The stupidity of contemporary metaethics
Crudely, contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. Each one is very stupid. I mean, just obviously false. But they're approximately equally stupid, which means that there is a lot of debate over who has the most stupid view. But, like I say, they're all stupid. The naturalists and expressivists will agree that non-naturalism is bonkers. The naturalists and non-naturalists will agree that expressivism is bonkers. And the non-naturalists and the expressivists will agree that naturalism is bonkers. So my view that all three views are bonkers is very well supported by contemporary metaethicists!
I will now explain why each one is painfully obviously false, starting with naturalism. The naturalist believes that the moral properties of rightness and wrongness and goodness and badness can be identified with objective natural properties. I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid).
This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. That's literally mad. If I thought the door wants me to close it, I'm a nutter, right? Well, nothing changes if instead of thinking a door wants me to close it, I think certain complex bundles of natural features want me to act in certain ways. So naturalism is literally insane. The objective natural world doesn't want us to do anything or be anything. Thus, as morality is about what we ought to do and what we ought to be, morality cannot be identified with any objective natural features of the world.
The non-naturalist would heartily agree with what I've just said. But to 'overcome' this problem - the problem of accommodating the normativity of morality - they posit non-natural properties. Now, exactly what one of those is is something non-naturalists are wont to spill a lot of ink arguing about. If you suggest that they are positing platonic forms, they normally insist they're not, but typically won't tell you exactly what they're on about, as they don't really know. It's just they try and turn not really having a clue what they're on about into a virtue. Anyway, whatever a non-natural property is, the simple fact is it is going to be every bit as insane to think that one of them can issue a prescription as it was to think that a natural property could. So, where the naturalist says "morality is a piece of cheese", the non-naturalist says "don't be silly, cheese can't issue directives - morality is an abstract monolith". But an abstract monolith is no more in the prescribing business than cheese is. The debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is, then, a bit like a debate between two lunatics, one of whom thinks he is Napoleon nd the other of whom disagrees and insists he is not Napoleon, but Jesus.
Naturalists and non-naturalists are typically united in their utter bewilderment, bordering on contempt, for expressivist views. And the feeling is mutual. The expressivists think that naturalists and non-naturalists are making a category error in thinking of morality as an aspect of reality that needs to be accommodated by our ontology. They insist that morality is an activity - it is something we 'do', not something we 'perceive'. Our way of talking about morality simply misleads us into thinking we're describing, when in fact we're expressing.
Naturalists and non-naturalists find this bewildering because it is just so obviously false. As false as insisting that something that is obviously an activity - such as walking - is in fact an exercise in description. It is noteworthy - though no-one seems to have noticed it - that most expressivists find the naturalists and non-naturalists constant appeal to moral intuitions puzzling. They often admit that they do not know what a moral intuition is. Well, that explains it. Just as there are people who have sight but are colour blind, there are also those who possess reason, but are not prey to moral intuitions. If you are not prey to moral intuitions, then you simply do not perceive the moral aspect to reality. And it stands to reason that you will then give an expressivist interpretation of morality. I mean, it is stupid and self-indulgent - for clearly the bulk of moral philosophers do get moral intuitions and so do get the impression of an external moral aspect to morality, for the bulk of moral philosophers are not expressivists and think the view is patently obviously false right from the get go - but it is understandable why one would think morality is just a name for an activity rather than a feature of reality if one gets no impression of that feature. Just as, if one has never walked or seen walking, one might think that when people talk about 'walking' and 'going for a walk' they might be talking, slightly eccentrically admittedly, about a place, not an activity. Note too that those who do not perceive morality may nevertheless come to be fascinated by what others are talking about, precisely because they do not know. And thus we can predict that a disproportionate number of moral philosophers may in fact be unable to perceive morality (and thus may also be disposed to be expressivists). Just as, for instance, a lot of psychologists seem to be mad, so too many metaethicists are morally blind.
Anyway, there you go: those are the three main kinds of metaethical theory that metaethicists dispute the truth of. And they're all extremely silly. Which, like I say, is actually something most metaethicts would agree about, for each one has approximately the same number of defenders, and their defenders agree that the alternatives are silly. Discuss. Or just say something totally unrelated to the OP, as per usual.
I will now explain why each one is painfully obviously false, starting with naturalism. The naturalist believes that the moral properties of rightness and wrongness and goodness and badness can be identified with objective natural properties. I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid).
This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. That's literally mad. If I thought the door wants me to close it, I'm a nutter, right? Well, nothing changes if instead of thinking a door wants me to close it, I think certain complex bundles of natural features want me to act in certain ways. So naturalism is literally insane. The objective natural world doesn't want us to do anything or be anything. Thus, as morality is about what we ought to do and what we ought to be, morality cannot be identified with any objective natural features of the world.
The non-naturalist would heartily agree with what I've just said. But to 'overcome' this problem - the problem of accommodating the normativity of morality - they posit non-natural properties. Now, exactly what one of those is is something non-naturalists are wont to spill a lot of ink arguing about. If you suggest that they are positing platonic forms, they normally insist they're not, but typically won't tell you exactly what they're on about, as they don't really know. It's just they try and turn not really having a clue what they're on about into a virtue. Anyway, whatever a non-natural property is, the simple fact is it is going to be every bit as insane to think that one of them can issue a prescription as it was to think that a natural property could. So, where the naturalist says "morality is a piece of cheese", the non-naturalist says "don't be silly, cheese can't issue directives - morality is an abstract monolith". But an abstract monolith is no more in the prescribing business than cheese is. The debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is, then, a bit like a debate between two lunatics, one of whom thinks he is Napoleon nd the other of whom disagrees and insists he is not Napoleon, but Jesus.
Naturalists and non-naturalists are typically united in their utter bewilderment, bordering on contempt, for expressivist views. And the feeling is mutual. The expressivists think that naturalists and non-naturalists are making a category error in thinking of morality as an aspect of reality that needs to be accommodated by our ontology. They insist that morality is an activity - it is something we 'do', not something we 'perceive'. Our way of talking about morality simply misleads us into thinking we're describing, when in fact we're expressing.
Naturalists and non-naturalists find this bewildering because it is just so obviously false. As false as insisting that something that is obviously an activity - such as walking - is in fact an exercise in description. It is noteworthy - though no-one seems to have noticed it - that most expressivists find the naturalists and non-naturalists constant appeal to moral intuitions puzzling. They often admit that they do not know what a moral intuition is. Well, that explains it. Just as there are people who have sight but are colour blind, there are also those who possess reason, but are not prey to moral intuitions. If you are not prey to moral intuitions, then you simply do not perceive the moral aspect to reality. And it stands to reason that you will then give an expressivist interpretation of morality. I mean, it is stupid and self-indulgent - for clearly the bulk of moral philosophers do get moral intuitions and so do get the impression of an external moral aspect to morality, for the bulk of moral philosophers are not expressivists and think the view is patently obviously false right from the get go - but it is understandable why one would think morality is just a name for an activity rather than a feature of reality if one gets no impression of that feature. Just as, if one has never walked or seen walking, one might think that when people talk about 'walking' and 'going for a walk' they might be talking, slightly eccentrically admittedly, about a place, not an activity. Note too that those who do not perceive morality may nevertheless come to be fascinated by what others are talking about, precisely because they do not know. And thus we can predict that a disproportionate number of moral philosophers may in fact be unable to perceive morality (and thus may also be disposed to be expressivists). Just as, for instance, a lot of psychologists seem to be mad, so too many metaethicists are morally blind.
Anyway, there you go: those are the three main kinds of metaethical theory that metaethicists dispute the truth of. And they're all extremely silly. Which, like I say, is actually something most metaethicts would agree about, for each one has approximately the same number of defenders, and their defenders agree that the alternatives are silly. Discuss. Or just say something totally unrelated to the OP, as per usual.
Comments (87)
(Time to take your meds now.)
May sound cliche but...
“There is no such thing as stupid just the unasked question.”
So maybe the road to enlightenment needs a dash of madness.
Maybe the concept we should be thinking of is “Consider the possibility” not to validate or believe. Take it as just a “Maybe”
Because there ethics may prove useful in the future and cannot be validated because that instant of time has not arrived yet to test the theory.
In other words your talking in what-if scenarios and if the scenario does not exist yet how do you test your ethics to validate it to be truly righteous and acceptable.
Ethics is not universal so the code you create to define it constantly needs to be tested by circumstance to validate it to be righteous.
No, there is clearly such a thing as stupid (though it is not a thing, but a property of a thing). For instance, see anything posted by 180Proof. Or, indeed, the claim that there is no such thing as stupid.
Quoting SteveMinjares
It is universal. And metaethical theories are not theories about the content of morality, but about what morality itself is.
For those tempted to comment on this OP, there is a clear, erudite summation of metaethics, in the SEP article.
Have a read of that first.
A more historical approach can be found at the IEP, but is not as up to date.
Is it worth the effort? :roll:
The OP is deliberately abrasive, and quite misguided. A look at the articles I cite will quickly show this. But if you are not interested in metaethics, let it be. Metaethics is certainly not where I would start a course on ethics.
...and you are now doing metaethics.
Metaethics is the examination, not of moral codes, but of the thought and language used to express them. It's not about what we ought do in specific situations, but about the nature of such ethical statements: are they universal? are they just expressions of sentiment? are they statements of fact?
Oh, and you know your stuff do you? Based on your deep understanding of contemporary metaethics, you think what I wrote was misguided? Okaaaay.
Only thing better than my posts for you, lil D-K, would be the meds you're not taking. :smirk:
Ok than indulge me in this hypothetical scenario
Thou shall not kill....
Scenario A: Robber kills a store clerk
Scenario B: Clerk kills a the Robber
Scenario C: Clerk accidentally kills a by standard while defending the store.
Ethics dictate killing is wrong but the scenario presents different motives. Does Ethics discriminate by motive of the individual or what society deems as acceptable?
Is Ethics intention is to justify punishment or to improve quality of life to community and individual?
The only moral standard that should be considered as Universal is Compassion, Love, Mercy and Forgiveness.
Anything outside those attributes is just seeking justification to condemn.
Ethical non-naturalism is right to reject that whole bag, but it’s wrong to identify the problem as the “natural” part.
Ethical non-cognitivism (of which expressivism is the usual species) is right to see that both of those have a common flaw, but wrongly identifies that flaw as cognitivism.
The correct solution is non-descriptivism, which can still be cognitivist in its moral semantics, and naturalist in its ontology, while dodging the problems of all three of the above.
Quoting SteveMinjares
Focus on this: the fact that ethics is about dictates, among other things.
Naturalism is the view that the objective natural world can dictate to us. Which is insane.
Non-naturalism is the view that non-natural Platonic Forms can dictate to us. Which is equally insane.
Agree?
On such a view, who or what is the source of the prescriptions? It is not clear to me, as it stands, exactly what the view is.
Quoting Bartricks
What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim?
Quoting Bartricks
Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism. I would break it down a bit differently I think. First, since we are discussing meta-ethics, let's start by posing a meta-ethical question. Let's consider a question that raises some of the issues dividing realism from anti-realism.
"Are moral statements truth-apt?"
If no, then we have established that you are a non-cognitivist.
If yes, then you are a cognitivist.
To press further, if no. "Are there at least some moral statements which are true?"
If no, then we have established that you are an error theorist.
If yes, I'm still unsure. "Are there any moral statements that are objectively true?"
If yes, then its official, your some type of realist and we can probe deeper by changing our focus a bit to include your now ontological, or more broadly, your now metaphysical beliefs of morality. Down this path we are likely going to be tasked in keeping up with three modalities: metaphysical, semantical and epistemological frameworks will intersect with one another.
If no, then your definitely an anti-realist but there is still more to uncover here.
Perhaps you view that we can make moral judgements that contain truth value, but that the truth value of any moral statement is dependent upon the subject to which it is indexed next to. If so, then you rely on a figurative theory of truth, nonetheless it remains between correspondence theory, deflationism, or some otherwise modified theories of truth.
If you do believe that moral truth is fundamentally dependent upon our attitudes but that moral terms can be defined by non-moral terms, thus dismissing the fact/value distinction, then I suppose you would have to either be in the camp of synthetic or analytic naturalism.
If you hold that both moral and non-moral terms co-refer, or share the same definition, do they then name the same property?
If no, then you are either a non-reductive analytic naturalist or a non-reductive synthetic naturalist.
If yes, then you are either a reductive analytic naturalist or a reductive synthetic naturalist.
If you hold that moral terms cannot be defined or have a reference fixing relation described by non-moral terms, but that they may still refer to properties that are nearly identical with, or constituentive of ones, that are naming non-moral terms, then your at least not a non-naturalist.
Non-naturalism contains some spooky duelist metaphysical beliefs that are, for sure, quite strange.
Back to the line of questioning.
Can we say anything meaningful regarding the metaphysical nature of these non-natural properties?
If yes, you are likely a robust realist.
If no, you either have a queitist take (an acceptance of things as they are without attempts to resist or change them), or some other variant adherent to moral sense theory, but only if you hold that moral knowledge cannot be a priori, otherwise, if you do hold to such a view, your probably working within some form of intuitionalist framework.
This is why people dismiss meta-ethics.
Neat summation.
If he is a troll he deserves an Oscar. If he isn't I'm deeply concerned. Here is someone that thinks rape victims deserved it.
An appropriate start to a thread by 'Bartricks'.
The person uttering the moral proposition is the one making a prescription.
There then remains the further question of when and why to assent to such prescriptions, just as there's the question of when and why to assent to descriptive propositions. But that's not moral semantics anymore, but rather moral epistemology; i.e. it's not about what do moral claims mean to say, but when and why are they right to say so, when and why they are true.
But FWIW my answer to both epistemological questions (about descriptions and prescriptions) is criticoliberal phenomenalist universalism, which on the descriptive side amounts to critical empirical realism (the reason not to believe something is because it dissatisfies an observation, and everyone's observations count), and on the prescriptive side amounts to liberal hedonic altruism (the reason not to intend something is because it dissatisfies an appetite, and everyone's appetites count).
Quoting Bartricks
I wrote a big thread about my own version of this view a while back:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8749/meta-ethics-and-philosophy-of-language
And in the time since I came up with that view on my own I have discovered that someone else (professional) had already come up with something almost identical to it:
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/factual/papers/HorganNondescriptive.html
Quoting Banno
Thanks.
Is it even possible to divorce the esotericism from philosophical discourse? I would much rather use common language that is broadly accessible but then terms and phrases seem to expand into essays or treatises. I just make mouth sounds and hope for the best most of the time.
If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. There are moral realists who are naturalists, and moral realists who are non-naturalists.
Consider: if I say milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, I am not thereby asserting that there are milkshakes. The view that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring is not, then, a form of milkshake realism. It is a view about what it takes for a milkshake to exist, but it is not a view about what exists. That's the same with naturalism and non-naturalism.
As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why?
For instance, what I said about naturalism - namely that it is bat-shit crazy because it essentially involves thinking objective features of the natural world can direct us to do things - applies as much to synthetic reductionism as to analytic reductionism. So what was the point in making that distinction?
They're bat-shit crazy, yes?
Yes. You've failed.
If you're view is that saying "Xing is wrong" is just a strange way of saying "don't do X", then you're an expressivist. And the view is clearly false. If Xing is wrong, it is not wrong 'because' I don't want others to do it, is it?
Quoting Pfhorrest
That doesn't make sense. They don't have truth-makers if they're prescriptions. "Do X!" can't be true or false.
So your view sounds confused to me. But maybe I have not understood it yet.
So what is true is just that which seems to you to be true, but what is right cannot be that which seems to you to be right?
You're saying that if I think to myself "I ought to do X", I should assume that because I thought it, it cannot be what is morally right. But if I think to myself "What is morally right seems to be something external to me" I should, on this occasion take that thought to be the absolute truth of the matter?
How do you distinguish between thoughts which are 'self-evident' and thoughts which originate from you alone? How is my thinking "I'd like to do X" not evidence that Reason dictates I ought to do X? Do your thoughts go around with little labels on them telling you if they've come from reason or just from you?
Er, no. I didn't say any of that.
If something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case. That doesn't mean it 'is' the case, just that it is evidence that it is the case. So, what's true is not just that which seems to me to be true.
And what seems to me to be right can be - and normally will be - that which is right.
Our exchange thus far:
"If it appears to be square, that's default evidence that it is square. It appears to be square. That's default good evidence it is square"
You: "So if it appears to be square to you, then it is square. But what appears to be circular can't be circular?"
"Er, no."
"And you're saying that if I think to myself "it is square", I should assume that because I thought it, it cannot be square. But if I think to myself "What is square seems to be something external to me" I should, on this occasion take that thought to be the absolute truth of the matter?"
"Er, no".
What I suggest you do, Isaac, is learn to read. Then learn to think. Then read what I say. And then don't try and translate what I say into Isaacian, because Isaacian turns sense into nonsense.
Is hard to say, is something I need to contemplate about.
I can only express my view of ethics as adaptive to circumstance. Each instance is unique and can’t be categorized.
To me ethics is defined by intention. That is why Laws which at one time were good but later become corrupt due to cultural evolution.
How cultural and social evolution play a role in how we define ethics.
While writing this it occurs to me that ethics may be a form of survival instinct. Since we as a species need to be in social settings to defend against predators or aggressive adversaries.
So those who conform to status quo of society will be protected and deemed worthy of society protection.
Example
If I follow current society ethic code I will be accepted in there group, Protected and care for.
If I go against the pack by causing waves or jeopardizing the groups welfare whether it is intentional or not. I will cause a undesirable effect.
Ethics can also be a evolutionary trait in a sense of getting rid of bad behavior like getting rid of defective genes in the DNA pool.
Only the well behaved will survive.
What you said was
Quoting Bartricks
Where, in that statement, is the additional information confirming that what is clear to you "if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X" is, in fact true such that "individual subjectivism is false."? You literally wrote in the form " it is ... clear to my reason... Thus ... is false" without any caveats about 'evidence' or further analysis being required.
Or did you mean to say "individual subjectivism seems to have evidence showing it to be false but cannot be determined to be until we've investigated further"?
Yeah, if these are the tests for enrapture I'd be happy to fail too.
Quoting Isaac
No, that's more Isaacese. All the evidence is that morality is 'not' individually subjective. There is not a scrap of evidence to the contrary. And the matter has been investigated for thousands of years and the bulk of philosophers have reached the same conclusion. For millennia. That's why despite the stupidity of contemporary metaethics, individual subjectivism is simply not a contender. The only people who take individual subjectivism seriously - indeed, are quite convinced it is true - are idiots with no expertise in philosophy whatsoever. So, you know, most people.
There are all the people to whom it seems as though moral norms and values do not have an external source.
No it wouldn't. It wouldn't be a hell if it was better than a paradise, would it?
What's heavier - a ton of feathers or a ton of gold?
You: 'a ton of stupid gold is heavier than a ton of clever feathers' (Victor Numbskull)
Quoting Isaac
Just to be clear, you mean the people whose reason tells them that if they order themselves to do X, then necessarily Xing is right?
Good job Isaac, you got me. And we have good countervailing evidence that 2 + 2 = 5 too, don't we - because some people think it does as that's what their reason represents it to be. Excellent. Good case.
Who said anything about 'order'. It is not necessary to frame moral feelings as an 'order'. The feeling that I ought to do X is not necessarily an order to do so. Regardless, if there were people whose reason told them that, then they would be on no different footing to those whose reason told them otherwise.
As your argument currently stands, all we have is that our feeling something is the case stands as evidence that it is, in fact, the case. That's all you given thus far in furtherance of finding out what, in fact, is the case.
So we have evidence from some that objective moral facts obtain, and evidence from others that they do not. Now what?
What is it that we've done to 2+2=4 vs 2+2=5 that means we can dismiss the prima facie evidence from those whose reason tells them the latter?
That's not what expressivism is. Saying "don't do X" isn't just an expression of desire about someone not doing X. It's a command. My view is much closer to universal prescriptivism, but not identical to it.
Quoting Bartricks
No, but that's why I say there's a separate question of what makes the claim right or wrong, aside from what the claim is simply saying at all.
Quoting Bartricks
Maybe they can't be strictly true or false, depending on exactly what you mean by true and false. But in any case there can conceivably be reasons to accept or reject a prescription given to you, just like there are reasons to accept or reject a descriptive assertion made to you. Descriptive assertions are cognitive because we can give reasons for or against them and so decide if they are the right assertions to make and accept, and those reasons are the truth-makers of those assertions; likewise, if there are some reasons to accept or reject prescriptions, they can be cognitive in light of those, and those reasons are the "truth-makers", or at least analogues thereof, of those prescriptions.
Quoting Bartricks
I'd suggest the professional paper (not mine) I linked in my last post for better clarification. I pretty much agree with it in its entirety and they probably do a better job explaining than me because they're real philosophers and I'm a worthless nobody on the internet.
But how can you tell whether you have the correct knowledge of them?
Potato potarto. Labels don't matter. Prescriptivism is a form of expressivism, at least as I would use the term, for a prescription, to qualify as a prescription, expresses an agent's desire or will or some such. (Expressivism, non-cognitivism and non-descriptivism can all be used interchangeably). But let's not cavil over terms, for you can't save a theory by relabeling it. And the simple fact remains that if you are the prescriber, or expresser, or what have you, then the view is grossly implausible. It just has nothing to be said for it. Moral norms do not - absolutely not - appear to be emanating from me. I cannot make an act right by barking an order to do it (or by engaging in any other expressive activity), not of necessity anyway.
Quoting Pfhorrest
That's viciously circular. It is moral rightness that a metaethical theory is supposed to be an analysis of. That is, it is supposed to tell us what it is.
The prescription to do X 'is' the rightness. That is, for an act to be right, is for it 'to be done', yes? That 'to be doneness' is the normativity of the moral norm.
Insofar as there is anything attractive about prescriptivism at all, it lies in the fact that prescriptivists recognise this: recognise that morality is essentially composed of prescriptions and valuings. Abandon that idea, and there is precisely no motivation to be any kind of expressivist at all.
So you can't then say 'ah, but you have to issue the command to do X when it is 'right' to do so' for 'rightness' is what you were supposed to be giving us an account of.
To see this most clearly, just imagine the proponent of a theory you do not subscribe to arguing in a like manner. For instance, a divine command theorist says that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us. Imagine, then, that it is then objected that those acts that appear to us to be right appear to be right irrespective of whether God wishes us to do them, rather than 'because' God wishes us to do them. The divine command theorist replies "ah, but that's why there's a separate question of what makes an action right or wrong". You'd reject that reply as viciously circular, yes? Or imagine the divine command theorist says - and this really amounts to the same reply - "ah, well a prescription is only moral when the God is expressing a moral wish" or "ah, well it is only when the God prescribes something morally right, that the God's prescription constitutes a moral prescription". You would - rightly - reject as viciously circular all such accounts, for by helping themselves to what is already right and wrong they cease to telling us about what rightness and wrongness themselves are and become just so much noise. Well, that's what your theory seems to me to be at this point.
That's exactly the point at issue here, distinguishing between, them, so if you're just going to refuse to do so then there's no point discussing it further.
That is, read the OP. See what I said about expressivist views. It applies to your view. Call your view whatever you want - insist it is not an expressivist view. Doesn't matter. It applies to your view, becusae you have made 'you' the prescriber or whatever.
If you think otherwise, describe your view in a way that shows it not to be susceptible to the criticism.
I mean, imagine someone starts a thread on the Euthyphro criticism of divine command theory and I reply "ah, but my view is called divine prescriptivism, therefore the criticism does not apply". That would be silly, right? That's what you're doing.
Likewise, if the meaning of any moral assertion is akin to a command more generally, there remains the question of whether or not to obey each command, and why or why not.
Moral semantics (what do the words mean?) is different from moral ontology (what makes those the correct words to utter, i.e. what makes them true?). And then besides both of those is moral epistemology (how do we know whether what this particular set of words says matches whatever it is that makes such kinds of words correct?).
No divine command theorist in their right mind would say that 'good' 'meant' 'commanded by God'. It is an analysis of what a moral goodness is, not what the word 'good' means.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Note: I am not defending the view that moral assertions are akin to commands. This is a moral assertion: "Xing is right". That's 'not' a command. I think those who think it is a command are stupid (as, of course, do naturalists and non-naturalists). If I say "Xing is right" I am not telling you to do it. I am telling you that we are being told to do it. This "we are commanded to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"
Quoting Pfhorrest
Er, yes. I know. You seem to be the one who doesn't. You seem to think you can get out of trouble by fiddling about with labels. You can't.
Now, once more, describe your view in a way that doesn't make it susceptible to my criticism.
By whom? And (other than the possible answer to that) how does that differ from what you say no divine command theorist in their right mind would say: that calling something good is saying that we are being told (by God) to do it?
God.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Water is made of tiny molecules, yes? That doesn't mean 'water' means 'tiny molecules'.
This thread isn't about divine command theory, but the stupidity of the alternatives. But when I claim that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us, I am not telling you the meaning of the term 'morally right', anymore than when I claim that water is tiny molecules I am telling you the meaning of the word 'water'.
If I judge that an act is morally right, I am judging that it is 'to be done', yes?
I am not saying "do it!"
This: "there is an instruction to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"
This "Xing is right" does not mean the same as "do X!"
I mean, if it did, then 'who the hell do you think you are?' would be an appropriate response, wouldn't it? But it obviously isn't. Why? Because when we make moral judgements, we are not ordering people around. As most of us recognise, because even if we think the judgement "Xing is right" is incorrect, we recognise that "who the hell do you think you are?" doesn't make sense as a response (this is an invitation for the normal parade of pillocks on this forum to chime in and say 'yeah it is!').
Anyway, back to your view - what is it?
Quoting Bartricks
I don't think that is a strong representation of individual subjectivism. We all tell ourselves that which we believe to be right based upon whichever moral framework we believe to be operating within. It is how we come to
such conclusions for what constitutes right from wrong and whether or not there is an external or intrinsic source at work.
As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.
1. Moral statements are truth apt.
2. Some moral statements are true.
3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.
A robust moral realist, by contrast, is also committed to three propositions.
1. Moral statements are truth apt.
2. Some moral statements are true.
3. The truth aptness of moral statements is determined only by the correspondence between cognitive representations of reality that refer to objective features of the world.
We are semantically compatible insofar as we agree that moral statements have meaning and that they can be expressed as propositions which can be true or false. We also seem to alethically agree, at least with respect to the second propositions relation to cognitivism within the framework of a theory of truth.
As with my objections, you likely deny the third premise. Here are my arguments to support proposition three.
(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)
1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.
2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.
3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.
(Argument 2 supporting P1: Argument 1)
1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.
2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.
3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.
(Argument 1 supporting proposition 3)
1. If a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes, then the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.
2. It is the case that a subject's attitude is both psychologically inherent to themselves, and the beliefs expressed by the subject only reflect propositional attitudes when indexing 'cognitive evaluations' to 'subject' so that moral statements purport to report only the subjects own predisposed attitudes.
3. Therefore, the truth aptness of moral statements must be dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to.
Your argument against individual subjectivism can be formalized into the following modus tollens structure.
P1. If the statement "'X' is right" is a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true", then individual subjectivism is true.
P2. The statement "'X' is right" is not a true statement necessarily entailed by the conditional, "If I say 'X is right', then the statement 'X is right' is true".
C. Therefore, individual subjectivism is false.
Everything seems to have an external source. That is because information itself is assumed, as well as intuitively apparent, to in some way be at least tethered to an external reality. If there is an external reality, it appears as if the inputted data received by our internal systems from this external source is largely a demonstrably false representation of what external reality would actually be like. For example, we observe chairs and tables but not as they seem to more accurately exist as a randomized organization of atomic material that we have arbitrarily assigned some meaning upon based on pragmatic assumptions.
I think there is something external to us from which we receive these assumed external inputs that we become increasingly more aware of by virtue of an ever broadening contrast between the elements within itself as the constant flow of information comes through. This contrast provides us with a sense of differentiation from which we can compare, attach a meaning to, and evaluate each input based upon our particular sense of the meanings derived from past experiences and in anticipation of future expectations.
In other words, if information comes from an external source, then the meanings we assign to everything either comes from or is sensitive to such external sources. I would agree with you on empirical facts that we correspond with some measure of truth based on objective properties of the external world. For example, we can look at heavy rain clouds and then empirically deduce events, happenings or patterns from previous experiences with relative margins of success
Quoting Bartricks
That was not the point I was making at all. I probably should have described them as the two main subdivisions of moral realism rather than the two main theories of moral realism. I do consider each as being a distinctive moral theory as one stands in direct opposition to the other, over whether or not moral terms and properties co-refer or are reducible to non-moral terms and properties.
The meta-ethical distinction between naturalistic and non-naturalistic versions of moral realism lies within the metaphysical nature of their disagreements regarding the reducibility of moral properties. Both are ontologically oriented towards independently existing moral properties, notwithstanding whether or not such properties exists within nature or beyond nature. Moral realism, on the whole, takes a view that moral properties exist and from such properties ethics may be reduced to a set of moral propositions that are true of human actions, regardless of whether or not we believe them or know about them.
Quoting Bartricks
Moral realism goes further than that. Only an error theorist would disagree with the statement that some moral statements are true. Also, they not only claim that their truth-makers exist, but that they objectively exist. Besides, the truth-makers of a proposition lie in the essence of a being within proposition itself, but only if the thing exists.
Your milkshake example, for instance, when you say that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, you are describing the necessary essence that necessarily must belong to the being of a milkshake. That a milkshake must contain milk and flavouring. In fact, the truthbearers for "milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring" is that milk and flavourings belong to the essence of all milkshakes in that they must in every possible world contain milk and flavouring. The truth-maker is supposed to be something concrete that actually exists. The truth bearers of your example would be the ingredients of milk and flavouring, but for the claim that bears on the truth that milkshakes are made from milk and flavourings to be true, the fact that milk and flavourings necessarily belong to the essence of being a milkshake, depends on the existence of the truth-maker, that milkshakes exist.
Quoting Bartricks
Because calling a thing dumb or stupid or batshitcrazy are all meaningless statements. To say something is wrong because it is stupid is just as vacuous as saying that something is bad because its disgusting. The terms 'disgusting' and 'stupid' are premises that both assume the conclusion. If you want to argue that a thing is false then you appeal to empirical facts that contradict how something is, not make a statements that are essentially tautological in nature.
I like the topic of the OP, but don't think you really said anything meaningful about it. I'm fairly new to philosophy but I just read your OP as something lacking but was genuinely curious to hear your objections to individual subjectivism, if for no other reason than perhaps finding potentially motivation for myself to interact here more often and more deeply.
You might not want to start with Bartricks then. He’s the site troll. Don’t believe me? Talk with him for a while. But he definitely will not help your motivation to interact here.
If there would be such a thing as the will of God, we would necessarily know it* and have no choice in the matter, unless he deliberately hid it from us.
*On account that he's omnibenevolent and thus wants us to know the truth.
No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. I mean, admittedly it'd be quite odd to be a subjectivist and think that morality is unreal (though one could, for it is metaphysically possible that there are no subjects, or that all the subjects that there are are not in the subjective states that constitute the truth-conditions of moral propositions). The point, though, is that 'realism' is not an essential element of subjectivism (or non-naturalism, or naturalism, or super-naturalism). You keep making this mistake. It's like insisting that incompatibilists about free will believe we have free will. No, incompatibilism is a view about what free will requires, it is not a view about whether we have it or not. Likewise for compatibilism. And likewise for subjectivism, naturalism, non-naturalism, supernaturalism, and non-cognitivism. They're not - not - views about what exists.
I gave you an example that you seem to have ignored. The view that milkshake is made from milk and flavouring is not equivalent to hte view that there exists milkshake. I have just told you my theory about what milkshake is made from. I have not told you that I have some milkshake.
3 is misleading. I think what you mean is that the truth conditions of a moral proposition would be some of the subjective states of the subject. That is essential to subjectivism - it is what makes it subjectivism. A moral subjectivist is something who thinks that moral norms and values are made of the prescriptions and values of a subject (a 'subject of experiences' that is - a mind). And individual subjectivism, which is the view that no serious philosopher defends because it is has even less to be said for it than naturalism or non-naturalism or expressivism, is the view that the subject in question is ourselves.
So, whether "X is morally right" is true or not is constitutively determined by some of my own subjective states if, that is, individual subjectivism is true. Which is absurd of course - as absurd as individual subjectivism about teapots.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
But you said something straightforwardly false. It is clear from my OP that I am addressing naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. They are 'not' forms of moral realism. The question of whether morality is real is a distinct one, but you are confusing what's already a confusing matter by introducing it.
So again: naturalism and non-naturalism are views about the ingredients of morality, they are not existential theories about what exists. And expressivism is the view that morality doesn't have ingredients because it is not a feature of reality that we observe and respond to, but an activity we engage in. But none of those theories carries with it any commitment to this or that existing.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
What work is the word 'cognitive' doing? I only ask, because a) I do not know what it means and b) most metaethical discussion seems to be made needlessly complex by this kind of technical vocabulary.
Anyway, 1 seems obviously false. Yes, moral statements are about propositional attitudes, but why on earth does that mean that they are about the attitudes of the utterer?
If I say "Cartesian trigger puppets wants me to shut the door" that is about a proposition attitude. But it is not about my attitudes, but yours.
So that first argument is clearly unsound and flagrantly question begging. Premise 1 just asserts the truth of individual subjectivism - a theory that appears to be false, not true - and then you just deduce from it the truth of individual subjectivism.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
That argument is very confused. First, the conclusion does not seem to describe individual subjectivism, but expressivism (although I don't know what 'cognitive' means, admittedly). But to 'express' an attitude is a different linguistic activity to 'describing it'. "Hooray" expresses an attitude, and "I am ecstatic" describes one.
But in addition to being an argument for a view distinct from the one you were seeking to defend with it, it is also unsound, for premise 1 is once more simply false and question begging.
Included in the definition of a troll, according to the internet anyway, is "someone who intentionally....tries to instigate arguments in an online community". Philosophers use reasoned argument to try and figure out what's true. That's literally the point. So, yes, I am indeed a troll and the title is surely a badge of honour in a philosophy forum! Socrates was one too.
Perhaps this is why you and so many others have a problem with me - you actually have a problem with philosophy. That is, with the very project. You think, no doubt, that this is not a philosophy forum, but an 'express yourself' forum - a kind of therapy session where you come to be heard, not have your views assessed. But when a nasty philosopher comes along and subjects your views to scrutiny, or presents his own and then defends them to the hilt, you get all upset because he's not validating you or something.
Quoting Bartricks
The projection is unreal.
You’re always the first one to get mad. What does that say about you? I never get mad talking to you. Just bewildered at how someone can be so sure while speaking so much garbage. Even when shown to be wrong your self assurance never wavers. It would honestly be commendable. If you learned anything.
Oscar Wilde look out!
Quoting khaled
Well, that's question begging.
What’s the question being begged? Whether or not you’re speaking garbage? Note it’s not a question of “whether” you’re speaking garbage, for that is so obviously the case, it’s a question of “how” one can speak so much garbage seriously. So no it’s not question begging. Look up the definition bud!
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quoting Bartricks
Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt).
What I try do when engaging in philosophical discourse is first to practice effective listening concerning my interlocutor. I perform a critical analysis of what it is that they are trying to tell me by requesting clarity (an attempt to identify, reduce, and eliminate ambiguity), isolate any propositions, identify any arguments those propositions form, consider the validity of the argument structure, and weigh the soundness of the propositions that form the premises of the argument.
So what I am proposing is that moral statements such as "Genocide is wrong" express a proposition similar to non-evaluative statements such as "The sky is blue". I'm saying that both these kinds of statements have the property of being either true or false.
Proposition two is not stating that the truth of moral statements exist as a property of the world, but rather it is saying that the truth value of some moral propositions are true. This is a distinction between error theory, which also agrees with proposition one (that moral statements are truth apt) but goes on to conclude that the truth value of all moral statements are false.
Realism also makes the claim that moral statements have a truth value, and that some of those truth values are true, but, in addition, realism also claims that such truth values exist objectively, as in a mind-independent property of the world. Realism states that moral propositions refer to objective facts. It is this last statement from which the divergence of realism and non-realism arises. We agree that moral statements are capable of being true and that some are indeed true, but we do not agree that the truth value of moral statements refers to objective facts.
Proposition three explains just how moral statements express propositions that can and sometimes are capable of being true without the additional ontology of referring to objective facts. Instead of the truth of moral propositions referring to objective facts of the external world, on the view of individual subjectivism, it is said that the truth of moral propositions refers to subjective facts contained within the psychological states of the individual subject.
So moral statements such as, "Genocide is wrong" refers not to some external property of the act or of the surrounding environments of which the action exists, but rather it refers to the psychological states of the individual subject who is making the moral statement, thus indexed next to it, ad it reflects the attitude and preferences that individual. What the individual really seems to be saying is that "To me, genocide is wrong" or that "I have a preference against genocide" which is a statement of truth value which is true as a description of the subjects psychological states.
Question begging.
Yes, I know. But I didn't say 1 was false, did I? I said 2 was false.
You're building a commitment to moral realism into individual moral subjectivism. That's just confused.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
I know. This is not in dispute. Individual moral subjectivism, moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism all take moral statements at face value: that is, as truth-apt propositions.
What they are not committed to is the claim that some of those statements are true. That's an additional claim, one that then makes the relevant subjectivist, naturalist or non-naturalist into a 'moral realist'.
The theory that water is made of tiny molecules is not equivalent to the theory that some water exists. The theory that unicorns are horse-type creatures with naturally growing spirally horns coming out of their foreheads is similarly not a theory about what exists. And the theory that moral properties are reducible to an individual's subjective states is also not a theory about what exists.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
No, you're conflating moral realism with objectivist moral realism. Look, this is all just a labelling matter of no importance to the issues under debate. But we might as well get clear about how to use these terms.
Moral objectivism is the view that the truth conditions of moral statements are objective properties of some kind or other. Naturalism and non-naturalism are both kinds of moral objectivism.
Moral subjectivism is the view that the truth conditions of moral statements are subjective properties of some kind or other. Individual subjectivism, inter-subjectivism and divine command theory are all kinds of subjectivism.
Moral realism is the view that some moral propositions are true. So you can have individual subjectivist moral realism, inter-subjectivist moral realism, divine command moral realism, naturalist moral realism and non-naturalist moral realism.
The reason you're conflating moral realism and moral objectivism is that most contemporary moral realists are also moral objectivists. Why? Because individual and inter-subjectivism are stupid views that no-one who knows their beans takes seriously.
Now, I stress that all of this is really beside the point. For these are just labelling matters. This is what matters, what the OP is about, and what you need to address:
Individual and inter-subjectivist views about morality are stupid (as is generally recognized among the experts, but not among the public). Why? Because moral norms do not appear to be norms we ourselves are issuing. The view that they are, in fact, norms we ourselves are issuing is as stupid as the view that the outside world is a figment of one's imagination.
The same applies to non-cognitivist or expressivist views. Expressing a subjective state is a different linguistic activity to describing it. But the same information is conveyed. As with individual subjectivism, there is simply no evidence that expressivist views are true, and plenty that they are not. Those who endorse them do so because - by their own admission - they lack moral intuitions (and this, combined with staggering arrogance, then leads them to conclude that we're at root expressing ourselves when we use moral language, not attempting to describe the world).
Moral Naturalist views are stupid too, because it is stupid - indeed, insane - to think that the natural world can issue instructions to us and value things.
Moral non-naturalist views are equally stupid, perhaps even more stupid. For it is equally insane to think that non-natural properties can issue instructions to us and value things. And to posit such things becuase one acknowledges that natural properties cannot do such things makes the non-naturalist possibly even more stupid than the naturalist.
As most contemporary metaethicists defend either some form of expressivism, or naturalism, or non-naturalism, we can conclude that contemporary metaethics is stupid. And note too, the battalions that defend these views are of roughly the same size, and so the majority of the philosophical community does, in fact, agree with me.
So far you have not said anything to address my claims. Rather you have argued that some form of individual subjectivism is true and gave two arguments. One of those was unsound and question begging. The other also had those features but even if it didn't would have established the truth of a different view from the one you were using it to defend.
Moral norms (when it comes to the "big" issues like assault, rape, murder, child abuse, theft and so on) are dictated by necessity: that is by the need for basic social harmony, and so are broadly cross-cultural.
The more nuanced, and hence potentially contentious, moral questions (like what should be the age of sexual consent, alcohol consumption, autonomy, voting, and many, many other questions about what is or is not socially acceptable) may be very different at different times and places,
In either case they are issued by people, individually or collectively, in the form of the law, and the established moral conventions we all (mostly) abide by.
Quoting Bartricks
Interesting.
Idk how you never tire of trolling. It was funny at first but it’s getting old now.
Look, this thread isn't about individual subjectivism about morality. For that view is so stupid only those with no philosophical training in ethics think it is true (hence why so many here are do convinced of it).
Like I say, individual subjectivism about morality has about as much to be said for it as individual subjectivism about cakes.
Yeah, and about as much as this piss-poor "response" has to say about what it is "responding" to.
Actions are done by individuals. The question about whether their actions are morally right or not has nothing to do with the question about their action's origins.
What can the rightness or wrongness of actions be assessed against? If you want to say it's reason, then the question becomes "whose reason" and "justified by what premises"? I doubt you have a cogent answer for that.
Your "critique" of naturalism is stupid. Moral naturalism doesn't claim that moral injunctions come form "the lifeless (sic) natural world" but from the natural dispositions of social humans. Precursors to this can be readily observed in the behavior of higher social animals; natural empathy and concern for others of one's own kind.
Naturalists identify moral properties with objective natural properties.
Objective natural properties can't issue prescriptions and nor is any collection of them itself a prescription. Thus the view is false and stupid.
That holds just as true for sociological facts if we include those among natural facts. So, if we say that moral rightness is one and the same as some sociological fact, then either that fact has to issue a prescription (which is stupid) or the fact and the prescription are being identified with one another - which is a category error and a very stupid one at that.
You yourself are just very confused - too confused to be able to understand my response above, no doubt - and are conflating dispositions to get the impression of, and believe in, moral norms and values with the norms and values themselves. Hence why you are going to keep rabbiting on about animals and the development of moral beliefs and think that by thereby doing you are providing some kind of support for something. It's a tedious rookie mistake.
Quoting khaled
Which is clearly not question begging by your standards.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
You are a fuck'n fool, Buttlicks.
Ethical naturalism, in ethics, the view that moral terms, concepts, or properties are ultimately definable in terms of facts about the natural world, including facts about human beings, human nature, and human societies. (underlining mine)
From here
It's not the "lifeless natural world", idiot, and it's not a matter of being "issued directives". but of understanding the origin of ethics, and being able to define ethical concepts in terms of facts about us as individuals and societies.
So, your miserably impoverished "critique" of naturalistic ethics fails before it even farts in its pathetic attempt to get off the ground.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quoting Bartricks
I didn't say that you said proposition one was false, did I? I was simply trying to provide clarity for the entire set.
I don't understand how claiming that some moral statements are true commits me to moral realism. I understand that in accordance with the traditional philosophical accounts of truth, namely the correspondence theory of truth, which says that the only true propositions are propositions that correspond with a fact of the world. In this sense, true propositions are necessarily confined to views such as realism and objectivism which only seem to provide satisfactory models within the confines of empiricism, naturalism, etc. Though I agree, such frameworks seem to produce the most accurate descriptions for the way the world really is and in a way that is true independent of the proposition itself, I do not think they produce the same satisfactory results with regards to evaluative propositions.
Evaluative propositions seem to be capable of expressing things beyond that which is physical, natural, material or concrete, and it is here where realistic models struggle, if not fail utterly, to provide satisfactory descriptions. Such propositions seem to be the physical vehicles which transport abstractions or other such non-physical entities between beings of similar sentience. Aside from Platonic forms, or Aristotelian and other subsequent attempts to fit such entities into a realist framework, such approaches, on the whole, seem to unravel upon crossing over to the metaphysical threshold. I think this is because, unlike with more concrete ontologies, meta-ethical semantics require a different approach and one in which certain exceptions may be made with regards to the rules which govern non-evaluative, non-material and non-empirical language.
When we use non-evaluative language to express a proposition, we are describing the way something is; a fact about the world. For example, if I say, "The earth is round," I am referring to the earth, which is concrete, and by assigning a quality to it, such as with it's shape in this example, I am able to say something capable of being true or false and by virtue of Earth's physical and material qualities, I am able to point to a feature of physical reality and objectively provide an empirical account for why the statement, "The earth is round," is true by virtue of corresponding to reality itself.
On the converse, non-evaluative language, such as if I were to say, "Torture is wrong," what I am expressing is a feeling or opinion about torture. When I say "Torture is wrong," what I mean is something like, "I disapprove of torture," or "I have a preference against torture". Since moral language seems to express the speaker's beliefs, it seems that me being against torture is what makes my statement true when I say "Torture is wrong." Though it is fallacious to reason, "I believe x, therefore x is true" using descriptive language that assesses the state of the natural world, as with other fields of knowledge, it seems to work for ethics for this reason.
I'm not quite sure which theory of truth best reflects my views on evaluative statements, perhaps coherentist or deflationary, but nonetheless I think that we can say that it is a psychological fact that we believe a statement is true. Even if I held the belief that the Earth was flat, and that statement could be proven false, it is still a fact that I held the belief that the world was flat.
It's just the definition of moral realism. Moral realism 'just is' the view that moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Moral realism is not a view about the truth conditions of moral propositions. You seem to be using 'moral realism' to denote some kind of moral naturalist realism.
Like I say, moral realism is the view that some moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true.
But I don't know why we're discussing this - of what relevance is it to what I have claimed in the OP?
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
That's expressivism, not individual subjectivism. And it is false, indeed silly. It's obviously false - what actual evidence do you have that it is true? Actual evidence, not just painfully perverse re-interpretations of moral statements.
It doesn't appear to be true (wrongness seems to be something I recognise, not something I do). If it did appear to us to be true, then it would appear to us all that all we are using moral language to do is to boss each other around. If I say "Xing is wrong" I am just telling you not to do X becasue I disapprove of it (and we would recognise this). Well, then "get lost!" would be an appropriate response. Yet "get lost" as a response to "Xing is wrong" doesn't make sense.
No it isn't. That isn't what the quote said. The quote said what I said. Do you have any expertise in this area, Hugh? Or do you not have the first idea what you're talking about?
:rofl: This is now a whole other level of lame denial and confirmation bias. I'll leave you to your sad ruminations.
Here is how I defined naturalism:
Quoting Bartricks
Note, then, metaethical naturalism broadly construed does, or can, include individual and inter-subjectivist views (assuming, that is, that subjects are natural objects, which is something many - myself included - would deny). But because such views are unbelievably stupid and rejected by everyone who knows their beans, I defined naturalism as being the view that identifies moral properties with 'objective' natural properties.
Quoting Bartricks
That is the minimalist definition of realism, which is a contention between the moderate and robust forms of moral realism. As far as I am concerned, the minimal realist is compatible with subjectivism.
Most realists believe that moral statements are truth-apt, that some moral statements are true, and that moral statements are true in an objective sense. Anti-realists, such as subjectivists, deny at least one of these claims. I understand that there are some forms of realism (minimalist) that do not hold to the metaphysical thesis, however I feel that it is the fundamental difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism.
Quoting Bartricks
You claimed moral subjectivism was false, did you not?
Quoting Bartricks
Evidence that our beliefs are what we believe? I suppose it would have to be taken axiomatically. Do you not think it is true that you believe in your own beliefs?
Quoting Bartricks
This is a misrepresentation of what I said. The truth of moral statements are dependent upon the individual subject they are indexed to. Moral subjectivisim gives moral statements a different meaning structure whereby a moral statement is indexed to the individual who made the statement, thus making it true if and only if it is interpreted accurately—that when we state a moral proposition we are actually expressing something about themselves. If you say "Xing is wrong" you are telling me that you would rather I not to do X becasue you disapprove of it. The statement "Get lost" is an imperative statement that expresses a command, so it wouldn't have a truth value.
You seem to be expressing quite a bit of your beliefs
on this matter. Is it true that you held these beliefs the moment you expressed them?
You are thinking too simplistically: ignoring the fact that there may be objective truths about subjects and their subjective states.'Objective truth' does not mean 'pertaining only to objects' but 'truth which is independent of opinion'.
Of course your subjective beliefs are not necessarily objectively true, because they are not independent of (your) opinion, but it is objectively true that you hold them. Are you able to understand the difference there?
If you can get that it will help you get a much better grasp on the issues. At the moment you are hopelessly confused.
Anyway, it is all beside the point as this thread is not about moral realism, but about the stupidity of the metaethical theories known as ecpressivism, naturalism and non naturalism - the dominant theories of contemporary debate. None of them is essentially realist as they are not theories about what actually exists, but theories about what it would take for morality to exist. I have said this umpteen times now and it doesn't seem to be registering.
I have also explained why individual subjectivism - which is 'not' a subject of contemporary debate - is false. You have not responded to that criticism, but instead gave two unsound and question begging arguments, one for individual subjectivism and one for expressivism.
There are three forms of moral realism: a minimal form, a moderate form, and a robust form. Proponents of the robust form of moral realism are committed to three theses: the semantic thesis, the alethic thesis, and the metaphysical thesis; whereas, the proponents of the minimalist form of moral realism leave off the metaphysical thesis. This is a highly contentious matter between moral realists and makes defining moral realism problematic. Here is a link to back up my claims:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/moral-anti-realism/
Quoting Bartricks
This may be true. However, I'm not the only one who defines moral subjectivism (or ethical subjectivism) in such terms that is compatible with a minimalist form of moral realism. What is more, this seems to be a matter of contention between proponents of moral realism. Here is an excerpt from the SEP link above:
[b]5. Subjectivism
To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent. Here I shall use a term as good as any other (though one used not infrequently in other ways): “subjectivism.” Thus, “moral subjectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent, while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. (Note that this nomenclature makes the two contraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the noncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor subjectivists.[/b]
An additional source defining moral subjectivism using almost the same terms:
https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_ethical_subjectivism.html
From the Wikipedia article:
[b]Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[/b]
Additional sources:
Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356.
Richard Brandt (1959). Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. p. 153. ISBN 0132904039. LCCN 59010075.
Quoting Bartricks
I acknowledge that my original comment was somewhat tangential to the thesis of the OP, however, I did respond directly to specific claims that you made within it and you nonetheless made effort to defend those claims. You have done little else but quibble over definitions and assert that mine were false and yours (apparently) more accurate. You did little else but define a minimalist form of moral realism and ignore the fact that other forms exist and that their existence makes defining 'moral realism' not as obviously simple as you seem to be implying.
You have yet to substantiate any of your claims. You conveniently ignore my more specific points such as my issue with the correspondence theory of truth, minimalist form of moral realism that also ignores the metaphysical thesis that a robust form of moral realism would commit to, or the question I raised asking whether or not you find the content of your own conscious mind to be true—such a thing that I would hold as my most certain knowledge and highest epistemic state.
Quoting Bartricks
It is pointless to attempt to argue one way or the other whenever we have yet to agree with how to define terms. I am seeking clarity with regards to a few claims that you have made and I'm happy to return to any other claims left on the table once some kind of convergence is made with the few. I'm interested to see how you respond with the sources I've provided you with. I assume that you would at least have to change your previous positions from "You are wrong" or "You are confused" to "Your sources are wrong" and "Your sources are confused".
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
OMG! i am not denying they're 'compatible'. Sheesh. I am saying that subjectivism does not include a commitment to moral realism. Blimey. This isn't hard. Subjectivism is a view about what morality is made of. It is not a view about what exists.
What is morality made of?
Subjective states.
Do those subjective states exist?
Yes = subjectivist moral realism
No = subjectivist moral nihilism.
See?
Now stop blithering on about moral realism. It is not a commitment of any of the views I outlined!!
Individual subjectivism - which is a view about what morality is made of, not about whether it exists or not - is false. So obviously false that it isn't taken seriously in the contemporary debate. That's why I defined 'naturalism' in a way that precluded it (naturalism, on my usage, is the view that moral properties can be identified with 'objective' natural properties).
You're clearly someone who prefers labelling things to actually assessing the credibility of the views that the labels are attached to.
This is my thread, yes? I defined my terms. So those definitions are the only ones you need to worry about. You don't need to educate me about how terms are used. A) you're clearly not qualified to do that as you keep misusing them and B) it doesn't matter how they are used, what matters is the credibility of the views that are being attached to.
The views that I have assessed to be stupid (and you can put any label you want on them) are these:
Moral properties can be identified with objective natural features. (A view I have - entirely conventionally - identified as 'moral naturalism')
Moral properties are non-natural properties (A view I have identified as 'non-naturalism')
There are no moral properties as such, rather when we make what appear to be moral statements we are actually doing something like expressing an attitude or issuing a directive (a view I have identified as 'expressivism').
Those are the views that I have said are stupid. I have argued they are stupid. Most contemporary philosophers agree with me that at least two of those kinds of view are indeed stupid, and thus most agree with me that the bulk of the views are stupid.
Are they stupid? If you think they're not, defend one. Show me that I am mistaken in what I have said about them.
Don't - don't - go on about moral realism.
I am a moral realist, ok. I understand what the term means in a way that you do not. I am one.
I have defined my terms and if you dislike my definitions that's your problem not mine. You haven't yet addressed anything I argued in the op. Do so and I will respond, but otherwise I really can't be bothered debating labels with you any more.
Thanks. I keep telling myself I'll read one SEP article a day, but some are pretty wrong and the random article button has sent me to some places so really don't care about. This'll be more up my alley.
I will not be led into temptation to comment on "the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice" and so will be delivered thereby from considering the presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and practice regarding evil.
That said, John Dewey.
P.S. Amen