Scholastic philosophy
I'm curious as to what you think about medieval Scholasticism and the relatively recent revival of late-Antiquity and medieval philosophy.
I've spent several months, on and off, reading up on it. I've gotten the impression that it is very systematic and broad, and that this is probably one of the reasons it seems to be gaining a resurgence. Many contemporary analytic philosophers espouse Aristotelian positions, a lineage that I think can be somewhat traced back to Wittgenstein and his family of fellow thinkers, like Anscombe or Foot. Right now there's a multitude of books out that attempt to "re-frame" metaphysical, and even ethical, issues in an Aristotelian or medieval fashion, and a common trend it to assign blame on Descartes and the rationalists for fucking everything up. In general, though, Aristotelian lines of thought are often touted as an alternative way of looking at metaphysical issues, a way that has always been there but apparently has been neglected.
I haven't studied him thoroughly, but I have talked to those who have and many of them say that Aquinas was working on things that wouldn't appear until much later. Heidegger's analysis of Being was previously investigated by Aquinas, as well as epistemology, which is usually credited to Descartes.
Because Scholasticism (and Aristotelian philosophy in general) is so wide-ranging and systematic, it can be intimidating and difficult to make one's way through it. It is difficult to find contemporary critiques of it - most of the dialogue seemed to have happened back in the day. Those who try to deal with it today are either advocates, or non-philosophers who have an irrational knee-jerk reaction to the word "metaphysics" and try to Science the shit out of everything.
Since it's so broad and systematic, it's hard for people like me to come up with legitimate criticisms that aren't minor quibbles or what have you. Systems like Scholasticism are inherently esoteric and as such they can be difficult to work with. Perhaps the main issues I have with Scholastic/Aristotelian philosophy are:
1.) Its inherent connection to organized religion. Does Scholasticism justify Catholicism? Is Scholasticism truly impartial, or is it metaphysics-in-the-service-of-religion? In other words, would studying Scholastic philosophy lead you to Catholicism, or does it merely act as a psychological support structure for those already invested in the religion? It's not too difficult to find amateur philosophy enthusiasts touting around Scholasticism as the end-all, be-all solution to everything. Looking at history, wasn't Scholasticism basically tailored to Catholicism?
2.) My personal aversion to all-encompassing, systematic Theories of Everything. There is something about them that I find to be deeply oppressive and totalitarian, even if they offer comfort and security. It's nauseating, and I'm not sure if this system can account for this personal experience. Instead, it seems like it just has to say "you're wrong, suck it up", like most politicized systems tend to do. I remember a post I made over a year ago at the old PF, where I said that personal theistic religions are inherently oppressive - you can't escape God, you can't escape the eschatology of the universe, and freedom is an illusion.
3.) They argue that this is the Way Things Are at the most basic level. I entirely agree with Nietzsche when he says that he mistrusts systematizers, who have a lack of integrity. In my opinion, metaphysics has the capacity to be abused horribly for political gain, and is more often than not a symptom rather than a revelation. People hold onto metaphysical systems for psychological security more than actual rational argumentation. The prospect of having a perfect web of beliefs is seductive and can act as a means of escape from the threat of nihilism.
4.) Scholastic ethics is, in my opinion, insufficient and anthropocentric (another insufficiency). The principle of double effect is not enough to qualify permissibility. Natural law ethics is, again also my opinion, dominating and totalitarian - for example, I believe it was Aquinas who thought masturbation was basically as bad as rape. Or that homosexuality was extremely immoral. Hence why I had previously said metaphysical systems, especially those espousing thorough essentialism, are oppressive.
5.) I believe it was Kierkegaard who criticized systems like Scholasticism or Hegelianism for not making room for personal spiritual experiences. If this is so, then I agree.
I realize that most of these are criticisms of the Scholastic system from the outside, and not really of the actual views themselves. But I think the views themselves can be placed into question by analyzing their historical roots and how it manifests in people in general.
So use this as a springboard for further discussion. Post your reactions and/or your own issues with Scholastic philosophy here.
I've spent several months, on and off, reading up on it. I've gotten the impression that it is very systematic and broad, and that this is probably one of the reasons it seems to be gaining a resurgence. Many contemporary analytic philosophers espouse Aristotelian positions, a lineage that I think can be somewhat traced back to Wittgenstein and his family of fellow thinkers, like Anscombe or Foot. Right now there's a multitude of books out that attempt to "re-frame" metaphysical, and even ethical, issues in an Aristotelian or medieval fashion, and a common trend it to assign blame on Descartes and the rationalists for fucking everything up. In general, though, Aristotelian lines of thought are often touted as an alternative way of looking at metaphysical issues, a way that has always been there but apparently has been neglected.
I haven't studied him thoroughly, but I have talked to those who have and many of them say that Aquinas was working on things that wouldn't appear until much later. Heidegger's analysis of Being was previously investigated by Aquinas, as well as epistemology, which is usually credited to Descartes.
Because Scholasticism (and Aristotelian philosophy in general) is so wide-ranging and systematic, it can be intimidating and difficult to make one's way through it. It is difficult to find contemporary critiques of it - most of the dialogue seemed to have happened back in the day. Those who try to deal with it today are either advocates, or non-philosophers who have an irrational knee-jerk reaction to the word "metaphysics" and try to Science the shit out of everything.
Since it's so broad and systematic, it's hard for people like me to come up with legitimate criticisms that aren't minor quibbles or what have you. Systems like Scholasticism are inherently esoteric and as such they can be difficult to work with. Perhaps the main issues I have with Scholastic/Aristotelian philosophy are:
1.) Its inherent connection to organized religion. Does Scholasticism justify Catholicism? Is Scholasticism truly impartial, or is it metaphysics-in-the-service-of-religion? In other words, would studying Scholastic philosophy lead you to Catholicism, or does it merely act as a psychological support structure for those already invested in the religion? It's not too difficult to find amateur philosophy enthusiasts touting around Scholasticism as the end-all, be-all solution to everything. Looking at history, wasn't Scholasticism basically tailored to Catholicism?
2.) My personal aversion to all-encompassing, systematic Theories of Everything. There is something about them that I find to be deeply oppressive and totalitarian, even if they offer comfort and security. It's nauseating, and I'm not sure if this system can account for this personal experience. Instead, it seems like it just has to say "you're wrong, suck it up", like most politicized systems tend to do. I remember a post I made over a year ago at the old PF, where I said that personal theistic religions are inherently oppressive - you can't escape God, you can't escape the eschatology of the universe, and freedom is an illusion.
3.) They argue that this is the Way Things Are at the most basic level. I entirely agree with Nietzsche when he says that he mistrusts systematizers, who have a lack of integrity. In my opinion, metaphysics has the capacity to be abused horribly for political gain, and is more often than not a symptom rather than a revelation. People hold onto metaphysical systems for psychological security more than actual rational argumentation. The prospect of having a perfect web of beliefs is seductive and can act as a means of escape from the threat of nihilism.
4.) Scholastic ethics is, in my opinion, insufficient and anthropocentric (another insufficiency). The principle of double effect is not enough to qualify permissibility. Natural law ethics is, again also my opinion, dominating and totalitarian - for example, I believe it was Aquinas who thought masturbation was basically as bad as rape. Or that homosexuality was extremely immoral. Hence why I had previously said metaphysical systems, especially those espousing thorough essentialism, are oppressive.
5.) I believe it was Kierkegaard who criticized systems like Scholasticism or Hegelianism for not making room for personal spiritual experiences. If this is so, then I agree.
I realize that most of these are criticisms of the Scholastic system from the outside, and not really of the actual views themselves. But I think the views themselves can be placed into question by analyzing their historical roots and how it manifests in people in general.
So use this as a springboard for further discussion. Post your reactions and/or your own issues with Scholastic philosophy here.
Comments (45)
Quoting darthbarracuda
That's an argumentum ad hominem - not an intellectual reason for disagreeing with Scholasticism. You may not like organized religion, and indeed think organised religion is a problem for the world, but that has little or nothing to do with reasons for disagreeing with Scholasticism.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Emotional reactions - not valid intellectual reasons.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Okay so what? Scholastic philosophy itself has the means of distinguishing mistakes. For example, masturbation is an evil that is done only to oneself - you only harm yourself. Rape harms you and the person raped. Therefore rape is worse.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Homosexual sex may be immoral - what's wrong with that? Scholasticism doesn't argue someone having homosexual attractions is immoral, only that a certain activity - having sex with a person of the same sex as you - is immoral.
For most philosophies it is not possible to prove them correct or incorrect. If it were there would be far fewer philosophies around - maybe only one. Choosing between them is done mostly on an aesthetic basis - ie emotionally-based.
I am interested in people that like Scholasticism, and why they like it. Personally I do not like it, for reasons not dissimilar to Darth's. But neither do I like card games and I am very interested in why some other people like them so much (and conversely, in order not to appear condescending to Bridge enthusiasts, many may wonder why I like patterns so much, and arranging things into them).
I doubt many philosophers would agree that they subscribe to particular philosophical theses wholly or primarily on the grounds of aesthetics or emotional valence. However, ideas are not (generally) proven correct by surveys, so perhaps you are right.
But, by your own criterion, your philosophy of philosophy has no greater claim to truth than any other, and could likewise be discarded on grounds of aesthetics were it found to be unpalatable.
Actually, Descartes mainly gets blame as 'the first of the moderns'. Ed Feser writes a lot (and very well) on the problems that were introduced by, and subsequent to, Cartesian dualism, chief of which was the bifurcation of mind and matter, and the subsequent elimination of mind or spirit altogether from the modern view of the world (culminating in Cartesian anxiety).
Quoting darthbarracuda
All pre-modern philosophy was 'religious' in some way or another. Religion wasn't a separate category of knowledge, it was just 'the law', and God wasn't a remote deist clockmaker but the ever-present judge.
Quoting darthbarracuda
You're sure that's not because ego wants to 'call the shots'? The idea that there could be a 'divine super-thou' to whom one is actually beholden might indeed be a scary thought if you've spent your entire life betting against it.
Overall, I appreciate some aspects of scholasticism and neo-scholasticism, mainly because it's one of the last ramparts of a perennial philosophy in Western culture, and generally I like Ed Feser, although he's a bit of a wind-bag. I think, in practical terms, you would have to be Catholic to really accept the tenets; but on the other hand, I think the neo-scholastic tradition's critical skills are quite effective against the shallow polemics of most modern atheism.
//ps// the other signficant 20th c neo-scholastics to be aware of are Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, although the latter was mainly known as an historian of philosophy.//
Well, back in the scholastic days -- and before -- how many writers thought masturbation was an appropriate and healthful activity, and that exclusive homosexuality was normal for 3% of the population? Not too many, just guessing.§ Certainly there were enthusiastic medieval masturbators and homosexuals, but they hadn't formed up consciousness raising programs or a liberation movement yet.
§ Right, I've read Boswell. "Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1980) argues that the Roman Catholic Church had not condemned gay people throughout its history, but rather, at least until the twelfth century, had alternately evinced no special concern about homosexuality or actually celebrated love between men." I'm not the only one who finds that a bit difficult to believe, but maybe it was the scholastics who caused all the trouble.
This is a good point. Descartes offers us a very poorly defined rendition of dualism. And as the founder of modern philosophy it is probably no coincidence that the acceptance of dualist principles has declined rapidly since.
Quoting darthbarracuda
You should consider that at the time of Scholasticism, the Church had control over virtually all existing literature in the western world. It was not like the common person had books, or that you could go to the local library. The Church had the books, and governed the educational institutions. Prior to the Scholastics, very little of Aristotle's work had been received into the Church. Some Neo-Platonist principles had been brought in by Augustine. Aquinas worked to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist ontological principles already held by the Church, and the metaphysical principles of Aristotle. This allowed the work of Aristotle to be brought into the educational system of the Church. Within the Church, it was of the highest priority to maintain consistency from the top down.
So the question, is Scholasticism a "metaphysics-in-the-service-of-religion", is kind of a moot point. The Church already held its top principles, the existence of God etc., so any interpretations of other philosophies would have been made from that perspective. If the philosophy was not consistent it would be rejected and not taught. Any principles maintained would be consistent, and therefore viewed by us as being used to support the religion. So if you are interested in learning some of these ontological and metaphysical principles, without the Catholic influence, I suggest you read the work of Aristotle and Plato directly. Then, after a good understanding, if you proceed to study the Scholastics, you can judge for yourself how well the Church remains true to the masters, or if they distort the principles to support their religion.
It was meant to be an observation of human nature rather than a philosophy, but I can see how it might have come across that way. Perhaps I should put it slightly more carefully as follows:
It seems to me that people choose philosophies, wittingly or unwittingly, mostly on aesthetic/emotional grounds.
I am certainly open to observations about other criteria people use to choose between philosophies. One thing I feel fairly confident about is that they do not do it on the grounds of which philosophy is most 'rational', because a philosophy is only irrational if it makes contradicting claims, and that sort of thing is likely to be noticed. Further, for any two philosophies that are not irrational in that sense, I can't see any way of supporting a claim that one is 'more rational' than the other.
Well, you might be surprised. There is usually a fair amount of inconsistencies within the philosophy of individual philosophers. I like to judge based on consistency, not just internal consistency of an individual philosophy, but consistency in relation to other philosophies as well. To be a good philosopher requires one to read much philosophy.
I don't know that a philosophical thesis is irrational only insofar as it contains (internally) contradictory claims: for instance, I would regard solipsism to be a fairly irrational standpoint, even if it is wholly internally consistent. Under this category, I would also lump panpsychism.
And again, it seems to me that you are here advancing a meta-philosophical claim (in addition to whatever observations about human nature you may be making, which I suppose are at least partly empirical in nature), i.e. that no philosophical thesis can be considered more rational than any other provided that neither contains any contradictions. By your own criterion, I must assume that you believe this for emotional/aesthetic reasons, and thus it carries no probative force.
Part of why I find scholastic philosophy so fascinating is precisely because it so rigorously tries to make a place for God, while at the same time trying to 'get things right' at the level of the world. This kind of double imperative, stretched between the two poles of God and world, lit a fire of intense philosophical creativity which resulted in all sorts of philosophical permutations that tried to strike the 'right balance', as it were, between the two. The entire spectrum of scholastic thinking can be mapped onto the various articulations between (the) transcendence (of God) and (the) immanence (of the world).
I think that any philosophy that would proceed today without attempting to absorb the lessons of this intellectual ferment - even if only taken as a series of mental exercises - would be at a great disadvantage. At it's most minimal, scholastic philosophy shows us just how hard it is to break the grip of theological thinking, and functions as a fantastic road-map of pretty much everything to avoid, precisely because of it's wide-ranging rigor. One can be all the more secure in one's thinking if one can properly coordinate or triangulate just where one stands with respect to the many strands of scholastic thought that exist out there.
--
And apart from all of that, all the theological puzzles are just so interesting! A snippet from Agamben's the Open about one of them: "The problem that the Fathers had to confront first of all was that of the resurrected body’s identity with the body of the man in life. For the identity of these two bodies seemed to imply that all the matter that had belonged to the body of the dead person must come back to life and take its place once again in the blessed organism. But this is precisely where difficulties arose. If, for example, a thief — who had later repented and been redeemed — had had a hand amputated, would the hand be rejoined to the body at the moment of resurrection? And the rib of Adam, asks Thomas, from which the body of Eve had been formed, will it be resurrected in Eve’s body or in Adam’s?
Moreover, according to medieval science food is transformed into living flesh; in the case of an anthropophagus who has fed on other human bodies, this would have to mean that in the resurrection one single matter would be reintegrated into several individuals. And what about hair and fingernails? And sperm, sweat, milk, urine, and other secretions? If the intestines are resurrected, argues one theologian, they must come back either empty or full. If full, this means that even filth will rise again; if empty, then we will have an organ which no longer has any natural function."
Not at all. It is, as I've said, an observation - a casual opinion, no more emotionally charged than my observation-based opinion that all live animals with hearts also have kidneys. I would happily (nay, eagerly!) adjust either opinion based on new data.
Perhaps such a datum is available in relation to your statement that you consider panpsychism irrational, despite not seeing any obvious inconsistencies in it. Can you help me expand my horizons by explaining on what basis you consider it less rational than some alternative philosophy of consciousness?
Well that brings us to one of the key fault-lines in consideration of philosophy - between those who believe that a necessary criterion for being a good philosopher is to be knowledgeable about most major philosophical streams, and those who believe instead that necessary criteria are having wisdom about how to live, and being able to communicate that wisdom effectively.
It's academic vs moral philosophy (or life philosophy), Kripke vs Comte Sponville. I am of the latter group of partisans - my favourite philosophers being people like the Dalai Lama, Mohandas Gandhi and the Buddha, with the only academic philosophers that really interest me being the ones that had useful and inspiring things to say about ethics. But I think there is as much hope of attaining agreement between the two sides as there is of obtaining agreement between Idealists and Materialists.
Even the question "how to live" is extremely complicated. We're all different, with distinct aspirations, so the answer of that question for you will be different from the answer of that question for me. Remember Plato's Republic, justice is claimed to be each person doing one's own thing, without interfering with the others. For me, to answer that question "how to live" requires an understanding of what it means "to live". For some though, perhaps you, as long as they're told the "how" part, they feel the question is answered.
Quoting andrewk
There's very surely a relationship between the academic and the moral, because what it means "to live", is a question for academia, while the "how" is moral. Some things, such as what it means "to live", are not given to us by the moral principles of "how to do it right". So if some moral philosopher is trying to tell me "how to do it right", I want to make sure that this person has a good understanding of what it is that we are trying to do. I want to question authority, and I am well within my rights to demand from the moral philosopher one's ontological principles, to ensure that the one who is trying to tell me how to do it, knows what we are trying to do.
I believe we can see the beginnings of this questioning of authority in the Scholastics. The accepted science of the time is brought up to bear against the theological principles. At first, the theologians are capable of maintaining their grip on authority but this is the beginning of the decline of the church. As science advances rapidly, and the Church enforces a morality based in age-old principles, it cannot stand up to the onslaught of questioning the authority. This forced the division between the academic and moral, which you refer to, allowing the Church to maintain its role in morality without interfering in academia. Ultimately though, the two must be brought back into a healthy relationship, because what's the point in listening to someone telling you how to do it, when it's possible that this person doesn't even know what we are trying to do.
Quoting StreetlightX
The scholastics showed much disagreement over the scientific nature of the resurrection of Christ, and the associated sacrament, the Eucharist. I believe it was Aquinas who first produced a formal representation of the concept of transubstantiation, in an effort to affirm that the bread and wine of the Eucharist, truly are the body and blood of Christ. I believe he provides more than one, rather lengthy discussions on this topic. In this process there is said to be an inversion of matter and form.
One thing to keep in mind is that there isn't any one "Scholastic" philosophy. People like Henry of Ghent, Aquinas, Scotus, etc all used the same basic philosophical vocabulary to build mutually exclusive systems and had profound disagreements with one another.
This is entirely correct. I suspect Scholasticism is indeed flawed even if has internal consistency, but this is just because it comes across as advocating the "final word" and not an ongoing exercise in inquiry. It seems dogmatic.
Quoting andrewk
I somewhat agree, although I would say that it's far more prevalent and easier to prove something incorrect than to prove something correct. Negative dialectic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This was exactly the point I tried to make. Scholasticism, although impressive, has an issue of credibility. The reason it flourished was because the Church sponsored it. And of course it's going to be tailored to suit your sponsor.
Quoting StreetlightX
Interesting interpretation.
Quoting StreetlightX
Right, yeah, it's like the Scholastics thought of everything, or at least everything that was possible to conceive of in that day of philosophy.
Quoting StreetlightX
I'm not sure if I would call them interesting, in my opinion at least. They're kind of silly for someone who isn't totally into the whole God thing. And the silliness of them makes me doubt the legitimacy of theology in the first place. Hair-splitting and tangles all over the place.
Potentially an issue for non-theologically-inclined metaphysics could be the justification of metaphysics, or inquiry for that matter. For the Scholastics like Aquinas, metaphysics was basically some kind of sublime activity that brought one closer to God in virtue of studying creation and all that. Without God, the world exists, but there's no independent, transcendent reason to study it. It's not inherently valuable or intrinsically important, or perhaps more specifically, obviously valuable. And so metaphysics can potentially become sort of bland. But it also introduces a freedom that does not exist in theologically-inclined metaphysics. Without God, the world is not required to be perfectly rational or intelligible or even good.
Once again, I think you're assuming Scholasticism is a monolith when it is not. The word refers to the method of disputation, or dialectical reasoning, employed by the "schoolmen" who taught at various cathedral schools during the high Middle Ages, which we also credit as the first universities. In other words, it designates how they taught, not necessarily what they taught. And what they taught wasn't a single thing. About the only thing that united them was the use of Aristotelian terminology and logic (although some of a more Platonist bent objected even to these) and the presupposition that the Christian religion was true. Now, you can take the Russellian line about how this makes them fakes, but I don't buy it. They were doing metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, and so on, which can be assessed on their own merits or else extracted from theological assumptions. We still read the ancient Greeks, for example, even though we don't accept their religious assumptions, so it's silly to dismiss the Scholastics merely because of their religious beliefs.
So your point is a banal and trivial one. We should be skeptical of the philosophical positions of every philosopher, no matter their religious and cultural background. But that doesn't mean the latter's influence is undue or false, merely on account of it being an influence.
I certainly agree that different philosophies will suit different people, from which it follows that - perhaps unless internally inconsistent (and maybe not even then?!) - philosophies are not wrong or right.
The fundamental philosophical question, to which I referred above, is often expressed as 'How shall I live?', and I used that form above. But I think it is more accurate to use the more banal-sounding form 'What shall I do?' That 'do' includes not only bodily actions, but also speech acts, thoughts and spiritual practices. Expressed in that way, the verb 'to live' is not part of the question, and one does not need to dissect it in order to answer the question.
Nevertheless, it does seem to be the case that at least some of the most influential philosophies of life do come bundled with a metaphysics of what 'life' - or 'existence' means. I am thinking of Buddhism's metaphysical concepts of Maya and Sunyata, or Heidegger's inquiries into being. I note however that neither of those seem to draw significantly in a positive way from pre-existing philosophies. Rather they reject the prevalent philosophies of their day.
I wonder, did that rejection shape them? Would the proponents have come up with the same philosophy if they had not been spurred on by ideas they wanted to refute? It's a little like the question of whether Kant would have written CPR if he hadn't been goaded into it by wanting to try to refute Hume (his attempts to refute Hume - unsuccessful IMHO - are the least interesting part of CPR, and yet there is so much value in the work in other parts, that may never have been written if he had not been spurred into action by Hume).
Kant was not a philosopher of life. It's hard to get more academic and non-applied than Kant. Even his moral works are hopelessly inapplicable to real life. But I'm interested in this question of whether the value of some philosophies may be in goading others to attempt refutations, which may contain helpful elements.
But for the Scholastics there is no such thing as "without God the world exists". For them, it was just a clear, undisputable fact, that God is the creator, just like for us it's a clear undisputable fact that the earth orbits the sun. To even doubt that God is the creator would be considered an unreasonable doubt. So from that perspective, studying the world brings one closer to an understanding of God. And if one wants to understand God, then studying the world is inherently valuable. If you remove God from the scenario, studying the world is still inherently valuable, due to the human being's philosophical nature. This is described by Socrates and Plato as the desire to know, the love of knowledge.
Quoting darthbarracuda
But God has nothing to do with whether or not we should believe that the world is intelligible. The world does not conform itself to be suited to the capacities of the human intellect. The human intellect is a living, evolving thing. It must conform itself to the realities of the world. So when an aspect of the world appears to be unintelligible, we must devise the modes of reasoning required to figure it out. Why would one ever adopt the defeatist position that some part of the world is unintelligible, regardless of whether or not that person believes in God?
Quoting andrewk
I think that Aristotle assigned the highest virtue to the contemplative act. Notice that this act, thinking, is hardly even an act at all. So if you're wondering, "what shall I do?", then to engage in thinking is a good option, because it's highly unlikely that you will do something bad if you're only contemplating. But this is very close to what I said anyway, I said that to be a good philosopher one should read much philosophy. And reading, like contemplating, allows one to be active in a way which is very unlikely to be harmful. Furthermore, reading gives one material to contemplate.
Quoting andrewk
I agree that there is something peculiar about "dislike", which tends to inspire one to action. Like what Plato said in The Republic, the person who makes the best ruler of the state is the one who wants the job the least, recognizing that it is the most difficult job. And this person will only move to become the ruler when the conditions under the present government become so bad, that it's worse than being the ruler. In any case, we tend to look at intentions, goals, and morality in general, from the perspective of human actions being directed toward what is wanted, "the good". Maybe it's more accurate to say that human actions are directed away from what is unwanted. Perhaps it's the unbearableness of the bad which actually drives one to act.
Quoting andrewk
OK then, let's assume that there may be value in putting out low quality, even false or deceptive philosophy, if it may inspire someone to produce good philosophy. This would be like saying some computer hacking is good because it demonstrates to the security companies where the weakness are. But is this really a morally acceptable principle? Would it be good to steal from someone if it's going to inspire that person to better guard one's property? In that case clearly not. What about general conditions, such as working conditions on your job, or the mess in your house, or something like that? If conditions are not so good, could it be justifiable to make them worse in order that someone will clean it up? I doubt it, because the right course of action would be to either fix the situation yourself, or ask someone else to do it. So what about the bad philosophy? If its only value is in "goading others to attempt refutations", can we really say that this is a value?
The trick is to recognize the specifically philosophical, rather than theological import of much of what is discussed. Agamben, from whom the quote I provided was taken, specifically discusses the scholastic debates over the body's resurrection in the context of a broader discussion about the issue of the human/animal divide, for instance. Elsewhere, one could speak about the contributions of negative theology (John of the Cross, Eckhart, Pseudo-Dionysius) to the study of negation, or the importance of Aquinas to the theorization of analogy (given that God and the world relate analogically; and let's not forget the many debates over the nature and meaning of 'homology'); Eugene Thacker has tracked the concept of 'life' in terms of the work of John Scotus Eriugena and other scholastics, while ideas of John of St. Thomas regarding signs have famously been employed in modern semiotic thinking. A personal favourite reference for me is that of Nicholas Malebranche, whose occasionalism seems ever more pervasive (if unacknowledged) in alot of pop-scientific writing on causality. And these are just a few examples.
Deleuze has a wonderful quote regarding Christian philosophy in particular that "it does not produce concepts except through its atheism, through the atheism that it, more than any other religion, secretes." He cites Nicholas of Cusa, Eckhart and Giordano Bruno in this respect, noting that "all philosophers [in the Christian tradition] must prove that the dose of immanence they inject into world and mind does not compromise the transcendence of a God to which immanence must be attributed only secondarily", but that this 'injection' is impossible to properly suppress - hence the 'secretion of atheism' that Christianity is particularly prone to. In any case, it's always a questioning of harnessing the creative energies of scholastic thinking - or even religious thinking - for ends other than scholastic ones. The hair-splitting is useful in that it makes us aware of the implicit stakes of many of the claims that we make over things. Insofar as 'we' don't hair split, we're just not being explicit enough.
The singular glory of the scholastic tradition is to have made philosophy aware of just how far the ramifications of thought might lead - even if one disagrees with their points of departure.
1. Hylomorphic dualism provides an interesting and worthy counterpoint to the dichotomous substance dualism that undergirds the dialectic of modern philosophy since Descartes and Locke. Subdues the modern tension between realism and idealism by more-or-less eliminating the underlying cause of that tension.
2. Metaphysics as the systematic study of being qua being provides an interesting and worthy counterpoint to the contemporary view that metaphysics is nothing more than a collection of specific problematics concerning the existence of universals, free will, god, etc.
3. The analysis of modality along the categories of potency and act provides a fascinating alternative to the hot mess that is modern possible world semantics.
4. The four-fold analysis of causation arguably provides and more robust and intuitive framework for analyzing and explaining the behavior of biological systems than do models that focus solely on the material and efficient modes of causality as most frequently used in the analysis and explanation of physical and chemical systems.
5. The analysis of being into the categories of substance and accident, matter and form arguably provides the foundations of a more robust and intuitive framework for modeling the structure of biological systems than is provided by the process or event-based metaphysical models typically employed at the level of, say, fundamental physics.
6. Like you, I'm not a huge fan of how the scholastics welded Natural Law ethics to theology in order to provide justification for their faith-based ethical percepts. That said, I think that the main idea behind Natural Law theory (ethics in accord with the principles of natural reason) could possibly bear interesting philosophical fruit if allowed to develop unencumbered by the presuppositions of Christian theology. I'm sure there are probably some thinkers who have charted some territory in this domain, but I haven't taken the time to research it.
7. The work of Aquinas, the Conimbricenses and John Poinsot on the category of relational being laid the philosophical groundwork that culminated in C. S. Peirce's semiotic philosophy in the early 20th century, which is still bearing fruit in multiple fields of study to this day (linguistics, communication theory, biosemiotics, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, etc.).
All in all I think that scholastic philosophy is absolutely worthy of close study for anyone with a serious interest in philosophy. Many of the scholastic thinkers were simply brilliant. And while their unquestioning commitment to the truth of the Christian religion can get tiresome, and some the topics on which they deliberated are of little more than historical interest, if you're willing to look past all of that (or even try to appreciate it) then I think that scholastic philosophy can provide any student with a rich deposit of philosophical ore to mine.
Indeed!
You can try David Wiggins's Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality, HUP, 2009, for a historical survey from which emerges Wiggins's own subtle, brilliant and seemingly unforced weaving together of the best strands of Aristotelian, Humean and Kantian ethics.
"Almost every thoughtful person wonders at some time why morality says what it says and how, if at all, it speaks to us. David Wiggins surveys the answers most commonly proposed for such questions--and does so in a way that the thinking reader, increasingly perplexed by the everyday problem of moral philosophy, can follow. His work is thus an introduction to ethics that presupposes nothing more than the reader’s willingness to read philosophical proposals closely and literally.
Gathering insights from Hume, Kant, the utilitarians, and a twentieth-century assortment of post-utilitarian thinkers, and drawing on sources as diverse as Aristotle, Simone Weil, and Philippa Foot, Wiggins points to the special role of the sentiments of solidarity and reciprocity that human beings will find within themselves. After examining the part such sentiments play in sustaining our ordinary ideas of agency and responsibility, he searches the political sphere for a neo-Aristotelian account of justice that will cohere with such an account of morality. Finally, Wiggins turns to the standing of morality and the question of the objectivity or reality of ethical demands. As the need arises at various points in the book, he pursues a variety of related issues and engages additional thinkers--Plato, C. S. Peirce, Darwin, Schopenhauer, Leibniz, John Rawls, Montaigne and others--always emphasizing the words of the philosophers under discussion, and giving readers the resources to arrive at their own viewpoint of why and how ethics matters."
Ed Feser has a current article From Aristotle to John Searle and Back Again: Formal Causes, Teleology and Computation in Nature.
I had the idea that the reason why Christianity engenders (which I prefer to 'secretes') atheism, is because of the compulsory nature of belief that it requires. Right from the outset of the early Church Councils, which thrashed out the Nicene Creed and the other articles, there was an emphasis on what belief is required of the professing Christian. 'Heresy' is derived from the greek word for 'choosing' or 'making a choice', the implication being that it is wrong to even have a view about what one ought to believe. As is well-known, the suppression or persecution of heresies gave rise to many of the darkest chapters in Christian history (not least the destruction of the Cathars).
Recall also that many of the mystics fell foul of the authorities because they threatened the undermine the requirement for submission to the Church hierarchy; that was the specific error that Eckhardt was censured for. 'No-one comes to the Father but by Me' was taken to mean 'other than by the Church'; and anything that threatened that was to be destroyed (which underlay a good deal of the violence of the Wars of Religion.) I think this 'with us or against us' attitude is the main driver of secularism and conscientious atheism that developed in and after the European Enlightenment, as a reaction to, and a kind of 'shadow' of, the ruthless orthodoxy of earlier Christianity.
Of course a lot of philosophical debates are really just masked politics. For example, the problem of universals is irrelevant to those who aren't specifically interested in it, unless of course someone claims things have essential universal properties that influence moral reasoning. Then you get thoroughly-nominalistic positions that are really implausible and aren't motivated by plausibility but simply a rejection of what is seen as the inevitable consequence of the acceptance of the alternative.
I think you're right to hit on belief as the hinge upon which this turns, and I think indeed it's a matter of 'practice' which is at stake here. The context of that Deleuze quote on the secretion of atheism in fact comes from a discussion of belief, specifically that of Kierkegaard and Pascal, each of whom transpose belief from the transcendent to the immanent:
"We have seen this in Pascal or Kierkegaard: perhaps belief becomes a genuine concept only when it is made into belief in this world and is connected rather than being projected. ... Kierkegaard leaps outside the plane [of immanence], but what is "restored" to him in this suspension, this halted movement, is the fiancee or the lost son, it is existence on the plane of immanence. Kierkegaard does not hesitate to say so: a little "resignation" will be enough for what belongs to transcendence, but immanence must also be restored. Pascal wagers on the transcendent existence of God, but the stake, that on which one bets, is the immanent existence of the one who believes that God exists. Only that existence is able to cover the plane of immanence ...whereas the existence of the one who does not believe that God exists falls into the negative." (Deleuze, What Is Philosophy?)
This is further connected to the soteriological element of Christianity, it's messianic core which aims at a restored future only if driven by the present. In other words there is a very specific temporarily that is proper to Christianity which always always brings it's belief back to bear on the present. Giorgio Agamben has written quite eloquently on this, especially with respect to the question of 'choice': "Contrary to the contemporary eschatological interpretation, it should not be forgotten that the time of the messiah cannot be, for Paul, a future time. The expression he uses to refer to this time is always ho nyn kairos, 'now time'. As he writes in the Second Letter to the Corinthians, "Idou nyn, behold, now is the time to gather, behold the day of salvation" (2 Cor. 6.2; 231) ... Living in this time, experiencing this time, is thus not something that the Church can choose, or choose not, to do. It is only in this time that there is a Church at all.
....[T]he Church can be a living institution only on the condition that it maintains an immediate
relation to its end. And - a point which we would do well not to forget - according to Christian theology there is only one legal institution which knows neither interruption nor end: hell." (Agamben, The Chruch and the Kingdom - note that Agamben rather sneakily gave this speech in the presence of the bishop of Paris at Notre-Dame, the whole thing being a rather pointed critique of the Church's currently existing institutional practices). All of this serves to continually make Christianity 'world-directed' rather that 'Heaven-directed' as it were (think here too of Weber's The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism). Or in Deleuze's words, "when we take pride in encountering the transcendent within immanence, all we do is recharge the plane of immanence with immanence itself".
Transcendence is immanently thought and can have, for us, only immanent significance. This much seems obvious. But it cannot be thought as immanence without losing all sense.
The other historical factor which I think is directly relevant to the waning and, now, the resurgence of scholastic philosophy, is the 'rise of nominalism' thesis which has been laid out by a couple of very influential books, notably Michael Allen Gillespie's recent The Theological Origins of Modernity.
Gillespie traces the conflict between the nominalists and scholastics back to the re-discovery of Aristotelean philosophy by the schools, on the one side, and the radical views of William of Ockham, and others, on the other, inspired (perhaps paradoxically) by St Francis of Assisi.
Review by Alin Vara
Gillespie contrasts this attitude with the inherenently teleological view of scholasticism, which, following the Greek intuition, emphasises the familial resemblance, as it were, between human rationality and the divine Logos:
What's Wrong with Ockham?
This can possibly also be traced back to a deep tension in Christianity itself between the Biblical sense of an inherently super-rational nature of revelation and that of Greek rationalism and Platonist mysticism, with which it became fused very early in the Christian era (this tension being preserved in such sayings as scripture being 'foolishness to the Greeks' and the rhetorical question 'what does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?')
But even more to the point, the medieval nominalists (Ockham, Bacon, et al) were really the precursors of the later empiricists and indeed crucial figures in the development of science; and among the consequences, was the denial of universals ( or of what was then 'scholastic realism') which ultimately entailed the dissolution of metaphysics proper (also discussed in Richard Weaver's influential 1948 book 'Ideas Have Consequences'.)
Which is why, I think, Scholasticism is making a comeback - because medieval nominalism and the mechanistic views of early modern philosophy have been shown to be metaphysically threadbare.
I agree with this, with the caveat that Ockham's nominalism remains committed to a substance-accident model of being which, for all his radicalism, nonetheless places him firmly within the ambit of Aristotelianism. The failure of nominalism - which is ultimately a radicalization, and not a break from Scholastic tradition - ought to speak to a rejection of that model tout court, rather than a swing from one of it's poles to the other.
And in a real way, this is what is happening: the rediscovery of universals is taking place on grounds other than those of the scholastics, such that one can speak - in a way that would have been anathema to medieval thinkers - of emergent universalities, or universals which are results of processes which subsequently have retroactive effects on those processes ('top-down causation'). Not a simple return to universals but a total rethinking of them is at stake in the apparent 'return'.
I do not think that it is correct to exclude Aristotle from substance dualism. In his Categories he clearly defines primary and secondary substance, primary substance being material substance, and secondary substance formal. Material substance he implies, substantiates, or grounds, the logical system. But in his metaphysics, when he seeks to substantiate being itself, he turns to formal substance.
So I don't see the support for your claim that hylomorphism eliminates substance dualism, as the underlying cause of tension. If anything, the Aristotelian principles of hylomorphism, which were introduced into Christianity by the Scholastics, only produced ambiguity. There was ambiguity with respect to how the logical forms of Aristotle were to be related to the immaterial Forms of Neo-Platonism. This was at the heart of the nominalist/realist debate.
Quoting Wayfarer
When discussing "choice" with respect to the theological principles of a religion, one should keep in mind the evolutionary stages of a religion. In its early days, a religion such as Christianity, must be adapted, to encourage individuals to choose that religion, in order that it may grow. A young religion trying to establish itself, has no real intrinsic power to encourage people to join, except to appear desirable. So it must encourage freedom of choice. Early fathers of Christianity, such as Augustine, display much freedom to choose metaphysical principles, and profess the intrinsic truth of free will. Even if a particular religion, as it grows, adopts certain principles to distinguish heresy, as in your example of the Nicene Creed, that religion must be very careful if it attempts to enforce any such contracts of belief.
In early medieval times, one would accuse another's beliefs as heresy, in debate, but there was very little means or desire to enforce punishment. This would be far too divisive. What came about in Christianity, in later medieval times, with the advent of Scholasticism, and the crusades, was a large influx of written materials, derived from various different places around the world. This presented a wide range of beliefs to choose from. The leaders of the Church saw the need to enforce laws of heresy, which led to the Inquisition.
But what I believe is that there is a fundamental difference here between early times and later times, with respect to the Church's attitude toward choice. In early times it encouraged freedom of choice, as a fundamental principle, with an attitude of tolerance toward different beliefs. But as it gained power, it ignored this principle completely, and turned its actions right around, in a hypocritical way, attempting to enforce belief in a way which cannot be successful. It is this hypocritical action which engenders atheism, because it cannot overcome the fundamental freedom of choice.
As a result I think regard for him was so high and extensive at that time that it was thought important to harmonize his work with the essential doctrines of the Church and justify those doctrines based on the authoritative opinions of The Philosopher. I think there was a real effort to do so, by Aquinas and others. To that extent, it might be said that Scholasticism in its incorporation of Aristotle had as one of its concerns the use of his thought and his way of thinking to buttress Church doctrine.
I’m not sure I’d agree. My understanding is that Aristotle ultimately argues that substance is the unity of matter and form or, more generally, of dunamis and energeia. This unity is the necessary and sufficient condition of being. In that sense hylomorphism fundamentally differs from modern substance dualism, which explicitly dichotomizes thought and extension into mutually exclusive categories of being. In the modern approach a thinking substance can exist entirely apart from extended substance and vice versa.
THE CRITICAL PROBLEM
The 'critical problem' with past philosophies and past philosophers is 'VERIFIED KNOWLEDGE'. In the past, philosophers had little to work with, so they had to make a lot of GUESSES concerning reality, which have almost invariably turned out to be wrong (which can be expected, reality being as complicated as it is, and guesses without verified knowledge being so open-ended, limited only by one's imagination).
FOOLISH FADS
So any 'return' to past philosophies will be a foolish fad, even if an academic foolish fad (academia not being immune to foolish fads).
Quoting andrewk
I don't necessarily disagree with your claim that people often form beliefs on the basis of aesthetic judgments or emotional valence. However, this is hardly limited to philosophy: even areas of inquiry which are amenable to empirical investigation such as anthropogenic climate change, vaccine safety, and evolution are filled with politically-, emotionally-, and even religiously-charged overtones among their proponents and detractors. However, no one can reasonably claim that, in such disputes, no side is more rational than the other.
My point is that you are here also making a meta-philosophical claim, i.e. that no philosophical position can be said to be more rational than any other. By your own criteria, this position has no greater claim to rationality than its contrary, i.e. that certain philosophical positions are more rational than others.
Panpsychism is absurd in attributing mentation to the most basic, non-living elements of the universe. It makes a hash of our understanding of the natural history of intelligence, our knowledge of the sort of systems in which mentation undeniably arises, is wholly unsupported by empirical evidence, and is more of an admission of defeat in understanding consciousness rather than being a serious position in its own right (a discussion for another thread perhaps).
Well, I think that "substance" was proper to Aristotle's logic, the categories, while the unity of matter and form was proper to his physics. Now we could say that physical objects, as a unity of matter and form, are primary substance, but we still have to consider secondary substance, which is more like the simple essence of a thing, form without the matter. Then in his metaphysics, when he seeks the nature of being itself, he finds that there must be a formal essence which underlies the material existence of a thing. That is to say that for every existing thing, there is a reason why it exists as the thing which it is, and this causes it to be the thing that it is. This formal essence therefore must be prior to the material existence of the thing.
So we clearly have a substance dualism here, though it is more complex than the simple representation of thinking substance and extended substance. It is more like "secondary substance" as the formal essence of a thing, and "primary substance" as a unity of matter and form.
I very much agree with that, and it's pretty much the same thing which I said earlier.