Want and can
Syllogistically:
1. Q knows about x (peripheral premise)
2. Q wants x to happen (premise)
3. Q can make x happen (premise)
4. x happens
I guess 2 implies 1, at least in ordinary cases; 1 just makes it explicit.
Q is implicitly an agent, a knower, a wanter, an actor.
At a glance (e.g. if I were Q), the syllogism looks valid enough, but is something amiss?
I suppose procrastination could at least delay 4, yet that seems like a peripheral case interfering with 3.
Anyway, this sort of thing might be short-circuited by a premise.
?
1. Q knows about x (peripheral premise)
2. Q wants x to happen (premise)
3. Q can make x happen (premise)
4. x happens
I guess 2 implies 1, at least in ordinary cases; 1 just makes it explicit.
Q is implicitly an agent, a knower, a wanter, an actor.
At a glance (e.g. if I were Q), the syllogism looks valid enough, but is something amiss?
I suppose procrastination could at least delay 4, yet that seems like a peripheral case interfering with 3.
Anyway, this sort of thing might be short-circuited by a premise.
?
Comments (29)
So you are attacking 3 to arrive at your 4?
Sounds good. I was just taking his premises as given in support of a conclusion. As you know, I am a big fan of not doing that. Anything you don't agree with should be chased backwards until agreement is found. But sometimes there's that old "gentlemen's agreement" and "for the sake of argument" thing we sometimes like to play with. Especially when a proponent (jorndoe?) does not want to carry their burden of proof on a premise.
I didn't think so at all. I thought jorndoe had laid out the "for the sake of argument" premise which you refused to accept. I was merely commenting on that.
If you don't want to accept his premise, then by all means, try chasing it back with him until you find something you can agree on. I'm sure you will arrive, eventually, at a gentlemen's agreement that A does not = -A. After all, who wants to assume the burden of proving that? But I'm also sure you won't have to chase back that far. You can always stop somewhere along the way at what the eastern man thinks he knows and start from there.
I thought 2 and 3 were exactly those premises?
Okay, my bust. I thought his argument said:
peripheral premise + premise + premise = conclusion.
I'm just that kind of guy. :grin:
I will take your lesson on = vs => under advisement. Thanks.
I guess it could be written as: if 1 ? 2 ? 3 then 4.
Might be outlandish, might be right, might be something in between (which is where I'm leaning, but my personal leanings aren't relevant, just the argument).
Suppose x doesn't happen, then maybe Q didn't want it after all, or maybe couldn't make it happen, or forgot, which may or may not fall under 1/2/3, or whatever, ... Or, there could be something ambiguous about "want" that could be elucidated, ...
Doesn't take more than a counter-example, yes?
I want to stop my crack habit.
I can stop my crack habit.
My crack habit ends. ?????
Quoting jorndoe
There is no argument as it stands; one can want things that conflict, ad one can be physically able to do things that one cannot bring oneself to do when the time comes.
I want to die.
I can jump off this high building and I will die.
But I cannot bring myself to do it.
Even philosophers are surely aware of such internal divisions and conflicts - we are not always single minded. Your logic only applies to a single mind, such as God.
That would be my Drill Instructor (God): "Want in one hand, shit in the other, tell me what you got."
(y) Maybe there's a "can" ambiguity?
Modal can: it's possible to quit the nasty habit
"Free will" can: you don't will it so
Quoting unenlightened
Yeah, neurotic apes, unreliable we are, unlike...
Quoting unenlightened
Might be moving more towards homo sapiens psychology.
Except I got the last sentence wrong. Should be: It does not follow that if you can't eat an eclaire (not-q), then you don't want one (not-p). Addled brain. But the point is the same.
I like this. :)
Yes, I think it likely jorndoe is talking about God. And on this I agree with him (Cuthbert's interesting aside about different usages of if..then.. notwithstanding.)
Thanks for dropping that hint! Very perceptive.
Q = god
x = our all-time-favorite state to be in viz. happiness
1. Q know about x [omniscience]
2. Q wants x to happen [omnibenevolence]
3. Q can make x happen [omnipotence]
Ergo,
4. x happens [there should be no suffering/evil]
It's the old Epicurean riddle but with one important addition - it also attacks omniscience.
Since 4 is false or so we believe, there is suffering/evil,
5. Q doesn't know about x [god isn't omniscient]
OR
6. Q doesn't want x to happen [god isn't omnibenevolent]
OR
7. Q can't make x happen [god isn't omnipotent]
OR
8. All of the above
OR
9. Q is putting off x [procastination]
OR
10. Q possesses free will and chooses not for x to happen
OR
11. x is in progress à la transhumanism
OR
12. x is [Leibniz's this is the best of all possible worlds]. This possibility is interesting because given god is omniscient we must on pain of contradiction conclude that either a) Leibniz is right i.e. x is or that b) our argument is useless since what we, essentially hairless apes, are, for all intents and purposesn drooling imbeciles compared to an all-knowing being.
Therein lies the rub. It's the quintessential dilemma that racks the mind of all theists - the choices are between there being no god or there being no evil. Theists can't deny that there is no evil, there is, but then they have to accept that there's no god and that's what they don't want to do which means they'll have to do one of the following:
1. Deny evil exists!?
2. Declare the dilemma to be a false dilemma and claim it's possible for neither of the two choices that have been offered to be true i.e. there's a third option that has been concealed from theists which is god exists and evil exists together. This, however, needs to be explained and the free will argument is one of them. Does this answer your question, "why does it need explaining?"
Quoting tim wood
This is what taking option 1. Deny evil exists looks like. God is defined as omniscient and thus if god is omnibenevolent as also defined, x has to be i.e. the world is/has to be good, there can't be evil in the world. If you see evil, apparently we do, hence the problem of evil, then this means:
1. Evil = Good. Our tiny brains are unable to fathom this equivalency which, on the face of it, god has.
2. Evil is an illusion. The evil you see is not real. I can't quite wrap my head around this, you know, what it means?, but suffice it to say that it differs from 1 above in that evil isn't real and so we never get to that stage where we can say evil = good like in 1 above.
Quoting TheMadFool
If we cannot say that relief from cancer is good, then we have nothing. [sup](Martinez, StJude)[/sup]
In case there's some unknown greater good at play, somehow justifying the suffering, instigated/warranted by God/gods, then such relief isn't actually good.
This would then stop efforts[sup](StJude)[/sup] dead in their tracks, or at least their warrant/justification.
"Everyone stop what you're doing!" :cheer:
You mean the god angle? Your Q problem is a perfect fit for the Epicurean riddle with an extra feauture - challenging god's omniscience too. I think we should name it after you as the jorndoe riddle :up: :100:
Quoting jorndoe
Not to downplay the pressing and real concern in re the extremes of suffering that some unfortunate people go through, but if god is omniscient and taking into account that we are thus comparatively ignoramuses, I believe we've already lost the case so to speak. To illustrate, we've all had experiences with children and I'm fairly confident that there are times when children fail to understand what's good for them and the usual adult response is to come down hard on, to chide, threaten, even administer corporal punishment to, children. Ergo, suffering, as we experience them, may be just god's way of handling the "situation", children as we are in faer eyes. This is how our relatively inferior intelligence makes sense of the situation as it is.
What has been achieved in this is a realization that god is incomprehensibilis i.e. we now know that god is unknowable and therefore, we're not in a position to analyze, judge this world for our limited intellect is not up to the task. That being so, the problem of evil is no longer meaningful or loses its force so to speak - a child can't comprehend what an adult is up to and so, a child's assessment of an adult will, for certain, be at its best, confused (god exists/doesn't exist) or at its worst, inverted (god is bad).
So, with the cancer example, if we suppose it's for an unknown greater good, then the right thing would be not doing anything about it.
There seem to be weird absurdities along this line of inquiry, which makes me think it started out wrong.
Not necessarily, we continue to do what we think is the right thing to do. Our values are ours and we use them to make sense of our lives and guide our actions. So, in case of cancer and other ailments, minor or major, we do what we instinctively and rationally want to do and do - try and cure ourselves. The fact that we can't comprehend god's intentions doesn't imply that we stop doing anything at all to better our condition. As reasonable as it is to believe that we're supposed to do nothing is the belief that we're supposed to act. Remember, we don't know what god intends for us to think, speak, or do - fae's, after all, beyond comprehension. I've faced a similar situation for real but nothing at all to do with the divine. I'll relate it to you here for your consideration. I remember hearing a story about a boss who his employees described as reticent, a man of few words, and refused to let on his staff what it was that he wanted of them. What did the staff do? They did what they thought was the right thing to do, not sit in their cubicles and just let whatever happen.
[quote=Wikipedia]The meaning of the phrase (above) may relate to 1 Corinthians 1:17–31, where something foolish to a human may be a part of God's wisdom[/quote]
The supposition: Martinez' suffering and death was good (the unknown greater good response).
The will and sentiments of the hospital staff (and cancer researchers) are directly contrary.
Contrary good is bad, or contra a greater good is something worse.
(Incidentally also unlike following Yahweh's example (by supposition), creating/allowing cancer, no relief.)
If Yahweh is good and capable, then it takes creative story-telling to deny that Martinez' suffering and death was good.
Quoting jorndoe
By the way, I'm sure it's possible to find some out there that wouldn't doing anything, "God's will" or "pray" or something, ... Suffering/death follows, including in cases where we can do something. [sup](Radita)[/sup]
The personnel at StJude's are willing but (mostly) incapable of doing something (per se anyway).
The supposed instigator/warrantor, God, would presumably be capable, and doesn't do something about it, so apparently unwilling?
[sub]
The examples:
• Martinez
• StJude
• Radita
[/sub]