Philosophy vs. real life
In short:
Officially, in philosophy, it's about the power of the argument.
Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. In the real world, the argument from power is always the most powerful one, "criticial thinking" be damned.
But philosophers are aware of that, are they not?
So why do they still advocate for criticial thinking?
Officially, in philosophy, it's about the power of the argument.
Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. In the real world, the argument from power is always the most powerful one, "criticial thinking" be damned.
But philosophers are aware of that, are they not?
So why do they still advocate for criticial thinking?
Comments (39)
Thrasymachus returns.
Who won the race? “Thrasymachus!”, do you dare?
Philosophers (at least in Ancient Greece) wanted two important things with the power of arguments: ethics and happiness.
Nevertheless, the real life that is like a jungle, only wins the argument from the power doesn’t matter if it is empty.
Darwinism rules!
The Uber-powerful don't require your critical reasoning when it comes to doing what they tell you to do. It just requires your obedience. But you vs. the top dog isn't the only relationship you have. In many contexts, critical thinking is essential. The top dogs expect their minions to solve problems, and for that you need to think.
Another thing you need to think about critically is what answer the top dog wants. Guess wrong, and it's off with your head.
Likewise, even the famous and powerful would like to know that their views are actually right, and they're not just being constantly lied to by yes-men. (Even this is a trope of its own: a powerful person appreciating the uninhibited honestly of someone, after growing tired of never getting anything but vacuous agreement from everyone).
Rational argument is how they can find out whether they really are right, and so is something to be valued even by those who can appeal to other power to otherwise get what they want.
Quoting Wayfarer
Although Wayfarer is probably sarcastic, I am not on the opinion that the statement is incorrect. The answer to your question is, that arguments have power, because they are product of the argument in power, as you put it. Dispute and argument sometimes appease the necessity. And sometimes there are other more direct ways to deal with certain contexts that employ order automatically, even if it isn't of the antropocentric mental kind. Sometimes, there are simply more effective ways to debate then to talk, and more effective ways to argue, then to explain. But conversant eloquence and sophisticated sense of resolution through human reason has some place. If I am not misreading Wayfarer's previous remarks on this forum, they would similarly interpret the existence of reason as being sourced at the ultimate power of nature as well.
[quote=Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason]In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature – even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man – frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy.[/quote]
I agree with much, but probably not the conclusion. I agree that sometimes evolutionary biology is wrongly ascribed as resolution of philosophy, ethics, or something else of that nature. Nonetheless, even as pure empiricism, stating the obvious, i.e. what can be will be, it can be argument for expressing judgement on the utility, plausibility, or feasibility in our ethical and philosophical interrelations. Assuming that we are biological entities, of course, and not substance-dual, it can also emphasize the need for the various collective and personal compromises, i.e. the tradeoffs inherent in our decisions.
As theory of guidance of life through genocidal adversity, I am not sure that evolutionary biology is actually so spiritually abject. It is indeed absent of benevolent antropocentric antropomorphic character, but it still allows people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency, even under the belief in dystheistic higher order, and the caustic implications.
I wouldn't imbue 'it' (evolutionary biology) with agency in this way. Culture and society allow people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency.
And to tie this with the OP question: Would you say that philosophers advocate for critical thinking in an effort to seek dignity and decency?
Could you sketch out the difference, please?
Obviously, there are several ways to interpret "critical thinking". In the OP, I was referring to critical thinking as it is usually understood in modern secular academic textbooks about the topic (notably, in textbooks about informal logic and informal logical fallacies). But beyond that, people tend to have diverse ideas about what comprises "critical thinking" (e.g. I've seen Bahais argue that if one thinks critically, one will see that Bahaullah is the prophet of God).
The background assumptions of Greek were still formed by near universal belief in spirits that animated the world (in Plato's philosophy 'the demiorgos'), notwithstanding the naturalist tendencies that began to appear. Many elements of Greek philosophy became absorbed in Christian theology in the form of Christian Platonism, which in many ways was or is the mainstream of Western philosophy ('philosophy as footnotes to Plato', as Whitehead said).
So critical thinking, in ancient philosophy, aimed to discern formal and final causes, the broadest class of reasons for the existence of particulars, which tended to become subsumed under the heading of theology. It presumed the universal nature of reason as the 'logos' or 'first cause'; Aristotle wishes to 'contemplate the first principles' in the Nichomachean Ethics. Modern thinking, reacting against religion, is generally dismissive of that kind of vision, seeking only to discern what Greek philosophy would categorise as material and efficient causes and the natural principles which give rise to them. Due to the vast proliferation of the special sciences, there's really little hope at arriving at the kind of unitive vision that the ancients aspired to through reason and contemplation. There's simply too much for any one person to know.
The upshot is, that in Western liberalism, individual and social aspirations are the principle focus, no longer grounded in any kind of universal vision per se. Rights are underwritten by the Western notion of human rights, which actually originated with the universal rights presumed by Christianity, but have now been transposed to secular culture where it manifests as political identity etc. Within that milieu, the rights of individuals and minorities is garaunteed by such things as declrations of rights, national constitutions, and so on, although there are many factors seeking to undermine it. Cases of 'might makes right' are clearly discernable in cultures without the human rights background of the West, conspicuously the People's Republic of China, where individual rights are held to be subordinate to the requirements of the State, as well as in other authoritarian and one-party states.
Might makes right is the doctrine of modern Western capitalist countries as well, given that the pursuit of justice costs a lost of money. For many people, it is prohibitively expensive.
People can do all kinds of things to you, things that are nominally illegal/criminal. Yet if you don't have the money to pursue them legally, this counts as agreeing with them, condoning those actions done to you.
Philosophy shapes thoughts, which in turn shapes actions. Might makes right isn't necissarily the case even in warfare. I'd argue it's generally not the case in day to day life. Otherwise, after a lifetime of weight lifting and martial arts practice, I wouldn't wait in lines anymore.
For me the notable divide is that, though I find idealist thought more appealing, even recognizing deep truths in them, I spend 90% of my waking time thinking and acting in terms of substance. I'm a very failed Platonist.
I like the way you touched upon terms of conflict on the way to measuring a proportion of effective methods versus not particularly helpful Platonic ideas.
One of my favorite parts of the Republic is when Socrates' brother stares down Thrasymachus and assures him that any wager made would be satisfied if he should lose.
Thrasymachus left the room shortly afterwards.
I agree with you, but how do you argue the case against someone who doesn't accept the power of rational persuasion? Which is why I didn't reply.
Spinning roundhouse kicks? :chin:
Might isn't limited to brute force. Might is everything that other people can use as leverage against you, and that can be anything from brute force to blackmail.
And further, how do you make sense of being the loser/victim/underdog in such a situation?
Gandhi and the Indians used some passive resistence methods of rebelling against the British. And those methods worked: but only because the British were honorable enough to be persuaded by those methods.
In contrast, such a passive resistence proved futile in many other cases, such as for the Native Americans against European colonizers or the Jews against the Nazis.
A massive boulder rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over does not accept the power of rational persuasion, and you wouldn't expect it to anyway. But normally, one expects humans to be open to rational persuasion, esp. when they themselves open the communication with you by appealing to rational persuasion.
Making the step from seeing other people as humans (who are open to rational persuasion) to seeing them as no different than massive boulders rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over requires some considerable change in one's outlook on life. It's not clear how that change can be made.
IOW, Socrates' brother appealed to might makes right, and apparently had the wealth and the power to back up his challenge. No surprise there.
Why is this a favorite part of yours of the Republic?
The text does not agree with your impression:
One thing I like about the passage is that paying a penalty is on the basis of some kind of justice that applies to Thrasymachus and Socrates equally. Otherwise, there would be no reason to honor the debt incurred.
A loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple can be very convincing, so convincing in fact that the owner of the temple may be convinced of faer own nonexistence [pace Descartes].
Likewise, a sound argument has the same power of persuasion that a loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple has. One is always, without exception, forced to accept the conclusion of a sound argument.
It seems that either way - whether you're in the presence of a philosopher presenting a good argument or whether you're under duress to believe something - we're being forced on pain of injury, death, or looking like a fool.
. No Philosopher has ever been able to know the truth.
. All the philosophers have been thinking about the truth.
. But, thinking about the truth is an impossibility.
. Either you know it, or you don't.
Not at all, given that two people can be presented with the same argument, and one feels forced to accept it (because he thinks it's so irresistibly good), and the other one doesn't (because he thinks it's dumb).
IOW, an argument's strength doesn't somehow exist objectively, independently of persons, as an inherent trait of the argument itself. Rather, strength is ascribed to it by people, and different people will ascribe different strengths to it.
I thought so too but then I read a couple of introductory books on logic.
They who "...aren't swayed by arguments" don't know what an argument is. The way a debate with arguments proceeds is, to my knowledge, all about what must be true given certain assumptions and/or claims and how that, on occasion, is denied, the resulting contradiction proving the incoherent nature of an individual's or group's position.
So what if their position is proven wrong? Will they poof out of existence?
What's in it for you if you prove someone else's position wrong?
Remember, this thread's theme is Philosophy vs. real life!
This can mean several things and I am not sure what your intent is. My experience is that good arguments often do not change minds. I think there may even be psychological studies on this for anyone who cares. Isn't it the case that people have emotional reasons for beliefs and this shields those beliefs from facts or arguments.
"...good arguments often do not change minds". Thanks for the warning. I believe everyone knows that logic (argument) alone doesn't quite do the job of convincing people. That's why rhetoric is a subject in its own right.
I sense a paradox: People get emotionally involved with the beliefs/claims/propositions that they espouse and support. The nature of this emotional relationship is that people don't want to be wrong or, conversely, they wan't to be right (about their beliefs). The problem is the more attached people are to their beliefs the more difficult it is for them to see the flaws in their beliefs, flaws which if they didn't mind examining could lead to the truth and then they would be truly right about things. The paradox is this: people want to be right and thus they take offence when others contradict their beliefs. However, to be truly right they shouldn't take offence when others contradict their beliefs because it's possible that they could be wrong. In essence, people want to be right; after all, they get emotional when told they're wrong, but the problem is that once you get all emotional about something, you feel you're right no matter what. Feelings are a problem for logic because though the relation between feelings and truth starts off on the right foot (we feel good when we're right), somewhere along the way, our feelings betray us (we're right no matter what the evidence says).
Quoting baker
The point of logic is to make sure that we're on the right side of the line dividing truths and lies.
And how can you know what is true and what is a lie, given that you, too, are, as a human, emotionally attached to your beliefs and resent it if other people contradict them?
*And no, this isn't what logic is about. Go back to that couple of introductory books on logic.
Sorry - I was being superfluous.