Sapientia
Let's make sure we agree on the definition first. Idealism: system of thought in which the objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind. Is that adequate?
That is right.
Quoting TheMadFool
You are correct too. Indeed, it appears the argument is refuted if there exists a being which can create (or imagine) something out of nothing, and then pass it on to us. Such a power is typically attributed to God. I think this is why Buddhism survives this argument, if I understand Buddhism correctly, as such: The physical world does not exist, but a God (pantheistic) exists which imagines it all.
Note: I know your quote was from the Christian Bible, not from a Buddhist book. But since Christianity (at least most branches of it) believe that the physical world is real, then the argument was never a threat to it.
You'd be arguing against Kant, if I have understood him correctly, at least with regards to space and time. (The term "energy" wasn't even used in its modern sense until after Kant's death).
And your syllogism doesn't work for the reasons I've said. It will only work if you're preaching to the choir, but what would be the point of that? And anything other than that would just be begging the question. So it's a lose-lose situation for you, it seems.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I've already given one. The physical is that which relates to physics, which is the natural science that involves the study of matter and its motion and behaviour through space and time, along with related concepts such as energy and force. This could be analysed and be found to consist in observation, reason, concepts and so on, which can be defined as mental, so these things themselves would not be physical except insofar as they relate to a study of things called physics. And the statements of physicists wouldn't be interpreted in accordance with scientific realism, but would instead perhaps be seen as "just a narrative" with no necessary "real world", "external", "objective", "materialistic", "non-mental" implications.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sure, let's give that a go. I don't usually argue in defence of idealism, and am playing devil's advocate.
Perceiving, and giving words to what is being perceived are tied together in an act of interpretation. So if I see something at a distance and perceive it as a table, and call it a table, but I walk closer and see that I should call it a desk, don't you think I was mistaken in my perception? If I hear a baby crying, then I find out that what I heard was a cat, was I not mistaken in my perception? The mistake is in the interpretation of what is going on, what is happening, and that is the act of perception. How is it that you think that this is not a mistaken perception?
What you say "you can be mistaken about the real thing you are perceiving" says nothing more than "you can be mistaken in your perception".
No. As you said, you first perceived it as a table. You were not "mistaken in your perception" because a table is what you perceived. Then you later perceived a desk. Again, you were not "mistaken in your perception" because a desk is what you perceived. Let's say the real thing was in fact a rock (that looked like a table from afar). Then both your perceptions were wrong in identifying the real thing, but you were not "mistaken in your perception", because even though we are not certain about the real thing that we perceive, we are certain about the perception itself. I think you are using the term "perception" incorrectly.
Another example: Let's say I perceive a purple unicorn. I am not certain if it is an illusion or reality (though likely an illusion). One thing is certain though: I am perceiving a purple unicorn, and not a green dog.
If I understand correctly, we at least agree that space is part of the physical. And we previously agreed that my syllogism works for things as colours and shapes. But how can we have colours and shapes without space? For us to perceive or even imagine colours and shapes, these must occupy an area (2D space). IE, shrink the area down to zero, and we can no longer perceive these colours and shapes. Thus space is an essential attribute of colours and shapes. Let's recap:
-Colours and shapes exist in the real world (as proven by the syllogism).
-Space is essential for the colours and shapes to exist, therefore space exists.
-Space is part of the physical world (if I understand your definition correctly), therefore the physical world exists, at least the portion of the physical that includes space.
Regarding Idealism: If we agreed that shapes and colours are things in themselves (as per the syllogism), then they exist independently of the activity of the mind. This does not refute the claim that some objects of knowledge are dependent on the mind, but it refutes the claim that all objects are.
How is this not a mistaken perception? When I perceive a table, then I later realize that what I perceived is really a desk, that is called a mistaken perception. I have bad eye sight, and quite frequently have such mistaken perceptions. I might see someone in a crowd, and think it's person X, only to find out soon, that it is not. How is this not a mistaken perception?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I really don't understand what you are trying to say. You seem to be trying to give some odd definition to "certainty". I know I have bad eye sight, so I am never certain concerning my perceptions of distant things, I am always doubtful. You seem to think that you are always automatically "certain" concerning your perceptions, but I don't think that this is possible. To be certain requires conscious effort, justification, reasons to convince yourself of your certitude. If something just comes to you in a perception, you cannot be certain of that, until what you think, concerning your perception, has been justified. This is more evident with sounds. It's very often that we hear sounds, and are not certain of what the sound is. You have to go over in your mind, the sound, in your memory, to determine what it is. Hearing sound is just hearing sound, there is no reason to think that there is certainty involved in this. But if the sound is understood as something particular, this could be mistaken.
As a compromise, let's assume that there is such a thing as perceiving, seeing for example, without recognizing, or in any way associating what has been perceived, with something in memory, because this is where there could be a mistake. What would this simple act of perceiving, or seeing consist of? It surely could not consist of any form of certainty.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Don't you see this as nonsense? You are claiming that you could be perceiving a purple unicorn, and you are not sure whether you are really perceiving a purple unicorn or not, yet you are certain that you are perceiving a purple unicorn. You just contradict yourself. You respect the fact that your perception might be an illusion, and therefore mistaken, yet at the same time you claim to be certain of your perception.
So we still disagree because for you, the statements "mistaken about the real thing perceived" and "mistaken about the perception" are the same thing, and for me, they are not. Let me try to explain why in another way:
Let's say I feel sick. I go to the doctor and, upon testing everything (let's say we are able to test everything), it reveals that I am not really sick. Thus the feeling was not reflective of reality, but at the time that I felt sick, I felt sick. I was not dishonest with the doctor, because the feeling itself was real, even though the sickness was not. This is an example of being mistaken about the real thing perceived (the presence of real sickness) while not being mistaken about the perception (the feeling of sickness).
I think you are just creating a fictitious, impossible scenario, for your example. You are saying, suppose I feel sick, and there is absolutely no reason why I feel sick. Do I really feel sick or not? I believe that if you feel sick, there is necessarily a reason why you feel sick, so the premise of your example, that you feel sick, and there is no reason for this, is an impossibility.
Therefore, I still think that your separation between being mistaken about the real thing perceived, and mistaken about the perception itself, is false. You only support it by referring to an impossibility.
Alright, assuming that you are correct, it only shows that my example is not a good one, but this falls outside of my main point. My main point is simply to make you understand what I mean when I say "we cannot be mistaken about our perceptions" which is not what you think it means. Let's try again.
When we observe the stars from the earth, we observe that they twinkle. In reality, stars don't twinkle and it is an atmospheric effect. Let's say I am a teacher asking a student what he sees when looking at the stars. He should say "I observe that they twinkle". He will be correct because that is indeed what he should see when looking at the stars. Not drawing any conclusions about the real things observed, he is "not mistaken about his perceptions". That is all that I mean by this. We might disagree on the label, but you just need to understand what I mean behind the label I use.
I think that I have understood what you've been trying to say, but the point is that I disagree. You think that it is impossible for one to be mistaken about one's perceptions, but I think that to perceive, by itself is essentially an act of interpretation, and like any other act of interpretation, it is possible that one could be wrong in such an act.
I admit that there is a mode of argument on this subject which claims that an interpretation is never right or wrong, it is always purely subjective, and the rightness or wrongness of an interpretation is something imposed by a further judgement. But who would make that judgement, God? And this may be what you are arguing, but I think if we follow this principle, it leaves us with no principles to assume any objective knowledge, without referring to God, as all knowledge involves interpretation. I think we are better off to assume that inherent within any act of interpretation is a judgement of correct, and the interpretation is produced based on this judgement. An interpretation consists of choosing from possibilities, so there is some sort of inherent judgement of correctness. But then we need to accept that this judgement may be mistaken.
So your example of the twinkling star does really address the problem, because it doesn't deal with the issue of person who doesn't perceive the way that one should perceive. If I have bad eyes, and do not see the stars as twinkling, which does happen because my eye sight is bad, and then I put on my glasses, and see them twinkling, am I not correct to say that I was mistaken in my perception, before I put on my glasses?
I disagree that the perception is an act of interpretation. The perception comes before the judgement. Step 1: I perceive the stars twinkling. Step 2: I interpret that stars twinkle. Step 2 has the potential to be incorrect because, as you say, it is an act of interpretation. But step 1 cannot be incorrect. It is a simple fact. If I am incorrect about the interpretation, the fact remains that I perceive the stars twinkling.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, you were not mistaken in the perception. Only in the interpretation, if you did such a thing afterwards.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see what you mean, but this is not what I am arguing, so we can drop this. Let's stay on the ground of "common sense".
The point though, is that Step 1 does not have to occur as the described Step 1, "I perceive the stars twinkling". One might perceive twinkling stars, one might perceive stars that are not twinkling, another might not see any stars at all. So the perception, which you are referring to as Step 1, is itself an interpretation of what is really out there, because we can see what's out there in many different ways. The fact that you can revisit the perception in your memory, and reinterpret, giving it another description if you like, is irrelevant to the fact that it already is an interpretation, as a perception.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
So, referring to common sense then, how do you account for these differences of perception, if perception itself is not an act of interpretation? Three people are looking at the night sky. One sees stars twinkling, another see stars not twinkling, and the other doesn't see any stars. I think that they each see something different, because the act of seeing is an act of interpreting what's out there, and a person could be mistaken in this act. You think that the act of seeing is not an act of interpretation, and that a person cannot be wrong in the act of perception, but how do you account for these differences?
The context of what you quoted is important, and I'm not sure you've fully taken that into account. We mean different things when we each say that space is part of the physical, so for you to say that we agree is misleading. If you're just assuming your own definition or interpretation of these key terms when assessing what I've claimed, then you may end up misinterpreting my meaning.
For example, you talk of a physical world. Given my position in this discussion, that term seems inappropriate. My point was that 'physical' is just a word or a concept that we use to describe or conceive of subjects relevant to the study known as physics. That does not by any stretch entail a physical world or physical things-in-themselves which are objective and mind-independent. By space, as I hinted earlier, I mean something like what Kant meant. And by colour and shape, I mean something like Kant, or the British Empiricists before him, meant. I have no intention of conceding that colours and shapes are things in themselves or that space is mind-independent or anything of that sort before the debate has even really begun.
I don't need to answer the question of how we can have colours and shapes without space, because I haven't claimed or implied that we can.
Your argument was as follows:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That doesn't prove physicalism, realism, idealism, or anything of relevance. Idealists don't deny any of the above. Hume certainly wouldn't have denied any of that. It's clearly influenced by his own views, yet he didn't reach your conclusion.
I did say that the existence of colours and shapes in the real world is not the problem, but that is only if you interpret that claim in the right way, i.e. charitably in a manner consistent with idealism, e.g. they are real [i]phenomena[/I], and exist as part of the phenomenal aspect of the real world. I think that Berkeley, if I have understood him correctly, would also say that they are real, and that they exist in the real world, because he is a monist, rather than a dualist, and because for him, the world is both ideal and real, i.e. reality is ideal.
These three perceptions are different but are not wrong because, prior to making an interpretation, these are mere observations. It is at this point only a passive event, and these are neither right nor wrong (if you exclude dishonesty) because no active event (interpretation or judgment) has occurred yet. Best is to give a full example in which all three persons have different perceptions, yet all have the right interpretation:
-Person 1: "I perceive the star are twinkling. But I know that this is an effect of atmosphere, and I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 2: "I perceive the stars are not twinkling. I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 3: "I don't perceive any stars. But I know I have bad eyesight and will rely on other people's sight and conclude that stars exist and in themselves don't twinkle."
All three persons are correct, because they are right in the interpretation of the perceptions, and are not lying about what they claim to perceive. Thus nobody is wrong, even though all three perceptions are different.
How is an observation itself not an interpretation? To observe is to pay attention and take note of what is happening. But one person cannot observe the whole of reality all together. So whatever it is that is being observed, at that particular time, by that person, is what is of interest to that person. Don't you think that this, therefore, what the person takes note of (observes), is the person's interpretation of what is going on.
If a person improperly takes note of what is going on, don't you think that the person's observation is wrong?
What is happening is that observations are changing and differing from other observations, which is impossible to avoid, as everything continuously evolves.
How does one explain 'quantum jumping', a phenomena I am not well-versed on in the definitive manner but rather the experiential manner, to one who is not up-to-date with the modern studies of quantum mechanics/supernatural phenomena/what-have-you.
As a newbie to the philosophical community, a lifetime member of the 'metaponderings' club', and a newly attached partner to an (disappointingly) abstainer of philosophy, I have found myself not only unsuccessfully debating the possibility of comprehending AND navigating the theorized 'multi-verse', but also cornered into a position that can easily be mistaken as "stupid" due to my lack of "lower-level science to back it up."
I am what my professors consider an "unconventional student", I am unable to communicate in collegiate terms, and I am frustrated.
And guidance, terminology, and links to scholarly resources would help immensely.
Ok, I am still trying to understand your point. Do you mean something like Kant in his critique of pure reason? That is: Things-in-themselves exist independently of the subject's mind. Let's call these X. But the subject may not directly perceive X, but a modified thing. Let's called these Y. In my argument with colours, colours are Y because that is what we perceive. Thus my argument only proves that something exists, but not necessarily colours themselves, because they are Y and not X.
And if idealism does not claim that things-in-themselves don't exist, and only claims that all that we perceive is dependant on the mind, then my argument does not refute idealism. Am I correct so far?
I differentiate the two as separate events. The interpretation is caused by the observation. And an effect is separate from its cause. i.e., nothing causes itself. Thus the observation comes prior to the interpretation. It is passive (step 1) and the effect of interpretation is active (step 2). Only interpretations are subject to be right or wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I agree. And that is because the act of taking notes is active and fits in step 2. But the observation comes yet again prior to that.
One more example: If I feel pain in my stomach, it could be for numerous reasons that I am not certain of, because I am not an expert on the subject. I can attempt to describe the pain or guess the cause, but I could be wrong in doing either. But one thing I am certain of: I feel pain in my stomach.
In other words, Heraclitus: You could not step twice into the same river. Is that what you mean?
What about consistency in nature? All laws of physics are based on observations which are consistent every time we repeat the same experiment.
Sorry, I don't think I can personally help. I don't know much about quantum mechanics, but it sounds more like physics than metaphysics. Physics is science. Metaphysics is philosophy.
The so called Laws of Physics (whatever they may be) are some equations that provide approximate predictions of behavior of non-living matter, under certain conditions, but also susceptible to being dead wrong. Quantum mechanics is probabilistic.
One might say that nature has habits subject to constant change. This describes both living and non-living matter.
That sounds correct. I guess all physical things will disappear, given enough time; and thus change. What about eternal truths, such as the truth that "2+2=4"? We would observe this continually.
As for observing similarities in multiplicities, this to is a matter of agreed upon convention. 2 apples + 2 apples equals four apples, if it is agreed that the similarities in the multiplicities are close enough. Everything we call laws are really just agreements which are based upon what we are taught and learned as we evolve. There is no given.
But is it not a self-contradiction to say "everything changes"? Because this 'everything' would include this very proposition, which means that at least one thing would not change, being this proposition. And if it is a self-contradiction, then it is necessarily false by the laws of logic. Therefore, the proposition "not everything changes" is true.