Collingwood's Presuppositions
I recently began reading Collingwood's "An Essay On Metaphysics". As a result of finding it as interesting as I have, I'd like to get into the nuances of the essay(and there are many) with others who also find his essay unique. This thread aims at a fruitful and respectful discussion concerning Collingwood's notion of presuppositions, for those are instrumental to what looks to me to be a rather novel approach to metaphysics.
"Why talk about metaphysics?", one may ask. I mean, so many philosophers in the past century have expressed open distain for the subject matter, and shown and/or argued for how problematic the entire enterprise has been. The linguistic turn, analytic thought, the positivists, etc., are all examples of 'anti-metaphysical' thought. I think few would argue that metaphysics doesn't have it's fair share of problems, but Collingwood makes a concerted attempt at divorcing metaphysics and ontology(which is an interesting move to begin with), as well as arguing for the idea that scientific thought is metaphysical thought and vice-versa.
As parenthetically mentioned above, Collingwood's position is very nuanced. In fact, he uses several different terms in very specific ways, and in order to follow his line of reasoning/thought, the reader must adopt these uses and see where they lead. Collingwood quite cleverly introduces the reader to a foreign approach, to a whole new way to think about metaphysics, by virtue of redefining what sorts of thoughts and/or lines of thought count as being those of the metaphysical variety.
So, I wish to extend an invitation to those who may be interested in reading a unique take on metaphysical thought processes. I'm not here to champion Collingwood's essay. Rather, I'm here to just see if anyone else would be interested in discussing his unique approach, and perhaps after it's understood, also discussing it's strengths and weaknesses should any arise. The link is directly below. It's a long essay, and quite involved. I am still currently reading and studying it. I suppose(pun intended) that this could effectively be similar to a reading group. My suggestion is to read through the first four chapters in order to get a feel for it. If it piques your interest, just let me know, because I'd be happy to have some others join me.
An Essay On Metaphysics
"Why talk about metaphysics?", one may ask. I mean, so many philosophers in the past century have expressed open distain for the subject matter, and shown and/or argued for how problematic the entire enterprise has been. The linguistic turn, analytic thought, the positivists, etc., are all examples of 'anti-metaphysical' thought. I think few would argue that metaphysics doesn't have it's fair share of problems, but Collingwood makes a concerted attempt at divorcing metaphysics and ontology(which is an interesting move to begin with), as well as arguing for the idea that scientific thought is metaphysical thought and vice-versa.
As parenthetically mentioned above, Collingwood's position is very nuanced. In fact, he uses several different terms in very specific ways, and in order to follow his line of reasoning/thought, the reader must adopt these uses and see where they lead. Collingwood quite cleverly introduces the reader to a foreign approach, to a whole new way to think about metaphysics, by virtue of redefining what sorts of thoughts and/or lines of thought count as being those of the metaphysical variety.
So, I wish to extend an invitation to those who may be interested in reading a unique take on metaphysical thought processes. I'm not here to champion Collingwood's essay. Rather, I'm here to just see if anyone else would be interested in discussing his unique approach, and perhaps after it's understood, also discussing it's strengths and weaknesses should any arise. The link is directly below. It's a long essay, and quite involved. I am still currently reading and studying it. I suppose(pun intended) that this could effectively be similar to a reading group. My suggestion is to read through the first four chapters in order to get a feel for it. If it piques your interest, just let me know, because I'd be happy to have some others join me.
An Essay On Metaphysics
Comments (58)
In case you may be interested...
Cool. Just trying to drum up some interest in carefully reading it...
No worries.
The link you sent goes to an error page. Here's another link:
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414
Suggest you limit the reading to Part 1 rather than the whole document. If my memory is correct, that's where the really interesting part is. I'll participate at least as far as rereading that. It may take me a few days to be able to get to even get to the first four chapters. Suggest you provide a list of the words for which:
Quoting creativesoul
along with definitions.
Thanks for that link. I think I've corrected the one in the OP.
Good suggestions. Collingwood provided his own definitions though. So, one who knows that in order to understand such a piece of writing, one must grant definitions/senses of key terms. Should anyone here wish to argue definitions, they're in the wrong thread.
:wink:
Everyone can read at a pace that is best for them...
There's no need for daily participation either. We can all do it at our own leisure.
By way of footnote, a recent essay by a philosophical biographer, Ray Monk, on Collingwood's early death, his replacement by Glibert Ryle, and its consequences. How the untimely death of RG Collingwood changed the course of philosophy forever. Paints a very sympathetic portrait.
Thanks. I'd be delighted to see what you think.
:smile:
This text is a pleasure to read. Elegant, amusing and precise. Seems like the writings of a true gentleman.
Quoting creativesoul
Excellent rule.
In a post on another thread, @Olivier5 provided a link to a podcast on Collingwood on "The Philosophers Zone," which is a very good show with lots of interesting guests. Trigger warning - they all have Australian accents.
https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/voice-in-the-wilderness-rg-collingwood/3148288
“criteriological” pg 118.
New one on me. Got a nice ring to it, much cooler than “normative”.
Initially, SEP's article on Collingwood says that the difference between presuppositions and propositions isn't one of content, but one of role:
"Whether a statement is a “proposition” or a “presupposition” is determined not by its content but by the role that the statement plays in the logic of question and answer. If its role is to answer a question, then it is a proposition and it has a truth-value. If its role is to give rise to a question, then it is a presupposition and it does not have a truth-value. Some statements can play different roles. They may be both propositional answers to questions and presuppositions which give rise to questions. For example, that an object is for something, that it has a function may be a presupposition which gives rise to the question “what is that thing for?”, but it may also be an answer to a question if the statement has the role of an assertion. "
So far, so good, for no Positivist could disagree with that; whenever an assertion is understood to be meant presuppositionally it isn't used in a truth-apt sense, but as a temporary conditional assertion upon which a subsequent course of a truth-apt epistemological enquiry is founded. This is to understand a presupposition as being a modest and consciously subjective assertion that is comparable to an axiom or a Wittgenstein 'hinge proposition'. But then immediately after that (emphasis added), the article makes a stronger claim on behalf of Collingwood, saying
"Philosophical analysis is concerned with a special kind of presupposition, one which has only one role in the logic of question and answer, namely that of giving rise to questions. Collingwood calls these presuppositions “absolute”. Absolute presuppositions are foundational assumptions that enable certain lines of questioning but are not themselves open to scrutiny."
At first I wondered if SEP was overstating Collingwood's position. For if the distinction of these types of sentences is one of role rather than content, then presumably he was merely pragmatic and did not think that his distinctions had significant implications with respect to epistemological conclusions, but only with respect to the defence of a plurality of epistemological methodologies, none of which have the capacity to contradict the assertions that the other methodologies arrive at. But then the article makes it clear that his position is even stronger:
" Collingwood’s account of absolute presuppositions generates an interesting angle on the question of scepticism concerning induction. Hume had argued that inductive inferences rely on the principle of the uniformity of nature. If it is true that the future resembles the past, then inferences such as “the sun will rise tomorrow” are inductively justified. However, since the principle is neither a proposition about matters of fact nor one about relations of ideas the proposition “nature is uniform” is an illegitimate metaphysical proposition and inductive inferences lack justification. The principle of the uniformity of nature, Collingwood argues, is not a proposition, but an absolute presupposition, one which cannot be denied without undermining empirical science. As it is an absolute presupposition the notion of verifiability does not apply to it because it does its job not in so far as it is true, or even believed to be true, but in so far as it is presupposed. The demand that it should be verified is nonsensical and the question that Hume ask does not therefore arise:
…any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the question “Is it true?” “What evidence is there for it?” “How can it be demonstrated?” “What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?”, is a nonsense question. (EM 1998: 33) "
If the SEP is portraying his beliefs correctly, then I think Collingwood has jumped the sharked from making reasonable and modest epistemological commentary, to arriving at a dogmatic position regarding presuppositions that appears to beg the very ontological premises which he claimed philosophy isn't about. For you cannot insist that Hume was mistaken to question the uniformity of nature on the basis of it being an absolute presupposition, without adopting the dogmatic ontological standpoint that absolute presuppositions constitute objective existential claims.
Indeed, it has been a pleasurable piece of reading at times. Of particular interest to me is that he avoids using inherently inadequate dichotomous terms like "subjective" and "objective", "internal" and "external", "noumenal" and "phenomenal", "object" and "subject", "perception" and "reality", etc.
I'm not at all certain whether or not he is what I would call a gentleman though. I do not have enough evidence before me to make such a declaration.
Actually, now that I'm thinking it over, although he's yet to have admitted this, I'm left with the impression that he has tested his theory out on other people. That would go a long way in explaining the sheerly remarkable level of confidence expressed by him. Now, to be clear, such experiments are not always unacceptable. I mean, not all such endeavors are based upon unacceptable moral grounding or ethical principles involving the deliberate treatment of others. For example, not all people strive to minimize harm. That guiding principle ought be strictly adhered to in that situation(where one is deliberately aiming to reveal another's presuppositions to them) as a matter of moral principle. I know not of Collingwood's.
So, with all this in mind, assuming that this particular essay consists of conclusions drawn from actual behavioural studies of people first becoming consciously aware of their own absolute presuppositions, I still do not know whether or not he let his desire to verify his hypothesis overwhelm his desire to falsify it. I also do not know whether or not he let his desire to confirm cloud his judgment regarding how he was effecting/affecting others. Both of those could possibly mark someone not such a gentleman. There's no doubt about it; if what he claims about how people react when faced with their own absolute presuppositions is true, whether sometimes or all the time(I'm tending to think he's overstated his case), I still do not know whether or not he intentionally avoided unnecessarily harming others during the course of his own experiments just to prove his point, or if he accidentally discovered how certain individuals react when their own thought and belief is being placed under such scrutiny and began recording and studying those circumstances in greater detail as a result. What I am sure of is that there's no anecdotal evidence in the essay to suggest that he witnessed any other reaction aside from one he described; which makes me wonder if he tried to elicit different ones...
If he accidentally discovered the reaction, as compared/contrasted to aimed at provocation thereof, and was the kind of person who cared about the effects/affects that his inquiry had upon others when he forced them to face their own absolute presupposition(I'm thinking of the pathologist), one would think that he would make a concerted attempt at lessening the negative impact. But again, there's simply no evidence to suggest that he even considered the negative consequences that his pursuit had upon others, and as a result, tempered his approach in such a way as to lessen it while retaining the benefits(whatever Collingwood thought they may be). No. To quite the contrary, he seemed to relish in the discomfort of others.
So was he a 'true gentleman'? That question is one that remains unanswered from my vantage point.
I've witnessed those same sorts of situations described by him up close and personal, and there have been times that people do react exactly as he so eloquently described. So there is some truth to what he says, no doubt. However, not all people react like that. The reaction is partly influenced, partly created, partly conformed by the conversation leading up to the exposure of the presupposition, and that much is crucial to properly understand. I mean, I've found that sometimes when someone values another's opinion, and trusts that their words are true, an appeal to the 'right sorts of reasoning' can go a long way in lessening the potentially negative impact that uncovering an absolute presupposition can have. To labor the point:An astute reader can see for themselves that the essay did not paint the picture of a pleasant unveiling, and there was no mention of his own responsibility towards the impact such an event has upon the subject in question. That lack of openly expressed concern towards who he is effecting/affecting concerns me and leaves his gentleness open to question. But alas, I've spent far more time than I initially expected talking about whether or not he is a gentleman. I do not know that. Could be.
I want to say a lot more about the aforementioned the appeal to "the right sorts of reasons" in the paragraph directly above. What I mean to say is that the practical and necessary reasoning required in order to show another's absolute presuppositions to themselves varies according to the individual. I am not of the opinion that everyone is even capable of understanding that they do hold such things if we restricted our endeavor to Collingwood's terminological preferences. There are also times which another can be shown that they are working from absolute presuppositions without inciting such angry resistance.
This essay is the only time I can remember seriously reading Collingwood(although I've seen him mentioned a number of different times over the past decade or so). What I can say with a fair amount of certainty is that if he is claiming that absolute presuppositions are discovered, then that claim alone rests upon it's own absolute presupposition that that which has been discovered existed in it's entirety prior to it's discovery. Talking about a discovery is to make the claim that something or other has been found as it already is/was, existing in it's entirety, at that particular time... the moment of discovery. A claim of discovery itself rests upon exactly that absolute presupposition.
I strongly suspect Collingwood would agree, for he does not strike me as man beyond reproach. He was an archeologist afterall, and clearly seems like he was a reasonable fellow. I do wonder though, upon hearing this articulation, upon hearing me propound his absolute presuppositions for the first time, if he would act in the same manner so described by him when characterizing how other people act when one of their absolute presuppositions was first revealed to them, or if he could be gently led along a path paved by the right sorts of reasons?
No matter really...
Back to reading and glad so many have found interest.
Glad you're reading this. Yes, it's interesting. That term jumped out at me as well. It plays a key role it seems. I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. Is it on par with "normative" on your interpretation?
Unless you first hold that absolute presuppositions are not claims at all, they are not propounded by those who hold them, and that what makes them what they are is their function as a basis from which questions arise not their truth value(not whether or not they are true). The uniformity of nature is not something that can be true. So questioning whether or not it is is mistaken. Hume's questioning of that much displays the logical efficacy of the absolute presupposition itself.
Having read two-thirds of the piece, I would like to make the following tentative remarks.
One is that I followed his reasoning and adhered to it, by and large. I share his analysis of presuppositions. I'm saying this just so my critiques below are taken for what they are: sympathetic overall.
You are right that there's lots of anger behind the sleek exterior of his prose. He lashes out at certain notions and thinkers in ways that sometimes may antagonize. I do the same here, often, so shouldn't I agree with his style?
The first element of response I find to his polemic tone is that this is an essay, and an essay is brief, written fast, and polemical. It's the nature of the paper and the circumstances of its writing (1940, on a liner sailing to Sydney) that explain the hastiness of some transitions, the approximations here or there, the hurried pace at which the writer proceeds.
The second, perhaps more interesting answer I am trying to figure out now is: Collingwood was on a mission. He took the fate of Western civilization very seriously, one of his assumptions was that it was threatened, and another that western civilization was grounded in good, systematic, logical thinking. Hence his defence of logic and metaphysics is ultimately a defense of civilization.
There is a parallel with Popper writing his defense of liberalism, the Open Society and It's Enemies during the war, in New Zealand. He too is dead serious about the philosophical enemies of liberal, western civilization, which he calls (or idealised as) the open society. And it is easy to understand why. Funny though that Popper lambasts Aristotle in his defense of liberalism, and tends to deride metaphysics as unempirical hence useless, in a facile and superficial way which Collingwood rightly ties to a trope from renaissance anti-scholastic thinking, while trying to rehabilitate poor Aristotle... So the two interpretations are radically at odd with one another.
Any attempt to draw a broad brush macro picture of the history of philosophy and tie this to the situation at the onset of the second world war is bound to get some details wrong. It is bound to be polemical, and urgent in tone. And it is bound to be highly biased.
One could ask whether the question "arises". It presupposes that 1940's geopolitics can be usefully explained or understood as a moment in the development of philosophy, and that philosophers contributed to it... Collingwood thought so and I agree, but my villains are not exactly his. E.g. I agree with Popper that there was a strong element of power-fetishism in Hegel, and that Marxism also contributed in a roundabout way (Mussolini and Hitler copied the mass organization system invented by the communists for instance).
I would add that from Luther to Schopenhauer and beyond, there is no shortage of illiberal German thinkers, rabbid antisemitists, nationalists and other complaisant believers in the superiority of German culture. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Germany was such a highly philosophical country AND YET failed at democracy. Or that Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party. Perhaps a certain strand of German (and other) philosophers did contribute to the rise of Nazism.
Collingwood seems to be faulting other people. Mainly other professors in Oxford, or perhaps also in Cambridge. And beyond of course... broad brush it is, his "enemies" are far less defined than Popper's.
Long story short, RGC is arguing that positivism is the ghost haunting Europe. I am broadly sympathetic to this POV but I agree he's overstating it
To come back to your point, his anger is not focussed enough for a true gentleman, I agree.
One striking contradiction I noted is in his relation to psychology. He is careful to state that it is valid as a science of feelings but not as a science of thought, which is logic and other 'criterioligical sciences'. But when he attacks the anti-metaphysicians, one type after another (ch. XIII), he repeatedly makes use of fear and even unconscious fear as a factor explaining their thought, as expressed in their books. And later on, in chapter XVI he comes back to similar argument about the fear of metaphysics.
In doing so he recognizes implicitly that feelings and emotions can alter and even motivate even our highest philosophical thoughts. Therefore, 1) a science of feelings would be tightly connected to a science of thoughts, not independent, and 2) beside logical presuppositions something else shapes our conscious thoughts: unconscious desires, fears and phobia. The very thesis of Freud...
I’m not sure about “all else”, but in the interest of a science of thought, the text has psychology, which is normative in that its propositions contain judgements by a thinker concerning the correctness of other people’s thoughts, opposed to metaphysics which is criteriological, in that it makes no propositions but retains the power of judgement respecting his own thoughts only.
This all evolves from the Greek understanding that the science of feeling is very different than the science of thought. The former were attributes of the psyche, the latter of the mind; the former was, by Greek standards, what we would call empirical because it has to do with directing towards ends in the form of behavior, and the latter has to do with determination of ends in the form of constructing opinions or knowledge. The latter was considered a theoretical science of thought called logic, the former the practical science called ethics.
Both these are called normative, insofar as “they paid great attention to the task of defining criteria by which they judge their own success” in the field in which they operate. But the judgement of success of one’s own thoughts is never given, if it be granted that thought is sometimes self-refuting, which implies normative in its strictest sense, cannot apply. In other words, success does not belong to a thinker’s faculty of judgement, for if there is a judgement, judgement is immediately successful because of it. Judgement cannot be unsuccessful.
On the other hand, judgement by a thinker respecting his own thoughts, has absolutely necessary fundamental conditions, whatever their name may be, so the appellation “criteriological”, is apt.
Close enough? I skipped some of the finer points, for expediency, so I trust you to correct me if I missed something important.
Sound advice. I, myself, have just recently realized that I had spoken too soon earlier.
I too am quite sympathetic. I would like to put his method of analysis to use here; play around with it, so to speak. I've read through around page eighty, but I keep getting the feeling that I need to read what I've already read, yet again. So, I've quite carefully studied the first five chapters reading through them multiple times taking notes and such. The more I read it, the more I actually want to make a concerted attempt at employing his method of analysis. However, I do not wish to do so alone.
Would you be interested in such an endeavor/discussion? As before, I'm very pressed for spare time lately, and do not see that changing anytime soon, so the pace will be slooow.
:wink:
Same here. It is a very original and funny text. I like it a lot. And in fact I am already using his technique (which is similar to 'deconstructing') in analysing Collingwood's own presuppositions. That's how I discovered that he had absorbed more Freud than he cared to say.
So yes, I'd be please to experiment further.
I'd be curious to see your work set out.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/510890
No, you should not. Generally speaking...
Not - for that reason alone - should anyone conclude that some behaviour or another is acceptable or ethically permissible. If another's behaviour is, was, and/or will be judged as acceptable simply because one does it, then it always and only follows that all actual behaviour is morally acceptable and/or ethically permissible.
That conclusion is quite clearly false. Not all are.
When one agrees with another's behaviour based upon the fact that it is like one's own, then one is - at a bare minimum at least - being consistent. Consistency is admirable for a plethora of reasons. Dependability requires consistency. Dependability is good. However, consistency of behaviour alone does not warrant moral acceptance of that behaviour. Slave traders were consistent enough in their treatment of the enslaved that others could, and did, successfully plan on it continuing, for example. Hitler was consistent in his treatment of any and all perceived enemies of his goals. That's another example.
Now, I'm not saying that all people holding a consistent belief system are equivalent to people who've consistently committed horrible atrocities, or consistently acted in horrific ways. Rather, I'm simply mentioning tha prima facie evidence, I'm just reminding the reader of actual events that prove to us all - well beyond a reasonable doubt - that behavioural consistency alone does not warrant admiration, praiseworthiness, and/or moral consent of that behaviour.
We could also say of one - regarding such situations - that one is practicing what they preach, so to speak. That's a good personality trait to have. There's nothing wrong with that, in and of itself. There's inherent worth/value in dependability. When someone acts in a consistent manner, they are more dependable than someone who is more unpredictable. Here again though, that's not enough. I mean, we could certainly depend upon Hitler's behaviour to be a certain way towards Jewish people and his perceived enemies. Like clockwork. The point, in everyday terms, is that practicing what one preaches does not make the practice praiseworthy and/or acceptable.
So...
To sum it up as briefly and concisely as I can, if all one's behaviour is faultless, then there is no problem whatsoever with them assenting to any and all others' behaviours based solely upon the fact that they share such a propensity.
However, to quite the contrary, if it is the case that some of one's behaviours are in dire need of marked improvement; if any are shameworthy, if any are unacceptable, then there is a problem with one using one's own behaviours as the standard by which to judge the moral permissibility of such behaviours in general.
I would agree with the first proposition if and only if it were further subsequently qualified in the following way...
The claim "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" would become...
Some statements are made in answer to a question.
For example, "I'm ready for bed" is a statement coming from someone who is ready for bed. Not everyone, when they're ready for bed, asks themselves some question or another which is answered by that statement at that time. Not everyone, when ready for bed, are being asked a question that that statement stands in response to... at that time.
Not all statements are made in answer to a question. Rather, some are.
I'll say one thing though; I strongly suspect that Collingwood is as brilliant as any other philosopher in the history of the world that I have personally had the pleasure of reading.
For now, Collingwood's piece receives reasonably high marks. However, I remain unconvinced that his first proposition is true at each and every point along the evolutionary timeline of human thought and belief(it's not always true). Do not get me wrong here. Collingwood does a fantastic job of describing exactly what many historical metaphysicians were doing, as well as clearly describing what he thinks we ought be doing instead, when he characterizes some historical lines of thinking. He uses the clothesline example to some degree of success to make his point. I agree with most of what he said in so far as it pertains to those peculiar lines of thought historically called "metaphysical", or those typically being articulated when someone in the past was 'doing' metaphysics(playing the sorts of language games commonly called "metaphysics"). No. That's all fine by me. I'm also not troubled by the rough mention of the commonality between metaphysical and scientific thought, even though I'm undecided regarding his arguments regarding that classification.
I'm also quite fond of the endeavor of disentangling thought and later rearranging it. He's talking about metacognition. That is to think about pre-existing thought and belief as a subject matter in it's own right. He mentions that not everyone practices. He's correct, for the most part. He admires systematic thinking. When we take account of our own thought with the sole aim of rearranging them in order of which must take place prior to the next, which is precisely what he does with the "fallacy of many questions" example as well as the clothesline, we are placing them into an order of emergence.
I've studied that part many times over. He's just plain mistaken here. His case is not as strong as he'd like it to be. It does not have the universal scope of applicability that he'd like it to have. Not all statements are made in answer to a question, at the time they are being made. That holds good regardless of the source of the purported question being answered. I've already offered a clear, readily understandable example to the contrary. "I'm ready for bed" is a statement that is not always made in answer to a question, regardless of whether one is engaged in thinking scientifically or not.
Collingwood wants to draw a distinction between thinking scientifically and not, where the former is untangling and reordering one's own thoughts with the aim of shedding light upon the presuppositions and/or questions underlying one's own statements(thought), and the latter is not. His justification for claiming that "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question" is one of arguing by definitional fiat. He goes on to claim that...
He goes further by re-introducing the clothesline example. I've no real issue with that example. He parses it well, and his method could be used with equal success regarding all sorts of statements where something or other is being identified. However, not all statements are ones in which the speaker is stating what something or other is or is called. Thus, "what is that?", or "what is that thing for?" are questions that quite simply do not arise regarding many other statements, regardless of whether or not one is thinking scientifically. "I'm ready for bed" being but one of many.
This is much better.
That is amenable to evolutionary progression. It also situates presuppositions prior to common language acquisition(prior to our learning naming and descriptive practices).
"What's that?" is a question that can exist in it's entirety; that can be formed by a language-less creature, and thus it's a question that can be formed prior to language creation, acquisition, and/or it's subsequent use, despite it's inability to be meaningfully articulated. It is one that has long since taken a linguistic form. We've all asked it at some point or other. It is perhaps the simplest of all questions; one that is perfectly capable of being completely articulated via language to the user's own satisfaction, but need not be in order to be formed by a language-less creature.
What's most notable is that it is a question that does not always require language use. It leads us to realize that we're in need of setting out what sorts of presuppositions such rudimentary questions can possibly involve. They certainly cannot involve presuppositions that are existentially dependent upon language and/or have linguistic content, because we're talking about language-less creatures.
At some of the earliest stages of human development, we can watch exactly and precisely what an undistracted, deep, and genuine curiosity looks like upon the face of another, and as a result we can also know beyond any and all reasonable doubt that curiosity itself does not require language. We all wonder about what we're looking at prior to, during the initial stages of, and long after our own language acquisition and/or the subsequent mastery thereof; all the while we're continuously learning the names of new things. Sometimes these things are directly perceptible, and sometimes not. That which is not warrants very careful attention. The point is that not all questions are existentially dependent upon language use(do not consist of language), whereas all statements are(do).
Long before using language to do stuff; long before ever adopting our first worldview; long before ever honing our initial worldview into what we may now call our 'very own' belief system/worldview; long before we ever became aware of the fact that we were already taking account of ourselves and the world before we came to realize that we were doing so; long before we ever even conceived of the idea of our having a place in this world; long before we ever even began talking about our own thought - like we are here; long before any of that, we began to wonder about what we were looking at. We can and do watch the face(s) of undistracted attention belonging to any creature after having just discovered something entirely new, something so interesting that it completely captured/captures their attention.
There are no statements about the world and/or ourselves possible unless and until there is a means for making them and a creature capable of doing so. If questions are asked prior to each and every statement that is made, as must be the case if every statement is made in answer to a question, then it only follows that questions give rise to statements. If questions give rise to statements, and all questions involve presuppositions, then all statements involve the same presuppositions as the questions giving rise to them(as the questions they were made in response to).
To labor the earlier point of refutation:There are any number of statements that can be, have been, and/or are currently being made about the world and/or ourselves that are not being made in answer to a question.
That's just the way it is.
Not all statements are made in answer to a question.<------That stands as an objection to Prop i, but it does not pose a lethal threat to the rest of Collingwood's project. I'm not looking to blow him up. To quite the contrary, the correction adds to the distinction between scientific thought and non scientific thought(in Collingwood's own sense of the terms). I'm not denying that all scientific thought involves statements that answer questions. I'm not denying that every scientific question involves at least one presupposition, and most involve a constellation thereof. I'm not denying that the role and/or operative function played by absolute presuppositions within scientific thinking are exactly as Collingwood describes. They act exactly like primary and secondary premisses, particularly those whose correspondence and/or meaningfulness is never questioned; those whose business it is to be believed. I'm not denying that it is not their business to be true/false. I'm not denying that the notion of verifiability/falsifiability does not apply to them, although they can sometimes be verified/falsified. I'm not denying that they are things left unspoken, unarticulated, and/or unpropounded by the candidate holding them.
I am most certainly denying the idea that absolute presuppositions are things that a subject can form, have, hold, and/or otherwise depend upon(infer from) when it is also the case that the subject themselves have never once even witnessed their being articulated. One can work from presuppositions that they've never witnessed being articulated without knowing that they are doing so. Such is the case whenever someone first learns that they've adopted some belief or another, or perhaps some set thereof, or to put it in Collingwood's terms, some constellation of absolute presuppositions, from someone else. For example, the absolute presuppositions that Collingwood concerns himself with through page 80 or so, are a group of three regarding causality. Some events were, are, and/or will be caused. All events were, are, and/or will be caused. No events have been, are, or will be caused.
All three of those are much too far along the timeline of evolutionary progression to be formed by anything less than a creature capable of taking account of it's thought, belief, emotions, feelings, and/or experience with a mastery that only metacognition can deliver. Such complex thought are the result of processes directly involving naming and descriptive practices(common language). None of the three are presupposed by any creature unless that creature has already found themselves at a loss to be able to take proper account of everything(all events).
It's well worth pointing out that Collingwood's notion of scientific thought aims to take proper account of that which already existed in it's entirety long before being untangled and re-arranged. It's a shame that he chose to dub the process itself as scientific, because in doing so he simultaneously devalued all other thought. It's akin to placing the utmost of importance upon lemon meringue pie, all the while devaluing the ingredients themselves along with the tools required for making/forming pies.
Scientific questions are asked long before any answers are ever offered. But we act as if we are very interested in all sorts of different stuff long before we ever being asking questions. Furthermore, there are some questions(most if I were to hazard a guess) about some stuff that quite simply cannot be asked until long after language use has begun in earnest. Questions about our own thought, for instance. Questions about one's own thought, belief, mind, feelings, emotions, experience, and/or all discussions about "what's it's like" to be another creature are just plain not capable of being articulated by language-less creatures.
The very capability of taking account of one's own thought requires something to take account of, something to take account of it, and a means for doing so. Collingwood is making a concerted attempt at taking proper account of metaphysics, and he begin doing so by virtue of cleaving the one common practice into two separate and distinct practices; ontology(the science of pure being), and the search for presuppositions(the science of thought). The former he relegates to the dustbin. The latter, he attempts to make good sense/use of.
Proposition 2 offers all of us a bit of knowledge regarding the evolutionary stages/development of human thought. It does not start out scientific. Just because something is true of scientific thought does not make it true of any preceding thought leading up to the scientific. Thought begins simply and grows in it's complexity. That is true with each and every individual thinking/believing human being that has ever existed. That is equally true of any and all thinking/believing creatures, regardless of the biological machinery. The complexity level of thought and belief is made possible, in part at least, by the biological machinery.
Quoting tim wood
Upon rereading, I deleted that bit. It's nonsensical as it is written, although I knew what I meant. Too bad I wrote the opposite. When something is existentially dependent upon something else, the something else exists in it's entirety either prior to or simultaneously alongside with,
"I'm ready for bed" is something I say to myself often, or to my significant other. Sometimes, it is a statement made in answer to a question, and other times it is not. The point here is simple:It is a statement that is meaningful and it is not always made in answer to a question. So, it only follows that Collingwood's first proposition is false, as it is written.
Then that's about what counts as being "in logical terms"...
My statement is one made in everyday discourse. It is not always made in answer to a question.
A position can be completely coherent(lacking self-contradiction) and based upon false premisses. Collingwood's is one such position. We do not look to Colliingwood's position to see if it includes falsehood. We look to what he's describing, in the real world. We look at real world examples.
I've given one, and it's certainly not the only one.
Collingwood's claim(prop i.) is about each and every statement made. He's wrong. Not each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question.
Relevance?
:brow:
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting tim wood
It's very odd when one, such as yourself, readily accepts the answer given to a question by saying "Sure, of course", only to then ask the same question.
:confused:
Is there a point, or counterargument somewhere here? I'm not interested in much else. The question you now ask, for the very first time, is irrelevant to the charge I levied here. In addition, it seems to be just plain obtuse, for obtusity's sake.
The point is that when I say that I am ready for bed, I do not always make the statement in answer to a question. Thus, prop. i.) is false, as it is written.
Now, are you going to put Collingwood's method to use here, or just keep on deflecting into irrelevancy?
I suggest you reread our exchange. The question you've asked has changed.
I'm saying that sometimes I make statements and they are not made in answer to a question. You're saying that that's false. Not much else to say here...
Do you have an argument? A valid counter? Something?
I'm all ears.
I've given a perfectly adequate example which adequately serves as prima facie empirical evidence that refutes proposition i.) as written. Universal claims made about all statements that have ever been made that are later found lacking correspondence to what's happened and/or is happening are false. Proposition i.) is exactly such a claim. It is wanting, lacking, begging for truth. An inherent deficiency is shown by it's inherent inability to take proper account of things that happen on the daily.
Black swans and all...
Not all statements ever made are made in answer to a question. Each and every day some statements are made by speakers that find themselves in completely different sets of circumstances than those proposed by Mr. Collingwood(statements that are made in answer to a question). As it is written, the first proposition is falsified by our looking at actual events, as well as by our listening to accurate historical accounts.
From a slightly different angle; granting truth to see what follows...
If it is true, then there can be no statements ever made that are not made in answer to a question. The problem, of course, is that there are! Each and every statement that is made despite no question being asked at the time, serves as a clear cut prima facie example to the contrary. There are a plethora of actual events that are actual examples to the contrary. Universal claims have no exceptions. Proposition i.) does. Proposition i.) is therefore denied universal value. It's not worthy.
I do not make up the rules. I'm just using them. Some statements are made in answer to a question. Not all.
In the simplest terms...
Collingwood asserts with the utmost certainty that each and every statement ever made is made in answer to a question. However, statements are made each and every day, across the globe and in different tongues, that are not made in answer to a question. There is no question involved in such cases. In each and evry one of these cases, the circumstances relevant to the utterance do not involve the speaker answering a question.
I mean think about it...
One can most certainly state the case at hand without being asked any questions whatsoever, whether those interrogations come from within oneself or directly from others at the time of utterance.
Reflecting back upon lines of thought in your earlier response to my counterexample...
Sure, we can all take statements completely out of their context, pretend that they are in some other context, and show that - when we take statements completely out of their context - the statement is, in fact, an acceptable answer to any number of relevant proxy questions. For example, you proposed a perfectly meaningful question that "I am ready for bed" could be answer for - if it were made in a completely different context; in completely different circumstances. The problem, of course, is that "I am ready for bed" is not always made in answer to a question. Whether or not a particular statement was or is actually made in answer to a question is not determined by Collingwood. Rather, in each and every case, whether or not a statement is made in answer to a question is completely determined by whether or not it was meant by the speaker to serve as an answer that particular question at the time of utterance. I say "I am ready for bed" as a means to inform my significant other that I am ready for bed. During all such times, the statement about my physical/mental state is not made as an answer to any question at the time of utterance.
Surely you're not going to insist on telling me otherwise, are you?
:kiss:
Well no. As I explained in the last post...
We can take a statement out of the context in which it's uttered, and when placed into different sets of circumstances, it could stand as an answer to some question relevant to those different circumstances. So, I do not disagree that that can be done.
I'm saying that it does not follow from the fact that we can do that, that the statement extracted was originally made in answer to a question.
Lost interest in this discussion with you...
I'll continue my assessment, further reading and review in spite of your absence.
Be well.
[quote=Collingwood]He is telling you that it is an absolute presupposition of the science he pursues: and I have made him a pathologist because this absolute proposition about all events having causes, which a hundred years ago was made in every branch of natural science, has now ceased to be made in some branches, but medicine is one of those in which it is still made.[/quote]
I'm looking at this, and thinking that it looks a lot like what is more familiar to me as 'a hinge proposition'. Clearly, what is an absolute proposition in one {ahem} 'language game', ceases to be quite so absolute in another. A great undergraduate essay question, surely - "Compare and contrast Collingwood's 'absolute propositions' with Wittgenstein's 'hinge propositions".
There are some similarities it seems. The differences are there as well. Absolute presuppositions, according to Collingwood, are not propositions though. In fact, they are rather ill defined in this essay, which is another critique I've yet to have gotten into here but have noted it elsewhere.
SPOILERS AHEAD :smile:
The two last sentences are a gem:
When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table ; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will.