A copy of yourself: is it still you?
Imagine that 3-D scanning and 3-D printing become so sophisticated that you could step into a machine that scanned the exact position and nature of every particle in your body and then send that information to a printer that could reconstitute a body with the same types of particles in the same positions within the body. Assume that the technology is 100% reliable, but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. Is there any reason to deny that the person who steps out of the machine at the other end is the person who steps into it. Would it matter if it wasn't the same person as long as they were convinced they were?
Comments (57)
The interesting part is there's no reason that would be required.. realizing that, I'd say no, I'm me.. now in your scenario assuming the memory and brain configuration (it's so much more complicated.. I'd hope lol but let's just assign "consciousness" as that) is the exact same.. there wouldn't be anybody to claim to be you at that point so.. you know it really depends if you view a human being as anything more than a blob of sentient meat or not.
Edit: This question seems oddly familiar to another one about a hypothetical planet-to-planet transporter system. It was suggested that an atom (or group of atoms) being truly transported from one place in spacetime to another is different from a new atom (or group of atoms) being created with 100% of the same properties and configuration. One is true teleportation, whereas the other is essentially a glorified fax machine.
"You" are your consciousness and "your body" is what you control, you could be given an entirely new body and you'd still be "you".
The "person" is not just the total of the atoms that are arranged to form them. The person is the result of the years of experiences and knowledge acquired. It is obvious that the person stepping out of the machine never experienced going into it, and the person going in has no experience of getting out. Therefore they are not the same people.
That's not obvious to me.
Quoting Sir2u
Yeah, in other words what makes you "you" is physical continuity of self-experience and not 'mere identity' of atomic or neural patterns. (Locke, Shoemaker, Parfit) An original and a copy – e.g. territory and map – are not 'the same'; the only "perfect" 1:1 copy – instantiation – of an original is the original itself. (Korzybski)
edit:
:up:
The brain changes every time it encounters information through senses—just reading your post changed my brain. So no. A copy of you is not you. Because the very second onwards it became a copy of you it started changing in its unique way.
It depends on what "you" we're talking about. From the perspective of the "you" stepping into the machine, every resulting copy is you. But as soon as more than one version steps out, they all diverge.
The answer is “no” by virtue of each specimen occupying its own space and time. Your copy is someone else.
What constitutes me as being "I" is my unique perception of existence, so no, the person who left the machine, even if he is equal in appearance, personality, aesthetics, method, etc... would not constitute "I", because as you well put it, it is necessary to "destroy" one in order for the other to "exist".
There's no "transferring" of information, only "replicating" information.
However, if your question comprises only the perception of other beings in question to me, then yes, I would still be "I", but only in the external; the view of others.
So please enlighten me how it was possible.
Person #1 walked into a machine, but never walked out of the other machine. Person #2 is not the same person as Person #1 because he has been reconstructed in in the shape of Person #1 but in a different place and from different molecules. Person #2 walked out of the machine but had never walked into it.
Sure. Let's backtrack.
Quoting Sir2u
Call this statement A. I find this statement acceptable. In fact, a person isn't comprised of the same molecules over time; the act of living involves the exchange of molecules (and atoms) with the environment.
Quoting Sir2u
Call this statement B. I also find this statement acceptable. A person as an agentive entity will in the "approximate now" have experiences. The person through time will notably acquire knowledge and experiences in the form of memories that are shaped by those experiences.
Quoting Sir2u
It's here where I see problems. The first statement here conflicts with statement A; it seems to suggest that a person is just the total of the atoms arranged to form them.
Also, given the problem statement in the original post, it's quite reasonable to presume that Person #2 would have the same memories as Person #1; i.e., that Person #2 would have the same acquired knowledge and "remembered" experiences as the person who stepped into the machine (Person #1). Under that reasonable presumption, your second statement conflicts with statement B; Person #2 would be a result of the same experiences and knowledge that Person #1 (again being the person who entered the machine) had.
Also, I find the "different place" thing a bit confusing. I just walked from my kitchen to my desk. I had and acquired some experiences in my kitchen; now I am having experiences at my desk. But obviously I'm in a different place at my desk than I was when I was in my kitchen. I don't think you're presuming I'm a different person at my desk than the person in my kitchen moments ago, but according to the argument you just gave, you're arguing that Person #2 is different than Person #1 because Person #2 is in a different place... perhaps you're missing a time element in your analysis?
No it does not. That is why it was stated that a person is NOT JUST the sum of the particles that make up the person, but it is obvious that they are included.
Quoting InPitzotl
Therefore they cannot be the same person because Person #2 does not have the experience of going into the machine.
Quoting InPitzotl
You went to maybe a million different places in your journey to the kitchen, but it was the same set of molecules that went along with you, not a completely new set.
Quoting InPitzotl
I left that part out so at not to confuse people. But I guess that your journey to the kitchen was not instantaneous and you changed very few molecules even though the distance covered was god knows how many microns in length. If you had instantly appeared a thousand miles away made up of completely different pieces, even managing to retain the memories walking into the machine, you would not have actually done the act of walking into the machine. The memories and experiences are not all of it either, a person is made up of both molecules and memories.
Another part of you is actually changing as you grow old, your reconstructed body would be brand new but aged according to the old one. In the art world that would be called a fake.
I think that they’d need a lot of convincing that they weren’t.
Actually, no, it's not obvious. Why is it obvious to you?
Quoting Sir2u
But being made up of molecules does not entail being a particular set of molecules. A river is made up of molecules, but is certainly not a particular set of them.
From a subjective perspective, we can easily say we're different persons because we have different points of view. I see what I see not what you see, and vice versa. We can also claim to have an identity across time due to memories of points of view; I remember seeing what that guy who stepped into the kitchen in the last post saw, you do not. So I'm the same guy that stepped into the kitchen in the last post. You aren't that guy.
Everything I described matches the heart of what these teletransporters (and apparently 3d printers now?) are wanting to get at... personal identity. Were it not for such inconvenient philosophical devices, our identities would simply be tied to our bodies that age from birth to death. But those bodies are living beings; furthermore, we're energy hungry mammals. As such, it's incredibly reasonable to say that this identity-having, identity-maintaining thing that goes from birth to death, which is what we're talking about, is a slow moving stream of molecules, not a lump of them.
Quoting Sir2u
Applying the principles above, Person #2 has a distinct point of view from you, so you and Person #2 are different identities. Person #2 remembers being person #1, so Person #2's personal identity connects to the past entity you're calling Person #1 in the same way my identity right now connects to the identity of that guy that walked into the kitchen in the last post. Therefore, per this principle, Person #2 does have the experience of going into the machine.
Quoting Sir2u
But a person is a living being not a sculpture.
The physical state-2 of Mary "waking up" is a direct consequence of, or change from, the physical state-1 of Mary "going to sleep" (re Ship of Theseus) whereas, on the other hand, two 3D printer "teleport" to Shanghai & Frankfurt two (immediately neuro-divergent, therefore non-exact) physical copies of the original Mary who was 3D scanned in Atlanta, where she remains after the scanning is done, so that are then three distinct "Marys" at three separate locations simultaneously (re: maps (copies) =|= territority (original)).
No it wouldn't if I couldn't subjectively experience or tell the difference.
Absurd.
Good point! I see no difference between the two. In both cases there's an interval, one between going off the sleep and waking up and the other between being disintegrated at one end and reconstituted at the other. In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. If the 3D printing process could be made to mimic sleep it would effectively make the two processes identical; perhaps we could wait for a customer/user to fall asleep first before using the 3D printing process.
true. Environmental influences on our DNA. I'd say part of me is the same and part of me is someone new. But it also differs from day to day how I feel.
Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking?
But nothing is shown wrong by your question. Per the principle they are both "you". But being separate beings, they are different from each other. There's nothing contradictory about it; just as your body has been copied, so has your identity been copied. Now there are two.
Yes, there will be two bodies and two minds presumably but both would be the same person. If you disagree you have a heavy burden on your shoulders which is, to be blunt, to inform us, possibly prove, what you mean by person i.e. what makes you you?
Sorry but I don't catch your drift. What is the definition of a person? In asking that I request you remain faithful to the common man's, the non-philosopher's, intuitions on the matter.
No worries. Context, like timing, is everything.
Thanks for the advice.
You didn't answer my question though. What is a person?
I cannot answer what makes me me, but I am sure that it is not possible to fall asleep and wake up in two bodies.
If you would have two bodies being a double agent would be an easy game. :)
Quoting 180 Proof
What makes identical twins different persons?
You mentioned twins and I ran with that. What makes twins different from each other?
1) They have different locations.
2) They change on a molecular level within seconds.
3) Can you imagine having two bodies?
To tell you the truth, or if it's all the same to you, I'm asking you to, well, expand and explain (yourself). If it's too much trouble you can decline my request of course.
The last question seems to be self-refuting. The "you" refers to mind and not the body. Ergo, it's ok within this framework of identity to have two bodies with the same mind. The question proves the prevailing intuition on the matter that identity is an affair of the mind but we need to clarify what exactly about the mind determines identity. You first.
You picked one out of three points and answered it with a counter question. You don't have to answer the counter question to realize that it is nonsense to have two separate bodies. One body is in NY and the other in LA. Can they then communicate telepathically as the same mind?
I agree. I need to keep my end of the bargain which I must admit I haven't. Until later then...as and when we can cross swords again - your longsword vs my kitchen knife :lol:
First off we need to be clear on what a person is i.e. what makes me me or you you? What defines a person's identity?
For my money both the mind and the body together define a person's identity. In the OP's gedanken experiment, the 3D printer produces a faithful copy of the original i.e. if I print Mr. X, what I'll get is another Mr. X. The two Mr. X's will be identical, mentally and physically. In other words the two are the same person.
If you disagree, you need to be both clear and specific as to why?
Your statement that, "...it's nonsense to have two separate bodies..." doesn't quite pack the punch it's intended to because the identity of person is a mind + body affair and there's no difference in those respects between an original person and the copy of that person.
I disagree.
Quoting TheMadFool
Clearly and specifically, the degree to which those bodies are identical is a red herring. Each body has a distinct point of view; one cannot see through the other's eyes and vice versa. Same with internal "senses"... there's no direct line between the two bodies' thoughts (though if we're talking arbitrary technology, there could be; but that tech is not in play... only the brains being identical is). If what one person sees triggers a thought, the only way the other one can know about it is through the typical communication route.
ETA: I've discussed the principles I'm applying here earlier in this thread; I believe they underline the core of personal identity. There are two principles correlating to two distinct processes; the one I'm applying to the bodies applies to the "approximate now"... roughly, the period of time where active perception operates. The second principle connects the identity to and defines "past selves" (aka identity through time); it's similar, but invokes memory-of-points-of-view instead of points of view.
True, but if and only if Mr X & Mr X are entangled entities ... which classically they definitely cannot be (1); to wit: affecting one does not instantaneously, if at all, affect the other at any distance apart (i.e. Mr X does not scratch his right palm when the other Mr X's right palm itches).
Also, the only (1:1 ratio) "faithful copy" of an original is the original due to (A) quantum uncertainty and (B) intractable computational complexity given any arbitrary time constraint for the 3D scanning –> noise/loss-less transmission –> 3D printing process (i.e. map =|= territory). It is physically impossible – violation of classical locality (Einstein) – for 3D printed "Mr X" to simultaneously be 3D scanned Mr X. (2)
In practice it would be terribly easy to know which one was you.
You would be the one whose eyes you can't see.
You would be the one who experienced the world from the inside out, not the one you experience from the outside in.
You would be the one you experienced now, not the one you experienced at a slight time delay
You would be the one whose voice was moderated by bones in the skull, not the one whose voice was conditioned only by the column of air in the throat
etc etc
There is an incredibly clear asymmetry which would leave you in absolutely no doubt which one you were. Even if, to a third person, you were qualitatively identical.
That's another story. Up to the point when the copy is created, since both mind and body are identical, both the original and the copy are the same. Beyond that, because the expereiences of the original and the copy will differ - the physical environment and mental contents will vary - the two will not be the same person.
What's intriguing to me is that the identity of a person doesn't seem to be defined by attributes inherent to the person but by the relationship with the rest of reality. What I mean is that all people are considered the same/identical until they carve a unique set of experiences, physical and mental, out of reality.
An analogy might help: It's like all of us are, say, identical metal balls. The identity of each metal ball is decided by the unique experience it can have for itself and likewise a person's identity is a function of experiences peculiar to it.
There's no such thing as a person if that person can't describe a set of experiences that only that person has had.
The practical impossibilities of perfect copying are beside the point. Nevertheless, point made, point noted. Thanks!
This statement confuses me. I'm thinking at time T=1, there is A1. Then there's a copying process, and by time T=2, there is A2 and B2. "Up to the point when the copy is created" sounds exclusive, like it's describing T<=1. "The original and the copy" is inclusive, as if it describes T=2. Could you clarify?
Quoting TheMadFool
This sounds a little clearer... T>=2. But it sounds like you're focused on states. So it goes something like, A2 is in state S2, and B2 is in state S2 as well. Then time passes, and by T=3 A2 evolved to A3 and B2 to B3. At that time, A3 is in state SA3 and B3 is in state SB3. So you're saying that since A2 and B2 are both in S2, then they are the same person; but at T=3, they diverge into SA3 and SB3, at which point they are a different person.
I think this is erroneous. Even if A2 and B2 are in the same state, they are nevertheless two instances of the state. A2 is simply one incarnation of the state S2, B2 is a distinct incarnation of S2. A2 and B2, being causally disconnected in the right way (neurally), are already two individuals; what happens to A2 is distinct from what happens to B2. The causally interconnected workings of a brain is what generates a singular personal identity; and here we have two distinct causal frameworks.
Think of it this way. We put A2 into a closed room, and you can observe A2, and his room. B2 we put into another closed room. Some evil genius guy is doing something with that room, who knows. Possibly, of all of the things this evil genius might do, one of them could very well be to perfectly simulate the room A2 is in, so much so that by T=3, B3's state would be the same as A3's state. That's something this evil genius guy just might do... it's so like him to toy with us like that. But who knows.
So now time plays on to T=3. There you are... you have seen A2 evolve to A3. You saw the room's states evolve. So here's the question... did our evil genius, in fact, perfectly simulate the room? And the obvious answer is, you haven't a clue. And frankly, neither does A3 have a clue. That A3 does not know if B3's in the same state is more significant than whether or not it happened that the evil genius did in fact perfectly simulate the room. This lack of knowledge ipso facto demonstrates that A3 is not the same person as B3; the causal disconnectedness that leads to this utter lack of knowledge is enough grounding to say A3 is a different person. I have the same lack of knowledge of what you are seeing that A3 has of what B3 saw.
Quoting TheMadFool
It doesn't. Again you're focused on state and not instances. The ball over here is a different ball than the ball over there, even if their molecules were exact translations of each other. If I did something to one ball, and the other ball was in the evil genius's room, I cannot conclude the state of the other ball based on the state of the one. They are distinct lumps of matter.
What is a person? What defines a person? This, I believe, is where we should begin in order to resolve the problem that has you and me in its grips.
Quoting InPitzotl
You need to flesh that out for me. It's rather vague in its formulation and liable to be misunderstood especially considering the complexity of the matter at hand.
Take That!
I disagree. John defines water as a substance composed of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. Julius defines water as the fundamental element that is cold and wet. John and Julius's definitions are incompatible and wholly different, but they are talking about the same thing. They're talking about that stuff that comes out of your taps... that thing you find in lakes and rivers, that falls from the sky in drops a lot. John and Julius aren't starting with their definitions; they're starting with a reference. The definitions are where they wind up. This case is similar... we aren't starting with definitions, we're starting with a reference.
If we start with definitions, you're likely to say something consistent with state-identity, and I'm likely to say something consistent with instance-identity. Neither is really where we start... the definitions are where we wind up. So if you'd like to start at the beginning, I recommend starting with the reference. You and I agree that you and I are examples of different people. There's a particular fundamental reason why we do... that's what the principles I discussed describe.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well let's look at an anomaly. This is sort of old news, so if you have heard it before pardons, but I'll present it as if you haven't.
Alien Hand Syndrome (AHS) is a common side effect of a corpus callosotomy, a last resort surgery where the corpus callosum (the bundle of nerves connecting your left and right brain hemispheres) is severed. AHS is a condition where some of one's limbs appear to have a "mind of their own". From the wiki article:
...and this can get extreme... here's Ramachandran recounting a case where one hemisphere is a believer and the other an atheist:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFJPtVRlI64
In comparison to these examples, I am of a singular mind, and you are of a singular mind, and our two minds are distinct in these kinds of ways. You don't experience AHS; your left hand isn't tossing cigarettes that your right hand is about to light, and you generally have singular sets of beliefs. Likewise, there is not a corpus callosum connecting our two brains. But each of us have two brain hemispheres which aren't even close to identical, in each connected with a corpus callosum. In contrast, these "two" subjects (the smoker/non-smoker, the atheist/believer) appear to be of two minds each, and we can blame this on the severing of the corpus callosum, which is a manifest example of a break in the appropriate form of causal interconnectedness. I would describe these subjects as being two persons each; the number of identities in their heads doubled as a result of the corpus callosotomy.
Secondly, what exactly do you mean by "reference" as opposed to definition. It's not at clear from your post what and how exactly you mean to use that idea to make a case against the fact that "if physically identical and also mentally identical then the same person". By way of showing how counterintuitive and for that reason probably false your position is imagine the following scenario:
There's a person X and fae's presented before you in all faer splendor. Fae is then taken out of sight and then brought back into your field of vision. How do you know that X is the same person and not someone else? Could you answer that question for me please? I think we might be able to resolve our differences with the answer.
It's impossible if by 'same you mean numerically identical but not if what is intended is qualitatively identical.
When it is asked if two physically identical human copies are the same person, I don't think anyone is suggesting that they might be numerically identical.
Your reckoning is wrong. Our disagreement should be about personal identity, not what the definition of a person is. This is the point of contention:
Quoting TheMadFool
Somehow, you're counting two Mr. X's, but you're getting "the same" out of it.
Quoting TheMadFool
You do understand, TheMadFool, that it's patronizing to suggest that I, a native English speaker and an explicit example myself of what a person is, do not understand the meaning of the 531st most popular English word, right? If you disagree that my slicing your head into 50 pieces might make it a bit difficult for you to remember what name your mother gave you, then please make your point. Otherwise, let's drop this gaslighting act.
Quoting TheMadFool
Reference is the act of referring. A definition traditionally is a statement that attempts to describe what you mean. A reference by contrast just points to what you mean.
Quoting TheMadFool
Square one is perfectly justified: you're counting two Mr. X's then immediately saying there's one of something. Two Mr. X's means there are two bodies; two heads and four feet; to dress them up fancy, I need two top hats, two suits, four socks, and two pairs of shoes (two cummerbunds, two pairs of cufflinks, etc).
But you said (essentially) there's one person. I note that you never actually gave your own definition of the 531st most popular word, but you did loosely say it had to do with bodies and minds. Well there's definitely more than one body here. And you're definitely saying there's just one person. So obviously you're not really serious about that "body" nonsense. So let's throw that away. You think there's one mind. Right?
So you tell me. You already have Mr. X 1 and Mr. X 2, with two distinct bodies, that you're claiming are one person. So apparently body count and mind count can differ, and despite saying the word "body" you really don't care how many there are. So let's talk about "Subject A", the smoker/non-smoker (the corpus callosotomy patient with AHS whose left hand tosses cigarettes her right hand is about to light). That is one body. How many minds do you think is there? And why?
. You're unique in the world, friend ... because ... You're an individual ..
. Individuality means your uniqueness - not compared with anybody else. Your incomparable uniqueness: that is individuality.
. Individuality is beautiful; thats how existence has made you, as an individual.
. Ego is comparison ... Ego is your invention ... But ...
. Existence has not given you any Ego ... It has certainly given you an individuality.