Relativism does not, can not, or must not obtain? Good luck.
A thesis.
The state of the art in argumentation theory takes descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive statements as given categories of analysis. They can be included in a semantic framework treating of the sources of their acceptability -- facts, values, and methods -- or they can be included in a formal framework in which subject-predicate combinations are ranked according to their perceived cogency ('elegance?'). I usually take this basis as a more applicable alternative to the monotonic cannons of classical logic of which is (somehow) regularly violated by (functional) human reasoners in actual trials. I mention this because relativism also seems to come in descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive varieties. In this context, often the last two seem to be called normative relativism, and sometimes the last one seems to be called methodological relativism. By tying it to a framework I attempt to resolve the complaint of relativism's methodological ambiguity. Since this framework is all about language, that also means relativism potentially obtains everywhere language is used to make arguments if the insights of argumentation theory are correct. As for the general thesis:
Relativism: Any x subject does, can, or must, have y status relative to z system of y2 qualities.
By 'system' I mean a set of subjects working together as parts of some mechanism in an interconnecting network of a complex whole that can function as rules according to which something is done. This is a combination of both entries in the Oxford dictionary that is intended to be maximally flexible. Thus, the 'system' can be a simple as a prior psychological bias. That opens the door to talk of optical illusions, false memories and hypnotherapy -- all of which are real, effective, and classically erroneous. Incidentally, the 'all categories' page of PhilPapers contains numerous systems. If any of those categories can be expressed systematically, which they can, then absolutists are invited to identify the configuration of absolutism that their passions find to be most tasteful. As a final aside, you will notice my formal phrasing includes 'does', 'can', or 'must'. This is my attempt to imperfectly capture the meaning of the descriptive-evaluative-prescriptive distinction verbally, which is obviously tentative (and arbitrary).
As for 'qualities', they can be a set of policies, practices, precedents, predicates, principles, procedures, processes, properties, or propositions. There's no reason in particular why I chose p-words other than to show that it doesn't really matter what the base units are called as long as they function as part of a sufficiently acceptable argument. Again, names are arbitrary. In science it's popular to speak of 'mechanisms', so I take them as favored (or 'virtuous') because science is popular and people will judge me for it, and that is impractical. Analogously, in ethics there are 'morals'. Epistemology has 'beliefs', ontology has 'events', et cetera. Pick a domain, pick a base unit, identify a throughput and with enough work you may even develop a theory. Let's blasphemously call the thesis that I have outlined the 'rational dependence thesis'. If you accept this thesis you are absolutely supposed to be a rational kind of person who believes in reality according to my sufficiently detailed and hopefully reasonable definition.
Now with the starting rule defined, here are relativism's premises. Premise 1. Many, or at least more than one, z does, can, or must, exist. Systems are plural. Premise 2. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, exclude each other with incompatible arguments. Systems are conflicted. Premise 3. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, entail flaws of applicability, locality, neutrality, and validity. Systems are symmetrical. Conclusion. Many, or at least more than one z, does not, can not, or must not, entail absolute acceptability of the y of x. Absolutism is false. Rationalism and realism by some definitions is also false. Recourse. Any z does, can, or must, entail relative acceptability of the y of x as a defeasible provision of some recognized act or policy. You will notice that this is all quite commonsensical, and that this is, in fact, what is occurring, and what has always occurred. To deny the reality of pluralism takes us back to Parmenedes, and that seems somewhat unhelpful.
Here are some other general points supporting relativism. They are presumably as numerous as are the degrees and domains of technicality in all academia. 1. The status of epistemic justification uses either elemental relata from rule structures that are often concealed or uses the meaning of the term 'justified' in a way that is open to interpretation. 2. Statements of the form, "a is justified to believe x", express a proposition where it's absolutely true or false that a is justified to believe x according to some certain z or the z that a is committed to. 3. Z justification is eventually circular in a way which indicates methodological groundlessness. 4. Z customs, habits, and traditions are historically contingent which indicates methodological choices are similarly contingent. 5. Z methods are not determined by facts of nature or hidden truths as indicated by the constant underdetermination of complete theory by incomplete data. 6. Z necessarily hold their methods as true or acceptable by relying on and vindicating their own norms. 7. Z alternation involves a signal conversion to new rules that isn't licenced by the prior system. Et cetera.
As an aside, some people take the logic of self-refutation, or paradox, seriously. So here's a seriously trivial self-refutation argument against absolutism, in the style of absolutism: "Absolutism says the truth of everything is absolute to everything, but if that is true, the truth of absolutism is absolute to everything, therefore everything says the truth of absolutism is absolute." Which is false. Because I'm at least one 'everything' who disagrees.
Finally, there's a popular idea that relativism is incompatible with morality, or something like that. However, here are some ethical points that relativism recommends. 1. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must, tolerate z other than their own. 2. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must blamelessly select the arbitrary z that best rationalizes a belief. 3. A belief-seeking agent committed to and employing different z does not, can not, or must not, automatically constitute an unacceptable perspective. Naturally, relativism can be used to mount a position where moralists are themselves potentially immoral by their own lights for presuming their own moral expertise, while relativism, with its overtures of defeasibility and tolerance, tends to make more practicable claims.
That's it. Thanks for reading.
The state of the art in argumentation theory takes descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive statements as given categories of analysis. They can be included in a semantic framework treating of the sources of their acceptability -- facts, values, and methods -- or they can be included in a formal framework in which subject-predicate combinations are ranked according to their perceived cogency ('elegance?'). I usually take this basis as a more applicable alternative to the monotonic cannons of classical logic of which is (somehow) regularly violated by (functional) human reasoners in actual trials. I mention this because relativism also seems to come in descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive varieties. In this context, often the last two seem to be called normative relativism, and sometimes the last one seems to be called methodological relativism. By tying it to a framework I attempt to resolve the complaint of relativism's methodological ambiguity. Since this framework is all about language, that also means relativism potentially obtains everywhere language is used to make arguments if the insights of argumentation theory are correct. As for the general thesis:
Relativism: Any x subject does, can, or must, have y status relative to z system of y2 qualities.
By 'system' I mean a set of subjects working together as parts of some mechanism in an interconnecting network of a complex whole that can function as rules according to which something is done. This is a combination of both entries in the Oxford dictionary that is intended to be maximally flexible. Thus, the 'system' can be a simple as a prior psychological bias. That opens the door to talk of optical illusions, false memories and hypnotherapy -- all of which are real, effective, and classically erroneous. Incidentally, the 'all categories' page of PhilPapers contains numerous systems. If any of those categories can be expressed systematically, which they can, then absolutists are invited to identify the configuration of absolutism that their passions find to be most tasteful. As a final aside, you will notice my formal phrasing includes 'does', 'can', or 'must'. This is my attempt to imperfectly capture the meaning of the descriptive-evaluative-prescriptive distinction verbally, which is obviously tentative (and arbitrary).
As for 'qualities', they can be a set of policies, practices, precedents, predicates, principles, procedures, processes, properties, or propositions. There's no reason in particular why I chose p-words other than to show that it doesn't really matter what the base units are called as long as they function as part of a sufficiently acceptable argument. Again, names are arbitrary. In science it's popular to speak of 'mechanisms', so I take them as favored (or 'virtuous') because science is popular and people will judge me for it, and that is impractical. Analogously, in ethics there are 'morals'. Epistemology has 'beliefs', ontology has 'events', et cetera. Pick a domain, pick a base unit, identify a throughput and with enough work you may even develop a theory. Let's blasphemously call the thesis that I have outlined the 'rational dependence thesis'. If you accept this thesis you are absolutely supposed to be a rational kind of person who believes in reality according to my sufficiently detailed and hopefully reasonable definition.
Now with the starting rule defined, here are relativism's premises. Premise 1. Many, or at least more than one, z does, can, or must, exist. Systems are plural. Premise 2. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, exclude each other with incompatible arguments. Systems are conflicted. Premise 3. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, entail flaws of applicability, locality, neutrality, and validity. Systems are symmetrical. Conclusion. Many, or at least more than one z, does not, can not, or must not, entail absolute acceptability of the y of x. Absolutism is false. Rationalism and realism by some definitions is also false. Recourse. Any z does, can, or must, entail relative acceptability of the y of x as a defeasible provision of some recognized act or policy. You will notice that this is all quite commonsensical, and that this is, in fact, what is occurring, and what has always occurred. To deny the reality of pluralism takes us back to Parmenedes, and that seems somewhat unhelpful.
Here are some other general points supporting relativism. They are presumably as numerous as are the degrees and domains of technicality in all academia. 1. The status of epistemic justification uses either elemental relata from rule structures that are often concealed or uses the meaning of the term 'justified' in a way that is open to interpretation. 2. Statements of the form, "a is justified to believe x", express a proposition where it's absolutely true or false that a is justified to believe x according to some certain z or the z that a is committed to. 3. Z justification is eventually circular in a way which indicates methodological groundlessness. 4. Z customs, habits, and traditions are historically contingent which indicates methodological choices are similarly contingent. 5. Z methods are not determined by facts of nature or hidden truths as indicated by the constant underdetermination of complete theory by incomplete data. 6. Z necessarily hold their methods as true or acceptable by relying on and vindicating their own norms. 7. Z alternation involves a signal conversion to new rules that isn't licenced by the prior system. Et cetera.
As an aside, some people take the logic of self-refutation, or paradox, seriously. So here's a seriously trivial self-refutation argument against absolutism, in the style of absolutism: "Absolutism says the truth of everything is absolute to everything, but if that is true, the truth of absolutism is absolute to everything, therefore everything says the truth of absolutism is absolute." Which is false. Because I'm at least one 'everything' who disagrees.
Finally, there's a popular idea that relativism is incompatible with morality, or something like that. However, here are some ethical points that relativism recommends. 1. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must, tolerate z other than their own. 2. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must blamelessly select the arbitrary z that best rationalizes a belief. 3. A belief-seeking agent committed to and employing different z does not, can not, or must not, automatically constitute an unacceptable perspective. Naturally, relativism can be used to mount a position where moralists are themselves potentially immoral by their own lights for presuming their own moral expertise, while relativism, with its overtures of defeasibility and tolerance, tends to make more practicable claims.
That's it. Thanks for reading.
Comments (42)
Well, there's a lot to your post. Lots of good information.
It's very interesting. I'm simple minded, so forgive my misunderstanding, if there is any, which is likely. Who says that someone can be completely justified in believing X? A person can be more or less justified in believing a proposition or an event, but absolute certainty is not attainable, with (perhaps) the exception of mathematics. We can then speak of, say, religious fanatics, but that type of belief doesn't make much sense to an otherwise rational person, so that can be put aside.
As I understand it, science is provisional, always subject to further revision. Common sense is different. If we see grass outside our windows and other people say they can see it too, then one can be relatively confident that one's belief is true, in so far as our statements mean anything in ordinary discourse. But common sense can also change, as it has done in history.
As for realism being false, if you mean by that word that there is a mind-independent world which we can know, maybe, maybe not. We can only see as far as our cognitive capacities can take us to and no further.
The only real point of potential contention would be that I'm unclear what you mean by rationalism being false in this instance.
The rest rings true to me, in so far as ethics and systems go. This very much reminds me of Nelson Goodman's "irrealism" as expressed in his Starmaking, which is a fantastic book. It's with people like Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett which you might get an argument. But it should not be too controversial, unless I'm missing some big point.
All in all, well explained and expressed. :)
I don't know who says that. And mathematics is just a language. It's certain to itself by definition.
Quoting Zophie
The absolutely is sarcastic for everyone except absolutists. I'm sort of implying that they are redundant because, as usual, it's only for their 'specialness' that this sentence needs to exist.
Quoting Manuel
So what's the difference?
Mathematics being a language is metaphoric. It doesn't have the same properties of natural languages such as syntax, tenses, verbs, etc. as well as most aspects of ordinary language use. It's similar to calling cooking a "science".
Quoting Zophie
Common sense changes when science tells us something about the world, such as, we are not the center of the universe, the sun doesn't rise and set nor does the sun go around the Earth. Apples fall because of gravity, not because they want to go down, and so forth.
But we can't help seeing the sun rising and setting, nor can't we (often) help think that we are the center of the universe. Common sense is stubborn in these respects.
Aside from the way an explanation that 'mathematics isn't metaphoric' only further demonstrates the utility of analogy, in this case metaphor, in translating between languages and framing their contents as required, including mathematics, logic and whatever other formal system you care to define, mathematics does in fact have syntax, semantics, and whatever other equivalent you care to mention. The elements of our frameworks (in this case verbs, sentences and whatever else) are not particularly relevant for their comparative analysis; I can just simply define them as a set, or a set of functions perhaps, and then eventually we would be speaking the same language -- a mathematical one -- in which eventually my arguments become sufficiently acceptable. I don't happen to know your ontology, though, so I don't know which words you find to be the most 'factive' -- I have to guess from the center. And even if we decide this wasn't the case, the objects of mathematical study have no meaning without definitions (or direct demonstration, which is obviously not always possible), which are ultimately stated in natural language.
(Aside: Food science is a thing. :D)
Sure, you can do that. It's not to imply that math and language don't have anything in common. We all have to use language to some extent to get around. But math must involve some separate cognitive faculties than language use as in, doing some technical math work need not involve ordinary language at that level of technicality. Of course, when speaking to other people, or to a general audience, natural language enters.
Quoting Zophie
Ah. The easy question. :) At a first instance it makes sense to me to distinguish manifest ontology from scientific ontology. Manifest ontology would include "everything". As for a scientific ontology, that's really hard. Either one can accept that whatever science says is what there is, or one can be agnostic. Or I could bite the bullet and say that I think Schopenhauer is more or less correct and say that everything is a manifestation of will, which is what I gravitate to.Quoting Zophie
It sure is.
Saying "that person has cooking down to a science" is also perfectly fine, as a way of speaking informally.
Why? It's symbol system with a grammar and axioms. That's language. Ask a mathematician.
Quoting Manuel
Yes, I merely need a list of every object you think does, can, or must exist.
Saying math has a grammar, like English has a grammar, or French or Mandarin is to expand the word grammar a bit much, I think. I guess I'll have to ask a mathematician after all...
Quoting Zophie
What's your ontology?
However, apart from that, it is also predictive of outcomes that one would not be able to ascertain without it. So it's not simply circular, it's also referential. And you can be wrong about mathematics. If you're wrong about it, you're not simply wrong by virtue of convention or definition, but mistaken in fact.
Quoting WayfarerNot sure what to say aside from "counting is no miracle."
"Everything" is a fine answer. Quine is correct in saying that. Though ontological commitments are problematic.
But, fair point.
Many find it natural to assume that of all the philosophical disciplines, logic has the greatest claim to objective truth. Unfortunately it becomes hard to see what objectivity has to do with truth when numerous truthful applications of logic are objectively equivalent. Both von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory (NBG) and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) are equally suitable for mathematical use, and there seems to be no good reason to decide which is best if we assume matters of taste do not apply. Contrary to this attitude is the logical monist and the One True Logic approach, in which one of these results must be false, or one of these models must be invalid. Furthermore, there are numerous different logics, notably exemplified by the classical and intuitionistic approaches to logic, both of which are mutually translative, though they start with different axioms of assumption, of which are yet more components or mechanisms of another formalizable system -- systems ultimately traceable to cognitive conveniences. Even the meanings of 'consequence' and 'validity', which are central to logic, are subject to interpretation. The implications of this are substantial.
[img="ddd"]https://i.imgur.com/D5lAXEA.png[/img]
I understand the primitive version of modality holds that x is a logical consequence of a set of truthmakers y1,y2..y0 as long as it's impossible for y1,y2..y0 to be true while x is false. The stricter (preferable) Tarskian version holds that x is a logical consequence of y1,y2..y0 as long as x is true under all true interpretations of the non-logical vocabulary of y1,y2..y0. Any definition, even the most natural and supposedly ineffable definition, will show arbitrary features to a greater or lesser degree. Apparently, the proof-theoretic (first) and model-theoretic (second) conceptions are a polysemic expression of intuitive consequence. Accurate formal theories presumably depict different aspects of such a primitive understanding of consequence but their deeper details are (yet) interpretive. A hybrid definition could be that x is a logical consequence of y1,y2..y0 as long as there is a gapless and primitively legitimate mechanism of deduction (the subject of a system) leading from y1,y2..y0 to x. That we can define our own components for use as modules in models, or 'schematic systems', only serves to demonstrate the implausibility of non-relativistic alternatives.
If the Devil resides in a specific location, then deflationism and reductionism are actually hostile to relativism. A conscientious relativist would rather be anything but a relativist. :)
No, the thing is I did not know who you were talking to, if it was to @Wayfarer or to me, and since I'm logic illiterate, I assume it was for @Wayfarer. :lol:
I'm now going back to essentials: what do you mean by relativism? I usually associate it with Rorty and Postmodernists in regards to truth claims. Is that your point, that there are many ways to reach truth (not truth with a capital 'T') or that there are many truths?
I would agree with both, stated at this level of generality.
Edit: I agree that reductionism is mostly pointless.
For me relativism is prior to everything except metaphilosophy. It can treat of everything except how or why we should do philosophy. Our biases here are accidental and, probably, ultimately untreatable. According to my relativistic logos (if we must call it something), everything that exists exits according to some further fact that is usually the relata of some element in a epistemic or metaphysical (or ethical (or whatever)) system -- relativism has a metaontological scope in which pure relativism just defaults to convention. Not very exciting. My metaphilosophy -- my metaphilosophical orientation -- is supposed to be empiricist and positivist. If I'm in an idealistic mood, that's my preferred framing for relativism.
I take postmodernism to be massively misunderstood. For one thing Lyotard, the only one that to my mind embraced the postmodern label, merely defined it as an incredulity towards big stories, grands récits, which eventually developed into an extreme cultural relativism in which the terminal conclusion is seen in Derrida, who basically took the insights of Wittgenstein and the structuralists to show the issues with fixing definitions and the way our thinking is massively shaped by environmental, rather than essential, factors. Rorty was a former positivist and I take his main work to be a mystical thesis who is only coincidentally a postmodernist. To the agnosticism of the French postmodernists, I imagine Rorty's 'nature' simply unmasks to 'God' -- je pense donc je suis Nature.
My point has postmodern sympathies and is captured by the notion of explication. If we must formalize a concept, then the theoretical utility of the concept’s formal correlate must often be traded off against the actual degree of match with the informal target concept. The abstract virtue of simplicity, such as its capacity for further theoretical integration, (almost always) comes at the expense of being a less faithful codification of the informal concept. Or in other words, processing information via any logical or mathematical code inevitably generates a variable amount of 'noise' that would have been essential to the flawless transmission of the original piece of reality that it was intending to meaningfully capture.
Who would be an example of such a philosopher, generally speaking?
Quoting Zophie
That makes sense. We can only go so far in any enquiry, given the creatures that we are. So we sacrifice some accuracy for simplicity, for example. Stated like that, who would be an "opponent" or a person who disagrees with this?
Quoting Manuel Who disagrees with the proposition that all information is lossy, or with Feyerabend's anti-realism? If the first, 'information' has an empirical component, so I expect that argument would need to be more substantial than an armchair conclusion. If the second, I don't know. :)
Ah. I've still to read him. From what I've heard about him, which may not be completely accurate, his "anything goes" as far as scientific method, seems sound: whatever works in giving you results. If you start with a rigid method beforehand, you're likely going to miss some important information or data. Or so it seems to me.
Quoting Zophie
The information aspect, that of it having an empirical component is interesting. Wheeler's "It from bit" hypothesis is stimulating. I wish there were more popular work on that essay, most of it is too technical. In other domains, I'd like to find a more "neutral" term, but that's just me. As far as anti-realism, Haack and Chomsky disagree. I'm personally agnostic at this moment on such a view.
Quoting Manuel Given systematic conflict is part of my thesis, I'd say that's expected. My analysis doesn't typically concern individuals, though. Especially not alive ones. XD
I think it could potentially lead to problems, in that "information" could be taken to imply a person being informed as well as talking about books containing more information than other books. Maybe? But it's slippery.
Propositions are good. :)
In my last supplement I concluded a primitive, polysemic logic may be identified. However, locating and fixing meaning comes with logistical in additional to logical challenges that are demonstrated by a sufficiently long history of anything.
The link between logic and (good) reasoning properly dates from the Enlightenment as a relatively recent invention of philosophy. Prior to this, logic was a tool of argumentation for use in ordinary disputation in which logical ('logical') premises entail logical conclusions within a practical framework of common acceptability, otherwise known as Ancient Greek dialectic. Various logos, or accounts, were acceptable, and sorting through fallacious logos was roughly the (usually indirect, doxological) business of some division of the polis (or the philosopher if you're Socrates). The prior analytics, known to be the venerable home of syllogistic logic, is filled with dialectical vocabulary and references to debating practices. Aristotle's other works detail the basis of rhetorics and stylistics. This is quite a departure from the modern meaning of logic as a definite kind of quantified reasoning.
By the middle ages the scholastic fever dream and the schoolmaster method coincided with the spread of universities in which dialectic was the primary teaching method. With the universities established, the culture absorbed these insights until the Renaissance, where certain authors started to deplore its perceived lack of applicability. Syllogistic was gradually deemed an artificial type of exposition that was useless for people looking to speak 'naturally' and only "expresses to others what one already knows to be true". The scholastic logic's theory of syllogistic is a logic of justification, not of discovery. And so the notion of logic was due for another refurbishment.
The early modern period came to see logic in terms of mental facilities of the mind that emphasized the role of novel individual discovery. Supposedly this kind of logic was about uncovering the truth as captured by certain influential publications of the time, ie. Port Royal (subtitle: the Art of Thinking). This trend started in Descartes and culminated in Kant, who interpreted the Aristotelian categories as pertaining to the structure of reasoning, a view that remained pervasive for the next two centuries. By selectively absorbing notions like category, form, and judgement, he put them to new use in describing the conditions for perception and thought. 'Judgement' in English originally concerned legal diagnosis inherited from Old French, but after Kant, judgement now also concerns the inner mental activities of the solitary thinking subject.
By the 20th century this broadly Kantian background provided the basis on which new traditions in psychology analyzed reasoning. Although it was known that participant performances often deviated wildly from the normative responses as defined by the cannons of deductive logic, this was insufficient to overturn the popular link between logic and reasoning, and early findings speculated abstract rules of thought which were supposed to be demonstrated by stages of psychological development, as per Piaget (and significantly via Inhelder, one of his collaborators). However, the picture of human reasoning as proceeding by schematic substitution of different contents has been seriously challenged by experiments suggesting that people don't really reason on the basis of logical rules. At the very least, classical logic is "not at all" an adequate descriptive model for human reasoning.
If humans have normative standards by which they reason, their discovery is still a future prospect.
Credit to J Wagemans of the grandly-named "Periodic Table of Arguments". A modified version follows:
1. Unit: subject(a,b,c..) and predicate(x,y,z..)
Basic units are taken to be the linguistic subject and predicate of a sentence. The subject is what the sentence is about. The predicate is everything else that is about the subject of the sentence. In the sentence, "the subject is what the sentence is about", the subject is underlined, and the predicate isn't. Another example. "You are browsing thephilosophyforum.com." One last example. "Any x subject does, can, or must, have y status relative to z system of y2 qualities". Computationally, this framework can admit strings of infinite length.
2. 'Id-op': 'is'(=) [or "do","can","will"(=)]
Next we define our operation of identity. At the formal level, this is just 'is'. Unfortunately natural language is multivalued and 'is' has many specific definitions. This is unhelpful. But as mentioned in my first post, discourse can be divided into descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive claims in which people attribute a level of factivity to their claims which is supposed to carry their rhetorical force. Accordingly:
substance: attitude / reference / cognate
In reality there are a limitless number of verbs that my be appropriated for formal use.
Determining attitude is obviously a subjective matter of interpretation that will relate to a personalized ontology. There is no real solution for 'correctly' pinning the correct attitude to the respective sentence. Intuition is involved, and this can be especially true when meaning shifts to what has not been said, as with speech acts, messages-by-omission, and whatever other interactive nuance that is partially obscured by the 'code of discourse'. My suggestion -- if in doubt, assume evaluation.
3. 'Prop': subject(a,b,c..) and 'is' and predicate(x,y,z..)
A proposition is a declarative sentence that can be true or false because it contains an 'is' with the following form:
As I would like propositions to become a universal unit of discourse I will define them no further, other than that they must be true or false. A proposition that can bear no value is a sentence, not a proposition.
4. 'Di-op': 'because'(<),'therefore'(>) [or 'if-then'(>)]
The operation of direction indicates the causal, consequential, or relative direction of two propositions adjoined by a 'because' or similar cognate. 'Direction' is my nonstandard term that is just a general logical entailment as dictated by the grammar. Metaphysically, the direction always points away from the most original or prior epistemic source in the formula (or 'formulate').
Here is the definition of the classical conditional, 'therefore':
Which we can use to define a 'because':
We can define any operator we please by using a truth table to define the logical properties of the informative throughput. Tables like these define the basis of logical systems. If their functions are sufficiently complicated, and their definitions sufficiently well-defined, objects like these can constitute the basis of abstract machines.
5. 'Arg': proposition(p,q,r..) and 'because'(<) and proposition(p,q,r..)
Here are two generic forms of argument:
Once we identify the two component propositions of the argument we're trying to analyze, whatever terms they have in common is the rhetorical action that links them and creates the force of the argument. By squaring and comparing the components we arrive at the following, where p means 'same proposition', p~= means 'different proposition', s= means 'same subject', and s~= means 'different subject':
These are traditionally valid arguments:
Be2 in which two subjects are linked to a single predicate. a=x
These are traditionally invalid arguments:
Be1 in which propositions are linked to themselves or virtually equivalent propositions. a=x
Although we can make them valid with:
Be5 in which propositions are linked to themselves or virtually equivalent propositions but are also linked to 'is true'. a=x
Hence:
form: formula / formulate / cognate
Again, in all of these arguments, "(is predicate3)" stands for "is true", and 'true' can be any arbitrary value.
6. List of sample arguments
In Wagemans' original framework, a list of prototypal arguments is given as follows:
A majore (greater to lesser) A minore (lesser to greater) Ad baculum (force) Ad carotam (coax) Ad hominem Ad populum Axiologic argument (value) Case to case Deontic argument (duty) Ethotic argument (personal credibility) From analogy From authority From beauty From cause From character From commitment From comparison From consistency From correlation From criterion (ie. metalinguistic eg. definitions) From disjunctives From effect From emotion From evaluation From example From genus From opposites From parallel From sign From similarity From standard From tradition From utility Petitio principii (circularity) Pragmatic argument (convenience-practicality).
How these arguments have been chosen and why they have their factive properties is not explained. Originally they're given a more structured form, where individual propositions have individual factivities. Here they're presented in a more leniant, linear form. The difference is that in my framework, whole sentences are given a factivity in order to facilitate greater interpretive flexibility.
7. Args by validity/form:
So then, a small miracle happens and then arguments can be ranked according to distinct criteria as pertaining to subject-predicate relations:
8. Args by identity/substance:
Or graded according to the more indistinct and personal criteria mentioned at the start:
It's possible to conjecture that the game of factivity ends when a disputant successfully changes the acceptability of their thesis using a sequence of dialectical moves in which a value is transformed, ultimately via a chain of analogies that may take minutes or decades, into an accepted fact or into an accepted method. Whatever evidence is available to a disputant will not in itself persuade without an explanatory logos relating the object of dispute to the situation of dispute. However, any given situation is a dynamic object that is constantly undergoing change, meaning that, as I mentioned, any given logical endeavor is also a logistical endeavor.
Analysis of individual arguments and why they have their factive properties is something that is possible, though I will leave this aside as there is enough literature on the topic. Presumably, all that remains is a list of universal objects along with their representative factivites that settles the ontological details and fixes the objective criteria about which an argument is supposed to be about.
:)
Pardon me for butting in, but I'm going to take a stab at this. At least one conscious mind must exist. Everything else conceivable *can* exist. A causal connection between matter and mind does not exist.
Is it a=~x or a=x, then?
Some conscious mind *must* exist.
I would prefer modal logic: there is no possible world where there's no conscious mind. I would assign a high subjective probability to: there is no possible world where matter causes mind.
It's easier to just talk about this in plain English. Materialism has not explained consciousness. I don't believe materialism ever will explain consciousness. Dualism might be true, but here I think there's an interaction problem between the physical and the non-physical, so I think idealism is probably true. Also, the building blocks of idealism (minds and thoughts/ideas, sensations, impressions, etc). are things we know for certain exist. That is not the case with dualism or materialism.
I don't.
Nevertheless, I have different ways of considering the situation. You could be an AI and you'd be, by far, the smartest AI I've ever seen. Or, you could be a person, like other people I know in real life, who also use computers to do many things, including, writing in forums.
I could be an AI. But before I ever heard of AI or anything of this sort, I knew I was a person, like anyone else. We could then discuss the peculiarities of the word "know" and not go very far.
But you could also be a figment of my imagination or I one of yours. Maybe but unlikely.
Required for what?
I'm confused about whatever point you're trying to make. Are you saying materialism shouldn't explain consciousness?
Well I can't express myself in this context absent words. Sure, I could use memes or emoticons but that would be a little hard.
Permit me to dramatize the situation a bit, to make the issue vivid: the difference between smashing a thermostat and killing a person in relation to consciousness doesn't look merely verbal nor a case of human exceptionalism.
Quoting Manuel
I see nothing new. What do you have against thermostats, anyway? It almost seems cruel to smash them.
"Cruel" tends to imply suffering of some kind. But if forced to choose between a thermostat and a person, I wouldn't see the problem in choosing at all. Likewise between a thermostat and a dog or a bird or a lizard.
If you then ask if I had to choose between thermostat or a silver coin, I couldn't make a distinction. I'm sure someone would argue they have equal value.
At least that's how consciousness seems to me. And sure, I'm almost certainly espousing some kind of human exceptionalism. But I'm human, or so I think.
You should be able to articulate your points clearly, no matter what belief systems you have.