Arguments for the soul
I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. By all means prove me wrong, but note that this:
Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events
is a stupid argument. The conclusion doesn't follow (obviously). If you add this premise - If A causes B, then A is B - then the conclusion will follow. But that premise is clearly false.
Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. Well, although I think that the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? - even if it is true, it would not entail the conclusion. It would entail, as I have said, that the mental events and the brain events must be events involving the same kind of object. But it would leave open what kind of object that was - that is, it would leave open whether the object in question is material or immaterial. For one could just as well infer from it that the brain is a mental object - that is, that the brain is not physical, but mental - as the opposite.
Yet whenever I have asked for evidence that our minds are our brains, the above is all I have been offered. So, my working hypothesis is that there is no good evidence that our minds are our brains. There's just a widespread assumption that our minds are our brains that reflects nothing more than the widespread assumption of naturalism. But no matter how widespread an assumption, it does not constitute 'evidence' that the assumption is true.
By contrast, when it comes to evidence that our minds are immaterial soul there is an abundance of it. (I do not claim any of these arguments is a proof - reasonable doubts can, I think, be raised about some of their premises - but each one counts for something and together they do, I think, constitute a proof. Think of each one as a witness statement. Witness statements are not completely reliable. But if you've got 10 witness who all say the same thing - that Tim did the crime - then you're one shit detective if you conclude that as each one is less than completely reliable, you have no reliable evidence that Tim did the crime).
Argument 1:
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound our minds have.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that our minds are not sensible objects
Another (2):
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it hopes).
2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like.
3. Therefore, our minds are not sensible objects
Another (3):
1. If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
2. Our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that our minds are not sensible objects
Another (4):
1. If I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, not everything I do traces to external causes
4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
5. Therefore, I am not a sensible object
Another (5):
1. If my reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties, then my reason is implying I am not a sensible object
2. My reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties
3. Therefore, my reason is implying that I am not a sensible object
Another (6):
1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
Another (7):
1. In order to be harmed at a time t1, one must exist at that time.
2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs
3. Therefore, we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist
4. If we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist, then we are not our sensible bodies
5. Therefore, we are not our sensible bodies.
Another (8):
1. No existing object has infinite parts
2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts (for it will be infinitely divisible)
3. Therefore, no sensible object exists
4. My mind exists
5. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
Another (9):
1. My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If my mind was a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing my mind not to be a sensible object
Another (10):
1. Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations
2. Sensations cannot exist absent a mind that is bearing the sensations in question
3. Therefore, sensible objects exist as the sensational activity of minds
4. Minds are not sensible activity, but objects engaging in that activity
5. Therefore, minds are not sensible objects.
There you go. 10 arguments for the immateriality of the mind. No one of them is a proof by itself. But each one counts for something, as they all have plausible premises - that is, premises that enjoy some support from our reason. And there are 10 of them! And there's no countervailing evidence. I think they put the matter beyond a reasonable doubt. After all, only one needs to work. Imagine that there is only a 1/6 chance that any given one of those arguments is sound. Okay - do the maths. What's the chance that at least one of them is sound? I'm no mathmetician, but I believe it is 84%. That makes the proposition far more reasonably believed than not, and may even be enough to put it beyond a reasonable doubt. And like I say, that's if each one is far more likely unsound than sound. But I do not think that is actually the case. I think each one is about 50% likely to be sound. What are the odds that at least one is sound? 99.9%. Now that really is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events
is a stupid argument. The conclusion doesn't follow (obviously). If you add this premise - If A causes B, then A is B - then the conclusion will follow. But that premise is clearly false.
Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. Well, although I think that the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? - even if it is true, it would not entail the conclusion. It would entail, as I have said, that the mental events and the brain events must be events involving the same kind of object. But it would leave open what kind of object that was - that is, it would leave open whether the object in question is material or immaterial. For one could just as well infer from it that the brain is a mental object - that is, that the brain is not physical, but mental - as the opposite.
Yet whenever I have asked for evidence that our minds are our brains, the above is all I have been offered. So, my working hypothesis is that there is no good evidence that our minds are our brains. There's just a widespread assumption that our minds are our brains that reflects nothing more than the widespread assumption of naturalism. But no matter how widespread an assumption, it does not constitute 'evidence' that the assumption is true.
By contrast, when it comes to evidence that our minds are immaterial soul there is an abundance of it. (I do not claim any of these arguments is a proof - reasonable doubts can, I think, be raised about some of their premises - but each one counts for something and together they do, I think, constitute a proof. Think of each one as a witness statement. Witness statements are not completely reliable. But if you've got 10 witness who all say the same thing - that Tim did the crime - then you're one shit detective if you conclude that as each one is less than completely reliable, you have no reliable evidence that Tim did the crime).
Argument 1:
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound our minds have.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that our minds are not sensible objects
Another (2):
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it hopes).
2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like.
3. Therefore, our minds are not sensible objects
Another (3):
1. If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
2. Our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that our minds are not sensible objects
Another (4):
1. If I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, not everything I do traces to external causes
4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
5. Therefore, I am not a sensible object
Another (5):
1. If my reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties, then my reason is implying I am not a sensible object
2. My reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties
3. Therefore, my reason is implying that I am not a sensible object
Another (6):
1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
Another (7):
1. In order to be harmed at a time t1, one must exist at that time.
2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs
3. Therefore, we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist
4. If we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist, then we are not our sensible bodies
5. Therefore, we are not our sensible bodies.
Another (8):
1. No existing object has infinite parts
2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts (for it will be infinitely divisible)
3. Therefore, no sensible object exists
4. My mind exists
5. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
Another (9):
1. My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If my mind was a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing my mind not to be a sensible object
Another (10):
1. Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations
2. Sensations cannot exist absent a mind that is bearing the sensations in question
3. Therefore, sensible objects exist as the sensational activity of minds
4. Minds are not sensible activity, but objects engaging in that activity
5. Therefore, minds are not sensible objects.
There you go. 10 arguments for the immateriality of the mind. No one of them is a proof by itself. But each one counts for something, as they all have plausible premises - that is, premises that enjoy some support from our reason. And there are 10 of them! And there's no countervailing evidence. I think they put the matter beyond a reasonable doubt. After all, only one needs to work. Imagine that there is only a 1/6 chance that any given one of those arguments is sound. Okay - do the maths. What's the chance that at least one of them is sound? I'm no mathmetician, but I believe it is 84%. That makes the proposition far more reasonably believed than not, and may even be enough to put it beyond a reasonable doubt. And like I say, that's if each one is far more likely unsound than sound. But I do not think that is actually the case. I think each one is about 50% likely to be sound. What are the odds that at least one is sound? 99.9%. Now that really is beyond a reasonable doubt.
Comments (127)
Assuming it does, explain how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body.
Mental things causing physical changes is telekinesis. Seems dubious.
Quoting Bartricks
No. What does light taste like? What is its texture?
Quoting Bartricks
Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think like, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow.
Quoting Bartricks
Where did this come from?
Quoting Bartricks
Not necessarily.
Quoting Bartricks
Not necessarily.
Quoting Bartricks
Not necessarily. Depends on the way you die.
Quoting Bartricks
wtf?
Quoting Bartricks
Really? What would a mind that has no body feel like? Doesn't seem possible to me.
Quoting Bartricks
Ontologically no. We only know of them through bundles of sensations. To assume sensible objects ARE nothing more than bundles of sensations is just idealism.
Quoting Bartricks
I don't think it's so much a proposition as a "call to redefine" each mental state with its associated brain state. Which makes many of your arguments that rely on language use bad (that we can't ask how much our mind weighs for example)
But yea.... replying to you was a mistake as usual if you can't even see that.
Just say the dunning kruger line then move on. Write something interesting next time. :yawn:
I would change “divisible” for tangible. All sensible objects are tangibles because we can use it or modified for our own desire respecting the laws of physics. Our mind is not tangible because is full of abstract criteria but it gives us the most powerful thing: awareness.
Can be awareness divisible as you stated? To be honest yes. Because we apply here cogito ergo sum rule. Since we are literally aware of our own mind we exist but imagine those who never had this thought. I guess we can apply here the divisible/tangible criteria because it will reflect us how aware we are about our mind.
Quoting Bartricks
I don’t understand so much this one. Infinite is so relative in our vocabulary. I guess any objects do not have infinite parts because literally we don’t know what extent or integrated is infinite in our reality. Sometimes we use infinite just as trying to describe something we don’t know yet.
Therefore, if my mind has limits admitting there are “infinite” variables then my mind is so sensible to their changes.Quoting Bartricks
I guess you mixed reason and mind. Reason provides us enter to the sensible/tangible world. When work the reason we can make the ideas of mind true. For example, building a pyramid was firstly an idea in someone’s mind. Later on, the architect put the reason to work and then build it. So this is literally sensible criteria.
I think you’re right on this. I believe the same but perhaps for different reasons, for what is the brain without the myriad systems that support it? All of it is so interconnected that it even makes the concept of “organ” seem inadequate. So instead of postulating a soul I would merely extend the concept of “mind” to throughout the entire body, or better yet, eliminate the notion of mind altogether since it essentially the same thing as the body.
Nothing but strawmen & sophistry, so the question remains:
Quoting 180 Proof
:sweat:
Doesn't address what I said.
Quoting khaled
Those questions make sense when asked of light particles. Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties (I have not said that if a sensible object has one sensible property, it has all others). But if I tell you that there is a sensible thing that has a certain smell, then it makes sense to wonder what it might look or feel like etc. But it does not make sense to wonder what one's mind smells like etc. But by all means just contradict me, just note that unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview. Try again.
Quoting khaled
No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like. Likewise with a lump of ham. Yet that's what a brain is. Try again.
Quoting khaled
What do you mean? I assume you're asking why that premise is true, you are just using entirely the wrong words to do it.
Imagine you have been invited to a party. You've heard rumours that 'Megan' is there. You are allergic to dogs. So you phone the host and you ask the following: "Is Megan there? And are there any dogs there?" The host replies that Megan is indeed there, but she's unsure if there are any dogs at the party. Do you have grounds to conclude that Megan is not a dog? Surely. It is, of course, possible that Megan is a dog, for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. But though that possibility exists, it is more reasonable to assume that as you are speaking to the host and the host is sure Megan is there but not sure any dogs are there, that Megan is not a dog. And that's what you'd actually conclude, right? Well, the host is Reason and Reason has told you that your mind definitely exists, but has also told you that she's not sure whether any sensible objects really exist. Draw the same conclusion. Or don't and be rationally perverse.
Quoting khaled
Explain. Quoting khaled
Er, you think there can be extended things that are not divisible.....okaaay. Brilliant refutation. Plato and Descartes take note.
Quoting khaled
Doesn't need always to be harmful. It is sufficient that it is ever harmful. Now, are you claiming that it is 'never' harmful to have one's sensible body destroyed?
Quoting khaled
Due to it being divisible. No matter how small an extended object, it will be divisible. Thus it will have infinite parts. As nothing has infinite parts, they do not exist, or at least they do not exist as 'extended' things (which is all that needs to be shown in order to demonstrate that minds are immaterial).
Quoting khaled
Stop up your ears, close your eyes, make sure not to be eating or smelling anything, and now render your body numb. Are you still aware of your self? Of course you are and you don't need actually to do any of those things to realize that you would still be aware of your self.
Quoting khaled
Question begging. What I am aware of when I am aware of, say, a table is just a bundle of sensations. The table itself, if I am to gain any awareness of it via my sensations, must resemble them in some or other respect. Yet sensations can only resemble sensations; thus what I know through my sensations are sensations. And sensations exist as the experiential activity of minds. Now, don't tell me that this is a well-known argument for Idealism, for I am well aware of that. The point, though, is that the argument has a high degree of plausibility and if it goes through it establishes that our minds are immaterial.
I stress too that only one of the arguments needs to go through. Just one. And you do not undermine my case if - and I do not think you have done this - you raise reasonable doubts about the premises of each and every one. For even if each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the set of 10 such arguments will render the proposition that the mind is a soul 99.9% likely to be true.
My arguments have the premises they have. Are you disputing one? Which one and why?
Note too that minds and mental events are not at all the same. A mind is a thing, an object. A mental event is a happening involving a mind. For an analogy: my body walks, but walking and my body are not the same. Likewise, my mind thinks, but my mind and thinking are not the same. Thinking is an activity of mind - so, when a mind thinks those thoughts are mental events - but the mind itself is not the thinking, rather it is 'doing' the thinking.
And your question is also confused. What 'gift' are you talking about? And what do you mean by a 'rational' animal? Do you mean an animal that is aware of reasons to do and believe things? I assume so. But a state of awareness is a kind of mental state. So a 'rational' animal must have a mind, else how can it be in the mental state constitutive of being aware of reasons? So no, I can no more imagine a rational animal lacking a mind than I can imagine a bachelor having a wife.
(JIC you're having a problem with argument 2: It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like).
But then you would not be addressing my argument.
Strictly speaking, premise 1 is false if sensible objects are understood subjectively. That is, if a sensible object is really a bundle of sensations - as Berkeley argued (convincingly, in my view). For though sensations can be divided into different kinds, sensations themselves can't be 'divided', for they are not 'things' at all, but mental activities. But of course, understood that way sensible objects are only 'objects' in an inverted commas sense and there would be no doubt that our minds are immaterial.
But if sensible objects are conceived of as extended things, then they are always going to be divisible. For any sensible object, so conceived, takes up some space. And any region of space admits of infinite divisions.
So the argument is sound, I think.
Argument 1:
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound the Linux kernel has.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
Argument 2:
1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a the Linux kernel process-schedules like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it schedules).
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible object, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like.
3. Therefore, the Linux kernel is not a sensible object.
Argument 3:
1. If our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
2. Our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
Argument 9:
1. My reason represents it to be possible for the Linux kernel to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing the Linux kernel not to be a sensible object
I'm not sure why this is even difficult. But, there it is. Given I have made the same argument about the Linux kernel, then by demonstration it can be made. Any real objections to this then?
The reason these arguments do not apply, is that the question at issue is what kind of an object the mind is, not whether it is an object or not.
As I understand it, the Linux kernal is a 'system', not an object (it will involve sensible objects, but isn't itself one anymore than, say, a 'friendship' is an object).
But anyway, I take it you accept that the Linux kernal argument is sound? So, it does establish or provides prima facie evidence that it is not a sensible object, yes?
And so presumably you accept that it does the same where the mind is concerned - it establishes or provides prima facie evidence that the mind is not a sensible object too, yes?
As the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind?' then this would establish that the mind is an immaterial object.
It wouldn't do that where the Linux kernal is concerned, but that's because it's a system involving sensible things, rather than a sensible thing itself.
Someone who thinks that the mind is a system is making a category error of the same kind someone who thought the Linux kernal is a sensible object is also making a category error.
Everything I have said above applies to what you've said about argument 2. You presumably accept the argument is sound, as when we put in Linux kernal it delivers the correct verdict. It is just that, once again, the question at issue is not 'is the mind a thing or a system' but 'what kind of a thing is the mind'. But again, you accept, I take it, that the argument is sound in respect of the mind, yes?
Premise 2 in that argument is clearly false. It is true when you substitute 'our minds' for Linux kernal.
But anyway, it is not clear to me what your point is given that the Linux kernal is indeed not a sensible object. (In this case you have arrived at a correct conclusion by unsound means).
Again, this argument is clearly unsound in a way that it would not be if 'mind' were used instead. Premise 1 is obviously false.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yes. First, the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind - material or immaterial?'
Confusing systems with things is a category error, akin to confusing friendship with a thing. (You could put 'friendship' in the premises of the first argument and get the same result). So you're using the arguments to establish something quite different from what I am using them to establish.
Second, what point are you trying to make? Do you think that the Linux kernal 'is' a sensible object and thus that there must be something fallacious about those arguments? Or do you think that it is not a sensible object and thus you accept the arguments go through? Or do you think that the relevant arguments leave open whether the mind is an object or a system? It is entirely unclear to me what you're trying to show....
You could call it a system if you like, but I wouldn't call it one. The kernel is an abstraction; it's kind of an abstract object. In principle people with minds can "operate" the Linux kernel; abstractly, we could evaluate potential runs of the Linux kernel through a sort of mathematical framework, but in practice that's quite difficult to do, and the purpose of the thing is more in lines with running it on physical machines that implement the abstraction of computers.
Quoting Bartricks
Sure. It's sound. But it also demonstrates something is a bit off with what is being argued. The fact that I can imagine the Linux kernel running on a completely abstract machine with no physicality doesn't really seem like it has any bite to it. It doesn't demonstrate, for example, that there can actually be such a running Linux kernel somewhere, nor does it demonstrate that a machine running the Linux kernel has another kind of "substance" in it.
Quoting Bartricks
"Mind" and "Linux kernel" are two abstract objects-of-thought with referents, neither of which I can hold in my mind at a moment but both of which I can reason with. I see no reason to hold one premise without the other.
Quoting Bartricks
You cannot imagine an abstract computer?
Quoting Bartricks
Perhaps confusing abstractions with substances is a category error.
Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object. It's not an object at all, but a system. But anyway, I am unclear what your point is. I have used an argument to show that minds are not sensible objects. You have used the same argument to show that something else is not a sensible object. What's your point, exactly? That minds 'are' sensible objects after all? Clearly, that wouldn't follow. That minds are systems?
No, that's a category error. Likewise if you propose that minds are abstract objects (whatever one of those may be). Our minds are concrete objects: they are causally effective. The question is what kind of object they are: material or immaterial. And the arguments I am presenting all imply that minds are immaterial objects. I don't yet see any basis for doubting the soundness of any of the arguments and pointing out that the self-same arguments can be used to establish that other things are not sensible objects - such as systems and so on - is not to cast any doubt on their probative force.
I have no idea what you mean by object then. An olive has effects.
No, I have literally no idea how to do that.
I can imagine thinking without there being any sensible objects. And my reason tells me that if I am thinking then I, a thinker, exist. So the combination of being able to conceive of myself thinking in the absence of the existence of a sensible world and the fact my reason assures me that if I am thinking then I, a mind, exist, is what tells me that it is possible for my mind to exist absent all sensible existences.
This doesn't begin to apply to an abstract computer, as I have no idea what one of those is.
Er, yes. Olives aren't abstract objects. It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects.
So, if the Linux thingy has effects, it is not an abstract object. It does, yes? (Not that I actually know what we're talking about here). So it is not an abstract object.
I suggest it is not an object at all, but a system - a network of relationships between things.
But this is all beside the point. The point is that you haven't raised any doubt about the soundness of any of the arguments I have employed (by your own admission!).
You can't show an argument to be unsound by showing that it is sound!
Can you imagine an abstract Game of Life, as in Conway's Game of Life?
Quoting Bartricks
I think we have different conceptions of abstract objects then.
Quoting Bartricks
Can you name an abstract object? Is a number an abstract object?
ETA: 1 is prior to 2; 2 is prior to 3; 3 succeeds 2, 2 succeeds 1. So are numbers systems? Is there an example of an abstract object?
No. I do not know what you're talking about. You're parachuting this word 'abstract' in - what do you mean? I can imagine an olive. Can I imagine an 'abstract' olive? Nope - no idea what that is.
Now a 'game' is not a thing, but an activity. I can imagine activities, though when I do so it is by means of imagining things engaged in the activities. But an 'abstract' activity? I don't know what you mean....
Quoting InPitzotl
I'd say.
But this is thread is not about abstract objects. It is about the mind, which no-one thinks is an abstract object. It is about whether the mind is a material object or an immaterial one.
I have presented 10 arguments - 10! - in support of the view that they are immaterial objects. Do you doubt the soundness of any of them?
Thus it is possible that consciousness is a sensible object without smell or taste or texture or color.
Quoting Bartricks
There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem
Quoting Bartricks
Correct. Because the lump of cheese happens to be one of the sensible things that it makes no sense to ask what they’re feeling. While minds are one of the sensible things for which the question makes sense. In the same way that it makes sense to ask what a mushroom tastes like but not what light particles taste like, even though both are sensible. You just couldn’t understand the argument.
Quoting Bartricks
This assumes determinism. Which is not necessarily the case. And QM makes it unfavorable
Quoting Bartricks
No.
Quoting Bartricks
This is the case. Or else you're just question begging. When asking whether or not the mind is physical or immaterial, that means you don’t know (that the host doesn’t know whether or not Megan is a dog).
Quoting Bartricks
An electron for one. Yes.
Quoting Bartricks
I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).
Quoting Bartricks
But not every sensible object is divisible. Nor is there reason to think they are from armchair musings.
Quoting Bartricks
Because my brain is still churning away. Try to stop that. Then come back and report what happened to “you”.
Quoting Bartricks
You can’t assume idealism, then argue that minds are immaterial. That would not be convincing to anyone who’s not an idealist.
Quoting Bartricks
I would give them a 1-3% chance.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Stop the presses. Back up. We have three kinds of objects that have been described:
Per the above, the mind counts as an object. Material objects, like olives, have effects. Minds have effects. By extension of your arguing that minds are immaterial objects, immaterial objects have effects. But by proxy:
Quoting Bartricks
I now completely reject your definition of an abstract object as special pleading. (You wouldn't accept an argument that the mind cannot be an immaterial object, because it is not an object because it has effects, I would imagine?)
There's a real problem here having to do with what you're arguing. And if you're genuinely concerned with category errors, you should be interested in exploring it. You have proposed a dichotomy... material objects versus immaterial objects. But all you're arguing is that the mind isn't what you classify as a sensible object.
How would you argue against the notion that a mind, whereas it can be imagined without having a body, can nevertheless not exist without a body?
Quoting Bartricks
Yes, but I'm only dealing with these four.
ETA:
Quoting Bartricks
In Conway's Game of Life, the activity is performed on a grid. Each square in the grid is either "alive" or "dead"; those being just states. Those things are abstract; alive has no meaning except metaphorically. There are rules for how the game evolves, but there aren't any players that interact with it... it's just the rules. A live cell with exactly 2 or 3 neighbors is alive in the next step; a dead cell with exactly 3 neighbors is alive in the next step. Those "things", living and dead cells on a grid, are abstractions.
I frankly don't care if you call these "things" abstract objects or not, but your system of attaching arbitrary words to concepts is just a meaningless labeling exercise... the concepts are still there. It most definitely does not make sense to talk about what a living cell in GOL tastes like, or how much it weighs. But likewise, it's kind of meaningless to say that just because a living cell in GOL is not a sensible object, it must be an immaterial one.
Well, no, because consciousness is not an object at all, but a state. It's typical of your sloppiness that you treat consciousness and minds as equivalent, which is as silly as confusing thoughts with thinkers.
Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?). And our reason represents minds to have none of them. That is prima facie evidence that our minds are not sensible objects. Try again.
Quoting khaled
Okaay. You might want to get in touch with the world's philosophy departments and point this out then.
Quoting khaled
Flagrantly question begging. But that's what you do, isn't it? Note too, it is not 'minds' that it makes no sense to ask the 'what is it thinking?' question (jeez!). It is lumps of ham. Psst, whether lumps of ham are minds is what is in dispute....so if you just assume that a lump of ham is a mind, then you've done what those of us with philosophical expertise call 'begging the question'. As for understanding arguments - er, you're just providing us with more evidence, were any needed, of the Dunning and Kruger effect.
Quoting khaled
No it doesn't. The claim that if something comes into being it has a prior cause is not equivalent to causal determinism. My argument is consistent with both determinism and indeterminism and so assumes the truth of neither.
Quoting khaled
Well, I shouldn't have said that 'you' would conclude that Megan was not a dog, for your reasoning skills are so poor that for all I know you might conclude that Megan is the capital of France. But a reasonably intelligent person, upon asking "Is Megan at the party? And are there any dogs at the party?" and receiving the answer "Megan is certainly here, but I am not sure if there are any dogs here" would conclude that Megan was not a dog. Note too that the 'host' is Reason, not 'you'. That you confuse the two is, of course, no surprise as you're no doubt one of these people who thinks that reality is their plaything and all they need to do is assert something and it will be so. Also, maybe learn what 'question begging' means before throwing the term around (presumably you're operating on the principle that if you make the accusation enough, it will eventually be accurate).
Quoting khaled
Electrons are divisible. Your confusing 'currently unable to divide it' with it being metaphysically impossible to divide it. So, for example, atoms were divisible in Roman times, even though Romans couldn't divide them. (I've often wondered who the 'remove from packaging' advice was for on foodstuffs.....I wonder no more).
Quoting khaled
Yes, you could couldn't you. You could bark at the screen too, or smear your dinner all over it. But none of these things would raise a reasonable doubt about the argument's soundness.
Quoting khaled
Yes they are, and yes there is. But nice try! So, go find an armchair and sit in it (remember: your face should face 'out' and not into the back of the chair and your legs should drape over the front lip and not be folded beneath you). And now muse on this: every extended object has a top and a bottom. There has to be some space between the top and the bottom, else the top will be the bottom and vice versa. And that space can be divided. See? Or you could just read what I originally said and realize that any region of space is infinitely divisible and thus any object that occupies some space will be as well, and as any extended object occupies some space, any extended object is infinitely divisible.
Quoting khaled
That's question begging. Note too that I am imagining no sensible object exists - so I am imagining that my brain does not exist. So, I can conceive of myself existing, and my brain not.
Quoting khaled
I didn't 'assume' idealism, I argued for it.
Quoting khaled
Yes, but you're not an expert and I am and furthermore you clearly haven't understood any of them. I'd give them an average of about 60-70% each. Perhaps that's too high - but like I say, at even half that they'd still put the matter close to beyond a reasonable doubt.
The idea that we each have a mind, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.
Quoting Bartricks
Partly because I suspect that arguments like yours would show that this idea leads easily to the fantasies (as they seem to me) of immaterial souls and the like. So I would see your argument, if it works, as a reductio.
I doubt (as also no doubt will you) that I am qualified to offer the kind of stress test of your argument that you seek. I thought I would try instead to see if there was any chance of making you doubt the premise, getting you to appreciate the possibility that animals might evolve without acquiring any non-physical aspect or component, but then also in certain cases be able and inclined to think the opposite.
I thought one reason you might entertain such a scenario could be that mechanical robots are (or soon will be) a clear case of rational-but-mindless-if-not-in-a-manner-of-speaking. So the scenario would merely be that of the evolution of a kind of animal with similar functionality to a machine. And evolution has proved adept at producing biological machinery of almost limitless complexity, so the scenario wouldn't seem implausible.
But you say you take "rational" as already implying possession of a mind (in more than a manner of speaking). And I expect you will feel the same way about "think". So for you (or other dualists) I would probably need to sketch the scenario in terms like "computational" and "compute": an animal able and inclined to compute statements implying that it had a mind (in more than a manner of speaking).
So you're a bot?
Ah, I see. So because you already know how things are with reality and my arguments contradict your understanding, my arguments must be faulty.
It seems you think you're God. But you also think you don't have a mind. Hmm. Methinks you're confused.
Quoting bongo fury
How do you doubt something without a mind? Do you think doubts can exist all by themselves, just drifting around like clouds?
Why are you mentioning animals? And yes, if there actually are any extended sensible objects then I accept entirely the possibility that a sensible body might evolve without there being any soul inside it. I mean, you're one by your own admission.
No, I said I suspect your argument is valid.
Quoting Bartricks
It's about beliefs facing the tribunal of experience as a corpus. That's why I might be just as inclined to judge premises from the conclusion of a valid argument as the other way round.
Quoting Bartricks
But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour.
Quoting Bartricks
Cool... an animal body able to compute statements implying it had a mind in more than a manner of speaking?
Quoting Bartricks
Yes, good definition of a bot: a typist without a mind in a manner of speaking.
Incidentally, I think the appropriate manner of speaking (which disqualifies any present-day bot) is to imply skill in the social game of agreeing (or disagreeing) about which words and pictures are being pointed at which objects out in the world.
I'd like a clear answer to this, too.
But you think they're unsound, though. And yet your only basis for doing so is that they lead to a conclusion that you judge to involve a fantasy of an immaterial soul. But whether it is a fantasy to think we have an immaterial soul is precisely the issue, and my arguments appear to demonstrate that it is not. Of course, if one just decides - as you seem to have - that our minds are not souls, then they will be powerless to move you. But then you're the fantasist, as you're deciding how things are with reality and then closing your mind to evidence to the contrary. I don't understand that attitude at all.
Quoting bongo fury
What do you mean? Do you mean you do have a mind or that you don't? I mean, you are thinking things, right? And thoughts are mental states. So you have a mind. A mind is just whatever is doing that thinking and desiring and so on.
No, the premise I'm deciding to explicitly deny is that we have things called minds, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.
Quoting Bartricks
To be fair, I think I'm maintaining a reasonably coherent worldview and finding I can consistently deny what seems to you an undeniable axiom.
Quoting Bartricks
I added this, above:
Quoting bongo fury
Quoting Bartricks
Again, only in a manner of speaking:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/433444
What's confused about it? I somehow decide to raise my arm, then I act of my volition to raise it. Then, the arm moves. The arm is definitely material. If the decision and will are mind, and the mind is immaterial, then the immaterial would be affecting the material.
The Gut-Brain bilateral communication Axis is accepted by science. The idea that the "brain" controls everything is antiquated, and I'm surprised people still believe that everything is happening in the brain. It's happening everywhere.
There is no such thing as materiality. Everything is quantum energy waves. Again, another myth that was destroyed 100 years still lives in the domain of philosophical discussion.
But he's not asking for evidence of interaction, he's asking 'how' it can happen, which is quite different.
Now that question is confused in this context for several reasons. First, you do not need to be able to explain 'how' something is happening in order to have evidence that it is happening. Second, it is not clear what's wanted in terms of an answer. Those who ask the question will never be satisfied with anything one says, for what they really want is a purely material explanation of interaction between the material and immaterial. Third, as I explained earlier, even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't provide evidence that the mind is material
Still waiting for your answer to
Sure, but we're facing a claim that the mind is immaterial. And we know of multiple kinds of interactions between the physical and the mind... it's not just that I can lift my arm; I can also see things based on the light entering my eyes; not to mention the modulation of mental states by drugs. It's enough in the face of a claim of immateriality to ask what it even means to claim that the mind is immaterial in the first place.
I have explained why the question is misguided in this context. Those who ask it demonstrate by their asking of it that they simply do not understand the dialectic and are therefore below the level of intelligence needed for fruitful debate.
Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? And do you understand that even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't imply the mind is material?
Scientists aren't investigating the matter at all. Saying 'there's no material world, coz it's all waves' is as confused as saying 'there's no materiality, as everything is made of tiny bananas, not tiny apples'.
And saying the mind is everywhere is to assert a confused materialist view of the mind.
The question here is whether the mind is material or immaterial. This is not a question investigated by science. Philosophy isn't backward science. And science isn't sophisticated science.
There is no such thing as materiality, other than in philosophical discussions, which is perpetuated by ba very poor educational system that is too lazy to change its textbooks fire 100 years. Professors just keep repeating the same thing that have learned, whether or not it is archaic. Mind/body duality is an artificial issue created by a misunderstanding of the nature of life.
Well it's consistent with this:
Quoting Bartricks
...but I think my problem here goes a bit deeper. You're entirely correct... not having an explanation for how the immaterial interacts with the material isn't proof that the mind isn't material. But if you're going to advance the burden "prove I'm wrong" on the material theory of mind, you should be held to the same standard in your proofs of its immateriality. By that light, we have this:
Argument 1: That our minds have no color, smell, texture, or taste is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 2: That our minds have particular properties of thought is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 3: That our minds are indubitable is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 9: That our minds can be imagined without bodies is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
...versus this:
Argument A: That our minds react to physical entities through our senses is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument B: That our minds can cause physical actions to occur is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument C: That chemical interactions with the brain appear to modulate mental states is evidence that our minds are material
...then the second set looks a bit better than the former set, unless we build some straw version of materialism where the Linux kernel, not having a weight, taste, or color, is immaterial (or any of other variants applied to args 2, 3, 4).
The reason you need an explanation for how the immaterial mind interacts with the material is because the entire first set seems to be too easily dismissed. All of your arguments have the same issues; no materialist would have a problem with the mind not having a taste, for example, so it's hard to see these arguments as anything but a straw man. But we all agree that you shouldn't drive under the influence of sleeping pills, for some reason.
It's not that a lack of explanation here somehow proves you're wrong. It's that there's a lack of things seriously suggesting you're right. If a belief in the material mind requires valid justification, shouldn't a belief in the immaterial mind as well?
You, for instance, seem entirely ignorant of the fact that materialism was refuted by philosophers thousands of years ago.
They should teach philosophy in schools and that might go some way towards remedying things.
No it isn't. Obviously. What did I just say? I just said that 'even if' two objects of different kinds are incapable of causal interaction, that does 'not' show that the mind is material.
'There's a tree outside my window'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? Er, no, obviously. (Typical response of someone on this kind of thread - but what's a window?)
'Two objects of different kinds can't causally interact'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? No.
Quoting InPitzotl
That's not what I said. I said not having an explanation of how something is occurring is not evidence it is not occurring.
It's a distinct point. I don't know how this computer is working. Is that evidence it is not working. No.
So, 'if' I don't know how the mind and body interact, that is not evidence that they do not interact.
Here's a completely different point: if immaterial things can't interact with material things, that's not evidence that the mind is material. This argument, in other words, is obviously invalid:
1. Material things can't causally interact with immaterial things
2. Therefore, the mind is material
Quoting InPitzotl
Yes, I provided 10 arguments. Each argument has premises that are far more plausible than their negations. If you think otherwise, show me wrong. If each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the proposition is shown to be 99.9% likely to be true. That's a proof, yes? If someone constructs a case for the truth of a proposition that establishes its likelihood as 99.9%, then they have proved the proposition according to the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' meaning of proof.
Quoting InPitzotl
Er, no. The second set are all question begging. Look: do any of my arguments have a premise that asserts the immateriality of the mind? No. They all 'conclude' that it is immaterial.
Now, construct arguments that 'conclude' the mind is material and then let's look at the premises you need to get there.
Philosophers don't refute. They present ideas based upon observations.
Arguments don't refute or prove. They simply restate the premise.
I meant mind. Stop nitpicking.
Quoting Bartricks
What sensible property do electrons have? Or photons of light? Or quantum wave functions?
Quoting Bartricks
A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one.
Quoting Bartricks
False. Whether minds are lumps of something sensible is what is in dispute. We can both agree lumps of ham don't have minds.
My point still stands:
Quoting khaled
It makes sense to wonder how heavy a piece of paper is, but not how heavy light is. Even though both are sensible objects. In the same way, minds can be sensible, and also be such that it makes sense to wonder what they think, but not what rocks think.
Quoting Bartricks
But that wasn't the claim being made. The claim being made was:
Quoting Bartricks
And I responded: Not necessarily. A quantum wave function can do something that does NOT trace to external causes, because it was random. Sensible objects can cause things without tracing to external causes.
And besides, even if your claim was that if something comes into being it has prior cause, what's your proof for that? My reply would again be: Not necessarily. Example: Big bang.
Quoting Bartricks
And that reasonably intelligent person would be wrong. He does not have sufficient evidence. As you said yourself:
Quoting Bartricks
Which has to be the case. If you follow the analogy, here you want to know "Is the mind a material thing?". You ask the host (reason) "Hey, is the mind present". The host replies "Yes". You ask him "Are material objects present". He replies "Maybe".
Given that you were asking the question in the first place we have to assume that your reason doesn't present the answer (or else you wouldn't be asking the question). So your reason (the host) doesn't know whether or not the mind is a material thing, despite knowing that it is present and that material things may be present. So you don't have enough evidence to conclude from that that the mind is not material.
I would suggest you stop wasting half a paragraph attacking me when you don't understand what I'm saying. It just makes you look like an idiot.
Quoting Bartricks
Yes I could. And with as much evidence and credibility as you use for your argument: None.
Quoting Bartricks
We were talking about sensible objects. Not extended objects. So there ends your line of reasoning. To say "extended object" is to already assume it's divisible.
Quoting Bartricks
No, I'm saying there could be things that are metaphysically impossible to divide. An electron is a good candidate.
Quoting Bartricks
Describe to me what you're imagining then. No wonder you specifically can imagine being without a brain!
Well I read this:
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
But "material" has to mean something, and it has to mean something sensible, else all statements you make about what is and what isn't material are either meaningless or irrelevant. Let's phrase it this way... suppose I invoke Laplace's "I had no need for that hypothesis" idiom here. Well, all of the interactions between the mind and the physical are consistent with the mind being a function of what a brain is doing. Yes, that doesn't mean the mind isn't immaterial, but the bigger question here is, what is the need for that hypothesis?
Quoting Bartricks
I don't see what you're correcting here.
Quoting Bartricks
The computer scenario isn't analogous; nobody is arguing minds don't work, and nobody is arguing the mind and body doesn't interact. You're claiming the mind is immaterial. But we know the mind interacts physically in multiple ways. So if it's immaterial, that immaterial thing is interacting in quite a lot of ways similar to how a material thing interacts with the physical. It's a fair question, then, what it even means to presume said mind is immaterial. Again, what is the need for that hypothesis?
Quoting Bartricks
You've mentioned this multiple times, as if it's making a point, but I'm not convinced that this should be all that surprising. Suppose I had a giant hat; I passed it to everyone in this forum, and I asked them to write one argument either for the mind being material, or for it being immaterial, and slip it into the hat. Once I've collected the arguments, I draw 10 arguments from the hat. What do you suppose the probability is that all 10 of those arguments would be for the mind being immaterial? I would gather that probability would be incredibly low.
Now contrast that with what you keep claiming you accomplished. In this case, you yourself are writing all 10 arguments. Then we draw those only-10 arguments out of that hat. So what is the probability that out of those 10 arguments, all of them would both (a) be for the mind being immaterial, (b) be convincing to you? I would gather the probability of that happening would be somewhere near 100%.
Now, I note that you stand by all ten of your arguments. But I've specifically chosen to talk about four of them; the four I have chosen have a single thing in common. They can all be applied to absurdly argue that the Linux kernel is immaterialistic. But I note you're standing by all ten of your arguments as being more believable than not, and those four I've shown lead to this absurdity are certainly parts of that set of 10. So I think that suffices to show there's a problem here somewhere.
It's not nitpicking. You confused a mental state with a mind. That's a huge mistake. It's a category error. You should be ashamed of yourself.
Quoting khaled
The first two have shapes, and I have no idea what a quantum wave function is.
Btw, which premise in which of my arguments are you trying to challenge?
Quoting khaled
Me too. So?
Quoting khaled
Ham, bone, gristle, blood, whatever. Same applies. But well done for missing the point.
Quoting khaled
Straw man. I did not claim that a sensible object has all the sensible properties. But it at least makes sense to wonder what other sensible properties it might have. So, I tell you that a hibbledip has a square shape. It now makes sense for you to wonder what colour it has, what texture it has, and so on. If it is transparent, then it does not have a colour. But it still made sense to wonder what colour it had.
By contrast, it makes no apparent sense to wonder what sensible properties a mind has.
If it did make apparent sense to wonder about such matters, then philosophy of mind wouldn't exist.
Quoting khaled
No, because all you'd be doing is saying something. And that's not evidence. By contrast, my argument appeals to a self-evident truth of reason, one that is discussed to this day (it's known as the 'existence condition' and it probably made its first appearance in the works of Epicurus).
This seems to be something ignorant narcissists have a problem with: they can't distinguish between things they say and self-evident truths of reason, for at some level they think they're god and all they need to do is say 'no' and it will be so.
Quoting khaled
It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states. The latter is an idealist position and if it is true, then minds are immaterial and my case is won. However, if sensible objects are extended objects, then it becomes a matter of debate whether minds are such objects. But again, congratulations on not understanding the dialectic.
Quoting khaled
Yes, I obviously agree that there are things it is metaphysically impossible to divide, namely minds. I don't know what an electron is. If it is an extended thing, then it is not a good candidate but a shit one. If it is not extended, then it may not be divisible. But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing. So, shit either way really.
Quoting khaled
Thinking while not being subject to any sensible experiences.
If the mind is not the brain, then why would consuming alcohol change the way the mind works - and change it more, the more one drinks? Why would one experience lowered inhibitions, increased clumsiness, impaired judgement and loss of memory if the mind were not a consequence of bodily functions? Does alcohol contain some sort of spiritual intoxicant - that effects the immaterial mind?
:up:
Quoting Bartricks
You're making that stupid argument. Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does.
A causes B, does not mean A 'is' B. I mean, by your logic, my mind is alcohol. After all, drinking alcohol causes mental events.....therefore alcohol is mental events. Therefore my mind is, what, the bottle?
Note: if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is alcohol' is a good argument, then I can't argue with you as you're below the threshold level of intelligence needed for coherent debate to occur.
Likewise if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my brain, which then causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is my brain' is a good argument (obviously).
One substance with two aspects – a Thought-aspect and Extension-aspect (synchronized) in parallel, or complementary descriptions of the dynamics of each other (i.e. 'ideas of movements' & 'movements of ideas', respectively). "Mind" does not control "Body" or vice versa; they are complementary attributions (i.e. coin-faces) and not separate substances (i.e. different coins) which is the cartesian premise of the MBP.
I don't say or suggest that the mind is the brain. Rather, the mind is the content and consequence of the functioning of the brain. That's why, when we drink alcohol - it effects the mind. Because it effects the brain. So either, what you are saying, when you say:
Quoting Bartricks
...is trivial, because you only seem to be saying something that you're not actually saying. Or, you're wrong. If you accept that the mind is the content, and consequence of the functioning of the brain, then what you're saying is trivial. But if you're saying that the mind exists independently of the brain - as you seem to be saying, then you're wrong, because of the effects of alcohol on the mind.
Not really. https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/02/07/what-is-the-shape-of-an-electron/
Quoting Bartricks
This:
Quoting Bartricks
Quantum wave functions, electrons, and many other things in the physics of small things have no sensible properties (color, smell, taste, shape). Yet we call them physical. Unless you want to distinguish between physical and sensible now, and claim something like "electrons are not sensible objects"
But typical of you to miss the point and require me to remind you...
Quoting Bartricks
Then you are lying or were lying:
Quoting Bartricks
You claim that there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview, I reply that most people don't think there is such a problem, then you reply that you don't think there is just a problem? If you didn't think there was such a problem why would you point out that there are people who do. What kind of argument is that?
Quoting Bartricks
Nor did I. Nor is that required for what I said. You just missed the point.
Quoting Bartricks
It is not something one arrives at by reason. Whether or not one experiences pain at the moment of death is an empirical question. No contradictions arise if the answer is "yes" or if the answer is "no" that are not just definitional.
Quoting Bartricks
The irony is too funny....
Quoting Bartricks
False dichotomy. They can not be extended and also not be subjective states. See: Quantum wave function. Or even electron.
It's you who doesn't understand.
Quoting Bartricks
Not surprised...
Quoting Bartricks
It goes against premise 2 of argument 8. There are sensible objects that are not divisible. So it is not true that if a sensible object exists that it is infinitely divisible. Is it clear enough for you now?
I'm seriously getting tired of having to remind you where the argument is. All the while you accuse me of not understanding the dialectic.....
Quoting Bartricks
And you think this is possible without a brain?
See my earlier comment.
How does that challenge my premise? If they don't have sensible qualities, then they're not sensible objects, duh.
Quoting khaled
Well, you need to be above a certain level of intelligence (quite low, embarrassingly) to realize that everything I said was true and consistent.
Quoting khaled
No, you missed the point. You need to say something that challenges a premise.
Quoting khaled
No it isn't and no they can't. An electron is extended, and a Quantum wave function is something you need to say more about. For if it is a 'function' then it is not a thing at all, but, you know, a function.
Quoting khaled
No, because if what you're talking about is an unextended indivisible thing, then it won't be a counterexample to anything I've argued, because I'm arguing that minds are unextended things.
Here's how we're arguing:
Me: Ps are Qs because they are Rs and all Rs are Qs.
You: But you're wrong because Ts are Rs.
Me: Yes, Ts are Rs. How does that do anything to challenge what I said? I said Ps are Qs, because Ps are Rs and all Rs are Qs. How does pointing out that there are Ts that are Rs challenge that Ps are Qs?
You: because it does.
Me: Erm, it doesn't.
Right, so to keep your hypothesis intact you will make it so that "sensible" is different from physical/material. So electrons are no longer sensible, even though they are a subject of study in physics.
Quoting Bartricks
It's consistent but misleading. I didn't say it's inconsistent. I said you are likely lying. Why else would you say "there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview" when you yourself don't see that problem. Either you're lying about not seeing the problem, lying about it being thought that there is such a problem or.... what? Why else would you say that sentence? Are you making some sort of argument from popularity? "Some people think there is a problem here, which is evidence that I am correct. Note I personally don't think there is a problem here, but I will cite it as evidence anyways". That's idiotic if that's what you're doing. Consistent, but idiotic.
Quoting Bartricks
No it isn't and I've provided a link.
Quoting Bartricks
You misunderstand as usual. No, the claim isn't that Ts are Rs. By your analogy the claim would be "But actually, not all Rs are Qs, there are Rs that are not Qs, such as electrons". Not all sensible objects (Rs) are infinitely divisible or have infinite parts (Qs).
But to you, it is definitional that if an object is sensible it has infinite parts. In which case you would have to argue that electrons aren't sensible objects, although they're physical. Most people use "sensible" to mean "physical" or "material". But in your system there is: Material stuff, Sensible (a subset of the former) stuff, and Immaterial stuff. It’s just too much. And you end up with “light is not sensible”
And more problematically, all your arguments conclude that minds are not sensible. But again, you have to distinguish between sensible and physical/material. So you can have it be that minds are not sensible but are still material (like an electron). So you don’t get “immaterial” anyways necessarily, even if your arguments make sense.
And I noticed you dropped the objection to the 4th premise of the 4rd argument (that if you are a sensible object everything you do traces to external causes). You would rather avoid responding to an argument than admit you have no response. Dishonest and pathetic.
Anyways, you seem incapable of responding to or even recognizing critiques of your position so I won't waste any more time trying to help you. Furthermore, you’re dishonest, so there is really no use. (Ohhhh boy here comes the dunning kruger :roll: )
I don't buy that the argument is stupid. You're just nay-saying it. Let's look at why it's allegedly stupid:
Quoting Bartricks
Well, it doesn't follow. But that doesn't imply it's stupid to conclude it. I see something outside my window that looks like my car parked in my driveway. It doesn't logically follow that my car is parked in my driveway; but that's still a good reason to believe my car is parked in my driveway.
If the mind is a product of the brain, I would expect brain impairment to correspond with mind impairment. If it's not a product of the brain, I simply have no such expectations. But it appears that brain impairment correlates to mind impairment; so it "looks like" our mind is a product of our brain. That the mind is a product of the brain doesn't logically follow, but that it looks like the mind is a product of the brain is a perfectly fine reason to suspect that it is.
Probably the best analysis of the nature of the soul, ever written, is found in Plato's Phaedo. The idea that the brain is the cause of the mind, is very similar to the harmony theory. The material parts exist in a way which creates a harmony, and the harmony is the soul. But this theory is demonstrated as deficient because it cannot account for the reason why the parts exist in such a way as to be in harmony rather than dissonant.
So the theory needs to be inverted such that each material part, in itself, as an organized existent, is a harmony, and the cause of that harmony is something immaterial. This is what Aristotle takes as his starting point in "On the Soul". A living being is an organized material body. The cause of the organization, which manifests as the material body, is the soul. We can conclude therefore, that the soul, being prior to the material body as cause of it, is immaterial.
180, I'm surprised you don't know this, did you forget Physiology 101? Emotions are the nexus between the mind and matter. Next question (?).
LOL
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/513676
If loving you is wrong, then I want to be right LOL
But seriously, emotions are the nexus between the mind and matter. Have you studied pathology? The mind controls the body, yes?
A little Karma goes a long way. Are you unable to answer the question?
LOL
How am I dishonest? And yes, obviously 'Dunning and Kruger'.
Quoting khaled
No, only if a sensible object is understood to be an extended object. So if materialism rather than immaterialism is assumed in respect of sensible objects. Of course, the word 'object' is a bit misleading if they are understood to be immaterial, as they're not so much objects as activities of a mind. But meh. The point, though, is that immaterial sensible objects wouldn't present any counterexample to my case, as I'm concluding that minds are immaterial. And electrons are extended in space and I'm not following any link you provide as it will not be to a philosophical paper, but a wikipedia page which, for all I can tell, will probably be written by you.
It is also not 'definitional' that an extended object has infinite parts, it is just clearly going to be the case. But well done for misusing words you Dunning Krugerite you.
Quoting khaled
Where? I stand by that premise: if there are any extended things (and there aren't - see one of my arguments for a demonstration), then they have all come into being.
Alcohol causes mind to feel happy, therefore mind is alcohol. That's stupid, yes? That's the same argument.
1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind
1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind
Same argument. And it's stupid. And those who think it's a good argument are being stupid. Unfortunately you have to stop being that stupid to realize how stupid it is.
Quoting InPitzotl
Er, that's not remotely the same argument. Again, I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it is. But then I have trouble understanding how anyone can think the original one is a good argument, so I suppose someone who thinks it is a good argument will likely think it the same as a completely different argument.
It's not the same argument.
Quoting Bartricks
Again, you're just nay-saying. You're phrasing this in terms of deduction; but we're applying evidence and induction. Variable substitution doesn't work in evidence. If I find a bloody knife on the floor next to the victim, there's a good chance it was the murder weapon. By contrast, if I find a bloody banana on the floor next to the victim, there's no chance it was the murder weapon.
The brain is the bloody knife. Alcohol is just a bloody banana.
Quoting Bartricks
That's irrelevant. It doesn't logically follow. You were ranting about how things not logically following means it's stupid, and how you can't see how anyone would think it would logically follow. It never occurred to you that this was proper induction.
Now you're just covering yourself, and comparing bloody knives to bloody bananas.
No, I'm saying that they're exactly the same argument. Which they are. X causes Y, therefore X is Y. It's stupid.
But like I say, if you think they're not the same argument, then I'm not surprised you think one of them is a good argument!
Quoting InPitzotl
Forgive me, but I don't think you have a clue what does and doesn't follow.
1. "The knife is the murder weapon" becomes "the banana is the murder weapon" by variable substitution.
2. "The knife is the murder weapon" is a viable theory.
3. "The banana is the murder weapon" is not a viable theory.
4. Therefore, viability of inductive theories is not preserved by substitution.
And that's confirmed what I thought - you don't have a clue what follows from what, or what it takes for one argument to be the same as another.
So educate me.
Tell me how it works with the body, next to the bloody knife and the bloody banana.
ETA: Are the knife-murder weapon and banana-murder weapon theories on equal ground? If not, why not? According to you, it should be the same argument, so if it's stupid to think a banana is a murder weapon, it should be stupid to think a knife is.
Not sure I am up to the job.
This argument:
1. Brain event causes mental event
2. Therefore brain event is mental event
is stupid, yes? The conclusion doesn't follow.
Given me an argument in support of the thesis that mental events are brain events (and thus that the mind is the brain) and I'll tell you if it is stupid or not.
No, it's not stupid. Yes, it doesn't follow.
I see a body. Blood everywhere. There's a bloody knife next to the body. There's a bloody banana next to the body.
1. It does not follow that the banana is the murder weapon.
2. It does not follow that the knife is the murder weapon.
3. It is stupid to suspect the banana to be the murder weapon.
4. It is not stupid to suspect the knife to be the murder weapon.
Quoting Bartricks
But you're biased. Any reasonable person would agree with the statements above.
But if we agree with these statements, that means we have to disagree on the equivalence of the arguments. So it's no wonder you avoid explicitly talking about bloody bananas.
No matter. I've made the bloody banana the elephant in the room.
No, it is stupid. And yes, it doesn't follow.
Why the hell are you talking about knives and bananas? That's not the same argument at all. Not even remotely. Are you on something or do you actually think you're making sense? Sorry matey, but you're beyond my help. You need medication, not education.
Why are these the same argument?
Quoting Bartricks
Here's what you need to do. Present an argument -a deductively valid argument - that has 'therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion. Do that. I won't hold my breath.
I don't need you to think for me. Let me answer since you're avoiding it.
Those two allegedly are the same argument because you've done a substitution.
Quoting Bartricks
Wrong tool. This isn't about deduction. This is about evidence.
We're going in circles. You phrase a perfectly valid inductive argument as a deductive argument, and argue that it's stupid on the basis that it doesn't follow.
That's sophistry.
You really do. But as I say at points like this, Dunning and Kruger. Dunning. And. Kruger.
Quoting InPitzotl
Ah, someone who's done all their learning on the internet. Inductive arguments are not 'valid'. 'Cogent' is the word you're looking for.
The argument was stupid. Someone who thinks it isn't shares that quality with the argument.
Now, do you have a deductively valid argument that has 'Therefore my mind is my brain' as a conclusion? You don't do you? So why are you still here?
Again, you're just nay-saying. The Dunning Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where a person's meta-cognitive awareness of an area is low, and as a result they overestimate their knowledge in the subject.
That does not apply here. What you're doing is building straw men out of valid inductive arguments.
Quoting Bartricks
But Bartricks... the mind-is-a-function-of-the-brain argument is inductive. Your attempts to conflate the inductive argument with a deductive one is a straw man.
Quoting Bartricks
Mmmm.
Stop misusing ugly phrases.
Quoting InPitzotl
Yeah, thanks, I know what it is.
Quoting InPitzotl
It really does.
Quoting InPitzotl
You could turn it into a deductively valid argument if you knew how. (Oh, and well done for making a category error too, just for good measure).
And don't thank me for giving you the word 'cogent'.
Sure. Add a premise near the claim you want to make and presume it. But that exercise is pointless unless you're rationalizing. The point of induction is to try to let the evidence guide you, not to try to derive what you already want to claim.
You didn't know that inductive arguments are 'cogent' not 'valid'.
Dunning. And. Kruger.
Now, once more: what's your argument? Lay it out for all to see, and then I'll take you to the cleaners.
But leave it. I can see you have your hands full fulminating.
Purrrrr.
Doubtless you are quite right, since brains are quite a different things to minds. Arguing that minds are brains would be like arguing that flight was wings, or guts were digestion. It would be confusing the thing done with the thing doing.
Has anyone suggested otherwise?
Goodness, who set out such a ridiculous argument? How silly of them.
Sorry it took so long to reply; I had to go on the internet and hurriedly look this up:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKQOk5UlQSc
Quoting Bartricks
You seem to be a bit confused. I'm not arguing for the mind being material. I'm arguing that you're rationalizing instead of reasoning.
1. Brain events cause mental events
2. Therefore brain events are mental events
shares a property with you. I don't click on links, but good luck with your continuing youtube education programme. Everyone knows that professional philosophers spend most of their days making youtube videos.
Well, no - obviously a bat can cause a ball to move; and they are, obviously, different kinds of objects.
Quoting Bartricks
...but as you pointed out, brains are soggy, grey things and mental events are quite different.
Funny thing is, when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.
Quoting Bartricks
Indeed, as you pointed out, and as I agreed.
But when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.
Quoting Bartricks
Indeed; nor necessary; it's obvious twaddle. The bat moves the ball.
Quoting Bartricks
Exactly.
But when I decide to move my hand, my hand moves.
Quoting Bartricks
Would it? But what about the bat and the ball? They are different kinds of objects, but one can move the other...
Quoting Bartricks
Ah. Immaterial brains.
Can you have still them crumbed and deep fried?
Quoting Bartricks
You may be hanging out with the wrong people, then.
Quoting Bartricks
Sure. But when I decide to move my hand, the damn thing still moves...
Quoting Bartricks
Widespread? Goodness, I hadn't noticed.
There is, of corse, the large and growing literature about how our hands are linked to our brains and how moving one's hand is dependent on nerves in the body and brain, and the considerable growth in Neuroscience. But of course, these folk are not the ones you have been listening to.
Quoting Bartricks
There is? What, all those ghost stories?
Self-evident to our reason. SO much better than it being self-evident to anything else. And it makes sense to wonder about the colour, smell, and texture of those crumbed, fried brains.
Mind you, some minds are more sensible than others.
This set me to wondering if it made sense to wonder what an insensible object thinks. Or perhaps, what a downright silly object might think.
I do like olives. Even with crumbed, deep fried brains.
Again, I'm not sure all our minds are not sensible. I've met some folk who seem quite practical and realistic.
That Des Cartes fellow - he said something about not doubting one's mind. Did he argue that no one was sensible?
And I've seen objects that are really quite silly, so there exist some objects that are not sensible. SO it seems to me that not all things that exist dubitably are sensible.
If your reason implies that your mind is not sensible, perhaps you ought not pay so much attention to your mind?
If instead you are morally irresponsible, would that imply that everything you do traces to external causes? And if not everything you do traces to external courses, and hence you are irresponsible, does that mean you are not sensible?
Goodness this is good. I am learning so much.
I think that sometimes one can be quite valuable while being silly. Monty Python, for example, or Spike Milligan. If they were being sensible they would not be worth watching, would they?
AH, I see; so if you are not sensible, you are indivisible? But silly people tend to fall about, so that does not seem quite right.
Quoting Bartricks
We exist at the same time as our sensible bodies? SO if we are silly we cease to exist? And if we are not our sensible bodies, are we then our silly bodies?
Quoting Bartricks
SO... if an object has only a finite number of parts, it is not sensible... and hence silly?
It pleases me that you can exist apart from being sensible - seems to me that you have shown how being silly is very important. Quoting Bartricks
SO... let me see if I have this: Silly objects don't hang about in bundles; absent minded bears are sensational. therefor silly objects are not sensational. Minds are not sensible and hence silly.
Hence... objects are bears?
Quoting Bartricks
Ah, so mind doesn't matter. Just as well, if all minds are silly.
If mind is utterly different from matter, how can this be?
Quoting InPitzotl
Quoting Bartricks
I just had to pause with this one.
Okay, if you don't click on the video, maybe I'll quote you some relevant snippets.
Bartricks, you're biased. You've started to fantasize about what is on my side of the keyboard. You took it a step further and started to fantasize about the video. Then you started refuting the video... one that you claimed you didn't watch, but I can absolutely assure you that you didn't watch, because that alleged professional philosopher you were trying to attack in that video? He doesn't exist. He's your fantasy.
But that's not the reality. The reality is, you have 10 bad arguments in this thread, and all you're doing is rationalizing them. This thread isn't about properly reasoning about the nature of the mind:
Quoting Bartricks
...it's about your fantasies of taking the opposition to the cleaners. Your fantasies are getting in the way of your making good arguments.
Your fantasies about me are as accurate as Sherlock's fantasies about Watson. Your response to the video is kind of self mocking. I am choosing to let you in on the joke, because at this point it's just cruel.
Quoting Bartricks
I'm curious. What is the inductive argument that "deductive" argument is a rephrasing of? And who made it?
Bartricks! Is this another fantasy?
I do agree that you're no mathematician.
If I have 5,000 pieces of evidence that if any are true would prove the existence of Bigfoot, I cannot assign a probability value of truth to each item and from that declare Bigfoot exists based upon the overwhelming amount of questionable evidence. What we'd be looking for in our box of Bigfoot evidence is a single photo, a single DNA sample, or a single piece of evidence that withstands scrutiny and proves his existence. In fact, what I I should do is take each piece of evidence and closely examine it one at a time, and if I notice by the 3,000th piece that each has failed under close scrutiny, I can reasonably conclude that I likely have a box of useless pieces of evidence and that Bigfoot doesn't exist.
The point being that no amount of bad evidence that Bigfoot exists or that the recent election was rigged can be elevated into statistical proof of the opposite: that a truckload of bad evidence = solid proof.