Do human beings possess free will?
Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. Free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgements which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. - Wikipedia
Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills. ~ Arthur Schopenhauer.
“Freedom is the alone unoriginated birthright of man, and belongs to him by force of his humanity; and is independence on the will.” - Kant
“ A puppet is free so long as he loves his strings.” - Sam Harris
Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills. ~ Arthur Schopenhauer.
“Freedom is the alone unoriginated birthright of man, and belongs to him by force of his humanity; and is independence on the will.” - Kant
“ A puppet is free so long as he loves his strings.” - Sam Harris
Comments (122)
I don't think we truly have free will at all because we have to consider two important facts:
1. Rule of law (we cannot do whatever our free will dictates because it can pass the limits of so)
2. The coliving (free will would sound even selfish because is an act of pure personal interests. Nevertheless, we are forced to live in a community of group that somehow "sacrifice" our own interests to persevering the common one)
To some extent we are forced to compromise our ideals as it may be seen as selfish, but still we have the choice to do so.
I think it all depends on ones definition of what free will is, and whether lack of freedom equates to not having free will
You know the freedom in your Kant quote (“Metaphysics of Ethics”, 1797), relates to jurisprudence, re: “The Science of Right”, not the “free will” related to pure moral philosophy, right?
When speaking of the human faculty of will, we are restrained thus:
“...That element in the question of the freedom of the will, which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the question, whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous origination of a series of successive things or states....” (CPR, 1787.)
As you can see, that which is given as a necessary birthright of humanity, which reduces to free to be, cannot be a mere transcendental wish that something be held as existing, which reduces to free to choose how to be.
Those who argue otherwise - that is, those who argue that we lack free will, or have less than our full share of it - are, I contend, demonstrably confused as they consistently allow weaker evidence to overrule stronger.
Free will is not something seen, touched, smelt, heard, or tasted. Our awareness of it comes via our reason. It is our reason that tells us we have it, not our senses. This is why it is not an object of empirical inquiry.
The reason of literally billions of people tells them that their wills are free and that they are responsible for the decisions they make. That is staggeringly good evidence.
It is also worth noting that the majority of philosophers who have thought carefully about this issue have also come to the conclusion that we have free will, despite disagreeing over what possessing it involves.
Clearly then, this premise - 1. We have free will - is extraordinarily well supported by rational evidence.
Yet those who conclude that we lack free will must first defend a controversial thesis about what having free will involves, such as that it involves having alternative possibilities of a kind only indeterminism can provide, or whatever. And then they must go on to argue that we do not have what it takes.
But that thesis - the thesis about what free will involves possessing - will be less self-evident to reason than the thesis that we have free will.
Take the thesis that free will is incompatible with causal determinism ('incompatibilism'). It provides the most common route to the 'no free will conclusion'. The reasoning going as follows:
1. Free will is incompatible with determinism
2. Determinism is true
3. Therefore we lack free will
Well, that's a terrible argument. It's valid, but even if premise 2 is true (and of course, its truth is currently in question), premise 1 is less rationally self-evident than "we have free will".
So even if premise 2 is true (and I'm not saying it is), this would be the rationally more compelling argument to make in light of it:
1. We have free will
2. Determinism is true
3. therefore free will is compatible with determinism.
Needless to say, my views here are, as ever, heavily influenced by Descartes.
https://www.skeptic.com/michael-shermer-show/daniel-dennett-gregg-caruso-just-deserts-debating-free-will/
Ignorant as ever. Compatibilism is not the view that we have 'limited free will' (it is the view that free will is 'compatible' with causal determinism - hence the name). And incompatibilism is not the view that we have no free will (it is the view that free will is 'incompatible' with determinism...hence the name).
Neither are views about whether we have free will. They're views about what free will is or is not compatible with. Sheesh!
Well done for trying. But, you know, maybe stop.
Second: what I said about compatibilism and incompatibilism was true, yes?
Here's your homework, my little Dunning-Krugerite: find out what a 'robust modest incompatibilist' is. And then find out what distinguishes one of those from a mere 'modest' (a.k.a. Valerian) incompatibilist. And then find out what distinguishes both from an 'agent causal' incompatibilist. Then come back and try and say something of philosophical relevance.
Unimpeded? Of course not.
But we do have a choices in intended course of action. I can choose to run head long into a wall, but my action is impeded. Free choice foes, always define choice in the most ridiculous manner.
Will is the ability to move in a given direction. I have a choice in what direction I will move, and I can assure you, whatever path chosen, there will be nothing but impediments. I can choose to run into the wall, or use experience to try to go around it, or over it. One only needs to observe life (as opposed to reading textbooks), to understand the nature of the human mind, and what it means to act like a living human.
Hows about you and @180 Proof act like adults in front of our new member. Give her a chance to get started before you start sniping at each other.
Would you say someone who lacks education/intellect or experience cannot truly have free will?
Might you further elaborate on “what it means to act like a living human” as that could differ from person to person. What does that mean to you?
Everyone knows that they are choosing. Everyone's life is based upon choosing. It's only after they are "educated", that some begin pretending that they believe otherwise. A (dangerous) game that is being played. Analogizing human life to chemicals. Humans, are interesting.
You don't have to completely understand the human mind, to know that you are making choices, and everything you believe in your life is based upon the choices being made. You don't think that guys like Dennett take full credit for "their accomplishments"? I've never heard of a determinist giving full credit to the Big Bang.
Everyone makes choices. Free Will, as well as Determinism, are philosophers' fables, that they like to talk and write about to no end. In no way, do they describe the human experience.
For example, what do you think of the viability of robust modest incompatibilism about free will versus agent-causal incompatbilism? Do you think the agent-causalists are correct to hold that without agent-causation the robust modest incompatibilist (and, of course, the modest incompatibilist) have done nothing to supplement the agent's originative control over their decisions beyond what it would be if determinism were true? I certainly think so, but that's just me and I'm sure 180Proof will put me right.
How? (Not denying that he did this, just wondering how). For something to be illusory, it must appear to be the case. So, in order for free will to be illusory, we must appear to have it.
If we appear to have it, then that's good prima facie evidence that we do have it.
So, we would need good evidence that the appearances are innacurate.
What's that evidence? It would need to be very good, surely, to defeat such widespread appearances to the contrary?
I hope I didn't seem condescending. 180 Proof and Bartricks are two of our more... [s]pugnacious[/s] rambunctious members. I was embarrassed. I try to be kind to new members.
Welcome by the way.
The term "free will" sounds a bit too loaded with metaphysical connotations for me personally. I prefer terms like Agency, volition, moral responsibility, they're less cluttered terms to examine.
From up here I can see that insulting poor defenseless @180 Proof is not legitimate philosophy. I've had my say. Carry on.
I am personally agnostic on whether compatibilism or incompatibilism is true, as I think the more important ingredient is possession of an immaterial soul.
I follow Descartes in thinking that we should first get clear about what is clearest and not dismiss the more clear on the basis of the less.
As it is more clear that I have free will than that free will either requires, or does not require, indeterminism, I conclude that I have free will (and conclude that it would be irrational to revise that conclusion in light of the discovery that determinism is true, should that discovery ever be made).
But my reason - which is my only guide to what's what - says that if everything about me is a product of external factors that I had no hand in, then I would not have free will. Contrary to what Sam Harris says, a puppet is 'not' free if it loves its strings.
So, I conclude that my decisions are not wholly the product of external factors that I had no hand in. There are, of course, external factors that play a causal role in me deciding as I do. But there's another ingredient as well: me. I make my decisions, and even if I have been caused to do so by external factors, as long as I am responsible for being the me that I am, then I will still be responsible for those decisions as they will still be 'mine'.
However, if I am a physical object - such as my brain or whatever - then everything about me will be a product of external factors, as I clearly did not create my own body. So if I am a physical thing, then I am not responsible for being the me that I am.
Thus, if I have free will - and my reason assures me I do - then I am not a physical object. My physical body is simply my temporary accommodation, but is no more 'me' than my house is.
Thus, I must be an immaterial soul. Free will requires it.
This is correct, and I’m very surprised to see @180 Proof get it so wrong.
I never claimed or implied anything in that Fartrix quote of me. I slapped a title on the link to a debate based on the summary of positions at issue given therein. Clearly, s/he is semi-illiterate and refuses to extend the principle of charity to anyone; but I'm surprise at you, Pfhorrest – is Fartrix kin or a lover?
Quoting 180 Proof
...and was surprised that you would give such inaccurate glosses of those two terms. I was going to offer a correction myself, replete with that surprise, when I saw that Bartricks had already given an accurate one.
Actually clicking that link now, I see that the disputants' actual positions are accurately described both as 'compatibilist' and 'limited free will' on the part of Dennett, and both as 'incompatibilist' and 'no free will' on the part of Caruso. But the way you phrased it sounds like you're saying that 'compatibilist' means 'limited free will' and 'incompatibilist' means 'no free will'.
Caruso seems to be what Derek Pereboom calls a "hard incompatibilist", which is not just someone who is an incompatibilist in the usual sense (someone who thinks determinism and free will are incompatible) but additionally someone who thinks indeterminism and free will are also incompatible, and thus free will is impossible either way.
Quoting Saphsin
Dennett specifically I would say yes, but I think that his notion of free will is more in keeping with the incompatibilist sense of the term than the usual compatibilist sense of the term (discussion of hard indeterminism at that link as well). I can't speak for "cogni sci folks" generally, but the archetypes of modern compatibilism as I'm most familiar with it are people like Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf, who hold that free will has nothing whatsoever to do with how (in)determined or (un)predictable anybody is, but instead everything to do with the specific kinds of functions that our minds do (which do of course, like every function of everything, depend on at least adequate determinism to have any reliable functionality to speak of at all).
Needless to say, he is just another naturalist who thinks that if you can't naturalize something it doesn't- or likely doesn't- exist.
I also believe that Frankfurt has never officially declared a side. He is widely assumed to be a compatibilist simply because he has argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (a claim which, if true, would seem to help the compatibilist cause more.....though many incompatibilists, including Pereboom, agree with Frankfurt on this). But, like I say, he himself has never explicitly endorsed compatibilism and everything he has argued is consistent with incompatibilism (I suspect that like me he is actually an agnostic on the issue).
Wolf, I think, holds a bizarre asymmetrical view according to which right-doing and praisewothiness are compatible with determinism whereas wrongdoing and blame worthiness are not (or at least require alternative possibilities). An unstable view.
I think you can make sense of her asymmetry thesis if you keep in mind that the rational practical abilities of human agents (and, even more so, their abilities to correctly evaluate ethical features of practical situations) are essentially normative. Hence, when an agent sets up to deliberate between doing A and doing B, say, and only the first option is the right thing to do, then for the agent to choose to do A (on cogent grounds) constitutes the proper actualization of her rational abilities of practical deliberation whereas for her to choose to do B constitutes a failed or defective actualization of those abilities (such as a manifestation of akrasia, of some other vice, or of some culpable ignorance, etc.).
Hence, unlike many agent-causal libertarians, Wolf deems agents to be blameworthy when they fail to actualize their ability to do the right thing, on the condition that they indeed possess such an ability, but it makes no sense to view them as praiseworthy just on the condition that they would have an ability refrain from doing the right thing. But that's not so much (or primarily) because praiseworthiness is uniquely compatible with determinism, but rather because there is no such rational ability (to chose to do the wrong thing). Failing or refraining to do the right thing just is a failure to properly exercise the ability to do the right thing.
But it nevertheless seems prima facie implausible. For instance, it seems implausible that if determinism is true, then we are praiseworthy for all our right deeds, but blameless for our immoral ones. Intuitively if one is one, one is the other - it's a package deal.
Actually, I was putting forth, on behalf of Wolf, the thesis that right-doing (and hence also, praiseworthiness) and wrong-doing (and hence also, blameworthiness) do not require different abilities. They both require the exact same ability, which is to deliberate correctly what it is that the agent ought to do, and to do it. It's not an asymmetry of abilities that is postulated, but rather an asymmetry in the way good and bad deeds relate to that one singular ability: as the manifestation of its proper actualization, or as a manifestation of its defective (or failure of) actualization, respectively.
The way I would rather put it, again, on behalf of Wolf (although I myself agree with her), is that blameworthiness (responsibility for bad deeds) requires a rational ability to have done otherwise (namely, the right thing), whereas praiseworthiness doesn't require a rational ability to have done otherwise (since there is no such thing as a rational ability to do the wrong thing). I agree with you that the metaphysical requirements of personal responsibility (for good and bad deeds alike) all come in a single package and hence it doesn't make much sense to say that the truth of the metaphysical doctrine of determinism is a requirement for blameworthiness and not for praiseworthiness. It seems to me that Wolf's picture, correctly understood, show why that wouldn't make much sense. It's been a while since I've last read Wolf, though, so maybe she slips up somewhere. Maybe you can point out to me where exactly you think she might have advanced the implausible thesis.
Re rational abilities to do wrong. There seems an ambiguity here. I agree that we never have overall reason to do wrong, and thus someone who does wrong is defying reason. But it can - and is - rational to want to have the ability to defy reason. So the ability to do wrong is one it is rational to have, eventhough it is not rational actually to do wrong.
The issue isn't just what the conditions are for there existing agents who have rational practical abilities, but also what the conditions are are for there being responsible agents who have those rational practical abilities. Rational agents can only be deemed praiseworthy (end hence personally responsible) for successfully exercising their rational abilities if those abilities are fallible. An ability being fallible just means that it has a liability to fail. If you hold that the fallibility of such abilities is inconsistent with the thesis of determinism (in whichever way you understand this thesis) then this would mean that indeterminism is a requirement for praiseworthiness and blameworthiness alike. That's because indeterminism, on that view, would be a requirement for the possession of the fallible abilities, the possession of which grounds both praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
I think Wolf would rather hold the opposite thesis: that determinism and the fallibility of rational abilities are compatible. Hence she would hold indeterminism to be a requirement neither for praiseworthiness nor for blameworthiness.
It therefore seems to me that Wolf's asymmetry thesis regarding the requirement for an 'ability to have done otherwise', for holding agents responsible just in cases of a failure to act rationally (and/or ethically), and the lack of a similar requirement for deeming them praiseworthy of having done the right thing, is preserved by her compatibilist account of fallible rational abilities. The metaphysical doctrine of indeterminism, on the one hand, and the thesis that agents have, in some circumstances, an 'ability to have done otherwise' (than what they actually did), on the other hand, are consistent with one another on her compatibilist stance.
The degree to which we are influenced by external or internal factors, varies and constantly changes, but ultimately we make choices. If we have any choice in anything, then that's it. Nothing is determined. There is a choice being made, for some event. It just takes one choice, to shatter any kind of deterministic view of life. If they is no choice, then just sit back and let the Bug Bang take care of everything, and certainly give credit to the Big Bang for the biggest miracle of all, the creation and determination of everything - sort of like the "scientific" version of God.
I doubt this. I think it’s mostly because if you ask anyone on the street “do you think you have free will” they will answer in the affirmative confusing free will with a general sense of feeling free.
The problem is that free will is defined differently. By some definitions we definitely have it (a general sense of freedom). By others, there is some doubt. That’s why I don’t think there is strong support for the statement “we have free will” at all. There is definitely strong support for “we feel free”, but as for “we have free will” that depends on the definition.
I think free will in a dualistic framework is under doubt for example. As it requires “minds” causing physical changes. Yet we have extremely strong evidence that the only thing that can cause physical changes is physical stuff. That’s what the laws of conservation mean.
Similarly, some people still insist that free will must require indeterminism. To them, free will is under doubt.
“Free will” isn’t this monolithic concept, so the fact that most people say they have it doesn’t really mean anything specific
Anyway, as you know I find it hard to understand how anyone in their right mind can consider someone blameworthy or praiseworthy for something - a decision, a desire, whatever - that was the causal product of external factors that the agent had no hand in. That seems no less unfair than blaming someone for their height or the age in which they were born.
There is a reason that we should justify the existence of free will. There are numerous scientific literatures showing that belief in free will results in a happier life, as well as being more academically successful and productive at work. Because of the belief's positive effects on people, there is a moral incentive to have people believe in it.
From a certain pragmatist point of view, this evidence is proof of the existence of free will.
[quote= Charles Sanders Peirce]Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.[/quote]
This pragmatist believes that introspective knowledge (like a priori) is purely inferences from external facts. For example, the concept of self is created from the interactions we have with the world and not the other way around. This pragmatist further asserts that real and true are words that can only be understood in the context of 'what works' or in other words, its usefulness, such that what is the most useful is the truth. Thus, overwhelming evidence showing that believing in free will 'works' better for people, than not believing in free will existing is proof that free will exists.
This view is contentious even among pragmatists, but I try to present their view to address the original question. My version of pragmatism doesn't necessarily relate usefulness directly to truth, although I do believe that if a false belief is less useful than a true one, then that truth does not have as much value to be known relative to the false one.
But among philosophers - so among those who have undertaken to reflect on this matter in a highly disciplined way - there is broad agreement on the basic concept, despite disagreement reigning over exactly what it takes for our wills to answer to that concept.
Free will is 'that which is needed to make one morally responsible for one's actions'. There's near universal consensus on this, which is why you'll find 'moral responsibility' and 'free will' used pretty much interchangeably in the debate. So, for instance, when Harry Frankfurt argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, that was taken to be a powerful source of support for compatibilist positions on free will, as defenders of such views would - if Frankfurt's argument works - now no longer have to argue that their conditional analysis of alternative possibilities was more plausible than the incompatibilist unconditional analysis and could instead sidestep the whole issue.
Anyway, among those who think carefully about the matter, the majority agree that we have free will of the moral responsibility-grounding kind. And they think this despite disagreeing over whether that kind of free will requires indeterminism.
What does this tell us? Well, it tells us that it is more clear and distinct to the reason of careful reasoners that we have free will - or, if one prefers, that we are morally responsible - than it is that free will requires indeterminism, or whatever. (That is, it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that moral responsibility requires free will; and it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that we are morally responsible for what we decide to do; and clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that it follows from this that we have free will, whatever it may involve).
There are exceptions - there are hard incompatibilists (such as Derk Pereboom) and there are impossibilists (such as Saul Smilansky and Galen Strawson) - but they are all guily of being unduly conservative about the nature of reality and how much our reason can tell us about it (which is somewhat ironic given that they are nevertheless willing to conclude that something that so patently exists - free will - doesn't).
I would say “there is broad agreement on the basic concept BECAUSE of disagreement reigning over what exactly it takes for our wills to answer to that concept”
Everyone is defining it so that it exists. But that doesn’t mean that it exists in all its definitions. That’s my point. For example:
Quoting khaled
So a definition of free will that involves an immaterial mind being able to cause material changes means free will doesn’t exist. Or that it needs redefining.
Again: they are talking about what's needed to be morally responsible for one's decisions. That's what compatibilists and incompatibilists are disagreeing over.
If you define 'free will' as 'a type of jam' then you are simply not talking about what they are talking about.
They are talking about what's needed for moral responsibility. And they're disagreeing over what's needed. But 'what's needed' is the issue. And 'free will' is what they agree is needed. And once the disagreement is resolved, we will know what having free will involves.
Moral responsibility requires being the originator of one's decisions, I think. And that requires being an immaterial soul, as all material entities - if any exist - have come into being.
Or in other words, do you think free will exists if epiphenomenalism is true?
They are states of mind, not really 'things' as such (a state of mind is a state of a thing - minds being things - but it is not itself a thing).
Quoting khaled
I do not really know what you mean.
Quoting khaled
Those aren't other words for what you previously said.
What do you understand epiphenomenalism to be?
Physical stuff causing minds which do nothing
I do not understand what you mean. Seems confused.
A mind is a thing. An object.
Minds do things, such as think, desire, decide, hope and so on.
Thinking, desiring, hoping, intending - these are activities of mind (exclusively so).
So do you mean by epiphenomenalism the thesis that the activities our minds engage in are the causal product of material events, but that those mental activities are impotent to cause any material events?
If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis is nevertheless entirely consistent with us being morally responsible for the activities our minds engage in, so long as we are morally responsible for being the minds that we are.
For instance, if I form the intention to do X and try to do X, and X occurs but entirely coincidentally and not as a product of my trying to do X, I remain fully morally responsible for trying to do X. Yes?
I would think no. Because the intention to do X didn’t affect whether or not you tried or succeeded at doing X, physically.
I would think to be morally responsible in that scenario you’d need some social definition of moral responsibility. “You are responsible when you do something you weren’t coerced into doing” or something like that.
Quoting Bartricks
Why bizarre? It comes from splitting up the world into mental and physical stuff. Then noticing that the physical stuff seems to be self determining with no need of mental stuff.
Well, I think you're going to be on your own there. So, just to be clear, your view is that if I attempt to kill Sarah, I am not morally responsible for forming that intention if it does not result in Sarah's death? That's too bonkers for words.
Quoting khaled
I don't have a clue what you're on about. You can't define someone into being morally responsible. Writers of dictionaries are not Gods.
Quoting khaled
Well, that too is extraordinarily confused. It's bizarre and unmotivated because it is asymmetrical - it is being claimed that material events cause mental events, but mental events can't cause material events. That's perverse. If there are material events, then we have good evidence that they cause mental events and vice versa. I just intended to raise my arm and it raised. There.
Oh, and physical stuff does not appear to be self-determining. When a physical thing does something we look for a cause of its doing it.
No that’s not my view. That you interpreted it that way is too bonkers for words.
If you decide to kill Sarah, your attempt to kill Sarah following that decision was not actually caused by that decision. So you did not even cause the physical attempt of killing Sarah. So how can you be blamed for something you didn’t cause?
Quoting Bartricks
Even in an epiphenomenalist view, your decision to raise the arm will always be preceded by an intention to raise the arm. The claim is that the physical raising of the arm causes both the intention and the raising. In a pair.
Your intention to raise the arm and it rising isn’t evidence that the intention was causal. In the same way that a color change preceding a pH change in titration is not evidence that the color has anything to do with pH (it doesn’t). And the fact that the intention always precedes the action is consistent with epiphenomenalism.
Quoting Bartricks
Correct. And at no point have we looked at the cause of a physical thing and did NOT find that it was purely and completely caused by other physical things. That’s very strong evidence that physical stuff is self determining.
In that case you simply didn't understand the original point and you used entirely the wrong words to express yourself. I am morally responsible for my decisions regardless of whether they are effective in the world.
And because of that epiphenomenalism, if true - and it isn't - would not preclude my being morally responsible for my mental activities.
What in blue blazes are you on about?
The question you asked me - and that I am patiently answering - is whether we would still be morally responsible if epiphenomenalism is true, yes?
Focus.
The answer to that question is 'yes'. Why?
Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.
Simples.
What matters where my moral responsibility for such activities is concerned, is their causal history. If I myself am simply a product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for being the mind that I am and so consequently I would not be morally responsible for any of my mental activity. Holding me so would be as unfair as holding me morally responsible for my eye colour or height or some other feature of my material body that I had no hand in it having.
If my mind is a material thing, then it would be the product of external events that I had no hand in, as this is the case with all material things.
So, in order for me to be morally responsible for the activities my mind engages in, I need 'not' to be a material thing. And as my reason and the reason of virtually all other careful reasoners (an important qualification - we're not including total spanners), represents us to be morally responsible for our mental activities, we can and should conclude that we - we minds, that is - are not material objects. Of course, few are willing to follow reason where she leads, but decide in advance how far they are willing to go.
Again, whether epiphenomenalism is true or not has no bearing on this whatsoever.
Sure. I would assume that being morally responsible would require you and your decisions to be able to.... you know.... do something. Guess not though.
Quoting Bartricks
Whether or not the thesis is bizarre and motivated. You would have known that had you simply read what I quoted.
Quoting Bartricks
I think you're on your own there.
If a bedridden paralyzed patient who can't move any muscle in his body intends to donate to charity, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something moral? Similarly if he decides to kill someone, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something immoral?
Morality applies to actions. Not mental activities.
Quoting Bartricks
Disagree. But that's not something I want to get into again.
And I'm curious how you think your mind originated. Not due to your birth or anything physical like that of course. So what? It was just sort of always there? An immortal soul of some sort?
No, that's the bonkers view you expressed earlier and then disavowed when its bonkerishness became apparent. To be morally responsible for intending to kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.
Quoting khaled
This is a derailing move as whether epiphenomenalism is plausible or not is demonstrably irrelevant to the free will question. But it 'is' a bizarre and unmotivated view. For the same evidence that implies material events cause mental ones exists for the reverse. What's the evidence that material events cause mental ones? Well, I just bashed my toe - material event - and it caused me to be in pain - mental event. What's the evidence that mental events cause material ones? The pain - mental event - caused me to shout out "ouch", which was a material event. But anyway, whether or not epiphenomenalism is a really stupid view or a sensible interpretation of the data is neither here nor there, as it doesn't bear on the issue under debate.
Quoting khaled
Oh, so now you 'do' think that whether you're morally responsible for intending to do X depends on whether X actually occurs? Not a great friend of Consistency are you? Until you and consistency start getting on a bit better I'm not sure this is going to be at all productive.
Quoting khaled
It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and some mental activity is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done for being so wrong about so much.
Quoting khaled
It didn't originate, for if it did then it would be the product of external causes. And yes, a soul. That's the point. Free will requires a soul.
Here's the argument again, clearly laid out:
1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
2. I am morally responsible for being the mind that I am and am morally responsible for what it is caused to do. (Not B)
3. Therefore, my mind is not the product of external events I had no hand in. (Therefore, not A)
4. If my mind is a material thing, then it is the product of external events I had no hand in (if C, then A)
5. Therefore, my mind is not a material thing (Therefore, not C).
6. If my mind is not a material thing, then it is an immaterial thing (if not C, then D)
7. Therefore, my mind is an immaterial thing (therefore D)
Free will requires a soul then. And a soul I am. And a soul you are. Which means you're morally responsible for the way you have been thinking above.
Obviously not. In that example, you still attempted to kill Sarah. If you hadn't attempted you did nothing wrong. Even if you had every intent to kill Sarah. As long as you don't act on the intention, you did nothing wrong. Because morality applies to actions.
Quoting Bartricks
You're just not a great friend of understanding. You sound so self assured I feel sorry for you because you always end up looking like an idiot when shown the obvious thing you've been missing.
Quoting Bartricks
Not derailing. Just a separate question I was curious about. Though I understand it may be difficult for you to keep two separate questions in mind at the same time.
Quoting Bartricks
You know that I mean. Physical actions. I just don't understand what you gain by trying to make such a stupid very easily dismissible "objection".
Quoting Bartricks
This premise is just false. You don't know if your mind is material or immaterial at this junction correct? If your mind WAS immaterial, then it could be the product of external events you had no hand in, but still not be caused to do anything as a result (be undetermined).
Even if your mind was material, it could be that indeterminism is the case, in which case, again, you would be responsible for what it does, regardless of whether or not it was created by factors outside your control.
Remember your original argument for this? It was "In order to be morally responsible my actions must not fully trace to external causes".
Quoting Bartricks
Well if your mind is undetermined (either by it being immaterial or by it being material and indeterminism being the case), then it could be a product of external events, yet still your decisions would not all trace to external causes.
So it is simply false that if your mind is the product of external events that that leads to your decisions tracing to external causes which leads to you not being morally responsible. Your mind can be the product of external events, without your decisions tracing to external causes if indeterminism is the case. So your mind can be caused by external factors while you retain moral responsibility.
This is in addition to the fact that I don't even accept the premise to begin with. Even IF your actions traced to external events you're still responsible for them depending on the events.
To be morally responsible for forming an intention to do X does not depend on whether X itself occurs. It isn't a difficult point to grasp and it is obviously true. I just explained the point to my plate of fish fingers and I think even one of them got it. So, you know, up your game.
Quoting khaled
Dunning and Kruger.
Quoting khaled
No, what you said was just plain false. Morality applies to more than actions. It applies to states of affairs and character traits as well, neither of which are actions (the moral properties of rightness and wrongness apply exclusively to actions, but those are not all the moral properties that there are). And all actions have a mental element, for actions are the exclusive preserve of agents, and agents are minds and an action is caused by certain kinds of mental event. So you were totally and utterly wrong. I mean, it's actually quite impressive to have packed so many mistakes into so few words. I'm impressed.
Quoting khaled
On what grounds do you reject premise 1? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of 1 as a conclusion. I cannot understand from what you've said on what grounds you are rejecting it. You seem to be thinking that as my mind could be immaterial and still the product of external causes, this somehow shows premise 1 to be false. Er, how? What the argument shows is that being immaterial is 'necessary' for being morally responsible (and thus having free will). It does not show that it is sufficient.
Quoting khaled
Why on earth would I be responsible for what my mind does if its activities are indeterministic? If it was indeterministic what height I would achieve, or what eye colour I would have, would that make me morally responsible for those matters? Obviously not. The same is true when the indeterminism infects my mind. You can't plausibly go from not being morally responsible for something to being morally responsible for it just by the addition of indeterministic causation.
Quoting khaled
False. Indeterministic causation is still causation. When an event is undetermined, it is not uncaused. It was caused, just indeterministically. Imagine that it was indeterministic whether the bullet would hit me or not. It hits me and blows my arm off. Well, what was the cause of my arm blowing off? The bullet, yes?
It's very easy to grasp. And obviously false. Again:
Quoting khaled
Answer these questions honestly. And you'll have your answer.
Quoting Bartricks
Would be to assume epiphenomenalism is false. And I thought it shouldn't matter whether or not it is true for your position....
Quoting Bartricks
Because it doesn't trace to external causes. That was YOUR standard. And it is met.
Quoting Bartricks
But any given action you do indeterministically does NOT trace to external causes. You can take all the causes into account, and it wouldn't be enough to cause action A or action B. There is an additional element.
But just to be clear: to you "traces to external causes" is the case even if indeterminism is the case? Sure. Even though no combination of the external causes can ever decide the result, apparently the result still traces to external causes. Gotcha.
Quoting Bartricks
Why is the burden of proof on me? The premise doesn't appear to be true. It's nonsense. And regardless, I've explained why it is false. Because indeterminism means (precisely) that actions do not trace fully to external causes. Which was your standard.
1- If indeterminism is the case, actions do not trace fully to external causes (if A then B)
2- If actions do not trace fully to external causes you are morally responsible (if B then C)
3- If indeterminism is the case, you are morally responsible (if A then C)
4- If your mind is the product of external causes, and indeterminism is the case, you are still morally responsible (If A and D, A -> C: then C)
5- It is not the case that If your mind is the product of external events that you had no hand in, then you are not morally responsible (proof by counterexample 4)
Quoting Bartricks
I mean.... I could see why you would have no one to talk to but talking to your food? You should consider therapy.
And no wonder only fish fingers seem to get you. Since you are of similar intelligence.
Some people just can't be helped it seems.
1. Individual A says “I have free will.”
2. Individual B says “We don't have free will but we are determined”
All determinism can say in both cases is that they were determined to say this due to some prior cause. And to say that the cause was some enlightening rational argument is not understanding determinism. So the very arguments to support determinism are undermined by the very idea of determinism since it is an idea that is arational by nature.
Yes, Finger, that's right. Although causes do not 'decide' a result as decisions are mental events and causes aren't minds. But apart from that misuse of language (and the conceptual confusion it expressed) yes, indeterministic causation is still causation and if indeterminism is true events still have causes. And thus if it was indeterministic what kind of mind my mind would be, that does precisely nothing to make me morally responsible for it. Obviously.
Cheers. Hope you get help. You need to stop talking to your food, though I know it's hard to find anyone else that agrees with you.
Quoting Bartricks
But don’t trace fully to the causes. That’s the point. That was your standard and it is met.
Correct. Determinism is a religion, not a philosophy.
What do you mean, can you further elucidate?
I guess you could say it was causation in a way, I met the right people at the right time, and it had a domino effect. But I still make my own choices, I can do choose to do as I want
That seems to be somewhat of a distortion of Wolf's view. What might be rather more consistent with her views, I think, is the claim that someone born with (or, more plausibly, who has at a later stage of her maturation from infancy come to acquire) a rational capacity to differentiate good from evil is thereafter suited to be held responsible for her actions. The very idea of someone being born evil -- having no capacity whatsoever to be good, or to mend her ways -- may be incoherent. Someone being born innocent, and not having yet matured out of this stage of innocence, as is the case with human infants and non-human animals, rather is a condition that makes one incapable of being either good or evil, and hence also unsuited to be held personally responsible for their actions, except proleptically in the case of very young human children who we expect to be on their way towards rational autonomy, and towards whom our reactive attitudes (such as those we express with praise and blame) scaffold the growth of their capacities for rational and moral judgement.
Yes, perhaps. But if she's defending a symmetrical view then there's not much that's new or interesting in her view. She's just a standard compatibilist, a capacity junky who thinks that all we need to be morally responsible is to be running on a certain programme or to be behaving in ways that express our values or what have you. All the time ignoring the elephant in the room, which is that if we are wholly the creation of alien forces then it doesn't matter what other capacities we have, we are not morally responsible for anything. You need to be alive before a healthy diet can improve your life, and you need to be morally responsible for how you are before the addition of this or that rational capacity can make you morally responsible for how you use it.
The “will” is another abstraction of the human being. How could it be otherwise? Whenever I look for the genesis of human action, and follow it through to it’s execution, I need not avert my eyes to any other being, state, or idea in the entire universe but the one committing the action. That a determinist must retreat into his mind to find some other cause is enough for me to be suspicious of the position.
Don't think that can be right.
Objects tend to be breakable (under conservation), whereas things associated with mind are interruptible (experiences, thinking, etc).
So, processes, occurrences, though maybe memory is an exception.
The quote looks like a category mistake, and that's going by evidence mind you.
No, ironically it is you who is making the category error. Mental states are states. A state is a state of a thing. Just as water is sometimes in a fluid state, minds are in mental states. (Water can be solid, gas, or fluid; minds can be thinking, hoping, intending, desiring and so on).
It is a category error to confuse a state of a thing with the thing itself. This category error is extraordinarily common when it comes to the mind, as there is a tendency to use 'mind' and 'consciousness' interchangeably, even though minds are objects and consciousness is a state (a state of mind, with 'mind' being the thing that consciousness is a state of). This error is facilitated to some extent, no doubt, by the tendency to confuse the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity ('my mind is conscious' does not mean that my mind is consciousness, but rather that my mind is in a conscious state).
Anyway, an 'object' is a bearer of properties. That's a non-question begging definition. That is, it is a definition that doesn't just assume that all objects are material.
Exactly what properties are definitive of a material object is a matter of debate, but I will follow Descartes in holding that the defining property of a 'material' object is 'extension'. That is, it takes up some space (and by virtue of this there will be a boundary between the space it occupies and that which it doesn't, and that boundary will describe its shape).
When it comes to minds, their defining state seems to be consciousness. This is not to say that minds are always conscious (although that is what Descartes thought). But rather, that if an object is in a state of consciousness, then it qualifies as a mind by dint of that.
There's a big philosophical question over whether consciousness is a state of material objects. If it is, then minds are, or can be, material. But they'd still be objects, it is just that the objects in question would be composed of matter (our brain being the most likely candidate). So there isn't a debate over whether minds are objects; the debate is over what kind of objects they are or can be.
If consciousness is not a state of material objects - and again, I follow Descartes, Plato, Berkeley, Locke and plenty of others in holding that it is not - then minds are not material. They are objects; they bear properties (one being the property of consciousness), but they do not have the kinds of properties that material objects have (extension, shape, size, location, colour).
You must not, then, beg the question by simply assuming - as so many do nowadays - that all objects are material. There is nothing in the concept of an object that requires it to be material.
And if one follows Reason diligently - as diligently as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley and others did - one will arrive, as they did, at the conclusion that the mind is an immaterial object. (And of course, now - as ever - most people couldn't give a rat's arse what Reason says about the nature of reality, preferring to listen to themselves in one form or another).
One route to this conclusion (and there are lots) is via free will. We obviously do have free will. Any decision I make was made freely, even if the circumstances under which I made it were not under my control. For it was 'my' decision - my response to the situation. But of course, that would be an absurd contention if I myself was the product of alien forces. To hold myself morally responsible for my decisions but not for my circumstances would just be arbitrary. But it is not arbitrary. To hold oneself morally responsible for one's decision is rational; but to hold oneself morally responsible for one's circumstances is irrational. So, as it is rational to hold myself morally responsible for my decisions - something that would only be rational if I was free in respect of them - my reason is thereby telling me that I, the producer of those decisions, am not a product of alien forces. For if i have free will but would not have it if I was the product of alien forces, then I can conclude that I am not the product of alien forces.
Yet all material objects seem to be the product of alien forces, including - obviously - my body and its brain. Thus, I can conclude that as I have free will and am therefore 'not' a product of alien forces but a source of origination, then I am not a material object. (Which should have been obvious anyway - I 'have' a body, but I am not my body; I 'have' a brain, but I am not my brain and so on; my body is my body because I am in it, not becuase I 'am' it).
Obviously this argument - deductively valid and apparently sound though it is - will not move those who have already decided that everything that exists is material, and thus that free will, if it exists, has to be made sense of in material terms. But then those people are just dogmatists and their views about free will patently absurd.
Let me ask a question. If they could prove to you that you did not have free will, would you act any differently?
How would you change if someone could prove to you that we actually have free will?
How you answer these questions are of some importance. Probably the only important thing that can be gotten ought of questions of these types, or so it seems to me.
I wouldn’t change if someone proved free will existed as I have always believed I had free will...
If there is a change in reaction and behavior, then that already indicates the ability to act on reasons, which you can reject. Like, someone could come and prove to me that the blue sky I see is actually everybody else's "red". I can't help but seeing a blue sky. So the actual answer won't affect me in practice, though I would be shocked.
There's been experiments done on people in which two different groups of people were told that they have free will and the other were told they had none. The one's who believed they had no free will behaved more recklessly and thought to themselves "I can't do anything about it". Those who did believe they had free will behaved normally. I wish I could find that study quickly.
Of course, this is no proof of anything, but it's worth noting.
If a person is arguing that we lack free will seems to me like that person is denying something that they can't understand, so it's easier for them to deny its existence than admit we have no idea how it works.
IMO Yes, but not just humans if you know what to look for.
Out of all the many impulses, biases, actions of any living thing there is a mental dynamic adaptation or free will.
The ability to act on new scenarios in order to adapt, each living thing has varying levels of inteligence which determine how well they act on change.
Change itself is quite explanatory considering not all prey is in one place and not all predators are in one place, its changes which would require a free will in order to adapt to such things.
With humans we have great cognative function paired with opposable thumbs, add that with free will and you have an inteligent being who is able to extent their will through creation of things.
With being a living thing who does not have to fight for survival constantly gives oppertunity to act free will in creation of things that may not be necessary for survival.
We humans may think of free will as being able to act without restraint and that we are special when it can be a species bias to assume so, especially when you have thousands of years of culture to influence our thinking.
So if you pile on humanities biases, cultures, experiences, and all the others things they can influence free will in order to dynamically adapt, but the act of dynamically adapting to new mental scenarios that is free will itself.
We have will, but it ain't free. It's going to cost you. And it will accost you.
Quoting Charlotte Thomas-Rowe
I started to pen some thoughts on this, contesting it, but I figure I should step back and have someone explain it to me; make sure I understand what is being said. I haven't read the whole thread, so if my curiosity would be satisfied by doing so, I apologize. Just lazy.
Quoting Charlotte Thomas-Rowe
I'm guessing Schopenhauer didn't have a gym membership!
Well, again, I'm not so sure I understand what was being said, and I may be missing the mark, but when I was a little boy I could will my will. I remember a time, when I was about 5 or 6 or so, when I would somehow become aware of a way that I would like to be. I would acknowledge that will once, at night, before falling asleep. Then, maybe four or five days later, it had become an indelible part of my personality. It only happened about four or five times, over the course of a year or so, before life got in the way, and I fell off of that ability for some reason. I had willed what I would will.
I can't remember what all the wills were, but one of them was to be a good person. Another was siding with the underdog. I can't seem to shake those characters, try as I might. I can remember one other incident, but I don't want to share the details. Suffice it to say, the specifics were a waste of will; but the general lesson that I could will my will was itself not waste, and therefore worth it.
Now that I'm slowing down, I'm trying to re-attain that ability. But a lifetime of experience may present an obstacle. We'll see, I guess.
A deterministic world is a world where all pasts have the same future, but it is true in a quantum world where all pasts do not share the same future. Consider that if the nature of human will is not necessarily reducible to all of physical causation (otherwise human will is a product of the material brain which is exclusively a physical object), it must be beyond physical law.
Agreed :)
Dreams can convey the absurdness of our immediate goals. If we don’t like the message of a dream we can ignore it. If some of our thoughts are deterministic, then could those same thought patterns be computationally accelerated during sleep? If a dream isn’t physically real then it follows that thinking about a dream after you wake up no matter how little you remember will still contribute to your free will. It’s not just the dream itself but also your response to it during the day that also counts. Dreams are like our own version of a Boltzmann brain that you created out of the chaos of your unconscious.
I don't yet have the elaborate philosophical justification for this claim, but I am of the opinion that, because we experience the world as if we have free will, we can assume that we do and that it is up to determinists to prove otherwise. The general course of the mind-body debate has taken has been entirely to the contrary, though.
For example, one might say that the Earth considered as an isolated system has "no choice" but to assume a particular orbit when subjected to gravitational forces exerted upon it by the rest of the solar system. Hence in this situation we have a notion of causality that relates a system taken independently and in isolation, namely the Earth, to the rest of the solar system considered as an external system. Here "no choice" means that the earth is expected to move differently given a different arrangement of the surrounding solar system, but it should also be noticed that the meaning of "different arrangement of the solar system" is itself partly determined by how the Earth itself moves. Hence even in this materialistic and atomistic example of an isolated system subject to external forces, the meaning of having no-choice is somewhat fuzzy and tautological in character.
But what about when considering the orbit of the Earth jointly with the motions of the rest of the solar system taken as a single, collective holistic system? When considering the solar system jointly, all that physics needs and has is an equation that describes the simultaneous motion of all the planets. As Bertrand Russell observed, the notion of causality that we had in the previous instance disappears when considering everything jointly, and in this latter context it would be meaningless to say that the earth's trajectory was determined by the solar system that it is simultaneously modelled with.
In a nutshell, causality is a meta-theoretic relation that relates a system considered as "foreground" to a context considered as "background". This implies that the question of free-will versus determinism is meaningless in the absolute sense in which everything is (hypothetically) considered simultaneously.
For me, a causal proposition is merely a synthetic proposition used to describe an intervention, that has the form "If an action A is performed upon a system in state S then the system possibly produces state R" .
Since my view of causality is anti-realist , game-theoretic and possibilistic, I suppose that my view is closest to the Occasionalists, at least as I understand them when squinting in an attempt to see past their surface-level dualism.
2. If I'm sane then, I'm logical [premise]
3. If I'm logical then, logic determines my choices [premise]
4. If logic determines my choices, I don't have free will [premise]
5. If I'm insane then, I don't have free will [premise]
6. If I'm sane, logic determines my choices [2, 3 HS]
7. If I'm sane, I don't have free will [4, 6 HS]
8. I don't have free will or I don't have free will [1, 5, 7 CD]
9. I don't have free will [8 Taut]
QED
N.B. Logical choices are, by definition, necessary which is just another way of saying you don't have a choice.
If there is free will then it's there in all the boring things and the boring places that do not have much significance. For example, you can wash your left hand first rather than the right hand, or vice versa. Otherwise there is no such thing as free will in things that really matter. Not a possibility even biologically.
In my opinion, this is an irrational question that is dividing two ideas that can't stand on their own. Do we drink oxygen or hydrogen? Actually, we drink water. Are we meat puppets or floating souls? Actually, we're humans. We're both determined and have free-will.
There's a ping-pong, back-and-forth kind of dialogue between the external world and your inner self. They both play off of one another. And the play is continuous, constant and oscillates ultra fast.
On the one hand, we are determined by our nature and nurture. It's funny when people pose nature and nurture against each other because they're essentially two different forms of determinism.
Biology, genetics, parents, parenting, and environment have a tremendous impact on you that is outside of your control. You're automatically directed into a certain kind of acting and thinking because you are who you are and you can't change that. You have an extremely limited range of options given your nature.
I do, however, believe that we have a little window of free-will that gives you the opportunity to act on some decisions within the entire range of actual possible decisions within your nature. This little window is determined (lol the irony), by how conscious you choose to be. You can choose to operate in the world with a metacognition, alertness, and big-picture view or you can suspend this awareness and go about life passively. Passivity is responding automatically like a robot getting their buttons pushed, or a zombie only motivated by petty brains.
It's like playing a video game. Your controller has only so many buttons, and you can only push them so fast, and certain button combinations can't be pushed at the same time. And sometimes buttons become useless or essential depending on which screen or section of the game you're on. And of course, you need to decide to even push these buttons, and pay enough attention to the screen to push the buttons at the "right" time.
Without determinism, it's like playing with the gaming console turned off. Without free-will, the game is on, but there's no one there to move the character.
You play the game with it actually turned on and you're paying attention to the screen.