Hedonistic Psychological Egoism
Thoughts/criticisms on this form of psychological egoism elaborated by Justin Garson in the paper, Two Types of Psychological Hedonism?
https://philpapers.org/rec/GARTTO-11
The following paragraphs will give you the gist of it.
"I will call the first kind of hedonism “inferential hedonism,” for reasons to be explained
in the next section. (Alternately, I will just refer to it as “I–hedonism.”) I–hedonism holds
that for any agent, A, and for any desire, D, A has D only because A believes that the
satisfaction of D will promote A’s pleasure. In this view, in order for A to desire
something other than pleasure, then, A must possess certain beliefs about the relationship
between the satisfaction of that desire and pleasure. In most cases, these will be causal
beliefs (i.e., that the satisfaction of D will cause pleasure). They can also be
“constitutive” beliefs, that is, beliefs to the effect that satisfying D is constitutive of
pleasure (e.g., my belief that health is somehow constitutive of happiness). This is the
kind of hedonism that philosophers are typically thinking about when they discuss
psychological hedonism.
I will call the second kind of hedonism, “reinforcement hedonism” (or, alternately, “R-hedonism”). R-hedonism holds that, where D is an ultimate desire, D is maintained or
reinforced in A’s cognitive system only by virtue of the fact that D is associated with
pleasure. When I say that D must be “associated with” pleasure, I am thinking of two different sorts of cases. In the first case, the satisfaction of D (regularly, typically, or non-negligibly) causes, or is constitutive of, pleasure. In the second case, A derives pleasure
merely from entertaining the satisfaction of D. According to R–hedonism, it is possible
for someone to have a long-standing, ultimate desire that is never satisfied, such as a
desire for revenge or a desire for world peace. The R-hedonist simply maintains that such
desires are reinforced because the agent derives pleasure from imagining their being
satisfied. A monk can have a lifelong, unfulfilled, and ultimate desire for sex. The R-hedonist says that the only reason this desire is reinforced is because the monk derives
pleasure from contemplating its satisfaction. When I contemplate satisfying a desire, and
I get pleasure from that, that sets up a kind of “virtual reinforcement scheme” that causes
the desire to persist. (Note that the R-hedonist is not committed to the claim that all
desires are reinforced only by virtue of their association with pleasure, but only that
“ultimate” desires are reinforced this way. “Instrumental” desires are maintained simply
by virtue of the agent’s beliefs about the relation between the instrumental and ultimate
desire.)
Another way of framing the distinction between I–hedonism and R–hedonism is in terms
of the distinction between the content of a desire, on the one hand, and the mechanism by
which that desire is reinforced in the cognitive life of the agent, on the other (or,
alternatively, the function of that desire – see below). I–hedonism is a theory about the
contents of one’s ultimate desires. It claims that one only has ultimate desires about one’s
own hedonic states. R–hedonism is a theory about the mechanism by which those desires
are maintained or reinforced over time – namely, by virtue of their actually being
associated in the right sort of way with one’s hedonic states. According to R-hedonism,
people can have ultimate desires regarding the welfare of others. R-hedonism just holds
that, if those desires were not, in fact, associated with pleasure, they would soon
disappear."
https://philpapers.org/rec/GARTTO-11
The following paragraphs will give you the gist of it.
"I will call the first kind of hedonism “inferential hedonism,” for reasons to be explained
in the next section. (Alternately, I will just refer to it as “I–hedonism.”) I–hedonism holds
that for any agent, A, and for any desire, D, A has D only because A believes that the
satisfaction of D will promote A’s pleasure. In this view, in order for A to desire
something other than pleasure, then, A must possess certain beliefs about the relationship
between the satisfaction of that desire and pleasure. In most cases, these will be causal
beliefs (i.e., that the satisfaction of D will cause pleasure). They can also be
“constitutive” beliefs, that is, beliefs to the effect that satisfying D is constitutive of
pleasure (e.g., my belief that health is somehow constitutive of happiness). This is the
kind of hedonism that philosophers are typically thinking about when they discuss
psychological hedonism.
I will call the second kind of hedonism, “reinforcement hedonism” (or, alternately, “R-hedonism”). R-hedonism holds that, where D is an ultimate desire, D is maintained or
reinforced in A’s cognitive system only by virtue of the fact that D is associated with
pleasure. When I say that D must be “associated with” pleasure, I am thinking of two different sorts of cases. In the first case, the satisfaction of D (regularly, typically, or non-negligibly) causes, or is constitutive of, pleasure. In the second case, A derives pleasure
merely from entertaining the satisfaction of D. According to R–hedonism, it is possible
for someone to have a long-standing, ultimate desire that is never satisfied, such as a
desire for revenge or a desire for world peace. The R-hedonist simply maintains that such
desires are reinforced because the agent derives pleasure from imagining their being
satisfied. A monk can have a lifelong, unfulfilled, and ultimate desire for sex. The R-hedonist says that the only reason this desire is reinforced is because the monk derives
pleasure from contemplating its satisfaction. When I contemplate satisfying a desire, and
I get pleasure from that, that sets up a kind of “virtual reinforcement scheme” that causes
the desire to persist. (Note that the R-hedonist is not committed to the claim that all
desires are reinforced only by virtue of their association with pleasure, but only that
“ultimate” desires are reinforced this way. “Instrumental” desires are maintained simply
by virtue of the agent’s beliefs about the relation between the instrumental and ultimate
desire.)
Another way of framing the distinction between I–hedonism and R–hedonism is in terms
of the distinction between the content of a desire, on the one hand, and the mechanism by
which that desire is reinforced in the cognitive life of the agent, on the other (or,
alternatively, the function of that desire – see below). I–hedonism is a theory about the
contents of one’s ultimate desires. It claims that one only has ultimate desires about one’s
own hedonic states. R–hedonism is a theory about the mechanism by which those desires
are maintained or reinforced over time – namely, by virtue of their actually being
associated in the right sort of way with one’s hedonic states. According to R-hedonism,
people can have ultimate desires regarding the welfare of others. R-hedonism just holds
that, if those desires were not, in fact, associated with pleasure, they would soon
disappear."
Comments (13)
The quotation you provided is pretty dense and convoluted. I don't understand the value of the distinction between the two types of hedonism. They also don't match my experience of desire or pleasure. Why do you think these ideas are valuable?
Anti-Hedonism. :)
I find value in the distinction within the context of psychological egoism (the position that humans act only in self-interest, that there is no true altruism). R-Hedonism is more accurate and withstands criticism more than I-Hedonism, I think.
In what ways do the views clash with your experience of desire and pleasure? Is it both I-hedonism and R-hedonism that you have a problem with or just one of them?
I'm against the whole notion of Hedonism.
No. It's Adharmic.
I'm not sure what you mean. could you rephrase it?
"We are goal-directed, anticipatory creaturesWe don’t need arbitrary mechanisms like hedonic modules to motivate us, Sense making is intrinsically self-motivating."
What do you mean by "sense making"?
I agree we are goal-directed if you mean that the content of our ultimate desires can be more than pleasure (I-hedonists would not agree, but R-hedonists would). But as far as a psychological mechanism for motivation, for desire, I can't imagine anything else responsible for that besides a hedonic module (first time I've heard this term, I like it). And this is an empirical question, whether or not all desires are associated with positive or alleviation/avoidance of negative hedonic states.
It’s a conceptual question before it is an empirical question, meaning that you would probably have to change your definitions of what a psychological system
is and how it operates before the empirical relevance of the idea of sense making as self-motivating can come into view as coherent.
I follow the psychologist George Kelly in substituting validation for reinforcement, and in the process doing away with the distinctions between motivation—affect-hedonic, and cognition-intentionality.
Validation is the relationship one senses between anticipation and realization, so we are ‘motivated’ to validate our anticipations of the world. This encompasses desire and hedonism. Perceived i coherence and confusion is intrinsically ‘unpleasant’.
Desire and pleasure have nothing to do with belief. They are completely non-rational. If it is subject to reason, it's not really desire. The only role for reason in pleasure is to say "no."