On two contradictory intuitions regarding the probability that the world had not existed
One of my university professors said once in a class: The world could have not existed, and the chances of it not existing were infinitely greater than the chances of it existing.
«Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is». It is from this passage of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus that he claimed to derive this view.
I remember that before saying that, he maintained one cannot talk meaningfully about the mystical, yet immediately after saying that he started to talk about the mystical by saying those things about the world.
He then talked as if what he said was meaningful, and even seemed to reason about it. His arguments on this subject rest upon an intuition which is far from obvious.
Compare his intuition with the radically different intuition of Leszek Kolakowski: In his work «If there is no God...» he holds that if the universe didn't exist, then nothing would. But the statement «nothing exists» is for him nonsensical and inconceivable, and therefore the statement «something exists» is necessarily true (he says), which implies that the chances of the universe not having existed were in fact 0%, not infinitely more than its opposite as the opposite party maintains, so that according to Kolakowski, my professor and those who agree with him literally could not be more wrong.
Bergson also held this view, he argued that the idea of absolute nothingness is as meaningful as the idea of a round square.
Their opponents, however, could retort that their intuition is that the «scenario» of the universe not having existed is «simpler» than the «scenario» of the universe having existed, and therefore more likely. From this, they could then say that it is always more likely for anything to not exist, rather than for it to exist, and that this is also true for the whole universe. This seems to also be the position of Martin Gardner in «The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener» where he talks about the ontological argument, he says: «There is nothing that exists, Hume said, including the entire cosmos, whose non-existence entails a logical contradiction. The idea that everything would be simpler if nothing existed may leave us in deep anguish, but there is nothing inconsistent about it.»
But if this latter intuition is maintained, they are lead to this dilemma: Either they admit that they can conceive of the world's non existence, which in turn means admitting that the metaphysical notion of «nothing» is meaningful, or they must maintain that it does not follow from the fact that we can't conceive of something, that it is impossible. And it seems to me that they would not accept either of these views. So that the only escape I can see for them is to say: «yes, even what we have said here is meaningless», in which case we can either ignore what they say on this matter for breaking the rule «whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must stay silent», or see it as something like Wittgenstein's ladder. This applies to what Kolakowski and Bergson say about this matter as well, of course.
If the question whether it is more likely for the universe to have existed rather than for it to not have existed had a meaning, then the 2 contradictory propositions : «it is impossible for the universe not to have existed» and «it was far more likely for the universe not to have existed» could apparently be proven.
Immanuel Kant called these «antinomies», and they arise from applying reason beyond the bounds of possible experience.
One can thus adopt the sceptical view that both conclusions are unwarrantable (assuming they even had meaning to begin with). Or that the question as to the probability of the existence of the world is meaningless.
My question for you is: Which of these 2 intuitions do you have? Or do you have neither of them?
«Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is». It is from this passage of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus that he claimed to derive this view.
I remember that before saying that, he maintained one cannot talk meaningfully about the mystical, yet immediately after saying that he started to talk about the mystical by saying those things about the world.
He then talked as if what he said was meaningful, and even seemed to reason about it. His arguments on this subject rest upon an intuition which is far from obvious.
Compare his intuition with the radically different intuition of Leszek Kolakowski: In his work «If there is no God...» he holds that if the universe didn't exist, then nothing would. But the statement «nothing exists» is for him nonsensical and inconceivable, and therefore the statement «something exists» is necessarily true (he says), which implies that the chances of the universe not having existed were in fact 0%, not infinitely more than its opposite as the opposite party maintains, so that according to Kolakowski, my professor and those who agree with him literally could not be more wrong.
Bergson also held this view, he argued that the idea of absolute nothingness is as meaningful as the idea of a round square.
Their opponents, however, could retort that their intuition is that the «scenario» of the universe not having existed is «simpler» than the «scenario» of the universe having existed, and therefore more likely. From this, they could then say that it is always more likely for anything to not exist, rather than for it to exist, and that this is also true for the whole universe. This seems to also be the position of Martin Gardner in «The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener» where he talks about the ontological argument, he says: «There is nothing that exists, Hume said, including the entire cosmos, whose non-existence entails a logical contradiction. The idea that everything would be simpler if nothing existed may leave us in deep anguish, but there is nothing inconsistent about it.»
But if this latter intuition is maintained, they are lead to this dilemma: Either they admit that they can conceive of the world's non existence, which in turn means admitting that the metaphysical notion of «nothing» is meaningful, or they must maintain that it does not follow from the fact that we can't conceive of something, that it is impossible. And it seems to me that they would not accept either of these views. So that the only escape I can see for them is to say: «yes, even what we have said here is meaningless», in which case we can either ignore what they say on this matter for breaking the rule «whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must stay silent», or see it as something like Wittgenstein's ladder. This applies to what Kolakowski and Bergson say about this matter as well, of course.
If the question whether it is more likely for the universe to have existed rather than for it to not have existed had a meaning, then the 2 contradictory propositions : «it is impossible for the universe not to have existed» and «it was far more likely for the universe not to have existed» could apparently be proven.
Immanuel Kant called these «antinomies», and they arise from applying reason beyond the bounds of possible experience.
One can thus adopt the sceptical view that both conclusions are unwarrantable (assuming they even had meaning to begin with). Or that the question as to the probability of the existence of the world is meaningless.
My question for you is: Which of these 2 intuitions do you have? Or do you have neither of them?
Comments (46)
(By the way, if you put an extra space between paragraphs, your posts will look less like an unappealing wall of text.)
I agree with you
Quoting SophistiCat
Thanks for the advice, I think it looks better now.
The best answer, given the circumstances, is "we don't know why there's something rather than nothing."
Is the question answerable i.e. what do we need to know to answer this question and equally important is it knowable?
The question seems to be specific to physical reality, the "something" referring to material objects. If so, science is the right person for the job of coming up with the answer; after all, science has spared no effort in staking a claim to the title of "authority on physical matters."
If that makes sense then you should know that Lawrence Krauss, physicist, science educator, has written a book titled "A Universe From Nothing" that's supposed to, in Krauss' opinion, answer your question. I believe Krauss' starting premise is that the total energy in the universe is zero. It must be mentioned though that his book has met with some criticism with other scientists, philosophers, etc. alleging that Krauss hasn't actually explained why there's something rather than nothing.
My personal opinion, for what its worth, is that we have to start from what is obvious viz. that something exists. There are two ways of looking at this undeniable fact:
1. That an event x occurs implies that x was liklier than not-x. That Stephen Hawking was given the Lucasian Chair Of Mathematics, that it happened, implies that it was likelier than Stephen Hawking not being given that honor - Stephen Hawking had what it takes to get that position. Likewise, that something is rather than nothing should mean that something was likelier than nothing.
2. If I flip a coin and I get heads, it doesn't imply that heads was likelier than tails - the probability of either is equal at 50%. Ergo, that there's something (I get a heads on a coin flip) and not nothing (I get a tails on a coin flip) doesn't mean that something is likelier than nothing.
That's as far as I could get.
I should like to point out that the question isn't exactly «why is there something rather than nothing?», rather: «What was the likelihood of there being nothing rather than something?».
It brings into consideration also philosophical probability.
Quoting TheMadFool
It seems to me that what Krauss is refering to isn't the philosophical «nothing», but rather to «vacuum» or «void». The philosophical «nothing» means, I think, «absolutely nothing», not even vacuum with energy or empty space.
Quoting TheMadFool
Would you agree with Kolakowski then in thinking that «something exists» = «necessarily, something exists»? Why or why not do you agree/disagree?
How would you then respond (if you do agree) to someone who argued like this?: It is always more likely for anything to not have existed, and this is true not only of every particular thing, but also about the whole universe. A universe that was just like the actual one, but where a rock didn't exist, was more likely to exist than the actual universe because it is simpler. And so, if nothing existed at all, that's as simple a scenario as it gets, and therefore not only is it not impossible that nothing should have existed, but it was in fact infinitely more probable.
Quoting TheMadFool
Does it though? Something may happen in spite of the fact that it is improbable. For example: It was unlikely for many people to be struck by lightning, but it happened anyway.
Quoting TheMadFool
In fact, those who argue it was more likely for nothing to exist would say that that is so because the «scenario» or «possible world» where nothing exists is infinitely simpler than the «scenario» or «possible world» where the actual universe exists. They would not compare it to a coin flip.
Well, in my universe these two are two sides of the same coin - to answer one is to answer the other, no? Why is there something rather than nothing? = Why not nothing rather than something?
Quoting Amalac
Perhaps you missed the part where I said that the "something" in your question refers to physical stuff and with respect to the physical, vacuum is nothing or, if not, is the closest "thing" we have to nothing.
Quoting Amalac
We may need to give your idea a closer look because one could argue that, in a way, nothing ain't that simple. I don't know if this helps but consider nothing in math, zero. At first glance it has that outward appearance of simplicity - it's nothing and it's been given a symbol of it's own "0" - but try dividing by it and, supposedly, all hell breaks lose. I'm simply offering you what to me is a good starting point to make the case that nothing may not be simpler than something.
Quoting Amalac
My thoughts exactly. That something happened doesn't seem to mean that that something is more likely and thus I offered you two perspectives.
What's intriguing though, ignoring nuances and subtleties, events that occur, like something exists, provides no clue as to whether they were likely or not. If one wins a lottery or is struck by lightning, take your pick, the fact is the win or shock is actually unlikely and compare that to the event that you meet a child at a daycare in which case meeting a child is likely. In essence, the occurrence of an event supplies no information on the likelihood of said event. This perhaps is the heart of the issue in re the question which has come to be known, kind courtesy of Heidegger, as the fundamental question of metaphysics (FQOM).
The probability of the world existing is 1. The probability of the world not existing is 0. Any other statement or question about the probability of the existence of the world is meaningless.
Although ... the Tao Te Ching has some interesting things to say about being and non-being.
Quoting TheMadFool
I just wanted to emphasize that I wasn't asking for an «explanation» or a «why» of the universe, rather the question is: Is it meaningful to even assign a probability to such «scenarios» (so to speak)? But anyway, this is not too important.
Quoting TheMadFool
But see, you don't disagree with what I said: the «nothing» Krauss speaks of is not the same as the «nothing» of the metaphysicians. The «closest thing we have to nothing» is not the same as that «nothing».
Quoting TheMadFool
I sort of get what you are saying, maybe it's not the case that the non-existence of something (so to speak) is simpler than it's existence. I'm not sure.
I see, my question for you would be: Do you think it was logically possible for the universe not to have existed? Or do you think that very question is meaningless?
Wikipedia says - "Logical possibility refers to a logical proposition that cannot be disproved, using the axioms and rules of a given system of logic."
How does that apply here?
Existence is a human concept. If the universe didn't exist, humans wouldn't exist. If humans didn't exist, existence wouldn't exist. Does that represent self-contradiction?
Would you say the proposition «Planet earth exists» would not be true if there were no humans on earth then?
Good question. I'll respond with another question. If the concept of "existence" didn't exist, would anything exist?
So if I understand you correctly, you deny the transcendental notion of truth (like Husserl's for example), according to which an assertion is true independently of the fact that we think that it is true or even come up with the idea of the assertion. Interesting.
As for your question, if we use the word existence in such a wide sense and deny the transcendental notion of truth, then I suppose nothing would exist.
But if «exists» implies «outside the mind» (which is how the term is usually used), then it can't be said that a concept like «existence» exists, unless we hold the kind of platonic realism according to which the universal concept «existence» exists beyond space and time.
Here you have committed a fallacy, as "Existence" is independent of the awareness of its existence.
The Earth had 4 billion years of where it existed even without an observer to become aware of its existence.
I don't necessarily deny it, but I think it's worth thinking about. Maybe we are getting away from the original post.
You say I've committed a fallacy. When people use that word on this forum, they usually mean a logical fallacy. I don't think that's what you're saying. I think what you mean is that I'm wrong. Or am I wrong about that.
There is a good, non-supernatural argument that existence is not independent of awareness, but it will take us into Taoism, which I think is beyond the scope of this thread.
Indeed, "fallacy" can be used in many ways.
Quoting T Clark
Please introduce me to this argument - or start another discussion if it is of interest to you - as I strongly disagree.
My position is based on the proposition of "Cosmic Ontologism", or as I prefer to call it, "Natural Egoism", where existence is independent of self-consciousness, because the very substance of existence is its "Craving for Craving", that is, Existence is its own cause.
I have started several and participated in several other discussions in the past on this subject. Maybe I will again.
Quoting Gus Lamarch
Is there a particular source I can go check out? One of your old posts?
My article, "Egoism: Humanity's Lost Nature"
1. I don't agree with the idea that nothing exists is non-sensical or meaningless for the following reason.
If we're to ever give a satisfying answer (satisfying, at least in my opinion) to the question, we have to accept the idea that there might have been nothing and then figure out how there can be something now. I think another way of saying this is to say that you start with a 0 (e.g., nothing) and end up with a 1 (e.g., something). Because you can't turn 0 into a 1, the only way to do this is if somehow the 0 isn’t really 0 but is actually a 1 in disguise, even though it looks like 0 on the surface. That is, if we could just see through the disguise of what we've always considered to be nothing and see this "nothing" in a different way, we could see that it looks like an existent entity, or a "something". So, the idea of "nothing" existing is not only not non-sensical but required, I think, if we're to satisfactorily answer the question.
2. How can nothing be thought of as a something? First, I define nothing as the lack of all matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws of math/physics/logic, possible worlds/"could have been"s, and the lack of all minds to consider this supposed lack of all. Next, I think it's important to ask why a normal thing like a book is a something? I think a thing exists if it's a grouping. Groupings tie whatever is there into a new unit whole, or existent entity. The grouping together of the atoms of paper, ink and binding are what make these formerly independent atoms into a new existent entity called a book. Applying this idea that a thing exists if it's a grouping to nothing, once everything (all matter, energy, space/volume, time, abstract concepts, laws of math/physics/logic, possibilities, etc.) is gone and the mind thinking about it is gone, this situation, this “absolute lack-of-all”, would be it; it would be the everything. It would be the entirety, or whole amount, of all that is present. Is there anything else besides that “absolute nothing”? No. It is “nothing”, and it is the all. Entirety, whole amount or “the all” are groupings, which means that the situation we previously considered to be “absolute nothing” is itself an existent entity, or a something. Said another way, by its very nature, “absolute nothing”/”the all” is a grouping and an existent entity, and is therefore the beginning point in the chain of being able to define existent entities in terms of other existent entities.
Thanks for listening
Kolakowski argued that we are incapable of conceving the non-existence of the universe which implies absolute nothingness, and that therefore we have reason to believe that something exists = necessarily, something exists. Now I wonder if one could say as a response: some people can't conceive of it while others can.
One thing seems certain though: It is impossible to picture the absolute nothingness implied by the world's non existence in the mind's eye (one where there wasn't even darkness nor empty space). But it's not clear if arguments of the form: «X is unimaginable, therefore X is impossible» are always valid.
I think one possible objection to your view would be that if nothing means not something, then nothing can't be thought of as «something» without violating the Law of Contradiction.
And if «nothing» does not mean «not something», then what does it mean?
And if this nothing is «thought of as something», then when asking: «Why is there something rather nothing?» then «something» in the question seems to include your idea of «nothing», and then the question would turn into: «Why is there something rather than something?» which makes the question meaningless.
The second part of the argument about what does "nothing" mean if "not something" is related to the first part. I think "nothing" can mean two different things, depending on how we think about it. The traditional way is when we visualize it in our existent minds. This way, it just looks like nothing. But, if we can try to visualize it when all including our minds is gone, then I think it looks like "something".
On the last part, about "Why is there something rather than something?", I don't think this is meaningless, or at least not value-less, because:
1. At least, we'd have an answer to the original question "Why is there something rather than nothing?". The answer would be the new way of thinking about "nothing" as a "something".
2. We'd have presented a mechanism for how "nothing" can be a "something".
3. If we now know a mechanism for how "nothing" can be a "something", we can go further and try to figure out some of the properties of this fundamental existent entity formerly thought of as "nothing". Because the universe we live in is composed of existent entities, we can theoretically use these properties of the fundamental existent entity to build a very simple model of the universe. If that model can make testable predictions, this becomes science. I think this metaphysics-to-physics approach is useful. While it will be very difficult and take years, I think this kind of model building is the only way anyone will ever be able to convince anyone else that their answer to the "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is correct. No one listens to logical arguments as I've found out in both this kind of thinking and at work. They listen to evidence.
Tao Te Ching – Verse 2
When people see some things as beautiful,
other things become ugly.
When people see some things as good,
other things become bad.
Being and non-being create each other.
Difficult and easy support each other.
Long and short define each other.
High and low depend on each other.
Before and after follow each other.Therefore the Master
acts without doing anything
and teaches without saying anything.
I like it.
Not sure about the translation - Stephen Mitchell, 1995)
I forgot to get back to you on this. I read your essay. I enjoyed it. You and I definitely see the world differently. But then, that's no surprise.
That's one of my favorite verses and Mitchell is the translation I read first. It's probably the most accessible for modern English speakers.
The idea of being vs. non-being in the Tao Te Ching is the one that changed my view of reality the most. I used to participate in a Tao Te Ching reading group and we got in a big argument about what it means that being and non-being create each other. My position - Of course the TTC is poetic and not meant to be taken literally. Of course the moon is still there when it's on the other side of the Earth. Except...
The posterior probability that the world exists is 1. Whether that's a satisfactory response to the conundrum you raise, I can't say.
Consider. Flip a trillion fair coins. What are the odds of all heads? They're [math]\frac{1}{2^{10^{12}}}[/math]. Pretty unlikely.
But what is the probability of any other particular result? They're exactly the same! People only think all heads is unlikely because it stands out. The probability of any particular exact sequence of heads and tails is exactly the same as any other: one out of two to the trillion. Yet some result must occur. And after that result occurs, in retrospect it is a perfect miracle. You just don't notice it because it happened with posterior probability 1.
This is the lottery paradox. It's not rational to buy a lottery ticket because you almost certainly won't win. But somebody has to win. So you might as well buy a ticket.
By the way your professor was being vague and imprecise when (s)he spoke of "infinitely more likely." I don't know what that means and neither did they. That's why I like the example of a trillion coins. That's an experiment that's physically realizable. We don't need to appeal to infinity to see the essential mystery. Any particular sequence of coins is extremely unlikely, but some outcome must occur.
In fact you can do this experiment at home by flipping a coin only 100 times in a row. [math]2^{100}[/math] is a pretty huge number. It's larger than 1 followed by 30 zeros. Whatever sequence you flipped, the odds were 1 out of 2 to the 100th power that you would have flipped exactly that sequence. Yet you did.
Yes. I've made your argument many times. Usually I am ineffective in getting the point across. It comes up a lot in discussions about the multiverse.
The value of rationality is greatly overrated in human discourse.
Good to know. I find myself agreeing with many of the versus - I don't understand all of them. TC, I'd be interested in how you find it supports you (if this is the correct term) in life.
Universe shouldn’t exist, say CERN physicists.
Talking about that here would really be shanghaiing the thread. I'm skeptical that a thread just about the Tao Te Ching would be of interest to enough people last very long. I'll try and see if it goes anywhere.
So, we must presume that the question makes sense, because otherwise we couldn't find a satisfactory answer to the question. Well, yeah. One can't find a satisfying answer to a nonsensical question. But what would be more satisfying? Massaging the terms until the question becomes trivial? For example, let's just say that "nothing" is the same as "everything" - Boom! Done! Is this really a satisfying exercise? Even if you stretch it over two paragraphs?
It's a bad argument, because it blithely presumes probabilities in the absence of any context. It's cargo cult math.
Like I said in my OP, I think the reason he, like Martin Gardner, says that is beacuse of an argument like this:
Quoting Amalac
In a response to another comment I gave an example: A universe that was just like the actual one, but where a rock didn't exist would be simpler than the actual universe, and therefore more likely to exist than the actual universe. And a universe where both a rock and the sun didn't exist was even more likely, since it's even simpler. And so, if we continue like that, we could say that the simplest and therefore most likely (infinitely more likely) scenario was that nothing existed at all.
Unless we are to say that it does not follow that something is more probable just because it's simpler, or we deny that it is simpler.
I don't think your post addressed what I said. A universe without a particular rock is a little bit simpler than the one with it. But it's not "infinitely" simpler. It's the vague and meaningless use of "infinitely" that I'm objecting to.
It seems you didn't read the whole thing:
Quoting Amalac
They would not argue that a universe without a rock or without the sun or the milky way is infinitely simpler, they would argue: the less things there are in it, the simpler the scenario is. And it reaches its simplest state when there is absolutely nothing in it, where infinitely many things don't exist (or at least where a huge amount of things don't exist).
The phrase "infinitely more likely" is incoherent. It's meaningless. And worse, it obfuscates thought. It's a phrase that literally short-circuits precise thinking. It's wrong at every level.
You say it's wrong at every level, so perhaps you could mention why it's wrong at a few levels at least. Since as you can see, for some people the argument I mentioned appears perfectly natural.
What does it mean? Infinity has particular technical meanings in math. If you're using it as a synonym for "lots and lots" or "really really big but still finite," you're making an error that leads to weak and confused thinking.
But you are right in that it probably doesn't make sense when taken literally.
Perhaps he was trying to say: It was far more likely for the universe not to have existed, since such a scenario is far simpler than the scenario in which the actual world exists, for the reasons given before.
What would be your response to that then?
I understand that, and I'm objecting to the usage.
Quoting Amalac
Then we're in agreement. And the reason I mention it is that it's all too common for people to use "infinite" as a substitute for "really really big, but finite." And it's confusing and wrong to do that. Physicists do it a lot, even big-name professional physicists. I saw Leonard Susskind being interviewed once about the multiverse, and he was asked whether there are infinitely many universes. He answered, "There are 10 to the 500 types of universes". But that's a perfectly finite number. And I read one of his papers on infinity once and he made the same error, confusing a large finite number with infinity. And he's a big name in physics.
Quoting Amalac
That this is exactly how he should have phrased it!
It is great when someone sets an example as to how feedback can be given with respect even if we are in disagreement. Thank you, and in indeed, we disagree!
I appreciate your comment. I try to be a good citizen of the forum. Often I fail, but I keep trying.