A child, an adult and God
Even as an adult I find some people inscrutable. That even though I've matured over the years. Then surely I would've found all adults an enigma undeciphered in my childhood.
Coming at it from the other side I as an adult, my logic and reasons, am incomprehensible to children.
Given the hard facts above wouldn't it be utter hubris and foolish to boot to claim one can understand god's mind?
Does this argument refute the problem of evil?
God moves in mysterious ways...Cowper
Coming at it from the other side I as an adult, my logic and reasons, am incomprehensible to children.
Given the hard facts above wouldn't it be utter hubris and foolish to boot to claim one can understand god's mind?
Does this argument refute the problem of evil?
God moves in mysterious ways...Cowper
Comments (132)
Look at the skeptical theist responses and the replies to them (this particular analogy is not fully addressed, but the lines of thinking are similiar and it is a good place to start). Your argument is faulty because it ignores vast differences between the relationship between God and man and the relationship between man and child. Namely: we cannot explain certain things to children because we lack the capacity to explain and the child lacks the capacity to understand. God, however, is omnipotent and omniscient, so it is not for lack of ability that God could not explain things to us and the fact that we cannot comprehend God's ways should not be a problem because God did not need to make it that way.
Let me come at this from an atheist point of view.
God didn't exist and it was necessary to invent him. God was conceived to be beyond our understanding. Perfect, all knowing, all powerful, ever present everywhere, just, loving and/or angry. We conceived of god as very different than us. We are imperfect, we know a little bit, we have a little power, we're very much stuck within time and space, and we are collectively an emotional mess.
We are only "made in the likeness of God" but we like to think of ourselves (sometimes) as "little less than a god".
The inscrutable god is our creation. We created god without a mind that could be known. We could, of course, revise our creation--but after a few thousand years of claiming otherwise, revising god's mind would devalue the franchise.
Believers, of course, don't think this way. Their god's mind is unknowable, but seems to be somewhat discernible with sustained effort. Believers can spot other believers gaming this mystery, especially when they don't agree:
Very good point. However just as adults conceal and defer some forms of knowledge from children, god must be doing the same - eventually for our own good and benefit.
So, is the problem of evil solved?
Notice how we went from "the nature of God's plan is obscure to us" to "God must withhold knowledge from us in order to protect us".
First, we must differentiate between outright lying to a child and lessening the blow of a truth. We may not be able to tell the child everything about life, but it does mean we should outright lie to a child.
However, this is irrelevant: the same exact issue I said before comes up: lack of ability on God's part cannot be used as an excuse, nor can some mental limitation on our part to understand, comprehend, and deal with the reasons for gratuitous evil exist (or heck, to, bring the problem of divine hiddeness into the mix, why a lot of us do not see God's presence of his existence at all).
I don't think it's an excuse. I think I've given a valid reason why god allows evil to exist. Heck, I can continue on with my child-adult-god analogy as in ''spare the rod and spoil the child''
You have not given a valid reason. You are attacking a premise of a version of the problem of evil argument against the existence of the god of classical theism.
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
(Therefore)
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
The argument is valid, so the question is whether it is sound. The crux of the argument is that there is, what appears to be, a lot of senseless violence, pain, suffering, and death that serves no reason or greater good. In other words, there is evil that does nothing. It is not like a doctor performing painful but life-saving emergency surgery or an athlete who has to deal with muscle pain in order to become better on the field. It is things like this:
Example 1: the case of Bambi
“In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering”
Example 2: the case of Sue
This is an actual event in which a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan was severely beaten, raped and then strangled to death early on New Year’s Day in 1986. The case was introduced by Bruce Russell (1989: 123), whose account of it, drawn from a report in the Detroit Free Press of January 3 1986, runs as follows:
The girl’s mother was living with her boyfriend, another man who was unemployed, her two children, and her 9-month old infant fathered by the boyfriend. On New Year’s Eve, all three adults were drinking at a bar near the woman’s home. The boyfriend had been taking drugs and drinking heavily. He was asked to leave the bar at 8:00 p.m. After several reappearances, he finally stayed away for good at about 9:30 p.m. The woman and the unemployed man remained at the bar until 2:00 a.m. at which time the woman went home and the man to a party at a neighbor’s home. Perhaps out of jealousy, the boyfriend attacked the woman when she walked into the house. Her brother was there and broke up the fight by hitting the boyfriend who was passed out and slumped over a table when the brother left. Later the boyfriend attacked the woman again, and this time she knocked him unconscious. After checking the children, she went to bed. Later the woman’s 5-year old girl went downstairs to go to the bathroom. The unemployed man returned from the party at 3:45 a.m. and found the 5-year old dead. She had been raped, severely beaten over most of her body and strangled to death by the boyfriend.
Both examples are taken from the link in my first post. Even if it were the case that we could argue for some justifiable good in both of these cases based on a ton of extra information, it becomes extremely problematic when we consider all of the cases that are similar in nature, considering we would have to believe in every single case, there is a very good explanation for it.
The child analogy attacks the first premise of the argument by saying that we are unjustified to make that assertion because the average human is in the same spot with God as a child is with an adult. It claims that humans have limited cognitive capacities that cannot understand the reasons for God to allow such evil. However, this is problematic because the limitations involved between an adult and a child are not required in the relationship between an adult and God. If it is hidden from us but we can understand it, then God can deliver these reasons and we would understand them. If it is apparent but we cannot understand it, then the question emerges as to why God could not give us these necessary cognitive abilities, considering that the anguish of not knowing the reasons for evil is an evil in and of itself. Heck, we do not even get any special reassurances in these cases that there is a reason, but God cannot reveal it to us at the time for whatever specific reason.
Again, your reason to reject Premise 1 is based on a faulty analogy. Therefore, it is not a good reason without you explaining what is specifically wrong with the line of thought I presented.
You're already assuming the conclusion here. Whether evil serves a purpose of greater good is the issue.
I do agree that there's a great amount of evil in this world: children are raped, tortured, enslaved, killed, etc. Whether this is "senseless" or not hasn't been established yet and given my analogy I don't think it's possible for us to know (yet).
The so-called "problem of evil" is clear enough: Men and women are capable of behaving very, very badly AND they do. We do not like to think of our selves as so readily and thoroughly capable of evil, but we are. And we hate that.
I said earlier that we created god. We also created the devil. We off-loaded our goodness and badness onto god and the devil. It's a way of projecting our strengths and deficiencies on to external (nonexistent) beings.
WE are the problem of evil, and we are the problem of good, for that matter.
Saying God moves in mysterious ways solves the problem of evil if it means there is no evil.
Why not?
The mind and intent of god are unfathomable to us. Therefore, we must think twice before we pronounce judgment on the world and all its contents. Evil may serve a greater good - we don't know. I read somewhere: "what if laughter were really tears?"
I cannot even imagine the genius of Newton, Einstein, Euler, etc. Doesn't this inform me to lend some latitude to the god-evil issue?
Yes but I don't know whether this has a divine purpose or not.
So maybe the evil is required for some greater good?
Yes, may be.
This is just game playing. "Evil" has clear enough meanings, and so does good. Trying to confuse them is a waste of reasoning power.
And I dare say that knowing whether evil had a divine purpose is way above your pay grade. You don't even know for sure whether a divine being exists.
A good point. I will respond very blandly to your fantastic post.
We don't know whether evil is truly good or not just as a child doesn't understand why he got spanked.
My response is:
Quoting Bitter Crank
It's a pretty morbid view, in my view...
True enough, I don't know for sure. Which is why I have come to the conclusion that talking about the divine is a waste of time. For believers worshipping, adoring, seeking some experience of the divine is eminently worth while. But talking about it is not. The object of our reasoning is unavailable for confirmation or denial.
I'm not trying to be unpleasant. I'm trying to suggest that you stick to what can be reasoned about, and keep your categories separate. Good and evil are opposites, and if the words are to mean anything in reasoned discourse, their usage has to be kept crisp and clean. Mucking about with "well, gee whiz, maybe evil is masquerading as good" and all that leaves you in a muddle.
My reply is that evil that cannot be prevented/avoided has divine purpose. Not all evil. Those which we can prevent/avoided should be prevented/avoided. God (if he exists) has empowered us enough to prevent some forms of evil but not all.
Quoting Wosret
No, it is not morbid to investigate a matter thoroughly before judging. I'm exploring all possibilities here. I don't want to make a mistake especially when it comes to truth. I've seen a lot of posts in TPF about the possibility that our universe is a simulation. They've been serious discussions on the topic. That even when such an idea is completely based on a mere possibility. I only ask equal treatment of the god issue as well.
In an apparently meaningless existence talking about the divine is a rational choice.
Quoting Bitter Crank
But so many philosophical issues e.g. simulation theory, skepticism, etc. seem to turn around mere possibility. Why can't I treat the god-evil issue in the same manner. It's quite unfair to write pages and pages on simulation theory or skepticism or whathaveyou and deny this to an important central issue - god.
I suggest rereading my post, because you took that statement out of context. I was rephrasing the previous statement. I offered evidence for why this is the case.
I then pointed out that it may be we're not ready for a divine revelation. That god wishes to hide some knowedge from us for our own good.
You claimed I assumed the premise of an argument. Your quote was still from when I was explaining the thought behind the premise.
Again, I already addressed this. Reread:
The child analogy attacks the first premise of the argument by saying that we are unjustified to make that assertion because the average human is in the same spot with God as a child is with an adult. It claims that humans have limited cognitive capacities that cannot understand the reasons for God to allow such evil. However, this is problematic because the limitations involved between an adult and a child are not required in the relationship between an adult and God. If it is hidden from us but we can understand it, then God can deliver these reasons and we would understand them. If it is apparent but we cannot understand it, then the question emerges as to why God could not give us these necessary cognitive abilities, considering that the anguish of not knowing the reasons for evil is an evil in and of itself. Heck, we do not even get any special reassurances in these cases that there is a reason, but God cannot reveal it to us at the time for whatever specific reason.
Your answer is also one generated by human cognition. If you are saying that all products of human cognition are faulty, then you and your arguments fall into that category. As such, they can be dismissed as easily as you dismiss mine- including the one in which you state human cognition is faulty.
My point is that there is no reason, based on obscure or hidden facts that justify evil, that God cannot reveal it to us based on cognitive limitation, because it was God who knowingly put us in said scenario. Again, we do not even get special assurances from God that everything is happening for a reason and the reason he cannot tell us what this evil is. This anguish from not knowing is an unavoidable evil in and of itself.
Well, if you accept we could be wrong in our thinking I'm happy to accept my own fallibility.
Completely missing the point there: I do not accept that the human mind is so faulty to the point of inability to generate arguments. I am saying your stance is self-defeating.
How so? I only have a single thought viz. I could be wrong. There's nothing self-defeating in that. I think skepticism is recommended in philosophy.
There is a difference between leaving the possibility for error and claiming that something is unjustified. If you are saying that I cannot, with absolute certainty, disprove God via the current argument, you are right, but this is nothing new. The problem of evil the child analogy targets seeks to provide evidence for the nonexistence of God and claim that, ignoring all other relevant evidence, it is more likely than not that God does not exist. If you you do not trust the mind's ability to make sound judgments to any degree, then we are left in a permanent state of agnosticism on everything. If you trust our mind's ability to make judgments, then what is wrong with my argument regarding why cognitive limitations are not a good reason to avoid the problem of evil?
A thought, even a possibility, can shatter and transform us....Friedrich Nietzsche
Quoting Chany
I think everybody, even non-philosophers, understands your point. So much so that it needn't be explicitly stated.
Okay? Fortune cookie wisdom?
Quoting TheMadFool
Except you use this view of the mind to criticize an argument I presented. Now that this avenue of attack is out of the way, please explain what is wrong with my argument regrading the failure of the child analogy.
I'm trying to solve the problem of evil, in effect making god's existence compatible with evil. It all rests on the possibility that there's nothing impossible about us, our thinking, being wrong.
I understand that global skepticism is impractical but look at the issue. It is of universal importance - what if there is a creator, a god? It would change everything: the way we conduct ourselves, the way we think, etc. Therefore, it is wise to entertain this doubt, this skepticism. In this case evwn the tiniest of possibilities is very significant.
The evidential problem of evil makes no such claim; read the link provided and the authors of the argument (Rowe and Russell, but mostly Rowe) specifically state that there may be other lines of evidence for the existence of God that outweigh the first premise or the argument in general. However, logical possibility alone is next to meaningless within arguments that do not revolve around logical impossibility or logical necessity. Pigs can logically fly, but pointing out that pigs can logically fly does nothing against the state of non-flying pigs in the actual world. The possibility has to be a reasonable one worth considering. The first premise does not require absolute certainty to be supported- but most premises in most arguments do not require this.
Quoting TheMadFool
What you are effectively asking for is special pleading in the case of the existence of God. You are not merely asking for the uncontroversial condition of being more rigorous in possibly important statements; we are not going to approach philosophical issues like we do with whether there is soda in the fridge. We want to be rigorous in intellectual pursuits. But what you are asking for us to do become hyper-skeptical on a specific issue because without said hyper-skepticism, you run into problems. You cannot ask to change the rules of game just because the rules of the game do not favor you. If we accept your stance- that on issues that are considered important to us, we should adopt hyper-skepticism- then we have to do the following: imagine a person claiming that every single terrorist attack and action supposedly done by Islamic extremists to Western countries was a conspiracy by the United States government to make the population of the country scared and complacent. Every shooter was a sleeper cell brainwashed by government, every terrorist video was invented by the government, etc. Imagine if we provided an argument with lots of evidence that it is the case and that there are no reasonable grounds to maintain that position. The person's response to the argument goes, "There is a logical possibility that the government does these things and that we just do not know how it is done. I understand that global skepticism is impractical but look at the issue. It is of global importance - what if the U.S. is killing the citizens of the world and are blaming it on Muslim extremists? It would change everything: the way we conduct ourselves, the way we think, etc. Therefore, it is wise to entertain this doubt, this skepticism. In this case, even the tiniest of possibilities is very significant." Do you find their counterargument very good?
Also, you are assuming that the God question actually matters. It is assumed God cares about humanity, but this might not be the case. As a joke from a television show goes, "And on the eighth day, God created a magical talking snow leopard and forgot all about us." There is, as it stands right now, no reason to believe a God that exists would actually care.
So, I restate: what is wrong with my analysis of the child analogy as faulty?
What would be the basis to even begin making any claims about a god's mind? Where are we getting any information about it from?
The stakes are high in this one. The truth/falsity of god is crucial to what we value, how we live our lives. Doesn't this make it reasonable (your words) to reconsider the possibility no matter how small?
Quoting Chany
You're committing the fallacy of accident. This is a special case and so must be given due respect.
Quoting Chany
You haven't yet convinced me that I should ignore the simple possibility that we and our reason could be mistaken.
I didn't understand your point.
So you're giving up omnibenevolence because (as I think BC mentioned) evil is evil. I think I understand where you're coming from, it's just psychologically precarious to say "This evil is for a greater good" because that can feed a longing to rationalize your own evil actions. I think Wosret made that same point. I'm just chiming in.
This statement speaks more to what you are bringing into the discussion than the discussion itself. The existence of the god of classical theism may tell us a bunch of things about reality, but, without a bunch of other concepts and ideas attached to said god, it would not change things anymore than other important issues would change things. God existing means:
1) We know the universe was created by God (I think, I never actually pondered a god who had nothing to do with the existence of the universe)
2) There is a purpose for our evil (the problem of evil is practically solved)
3) We know there is an objective moral system
4) Physicalism is false
There might be a couple of things missing from the list, but if nothing else changes, we still have a group of problems. First, if people do not necessarily need to believe in the correct god or, so nothing changes there; atheism and nontheistic religions are off the table but that still leaves the rest of them. We know morality is objective now, but we have no idea what exactly is good. Epistemology is still a problem, and there are a boatload of metaphysical questions still unanswered.
Again, I apply it to the scenario I said above. There are a lot of things that are serious and can change a lot of how we do things and how we think about things, but the mere logical possibility that something is true alone does not matter. I actually think that there are questions in philosophy related to epistemology (how we know generally, peer disagreement) and metaphysics (free will, personal responsibility) that matter as much as, if not more than, the god question, and I do not see the reason to change the entire rule set of philosophy for them. Particularly for an argument that does not claim to disprove God, but provide strong evidence against God's existence.
Quoting TheMadFool
It is only a special case if your entire worldview already revolves around the existence of a particular god and you desperately need that god to be true within your own mind. In philosophy generally, it is a question among many. Again, we have general rules about epistemology and philosophical investigations. We can argue about the rules themselves, but we cannot arbitrarily suspend or changes them to fit our needs. We need to be consistent.
So, unless you want to say that "the mere possibility of determinism being true warrants us to ignore any argument for free will where the premises have a logical possibility of being false, no matter how true it appears to be in the actual world and how much support we muster for free will," and "we cannot dismiss the claim that terrorism is all secretly a conspiracy by the U.S. government to keep the populations of the world fearful because there is nothing inherently contradictory about the proposition," you have to say the hyperskeptical attitude you demand is special pleading.
Quoting TheMadFool
Because your argument rests on an analogy between God and man and man and child. The analogy fails because humans and children have limitations on what we can understand and what we can do, while God created us with limited cognition and can explain these facts to us.
No. It can actually work against you, since adults can do or allow bad things without good reason and/or for bad reasons (and children can be oblivious or fail to understand). And this is evidence against them being good people.
Why would it mean that? If it's a mystery, then wouldn't that just mean that that's possible, but we don't know? And that would equally apply to other possibilities, like those in the argument from evil.
But the problem of evil makes assumptions which could easily be avoided with that approach, and it would cease to be a problem for you. It'd be possible that God doesn't exist, or that God exists without being omnipotent, or that God exists without being omnibenevolent, or even that God exists and is evil. These possibilities are only really a problem for theists who are committed to the existence of God, and are committed to God having those attributes which the argument from evil takes into account. You can't be such a theist [i]and[/I] a global skeptic without contradiction. Global skepticism doesn't allow for special pleading - that's why it's called global skepticism (also known as absolute skepticism or universal skepticism).
It's a question. Conventionally you'd respond by answering it.
If the Lord moves in mysterious ways is presented for consideration as a solution to the problem of evil, I would assume that what's meant is that an evil action is a stepping stone to some greater good.
The way that would work out in practice is that some mother whose child was murdered by a policemen might be told that her grief is inappropriate because unbeknownst to her, it's all working out for the best. So that would solve the problem of evil because it would mean there is no such thing as evil.
For a being that can create the universe I only have my imagination to understand.
No I'm not giving up on omnibenevolence. I'm giving up on human ability to comprehend god.
Doesn't change anything. All evil that actually happens is good, and any preventable evil couldn't possibly happen, or it wouldn't be true that evil leads to a greater good, unless it was revised to a wishy-washy sometimes it leads to a greater good. This though, would defeat the best possible world notion, as all evil that actually comes to fruition isn't evil at all. All evil that is preventable, must be prevented.
You are free to make a value judgment on fact/truth as wishy-washy. However, it doesn't alter the truth/fact.
It's wishy-washy because it no longer is controversial, nor significant. Sometimes we don't realize what worse luck our bad luck saved us from, as they say. Bad things still happen to good people as well. So it becomes insignificant and impotent in this form.
Yes, I think you're right, given that context. That's probably what he had in mind. Although that doesn't actually follow if you take that phrase at face value, as I did.
Quoting Mongrel
Yes, and like most people, I find that ludicrous. I think that even most believers would find that ludicrous. Perhaps [i]especially[/I] believers. You'd have to bite a massive bullet to avoid the problem of evil in this way, so I don't think that it's a good resolution. It just leads to another problem - a far bigger problem, in my opinion.
So, you're not giving up on omnibenevolence, but you're not committed to it either. Otherwise, that'd be inconsistent with your second sentence. So, the problem of evil isn't a problem for you.
By the way, are you aware of how many times you've contradicted yourself in this discussion? On the one hand, you claim to be unable to comprehend god, and on the other hand, you make claims about the nature of god - sometimes implicitly (e.g. "evil that cannot be prevented or avoided has divine purpose") and other times explicitly (e.g. "God (if he exists) has empowered us enough to prevent some forms of evil, but not all"). Or have you just been playing devil's advocate?
I'm only after the truth. If you think my train of thought leads to a bland or weak conclusion I accept these evaluations as your opinion on the matter.
Also, truth in and of itself is more potent, more significant, more relevant, more whathaveyou than anything else in this universe.
I'm keeping an open mind on the matter. I'm especially concerned with atheistic arguments which categorically deny the existence of god. There's an unwarranted surety about them that I find problematic. My opening post explains why.
Or maybe he doesn't mean that... I think he was saying we shouldn't rely on our own understanding (or logic). Some would say logic puts us in contact with the Divine Mind. He's saying it's still not enough to see the truth.
Anyway, what if people worshiped a god who was supposed to be omni-malevolent? So they would have the problem of good, but the apologist might say that the appearance of good is mistaken. All good things are just the prelude to a greater Evil. :)
I haven't contradicted myself. I only questioned the authority of rationality. You were there in the old philosophy forum. Surely you must remember how many times members expressed their fear of infallible authorities. I only ask you to extend the same care and caution towards rationality. Nothing more and nothing less.
If there's anything I've done it is put avery harsh and unforgiving judge (rationality) on trial. Isn't a judge fallible?
You say that, but you have not directly addressed what I was referring to, so I don't see how you have not done so. You've made statements which seem contradictory. I even made it easier for you by quoting some of those statements.
If you can't comprehend the nature of God, then many of your claims relating to God in this discussion and others are unwarranted, and you could only reasonably make them by playing devil's advocate. Is that what you're doing or not?
I'm only exploring the possibility of evil being compatible with god by questioning the authority of rationality. This I do because the atheistic approach to god is, to say the least, rational.
Atheists construct and present arguments that conclude by denying god's existence or diminishing god's greatness. In such behavior and certainty of claims there is an unseen, very important, extremely relevant assumption - that rationality is perfect and infallible.
It is this key assumption that I question. Isn't it fair ? Isn't it justified? Isn't it natural? The judge of rationality must be itself judged by the exact and stringent criteria that it imposes on others.
That's all I'm saying.
So, you [I]were[/I] playing devil's advocate? I don't know why you won't directly answer my question.
The assumption of rationality is made, at the least, for argument's sake. Otherwise, anything goes and it would be pointless to debate anything at all. If you scrap rationality, then what would be the point of any of this? Obviously, you can't argue against rationality [i]using[/I] rationality, because that'd be self-defeating, since it would necessarily amount to a performative contradiction. So you'd have to irrationally reject rationality, and nothing you asserted would be of any significance, since the contrary of whatever you assert would have equal standing.
Yes, you are right. However there's no contradiction as such. Simply a circularity: to evaluate rationality rationally you already endorse rationality. Implying therefore that rationality has no basis, no firm foundation. In other words rationality is irrational.
Why then are atheists presenting rational arguments e.g. ''the problem of evil'' and accusing theists of being irrational?
Yes
Isn't it clear that that only provides evidence for claims about your own mind then? You're telling us something about what you imagine. Not what any putative gods are like.
Do you mean that other minds have a better, more complete understanding of the matter?
Quoting Terrapin Station
All I want to say is rationality may be wrong about the whole god issue.
No. I'm just saying that if claims about a god's mind are solely based on what you're imagining, you're really just telling us about your own mind/your imagination.
Quoting TheMadFool
If it's concluding that any gods exist, then I'd say it's definitely wrong.
I'm not claiming anything about god. I'm just playing on the chance that we may not have the right tools and/or our faculties may not be up to the task.
I feel the problem of evil is a good counter-argument to god. However, it is, at its heart, a rational argument and rationality itself has a rather shaky foundation. So the whole atheistic problem of evil becomes a self-defeating exercise.
What is "the atheistic problem of evil"?
Christianity traditionally addresses evil with free will, by the way.
Then you have not solved the problem of evil in all its forms and have missed the point. Again, mere logical possibility is irrelevant to truth claims unless we are talking about deductive proofs (arguments that prove necessary truths or show logical contradictions and impossibilities). The existence of a particular god does not get to have special status because, as I stated in one of my earlier posts, unless you already follow s specific religious doctrine that says a lot about metaphysics beyond the existence of god, the god of classical theism does not, as you claim, automatically change everything. It changes some things, but so would the truth of a lot of philosophical positions. It does not get special status.
Ultimately, the merits of the child-parent analogy are not based on whether it is possible we are wrong; there is only one proposition I can think of that people could not argue the truth over and lead to a possibility of error. Heck, even the version of the problem of evil I am defending says it may be mistaken. Rather, The merits are based on whether the child-parent situation are actually analogous with the person-God situation. I have pointed out that the situation is not very analogous because a) the lack of ability of the parent to explain to the child is not present with God, b) the cognitive limitations that the person is supposed to have towards God should not be there without special reassurances from God about the very specific reasons he cannot reveal right now.
At the point rationality is completely thrown out the window, we can throw out the entirety of philosophy, science, and every other intellectual pursuit. At best, we are left with Kierkegaard's faith of Abraham on practically everything, which is a very horrifying thing. And even then there are reasons given for why we would want the faith of Abraham.
Also, this lack of cognitive ability is an argument against God in and of itself.
Of course that runs into the problem of evidently ''evil'' natural phenomena like quakes, hurricanes, fires, etc. Anyway, I don't want to go into that because my understanding of free will is not up to mark.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Isn't the problem of evil an atheistic argument in the sense that it refutes god's existence/greatness?
Isn't the problem of evil (which I'm refuting) a deductive argument. If what you say is right (about the relevance of possibility in deduction) I'm on the right track.
Also to make matters clear let us take a legal example. Perhaps it'll drive the point home. A person is being charged with murder. It is then the prosecutor's solemn duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In other words there should not be a shadow of doubt that the accused committed the crime. Even the slightest possibility of innocence will affect the verdict. Our situation here is similar. I believe that the problem of evil leaves much room for doubt (on the nonexistence of god) because it elevates rationality (the judge) to that of an infallible authority which, you know, is wrong. To further elucidate my concerns about rationality we can take examples from quantum physics and even well known philosophical paradoxes - they are all instances of the inability of rationality to grasp these phenomena. And these are rather mundane matters compared to the mind of a god that can create a universe. How then can atheists be so confident, so dead sure, so definitive about god e.g. by relying on rationlity to deny god's existence. It perplexes me as it should you.
Quoting Chany
Your objections to my analogy are noted. They make sense to me. However my previous paragraph should suffice to answer your objections.
At least certain types of theists seem pretty confident in their ability to decipher God's wishes, and have historically and currently even been willing to torture, kill, and oppress in the name of these supposed wishes and commandments.
If one claims that (1) there exists this entity called "God", and (2) this entity's mind is wholly inscrutable (beyond knowing that he/she/it has a mind, with intentions, desires, etc), that is fine as it goes, as there is nothing inconsistent there. However, one should be cautious not to claim to understand God's mind when it's theologically or ideologically agreeable to do so, and then to claim such inscrutability when confronted by inconvenient theological conundrums such as the problem of evil. (So one could not claim, for instance, that abortion, gay marriage, etc are contrary to God's wishes, or that God wishes for people to live the Golden Rule, and so forth.)
I'm not an extremist. At least not yet. Rationality has its uses and it is the most productive human tool ever. I just think its deficient in key respects when it comes to god.
No. Thanks
I wasn't suggesting that you were, and in truth my comment was more of a general proclamation. I should ask, though, as you believe that God's mind is inscrutable, do you adhere to the notion that we cannot say what God's wishes and wants may be on any matter?
And my original point stands. You have to explain why we should suspend rational argument when it comes to god. If you cannot do so in way that does not include other arguments, then you are using special pleading. You have to show it is special. Importance is not special, so it is not a valid reason.
And to point out again, in order to do so, you have to give a rational argument about something related to god, defeating the original stance you are arguing for.
No, because it begs the question.
You claim one cannot understand God's mind. Yet by saying so, you claim to understand an aspect of God's mind - it's apparent inability to be understood.
The religious leap of faith seems to be, then, that jump when someone recognizes the everyday, common-sense implausibility of what they believe, but also understands the technical internal coherence of the religion. That, despite the great chance of the opposite, it just might actually be correct. There's no way to rationally justify it. You just have to take the leap.
Much of theology and theodicy are not really proofs of God's existence or goodness or whatever, but rather defenses against criticism. Apologetics. To show that a belief in God is technically compatible with whatever criticism is brought up. It doesn't prove anything definitively, it just shows that it's not entirely incoherent.
So, when you made those statements about God, you were either playing devil's advocate or you've retracted them, and you don't want to say which it is.
The form of Rowe's argument is valid, meaning, in that sense, it is deductive: if the premises are true, then the conclusion must follow. However, the argument is an evidential one: the premises may not be necessarily true, but the argument openly admits that. It is simply puts itself into a deductive form to show that if you accept the two premises as true, the conclusion follows.
The logical problem of evil must show that evil and God are, in a way, logically contradictory. This one does not attempt that. It, rather, claims that gratuitous evil, if it exists, creates massive problems for the existence of God. It just needs to show that the premises are very much more likely to be true than not. Again, read the link I provided: it does not try to hold itself up to the standard of being infallible and definitive.
Quoting TheMadFool
This actually quite a good example for my point, not yours. The legal system often operates under the notion of the reasonable observer. For example: would the reasonable observer find that this government policy violates the establishment clause of the first amendment for church-state separation? Would the reasonable observer find this voting registration law to unfairly target and infringe upon people's right to vote? And so on. Reasonable doubt operates under a similar vein. Would the reasonable person find doubt in the case of guilt? They use words like "shadow of a doubt", but, again, through the lenses of reasonable doubt. There is always the possibility that someone was possessed by a demon and the demon framed them for the murder, but this would be considered unreasonable doubt without any reason to believe it to be the case.
The emphasis is on reasonable doubt. In a murder case, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty; not an exactly parallel here, but that is not what matters, as we are interested in the what the prosecution and defense must do. The prosecution must present that the only rational, logical explanation for the available evidence surrounding a murder case must be that the defendant is guilty. The defense, on the other hand, must ensure that there remains reasonable doubt, that there is reason to doubt that the defendant is guilty. This is why defense attorneys will try to argue to implant alternative scenarios in the juror's heads or argue that critical evidence that points to the defendant's guilt can be interpreted in another way. They want to create an alternative account of what happened that can serve as a reasonable alternative. I emphasized "reasonable". The prosecution does not need a smoking gun: it does not need direct video evidence of the crime taking place in order to get the jurors to find the defendant guilty. It needs a case that no reasonable interpretation of the evidence can exclude the guilt of the defendant. So, if the defendant has a motive, does not have an alibi, was spotted at the scene of the crime around the time of death, was in possession of the murder weapon at the time, and was found at the scene of the crime with a body and no evidence offering an alternative, there is no reasonable doubt and the only way the evidence makes sense reasonably is that the defendant must have committed the murder. It is possible that this was all a grand conspiracy by a third party to frame the defendant, but without any positive reason or evidence that this is the case, it is unreasonable and, therefore, not reasonable doubt.
Also, even if I agree with you, you still have not necessarily dealt a killing blow to the argument, as you are attacking a strong version of the argument that requires a high degree of confidence and high epistemic standards. I can simply argue for a more moderate version that still has relatively high epistemic standards, just not as high as the strong version. It still offers strong evidence, just not as strong as the one you are arguing against.
Quoting TheMadFool
I will not pursue quantum mechanics further, as I am not a physicist and all my information on it comes from people using it for whatever philosophical argument they want to bolster at the moment. I doubt you are a physicist as well, as whenever I hear a physicist talk about quantum mechanics, they seem to not freak out over it like it’s some impenetrable entity destroying our reality. And what of paradoxes? It’s not like we do not have potential solutions to them. They are problems, yes, but we still parse through them, and solve some of them. And the vast majority of philosophy does not involve paradox. Lastly, you really do not understand atheists, their reasoning, or their arguments that much, as you demonstrated over the course of the thread.
I wonder how many atheists actually fit his description, or how many would agree with what he presupposes about them. I, for one, do not think of either rationality or science in quite the way that he has described them, and for the same or similar reasons as you.
As for the problem of evil, that has nothing to do with why I am an atheist, and I in no way rely upon it. I think that most atheists were atheists before learning of that problem.
Exactly. People believe things for different reasons. People have positions on various topics, of which the god question is one. I do not even like framing the debate in atheist-theist. I feel it ignores all the other positions, namely agnosticism, and tends to overlook attitudes and nuance within people's positions. I know people who are ignostic: they simply do not care enough to even form a position.
Yes.
I can't understand what the problem is?
Perhaps some analogies will clarify:
I cannot understand Quantum physics (god).
I can't understand the theory of relativity (god).
I can't understand calculus (god).
In none of the above statements of fact (speaking for myself alone) will you conclude that NOT understanding is some form of understanding.
If so why are you accusing me of begging the question by claiming that not understanding god's mind is tantamount to understanding god's mind?
Quoting darthbarracuda
I agree.
Then I know you are special pleading. Because, if this is true, then god really does not change anything and so it is not that important.
Exactly. And I've shown that this is not the case.
Quoting Chany
That works for me.
Quoting Chany
I agree. I find it reasonable to question the import of the problem of evil.
If the latter, then you've made a false analogy in your reply, since you [i]can[/I] understand quantum physics, the theory of relativity, and calculus. That is to say, it is both logically and physically possible - you are capable of understanding them. There is nothing [i]about them[/I] that makes them impossible for a human to understand, but if you have a physical or mental disability then you might not be capable like the rest of us.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, you haven't. The problem isn't directed at everyone. Just because [i]you[/I] might have found a way in which it is not a problem for you, that doesn't mean that it isn't a problem. It is still a problem for the existence of God [i]if[/I] you accept the premises of the argument, as many believers do or would, and cannot resolve it in any other way (arguably, there are resolutions, like the free will response). And there's a sort of hidden premise in virtually [i]every[/I] argument, which is the assumption that we're being rational, and I've explained why that assumption is required.
And I say that you [I]might[/I] have found a way in which it is not a problem for you, because that is doubtful. Even if you refute a strong version of the argument by showing that what the argument argues is not necessarily the case, the possibility alone would still be considered a problem for many, and for even more if it has equal standing with the contrary possibility.
Like I said in one of my initial replies, as with most problems, [i]ignorance doesn't really resolve the problem[/I]. God could still be evil or incompetent, even if I am ignorant. That's what you [i]must[/I] accept in order to be consistent, and even if [i]you[/I] don't consider that to be a problem, I'll bet my bottom dollar that plenty of people do - especially believers.
So, you have [i]not[/I] resolved the problem of evil, you have just failed to understand [i]why[/I] it's a problem.
I don't think that that quote should be taken quite so literally. I very much doubt that he meant that it's [i]impossible[/I] to understand quantum mechanics to the extent that one can do so based on our current understanding. I think that he was just emphasising the difficulty in doing so, and that we are fallible.
That's a false analogy to the claim that you can't understand God, unless you actually meant that we [i]can[/I] understand God to a significant extent, just not completely at the current time, and with some difficulty, and with the possibility of error. But that doesn't seem to be what you meant, given what you've said previously (although you've made contradictory statements and seem to switch between positions when it suits you). And if it was, then tell me what you know about God and how you know it.
(And I'm warning you that if, in your next reply, I think that you haven't properly addressed any of these last few replies of mine, but have instead, for example, skimmed over important details and created a diversion, then I might not bother to reply again).
Consider this: No amount of monkey rationality will help the monkey to understand geometry.
Quoting Sapientia
Ignorance creates a problem; a problem for the problem of evil argument.
Quoting Sapientia
Please extend the same courtesy to my position.
Quoting Sapientia
Yes, that's my stand.
I could criticise the substance of your reply - the little of it that is there - but why should I when you aren't putting in the same effort that I am? And if I did do that, then we'd be moving on from those parts of my reply that you haven't addressed [i]at all[/I] or haven't [i]properly[/I] addressed.
What I'm basically saying is there's a possibility that the problem of evil, as a refutation of god, commits the black/white fallacy (either god is not ommipotent or god is not omnibenevolent). There's a third possibility viz. we don't understand or worse, we've misunderstood, god.
But you haven't actually answered some of those key points. Your example with the monkey and geometry is just a reiteration of your argument which I've already criticised, so that doesn't answer my criticism, it just diverts attention away from it, and that's how the discussion ends up going around in circles.
And it also contradicts your other claims. You have two contradictory positions that you keep switching between without warning when it suits you. [I]Either[/I] you know shit about God [i]or[/I] you're like a monkey and don't know shit. You can't have it both ways. Make up your mind and keep it that way unless you concede. If you know shit about God, then you should go back and answer my request to clearly state what it is that you know and how you know it, rather than evade it. And you should also stop contradicting yourself or making misleading statements by saying things like you can't understand God.
Why should I continue this discussion if you're going to do things like this?
Quoting TheMadFool
And this has been addressed and criticised by myself and others. I think I speak for everyone when I say that we want a proper reply to [i]that[/I], rather than a reiteration of your original argument, which leads us around in circles, or some other diversion, which leads us astray.
The problem of evil is not a single argument. That is what you fail to grasp. It is like refuting one of the cosmological arguments for the existence of God and then saying you refuted all of them. All you might have done is refute the logical problem of evil (which I do not think you have done since you are not addressing that particular argument).
''I know one thing; that I know nothing'': Socrates (2500 years ago).
That's all you have to say in reply, is it? Funny how you seem to be suggesting that you know nothing, yet you also claim to understand God to a significant extent.
"I know a thing or two; that you're full of it": Me (just now).
How does ''maybe we're wrong about god'' become ''i understand god to a significant extent''?
Can you be specific. Which version of the POE haven't I considered?
You agreed to those words yourself in a previous comment on the previous page only hours ago. You said "Yes, that's my stand". :-}
The real question is, why am I arguing with a mad fool?
The problem here though is that if we can't comprehend god, then what are we actually believing in? We can't even comprehend the nature of the content of our belief (god). We can't even know WHAT we are believing in, and so the "god" in the "I believe in god" statement is meaningless to us. It's incomprehensible, the word is essentially meaningless.
But it appears to me like you want it both ways. As in, "god has x nature (exists, is omnipotent, non-evil, what have you), while at the same time, "gods nature is incomprehensible to humans". How can you have this both ways? It makes no sense. God can't be incomprehensible an yet you comprehend gods existence and at least a few attributes of his (its?) nature.
This apparent contradiction is why I don't think your argument works.
Personally I just don't see how the problem of evil can be resolved. There is a disgustingly abhorrent amount of suffering in this world, and I simply can't perform the mental gymnastics required to believe that an all powerful being (benevolent) being couldn't EASILY resolve. At the risk of sounding antagonistic, this "it's all for some obscure greater good so it's not REALLY that bad" strikes me a wishy washy self-comforting delusional nonsense. Forming this belief is like a child reaching for his blanket - it's a comforting feeling, but not particularly mature.
I think there's just two options here,
1. God (as an omnipotent being, benevolent, perfect, creator of universe, etc) doesn't exist
2. God exists, but just doesn't care about suffering and evil, or is downright evil himself
I'm putting my chips in with option one - although perhaps some might say that that's just me forming a belief because it's comforting - my own personal child's blanket. Option two is quite unsettling indeed.
Why don't you read the thread and find out?
''Incomprehensible'' doesn't imply meaniglessness. Perhaps there's a meaning that we can't understand.
Quoting dukkha
My main point is that there's a possibility that we haven't yet understood god. The omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent (OOO) god is compatible with evil via the simple and real chance that we haven't understood god's will/message. Does a child understand why she won't be getting ice cream for dessert? She doesn't. It's painful and yet there's a greater good in the parent's actions.
Of course one can say that suffering is disproportionate to the message conveyed. When a young child is tortured, raped and killed we have great difficulty in understanding what greater good might be served. This, prima facie, appears to be a valid objection. At this point emotion kicks in and our empathy and pity for the sufferer gets the better of us and we hastily conclude that the amount of suffering in the world just doesn't tally with god. Since emotion is involved, and any logic book says, we must be cautious and still remain sufficiently aloof to be able to make a good judgment.
That said, extremeness of suffering, while painful and sad to behold, doesn't eliminate the possibility of we having not understood/misunderstood god and god's will. All it does, so far as rationality is concerned, is evoke deep emotions that obscures the truth.
As to your accusation that I want it ''both ways''...
Firstly, there's no logical contradiction in it. As I said before, an OOO god is compatible with evil solely on the basis that we've misunderstood or have not yet understood god's will. Nothing more, nothing less. Just as a child may know certain character-traits of its parents while being oblivious to other features of the parent's personality.
Quoting dukkha
Notice how you use the terms ''disgustingly'', ''abhorrent''. It's natural. Please read my response above.
Yet, how can you use [i]that[/I] as an example of a greater good, for the sake of an analogy, when you extend your moral skepticism to the extent of seriously entertaining the possibility of completely turning the tables on our normal understanding of morality? If our understanding of morality is as unreliable as you suggest, then you would have no reliable comparison to make here. You'd be forced to completely scrap our human understanding of morality, so you wouldn't even be able to make that analogy in the first place.
And, in practice, you actually rely on your own human understanding of morality, and not this imaginary understanding of morality from God's perspective, so, in that very important sense, the latter is redundant.
And if you're skeptical enough to allow for the possibility of a God with the three omni-attributes, and for our understanding of morality to be completely mistaken, then why not a God with only two of those attributes or only one of them or an evil God or no God at all? Isn't it possible that our normal human understanding is right? The answer is yes. You'd need something more than mere possibility to go by here.
As far as I can tell, based on your replies, you don't have an answer for these kind of objections that have been raised, so you might as well just concede.
I'm not proposing such radical measures as ''scrap our human understanding of morality''. I only suggest caution. A child latches onto what he understands about his parents and defers his analysis of what he doesn't understand. Likewise we too can do the same.
This is beside the point though. I'm not affirming god's existence, nor am I denying it. I only want to test the soundness of the problem of evil and so far it doesn't look as good as it's made out to be.
Quoting Sapientia
As I said I'm only questioning the soundness of the problem of evil argument. It doesn't look good because it ignores a very important possibility that we've misunderstood or don't understand god. This mere possibility is a real possibility as I've demonstrated countless number of times with my child-adult analogy.
2. Socrates is a man.
Therefore-
3. Socrates is mortal.
According to you, this is a bad argument because of the possibility of one of the premises being false.
I think it is obvious to any reasonable observer that you have not dealt with any objections with anything more than a restatement of the original proposition, are engaging in special pleading, and are not acknowledging the differences between various forms of the problem of evil and what they aim to do. Therefore, I think we are done here.
I didn't say that that's what you're [i]proposing[/I]. I said that that's what you'd be [i]forced to do[/I] for sake of consistency. I didn't think that you'd find that logical consequence acceptable, but that's what it is.
Quoting TheMadFool
I already know what your argument is. Why repeat it? That doesn't address my criticism.
Is it Groundhog Day today?
Quoting TheMadFool
No, it isn't. You made an analogy in an attempt to support your position. I argued that that analogy is not consistent with your position. You can either concede or try to show that I'm mistaken. Handwaving isn't a valid option.
Quoting TheMadFool
You mean, [i]your interpretation of it[/I] doesn't look as good as it's made out to be. I agree. As Chany has explained, your interpretation is uncharitable, since it is a considerably weaker version of the argument.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, you're questioning the soundness of [i]a version[/I] of the argument from evil that is notably weaker than others, then you are using that to attempt to refute the argument from evil. So you are attacking a straw man.
If MadFool is attacking any problem of evil other than the logical problem, then their analogy is, at best, highly questionable. If MadFool is attacking the logical problem of evil, they are attacking the strongest form and are honestly not showing much, as a) I do not need to show something is logically impossible in order to claim it does not exist, b) logical possibility is the weakest form of evidence, considering it simply means the idea is coherent and internally consistent, and c) to my understanding, most people, including the original author of the argument, Mackie, already admit the argument is flawed, so refuting it is a moot point only useful in a teaching setting.
A child may choose to accept parts of a parent's personality and reject/modify others. She has no logical obligation to accept everything the parent does/says.
Quoting Sapientia
Read on. I'm responding to your criticism.
Quoting Sapientia
The problem of evil argument I'm concerned with:
1. Either god doesn't exist or evil doesn't exist
2. Evil exists
Therefore,
3. God doesn't exist
It has the strongest conclusion: certain denial of god's existence. If you have another problem of evil argument in mind please post it.
What I want to point out is that this is a false dilemma and presented through my analogy a third alternative viz. we misunderstand or don't understand god's will. Evil could very well be for the greater good just as an adult might discipline a child in a way that causes the child to suffer.
Then you (and others) said I was contradicting myself viz. that I was making god both incomprehensible and comprehensible at the same time. To this I replied that, as in my analogy, a child may understand part of an adult's personality while remaining ignorant of the rest. There is no contradiction there.
I have summarized our discussion so far.
I accept your criticism. However, one point I want to get across. What is relevant or important depends on the circumstances. The strong problem of evil argument has a strong conclusion viz. God DOES NOT exist. Given this is so, even the slightest possibility of being wrong counts.
Then you can't read. Read the thread.
It would be the strongest form in the sense that logical necessity is stronger than a possibility supported by evidence. But it is weaker in the sense that there are other versions which encounter less problems. Like you say, logical possibility is the weakest form of evidence, yet it would be sufficient to refute a version of the argument which doesn't allow for that possibility.
[url=http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/56310]See here[/URL]. Do you concede to my criticism of your analogy about the greater good? Yes or no. If no, then why?
Quoting TheMadFool
[url=http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/56310]See here[/URL]. Do you concede to my criticism of your analogy about the greater good? Yes or no. If no, then why?
Quoting TheMadFool
There are different ways to interpret the argument. If you think that [i]possibility alone[/I] is enough to do away with the argument, then you are wrong. That only does away with an argument [i]which doesn't allow for that possibility[/I]. There's no need for someone putting forward an argument from evil to be committed to a version which doesn't allow for fallibility.
So, even if you're right about [i]this version[/I] of the argument, that doesn't make you right about the argument from evil in general.
This has been said enough times for you to have got the message.
And, if you still haven't done so, then [url=http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/56310]see here[/URL]. Do you concede to my criticism of your analogy about the greater good? Yes or no. If no, then why?
Quoting TheMadFool
You definitely made contradictory statements, whether you meant to or not. That isn't debatable. The evidence is right here in this discussion for anyone to see.
And don't forget to [url=http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/56310]see here[/URL], tell me whether or not you concede to my criticism of your analogy about the greater good, and, if you don't, explain why.
I agree. Actually, now that I'm thinking on it, I am not sure if it attacks the logical problem of evil. I hypothesize that one of the reasons the free will defense may be so popular is that it is meant to combat Mackie's version of the argument: namely, there is a logical possible world in which all moral agents pick the moral thing to do whenever faced with a moral situation. It bypasses the whole "obscure possibilities" deal the child analogy seeks to establish by attacking a type of evil we are very familiar with: the evil of other human beings. If this evil is unnecessary, then God's existence runs into a massive problem. The free will defense says that because of the nature of morally significant free will, such a world cannot be brought about by God, but can only be brought out by free agents.
Then again, I am not really sold on the whole free will defense either. Maybe it is better in the actual source material, but from what I've been taught and read about it online, I do not understand how it refutes the logical problem of evil without also including something questionable like open theism, which states that it is logically impossible for God to have divine foreknowledge of free will decisions. And I have a feeling that most theists, at least within mainstream Christianity and certain sects of other religions, would never admit to that.
That's all I'm asking for. Evil does not necessitate the nonexistence of god.
That is correct.
Unjustifiable evil, however, might. Even if it is not logically possible (debatable), it might practically be.
But gods roamed the landscape of the human psyche long before Abraham. Many of them were assholes.
The word "god" in the problem of evil means the tri-omni god of classical theism. The second you redefine the word "god", the argument will obviously no longer apply.
Okay, but that means that there could nevertheless be an extremely good reason for believing that God doesn't exist because evil exists; and that argument would be an argument from evil.
I agree.
Okay. Well, that's that settled then.
This is really an argument against [i]any[/I] deductive argument, or at least against how they ought to be taken, rather than the argument from evil, specifically.