New form of the ontological argument
Leibniz's definition of perfection is: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. " (Source: Monadology)
For the following argument, I shall also use the notion of existence given by Leibniz, specifically from his argument from the eternal truths, according to which eternal truths (eg: 2 • 2 = 4) exist in the mind that apprehends them. The proof, which is a new form of the ontological argument, can be formulated like this: A subject of all perfections can be conceived. Said subject either exists or does not exist. If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection. When existence is a perfection, then in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists.
Hume's objection to the original argument is the following: «I will begin by noting that there is an obvious absurdity in the claim to prove a factual point, or to prove it with a priori arguments. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies contradiction. Everything that we can conceive as existing, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is, therefore, no being whose non-existence implies contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and I am willing to let the entire controversy depend on it. "
But we see that if this new argument were valid (which I neither affirm nor assure), the manifest contradiction would be that if God did not exist outside the mind, he would not exist as an idea in the mind either.
This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection.
It does not, however, answer the objection that existence is not a predicate.
Thoughts?
For the following argument, I shall also use the notion of existence given by Leibniz, specifically from his argument from the eternal truths, according to which eternal truths (eg: 2 • 2 = 4) exist in the mind that apprehends them. The proof, which is a new form of the ontological argument, can be formulated like this: A subject of all perfections can be conceived. Said subject either exists or does not exist. If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection. When existence is a perfection, then in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists.
Hume's objection to the original argument is the following: «I will begin by noting that there is an obvious absurdity in the claim to prove a factual point, or to prove it with a priori arguments. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies contradiction. Everything that we can conceive as existing, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is, therefore, no being whose non-existence implies contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and I am willing to let the entire controversy depend on it. "
But we see that if this new argument were valid (which I neither affirm nor assure), the manifest contradiction would be that if God did not exist outside the mind, he would not exist as an idea in the mind either.
This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection.
It does not, however, answer the objection that existence is not a predicate.
Thoughts?
Comments (130)
I think this debate is not all about contradiction between existing/non existing God as a perfection. I guess this is an argument that can be put inside the "infinite" realities.
Firstly, it is interesting the quote you used about Leibniz saying perfection is It is very complex this one. Because he is speaking about positive realism. So I guess he wants to put a divisional line between tangible and non tangible realities. Let me put another example of this. Descartes said perfection is that realism which even dreaming does not drive to failure. It is pretty similar as yours but one important point here: Awareness.
It will depend a lot of how is interpreted perfection and "God" in our awareness. This is the main reason that probably you used empiricism like David Hume but I will go for John Locke.
First, we have to understand what is abstract concepts as "perfection" "limits" and "God" What if you never heard of these? Well welcome to extreme empiricism. It is just impossible to give characteristics to something or someone that we do not even know yet. So I think this perspective wants to be as much as "limitless" in terms of skills and then we can say that those characteristics always existed but it was our fault not knowing it.
This one is so awesome. If you want to develop this existentialism debate I recommend you a serie: "Social Experiment Lain". It is free around internet. Explain the perfection of non-existence pretty well and I think is one the most interesting doubts about human existentialism.
Why do you think a subject of perfection is conceivable? Firstly, in theology this gets into problems with the "perfect being" having both a necessary will and a free will. Secondly, it's extremely Platonic to think of virtue as some kind of substance that can exist as an infinite nature. Thirdly, a "supernatural" being cannot really be conceived at all so why speak about it in such a context? Fourthly, infinite such persons would be greater than say 3 so you would have to say there are infinite divine persons in this "perfect" substance. Therefore the arguments proved too much and nothing at all at the same time
First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.
But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).
As I understand it, the currently most popular version of the ontological argument is Alvin Plantinga's. I am not too familiar with it, but I think it assumes that God is a necessary existent. And then it exploits this by noting that if we accept that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a necessarily existent God, then such a God must in fact exist. I think that's quite right, but the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity. Which undercuts this kind of ontological argument.
1. “Why do you think a subject of perfection is conceivable?” A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».
2. “Secondly, it's extremely Platonic to think of virtue as some kind of substance that can exist as an infinite nature. ” I never said anything about virtue.
3. “infinite such persons would be greater than say 3 so you would have to say there are infinite divine persons in this "perfect" substance.” Perhaps, that depends on how you define God. If by the «greatest conceivable beaing» we mean «A being greater than all other beings» then it is inconceivable that there should be more than one of them, since then there would be a being that is not inferior to the «greatest conceivable being», namely: the other greatest conceivable being (s).
If, on the other hand we mean only that no greater being can be conceived, then if the proof were valid, there may be more than one, I don't deny that possibility.
4. “To clarify, "supernatural" means divine. "Spiritual" means "of the soul". We can understand the soul because we all have a psyche and the psyche, when operating correctly, is "soul". When people feel "grace" that is what the Chinese call "chi" or "qi". When under the influence of grace your will often feels like someone is giving it to you, but rationalizing about this "person" comes at it from the perspective of philosophy and reason, and this gets into a lot of difficulties. ” That sounds like the experiential ontological argument, which is not the one I have mentioned.
5. “since we can't really form a proper idea of this divine person or persons, the ontological argument really fails” What is the basis of your claim that «we can't form a proper idea of this divine person or persons»? And before that: what do you mean by «proper idea»? I think that needs to be clarified.
6. “Also remember that if we look at the Jesus story as ancient literature we have the person in history who was more convinced of anyone that he knew or could prove there was a God, yet as he suffered death he too said God had abandoned him” What the bible says is irrelevant unless it is proven beforehand that it is divinely inspired, and that Jesus, if he existed, was in fact how the gospels depict him. That is a matter for another discussion.
1. “First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? ” «Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. »
2. “God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.” That is a fair objection. It may be, however, that only God (if he exists) knows the reason why it is morally better to create something imperfect rather than not to (see Leibniz's doctrine of compossibles and also his proposed solution of the problem of evil) (Notice I said «it may be» that way, not that God exists and it is in fact like that).
3. «But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).» That's an interesting argument. However, you can only say that it is impossible after reflecting upon it. It may be impossible that the subject of all perfections exists, but it is not enough to say that it is, as you say. Whether it is so is still a matter of debate.
Perhaps I can give a clearer picture of the argument with this passage concerning Leibniz:
«(...) Leibniz wrote out a proof that the idea of God is possible (...) This proof defines God as the most perfect Being, i.e., as the subject of all perfections, and a perfection is defines as a "simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." Leibniz easily proves that no two perfections, as above defined, can be incompatible. He concludes: "There is, therefore, or there can be conceived, a subject of all perfections, or most perfect Being. Whence it follows also that He exists, for existence is among the number of the perfections."» (Source: Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy).
4. «the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence.» If you define omnipotence like that, then that is obviously correct. But in order to inquire epistemologically into the most coherent and logically viable notion of God (and also to abide to the principle of charity), we should look at all notions of omnipotence that seem as plausible as possible. For instance, one may define omnipotence as the ability to do anything except what is contrary to the laws of logic. That God cannot kill himself may only confirm his omnipotence, since some also define him as immutable, and dying would imply that he could change (if he existed) which is impossible by definition.
5. “Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity.” See my response to 1, it is a reductio ad absurdum.
I don't see how that follows. God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. So he's 'morally' perfect.
Well, it is easy enough to imagine that there is no morally perfect being. After all, not existing is not a vice, is it?
It seems to me that you are simply using the word 'perfection' as a synonym for 'exists' and then pointing out that if X does not exist, then X's non existence is a perfection (which only follows because you're using the word perfection in that strange way).
But then all you're arguing is that things that exist, exist.
Therefore, non-existence must then be a perfection. But a perfection is "a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." But if God merely didn't exist in reality, and didn't also not exist as an idea in the mind, then non-existence would not be a perfection, since it would have limits. (Remember I used the notion of existence in Leibniz's argument from the eternal truths, according to which ideas also exist in a mind which apprehends them)
Therefore, to reject that non-existence being a perfection entails a contradiction amounts to rejecting the definition of «perfection».
I think God exists. But what exactly are you talking about when you talk of a 'subject of all perfections'? It seems to me that you are simply using this word 'perfection' to mean 'exists'.
For something to be perfect, is for it to be good. I mean "that's perfect, but bad" sounds incoherent.
For something to be good is for it be valued by God.
So, certainly for any perfections to exist, God needs to exist.
And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.
Do you disagree with any of that?
Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist. (And so we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere a perfection, given that a perfection is a good quality).
Does God exist? Yes. But I don't think we can get to this conclusion by just noticing that we have the idea of a maximally good being.
Well, what's in a word? Let's dispense with the word omnipotence and just talk about being all powerful instead - or, what amounts to the same thing, let's talk of him being able to do 'anything' (which is how Jesus put it, I believe) - as that is the feature God has.
A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?
Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself (and making square circles and such like).
Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.
No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.
So, God is all powerful. And as an all powerful being he can do anything - which is just to say the same thing again. And as he can do anything, he can destroy himself and anything else. Thus nothing exists of necessity. And thus Plantinga's ontological argument and any other that appeals to a necessary existent fails.
1. «The subject of all perfections» is the definition of God I take from Leibniz.
2. No, I am not using the words «perfection» and «exists» as synonimous. What makes you think that's the case?: «a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.» that's the definition I use, Leibniz's. Existence is only one among other perfections, and certainly does not mean the same as that.
3. «Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist» Fair point. But as I said before, The Law of the Excluded Middle states that the subject of all perfections must either have the perfection of existing, or that of not-existing. And if he did not exist, he would have the perfection of not-existing and consequently be inconceivable, which contradicts the fact that he is conceivable.
Also, see my reply 2 on the previous post.
4. “And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.” Then he would not be immutable nor pure act, properties many philosophers often atribute to God.
I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I juts don't know what that definition means.
That's perfect but bad makes no sense, right? Can something be maximally morally good and not perfect? No. So, perfect really means morally good.
If you think otherwise, can you provide an example of something that is perfect yet bad, or fully good yet imperfect?
1. «A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?
Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself.» That is one possible conception of God, yes. But many philosophers would not accept it. For instance, Aquinas would retort that it makes no sense to say that God is constrained by the laws of logic, because God didn't «create» the laws of logic, he is those laws, just as he is, literally, truth (once again, according to Aquinas and other philosophers).
2. «Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.» Well, if we follow the notion of omnipotence according to which omnipotence does not involve the ability to do what is logically impossible, then the ability to kill oneself would only make one less great, and to affirm that God cannot kill himself amounts to affirming that God cannot cease to be omnipotent. So no contradictions there (at least I don't see any).
3. «No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.» True, but all one needs to do to avoid equivocation is to clarify the meaning of the terms used.
I don't hold the view that there is such a thing as the «true» definition of omnipotence, only that some definitions are more useful than others for given purposes.
Not to mention, how do you know that it is more likely that it is impossible to prove God's existence a priori and from his notion alone?
« I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I just don't know what that definition means.»
«Leibniz argued that, since perfections are unanalysable, it is impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible— (...)» (Source: Stanford Enciclopedia of philosophy)». «Positive» also cannot be analyzed, because it is a simple quality. But we can understand some words without the need of definitions (otherwise, it would be impossible to understand any word due to the ad Infinitum regress which results from defining the words that define a word).
But if that still bothers you, let's use this definition instead: a simple quality which is absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.
Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?
Plus I have Jesus and Descartes on my side. Who's got the better army?
But anyway, the point stands, does it not? Surely no reasonable person can deny that an all powerful being cannot lack a power that I, a far less powerful being, possess? I mean, how is that not a contradiction?
I have the power to destroy myself. So, God - being all powerful - also has the power to destroy himself, otherwise he'd lack a power i possess and so could not sensibly be called 'all powerful'.
Thus, God does not exist of necessity. For he exists by his own grace and thus exists contingently (as does all else, of course).
And note, you cannot say "ah, but Aquinas disagrees" because Aquinas is not here and hasn't read what I just said. I think there's a very good chance he'd agree if he was!
Quoting Amalac
Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.
Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.
Similarly, if I say "God" just means "the sum total of what exists" and then argue that as the sum total of what exists exists, God exists, then although I have proved God, the God I have proved is just "the sum total of what exists" and not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.
1.«Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?» Is your conception of God better? I don't know, I merely pointed out that it is not the only possible conception.
2.«Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.
Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.»
Only if you hold the dogmatic view that yours is the «true» definition of omnipotence, does «but the word can no longer be used to characterise God» follow.
It's possible that God has the property of omnipotence according to that other meaning, and that you are wrong in thinking that he had omnipotence in an absolute sense. Just because someone defined a term first, that doesn't mean theirs is the «true» definition of a word.
But at any rate, if that bothers you, we may just say: Maybe God does not have the property of being omnipotent, but rather this other property (call it whatever you like) which is like omnipotence but with some limitations. And this may be used to characterise God.
All that we know of good is beauty in the world, the goodness of children, and virtue in adults. Trying to conceptualize a being having all those "to infinity" or whatever is not a sound philosophical move. You can't prove the first step of your argument. It's not a clear and distinct idea like Descartes said so it is not possible to prove anything from it
1. «All that we know of good is beauty in the world, the goodness of children, and virtue in adults. Trying to conceptualize a being having all those "to infinity" or whatever is not a sound philosophical move» Because you say so?
2.«You can't prove the first step of your argument»
The first step? Do you mean the first premise?:
«A subject of all perfections can be conceived.»
If so, I already clarified what I meant by that:
A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».
Do you deny that we can understand that proposition?
If that is not the «step» you meant, then please point out to me which step it is that I cannot prove.
3. «Descartes implicitly admitted the ontological argument doesn't work unless the idea of God is clearer than all other ideas.» Well, I am not Descartes, so that's irrelevant. (Edit: I now noticed that this is not a reply to me, so ignore my reply if you meant this as a general comment).
4. «I'm saying it's the least clear of all our ideas so the argument doesn't get off the ground.»
How do you know that it is the «least clear of our ideas»?
Plus, perfection doesn't just involve «good». Goodness is only one among other perfections, such as existence. The argument depends on «existence» as a perfection, not of «goodness».
Your arguments have many assumptions woven into them. Maybe ultimate goodness is a place and feeling we experience when we die, not some God out there watching us
1.Let's hear those assumptions then.
2. Again, I don't see what «ultimate goodness» has to to do with the argument. I don't mention goodness even once in the argument I mentioned. The perfection with which the argument deals is «existence» not «goodness».
You mention Pure Act, which is of course from Aquinas. God as understood by Aquinas have 3 parts: his essence, his free will, and his necessary will. Now moral goodness doesn't flow from essence. You can't define goodness by substance. This is not how moral goodness is properly understood. It is impossible for any being to simply possess moral virtue. Morality is act. God's goodness might be seen as infinite possessed goodness, but that couldn't be as good as proper virtue. So let's set essence aside for a moment. So we have necessary will now. Nothing willed necessary is morally perfect. That's obvious.
Also, how would do you reconcile God having one will when he wills necessarily and freely? I thought he was supposed to be perfectly simple.
It is said when talking about the "problem of pain" that God cannot create free creatures who can gain virtue without allowing them pain. However, since God was always happy, couldn't he create creatures more in his likeness (without having to allow pain)? God doesn't face struggle to find happiness. His act of existing is blissful I thought. So we have an infinite deity who loves infinitely but does so with bliss and necessity. And we have his creatures who have animal natures which earns its way in life through strain of their muscles and wits. Doesn't this seem strange to you?
So the conclusion is your idea of God is vague and probably inconsistent, and therefore trying to prove his existence from sheer logic is ridiculous
Yes, that is a good formalization of the argument.
You should only add a premise that 2 is true because that is what is implied by non-existence being a perfection, and by the subject of all perfections having that perfection.
For my money, everything rides on this part of the argument. It's necessary that the greatest being conceivable but nonexistent should lead to a contradiction forcing us to accept that the greatest being conceivable is one that exists.
1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]
2. Nonexistence is a mark of greatness [assumption]
3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]
Ergo,
4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]
5. God is the greatest being [definition]
6. God cannot exist in any way possible [4, 5 Substitution: The greatest being = God]
7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea
Ergo,
8. God cannot exist as an idea [6, 7 Modus ponens]
9. God exists as an idea [premise]
10. God cannot exist as an idea AND God exists as an idea [8, 9 Conjunction, contradiction]
11. False that nonexistence is a mark of greatness [2 to 10 Reductio Ad Absurdum]
12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]
13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]
Ergo,
14. The greatest being exists [12, 13 Modus ponens]
14. God exists [5, 14 Substitution: The greatest being = God]
Am I on the right track?
Yes, even better stated.
:ok: Thanks for the thread but I feel something's off somehow, somewhere.
I'll be eagerly waiting for when you find what is off then.
«Maybe ultimate goodness is a place and feeling we experience when we die, not some God out there watching us» So you are arguing that non-existence might be a perfection? What is your response to this part of the argument then?: Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. And therefore this assumption must be false (TheMadFool formalized the argument, there you can see clearly how this step works).
«It is said when talking about the "problem of pain" that God cannot create free creatures who can gain virtue without allowing them pain. However, since God was always happy, couldn't he create creatures more in his likeness (without having to allow pain)? God doesn't face struggle to find happiness. His act of existing is blissful I thought. So we have an infinite deity who loves infinitely but does so with bliss and necessity. And we have his creatures who have animal natures which earns its way in life through strain of their muscles and wits. Doesn't this seem strange to you?»
Like I responded to another user, yes, that might contradict God's omnibenevolence. But the opposing argument, let's take Leibniz', would argue thus: «One of the most characteristic features of that philosophy (Leibniz') is the doctrine of many possible worlds. A world is "possible" if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of possible worlds, all of which God contemplated before creating the actual world. Being good, God decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it would not have been so good as the actual world. That is because some great goods are logically bound up with certain evils. To take a trivial illustration, a drink of cold water when you are very thirsty on a hot day may give you such great pleasure that you think the previous thirst, though painful, was worth enduring, because without it the subsequent enjoyment could not have been so great. For theology, it is not such illustrations that are important, but the connection of sin with free will. Free will is a great good, but it was logically impossible for God to bestow free will and at the same time decree that there should be no sin. God therefore decided to make man free, although he foresaw that Adam would eat the apple, and although sin inevitably brought punishment. The world that resulted, although it contains evil, has a greater surplus of good over evil than any other possible world; it is therefore the best of all possible worlds, and the evil that it contains affords no argument against the goodness of God.» Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy.
Now, I don't say that things are just as Leibniz' says here, I am only saying that it is not logically impossible nor incoherent that they should be like that.
Food for thought...
Definition of "conceivable": capable of being imagined or grasped mentally.
If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.
To continue along the same trajectory, imagine god is inconceivable but if god is so then god would fall into the same category as contradictions and again there's something which is, in a sense, "equal" to god and that can't be because god is the "...greatest being..."
Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.
«If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.»
Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.
Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things in his image and likeness.
You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.
«Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.»
How is this not a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle?
Argument A
1. God is the greatest being [premise]
2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]
3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]
4. God exists [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]
5. If God exists then God and I are equal in terms of existence [premise]
6. If God and I are equal in terms of existence then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [premise]
7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [5, 6 Modus ponens]
8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 6 Conjunction. Contradiction]
9. God doesn't exist [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]
Argument B
1. God is the greatest being [premise]
2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]
3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]
4. God doesn't exist [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]
5. If God doesn't exist then God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist
6. If God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time
7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [5, 6 Modus ponens]
8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 7 Conjunction, Contradiction]
9. God exists [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]
God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic and if that is something then God is even beyond that.
Like you say, for those who are radical empiricists that follows. But I am not.
As for your point that we can't give characteristics to something or someone we don't yet know, it seems to me that sometimes scientists can deduce the existence of some things they don't yet know, and give characteristics to these hypotetical things, which sometimes turn out to exist.
I am not saying «God exists and God has this and that attribute», I am saying: «If God exists, then God might have this and that attribute».
«2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]» Why should I accept this premise? See my previous response again.
«God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic.» While I understand that some, like Nicholas of Cusa, might adopt that view, if we adhere to the view that God can't do or be anything contrary to the laws of logic, then this plainly is a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle, according to which if the proposition «God exists» is false, then its negation «God does not exist» must be true and viceversa. The same applies to the proposition «God is conceivable».
Or perhaps I misunderstood you, and you are taking a view similar to Kant's, i.e. that it is an antinomy. Now what concerns me about that is that what is beyond words and logic would surely also be inconceivable, isn't that right?
At any rate, I don't see why I should accept the second premise of your argument A.
Ok. Understandable. You put existence as the epitome of all attributes. Existence could be the most perfection or attribute you can put on somebody (God). But how can we know he exists?
Then, if he exists and we discover it which attributes we put on them? I guess previously someone had to taught the existence of God himself (empiricism again).
Here we have a base of beliefs and believing in something abstract like God. I guess again when you believe in something "higher" or "greatest" you want to put on it all the best attributes possible because we see it as it could be our purest form
That said, I'm still not completely convinced by my own argument. Just wanted to throw it out there for you/someone to pick it apart if possible.
So why can't the greatest blank possible be the afterlife? Why put a person in there as the greatest blank. It's as hoc
Like I said, argument A is only valid if we accept premise 2. Why should we accept it?
If the propositions «God exists» and «God is conceivable» are neither true nor false, then they must be meaningless. Is that what you are saying? In that case, that's only true if argument A is valid, and I'm unsure it is.
If your argument A is not valid, then the conclusion «God does not exist» does not follow.
If God is the greatest being and God exists then God is like us in that respect, there being no difference between us and God which in different words means that God is no greater than us with respect to existence but that contradicts our basic assumption, the assumption that God is the greatest being.
And I already gave you my response, to which you have yet to respond:
Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.
Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things according to his image and likeness.
You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.
«it seems to me you make a fatal mistake in not distinguishing between a thing and the idea of a thing. Indeed I would agree that we can have an idea of perfection, even perfect perfection in any way conceivable, but those would be merely ideas of that perfection, and not in any way the perfection itself.
I can have ideas all day long of my perfect dream house, but dreaming doesn't make it so - except in dreams - nor can I live in an idea.»
Your argument then is in line with Gaunilo's argument of the perfect island, correct?
But there is an important difference: one may say, following the notion of existence of Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, that the «perfect island» or the «perfect dream house» have the predicate of non existence, but in said subjects that predicate is not a perfection, since subjects other than the subject of all perfections posses only some perfections, and therefore there is no logical contradiction arising from denying the existence of the «perfect island» or the «perfect house» outside the mind. We may say the «perfect island» has the predicate of non-existence, but that since its non existence is not a perfection it is limited, and thus it does not follow that said island must also not exist as an idea in the mind if it does not exist outside the mind.
And the argument I mentioned holds that if God did not exist, that would imply a logical contradiction. It is not argued that: «We have an idea of God as existing, therefore God exists», rather it is argued that: «If God (defined as the subject of all perfections) did not exist outside the mind, he would also not exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the fact that he does exist as an idea in the mind.»
«Someday when after a hard day's work you have a earned for yourself a great appetite, you must visit and I'll serve you a wonderful logical and non-contradictory dinner! But i wonder if you might not arise from table hungrier than when you sat. Logic is the use of tools on things, itself neither the tools nor the things. With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve.»
I have no idea what you mean by this. «With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve». What do you mean by that? Could you be a bit more specific about what you mean when you say «that existence is no more substantial...»? What do you mean by substantial?
«if you think Anselm's proof provides it, then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely.»
First of all, I am not mentioning the original ontological argument as formulated by Anselm, but rather a different form of it. I already explained this in my previous reply to you.
Second, I never said I consider the argument I mentioned to be valid, nor invalid. I do not assert either claim, nor does it convince me that God exists (nor does any argument I have seen yet).
I mentioned it for purely logical and epistemological purposes, such as clarifying the errors (if any) that the argument has, because it seems to me that the answers to the argument I've seen thus far are not very convincing, except perhaps Kant's objection that existence is not a predicate, and Russell's theory of descriptions.
Third, you say: «then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely». Assuming I did affirm the argument is valid, am I supposed to believe that just because you say so?
You have assumptions of the idea of "substance". They are undefended by you and and have no basis. Again, maybe the greatest good is where good people go (hence a place and a feeling) instead of a person. That place and feeling is more or less infinite and perfect. Whether there is a non-human in that state is a non-question. There could be, but it doesn't matter. The idea that there is a person who has all "perfections" has so many assumptions behind it that I think you'll have to do a lot of self-questioning to get out of this mess you got your mind into
No, it isn't dogmatic. A being who has more power than another, is more powerful, yes? Now, you can use 'omnipotent' to refer to the less powerful if you want, but now you're not talking about the most powerful being, are you?
You're just playing with words. It's easy to prove God if you do that. Here: I understand 'omnipotent' to mean 'able to do all the things one is able to do'. I am omnipotent according to that definition. It's a silly definition. But let's not be dogmatic.
I understand 'omniscient' as 'knowing all the things I know". Now I'm omniscient. Silly definition, but again, mustn't be dogmatic. I understand 'omnibenevolent' to be 'approved of by me'. And as I fully approve of myself, I am omnibenevolent. Silly, but don't be a dogmatist. Now it turns out that according to those definitions of the terms, I am God. And as I clearly exist, bingo - God has been proved.
That's what you're doing. You're using 'omnipotent' to denote a being who is less than all powerful. And then running an argument that would be unsound if God exists - an argument that, if it worked, would establish the non-existence of God.
And when it comes to perfection, you are using that word in no clear fashion. I have given you a definition of it that clearly makes sense: to be perfect is to be maximally good. But you're not using it to mean that - you're using it in an all-purpose way to plug gaps.
This sentence has no verb. It is nonsensical.
No, that's entirely unclear too. Like I say, you're just playing with words. Of course definitions have to come to an end, but they should come to an end with terms denoting concepts that can be grasped, not just hot air. I have literally no idea - none - what you mean when you talk about a 'perfection'.
Now I gave you a perfectly clear definition of what a perfection is: it is something that makes something good. And to be perfect is to be maximally good.
And I gave an argument demonstrating the plausibility of this definition: if something is perfect, it is incoherent to think of it as also being less than good. And if something is bad, one is confused if one also thinks it is perfect.
So, perfect means maximally good. And this is not a question-begging definition, for it facilitates a version of the ontological argument.
We have the concept of a morally perfect being, for how else do we recognise that others fall short of being such a being? Thus, we have the concept. And it is better if a morally perfect being exists than not. Thus, our concept of a morally perfect being is the concept of a being who exists. That is, the existence of such a being cannot be separated-out from the rest of the concept. And when a concept is like that, we are justified in concluding that reality contains something answering to the concept.
So, the concept of a strawberry is one I can entertain without having to take strawberries to exist.
I can't do that with the concept of 'an existent strawberry', but nevertheless in that case I can separate out the concept of the strawberry from its being existent.
But when it comes to - Descartes' famous example - the concept of myself, I cannot separate out existence from it. To entertain the concept of myself, is to take myself to exist. And thus I can conclude that the concept of my self has something answering to it.
And this seems also to be the case with the concept of God. For God is morally perfect and an existent morally good being is better than a non-existent one. That is, an existent morally virtuous being is better than a non-existent one. And thus the concept of a morally perfect being includes existence. Conclusion: a morally perfect being exists.
Not endorsing that argument, just noting that it has something to it.
What you quoted is how Leibniz defines «perfection» in his Monadology.
I wrote:
I don't see how that's «nonsensical»
I think the following article, although lengthy, constitutes a direct response to your OP. Hope you enjoy it.
CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
That the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact that the necessity of His existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him.
Rene Descartes
The (ontological) argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.
Bertrand Russell
It is this author’s contention that Renee Descartes should have rejected the validity of all ontological arguments for the existence of God and that his philosophy would have provided him with a unique and sound rationale for explaining why such arguments had to be false. Descartes should have realized that his version of the ontological argument, as well as the version formulated before him by Anselm, was simply incompatible with the new philosophical methodology and criteria he established for determining indubitably certain existence.
It was not sufficient for Descartes and Anselm before him merely to present the individual with the idea, or definition, of a necessary being and then, by performing a detailed analysis of the idea, or definition, try to claim to have demonstrated successfully the necessary existence of such a being.
I submit that Descartes’ own well-defined methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence should have prompted him, instead, to explain (a) the difference between contingent thinking activity and necessary thinking activity, and (b) the corresponding difference between contingent personal existence and necessary personal existence. The specific definition of the terms contingent and necessary, as used in this paper, will be made clear during the following discussion.
In Meditation II, Descartes presented the reader with a detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum along with the method the reader could use to realize it. He claimed that a person attempting to doubt his own existence, even under the most extreme (hyperbolic) of scenarios (the dreaming doubt and the malicious demon doubt), would ultimately and inevitably realize or intuit, during his doubting activity, that his existence was an indubitably certain existence. A simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that not existing while doubting or thinking was impossible for the thinker. Or, phrasing it positively, a simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that existing while doubting or thinking was indubitably certain for the thinker. As Descartes put it: “I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think.”
However, Descartes did not say that his existence was necessary-in-itself. He said only if, and when, he doubted, only if, and when, he thought, only then, during the time of their occurrence, did he simultaneously intuit his existence to be indubitably certain. If he ceased to think for an instant of time, then Descartes claimed that he would have no ground for believing that he could have existed during that instant. As Descartes cautioned: “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”
So, then, according to Descartes, a person’s thinking activity is contingent in the specific sense that it is experienced by the person as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In other words, the Cogito portion of the Cogito Sum is experienced by the person, in the first person, present tense mode, to be contingent thinking activity (a contingent Cogito), since it is experienced as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence.
Search as one will, there is no separate or concomitant intuition available which would also assure the person, beyond all reasonable and hyperbolic doubt, that his doubting or thinking is an activity impervious to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. And the force of this realization would apply equally to all the many different modes of the person’s thinking activity such as perceiving, inferring, deducing, imagining, remembering, conceiving, speculating, calculating, hypothesizing, etc.
Descartes showed how the performance of a human Cogito Sum did, in fact, yield the intuition of an indubitably certain, yet contingent, personal existence (the contingent human Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the human person’s simultaneous experience of the occurrence of its contingent thinking activity (the contingent human Cogito). Or, stating it more succinctly, a person’s contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), during the time that it is experienced by the person, always provides the person with a simultaneous intuition of the indubitable certainty of that person’s contingent personal existence (the human Sum).
Surprisingly, in none of his subsequent meditations did Descartes attempt to present the reader with a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum which would have paralleled nicely the detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum he offered in Meditation II.
Preoccupied as he was with the urgent need to provide a divine guarantee for his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth, in Meditation III Descartes decided to present the reader with a series of more, or less, traditional a posteriori arguments for the existence of God and, in Meditation V, he decided to present the reader with his a priori ontological argument for the existence of God based, curiously enough, upon his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth.
Nevertheless, had he intended to do so we suspect Descartes could have provided a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum along the following lines.
If one assumes the divinity thinks, then its thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would be necessary in the specific sense that it would be experienced by the divinity as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence and, as such, it would always provide the divinity with an intuition of its indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).
In other words, he could have explained how the performance of a divine Cogito Sum would have provided an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the divine person’s experience of the occurrence of its necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). The divine person’s necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would provide the divine person with an intuition of the indubitable certainty of the divine person’s necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).
He could have gone on to explain that if the human person were also able to experience the occurrence of such necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito), then the human person, too, would be able to experience it as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. But that since the human person is, in fact, simply not able to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) in the same way as the human person is able to experience the occurrence of contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), the human person is, therefore, prohibited from ever having direct access to an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).
This Cartesian-based distinction between the impossibility of having a personal experience of necessary thinking activity and the possibility of having a personal experience of contingent thinking activity should not be confused with the traditional distinction between an essence that contains within itself the reason for its existence (necessary being) and an essence that does not contain within itself the reason for its existence (contingent being). The Cartesian-based distinction is grounded in, and can be verified through, a person’s experience, whereas the traditional distinction is grounded in a person’s abstract thinking but cannot be verified through a person’s experience.
From a Cartesian-based perspective, the central issue is the possibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can cease to occur and can go out of existence versus the impossibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence.
Human thinking activity is contingent being because the human person experiences his thinking activity can cease to occur and can go out of existence – nothing more, nothing less. The human person’s, alone, is the I think contingently, I exist contingently (Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter).
By contrast, divine thinking activity is necessary being because the divine person experiences that its thinking activity can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence - nothing more, nothing less. God’s, alone, is the I think necessarily, I exist necessarily (Cogito necessario, Sum necessario).
It is simply impossible for a human being to have a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence (the divine Cogito).
However, from a Cartesian perspective, it is precisely this impossible experience which is the indispensable prerequisite that would enable a human being to have a performative intuition of the indubitable certainty of necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), i.e., the existence of God.
But, unfortunately, all ontological arguments lack this indispensable experiential prerequisite.
And, in response to Russell, this is precisely where the fallacy of the ontological argument lies!
For whatever reasons, the preceding line of thought is what Descartes chose neither to pursue, nor to explain. Nevertheless, from a Cartesian point of view based upon a well-defined Cartesian methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence, I would submit (a) that the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) is precisely what a person would have to be able to experience in order to make a legitimate claim to having an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), and (b) that this Cartesian-based explanation of what would be required for a human person to successfully execute an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) is far superior to Descartes’ ontological argument and that of his predecessor, Anselm.
This Cartesian-based critique specifies precisely what is fallacious about Descartes’ ontological argument, Anselm’s ontological argument, and all other ontological arguments for the existence of God in a manner uniquely different than the critiques proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Gottlob Frege.
Ontological arguments, being conceptually abstract through and through and remaining completely detached and isolated from the empirical realm, lack the requisite foundation of a personal human experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). Only the possibility of having such a personal experience would also permit a human person to have an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).
It is of interest to note, too, that all the critiques cited above are essentially as conceptually abstract as the ontological arguments they seek to contest. The total inability of a person to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity is never made the central issue of contention. For all these critics, the perennially unresolved central issue is simply the logical validity, or invalidity, of the abstract reasoning involved in the ontological arguments. Without exception, this is their exclusive, limited focus.
I submit that the Cartesian-based critique succeeds in altering this traditional focus since it offers a unique, experientially grounded explanation for why, ab initio, all ontological arguments for the existence of God must be false.
Certain assumptions shared by Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God, be the arguments a posteriori or a priori, are that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are ontologically prior to the ideas of the finite and the imperfect, and that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are innate to the human mind because they are implanted there by God.
For example, for Descartes my idea that I think contingently (which is my idea of a finite and imperfect activity) presupposes an ontologically prior, innate idea of what it means to think necessarily (which is my innate idea of an infinite and perfect activity). Or, to understand that I think contingently (a finite and imperfect activity) requires that I must have some ontologically prior, innate understanding of what it means to think necessarily (an infinite and perfect activity). However, as this line of reasoning relates to the central theme of this essay, I would submit, contrary to Descartes’ position, that my understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) is not innate to the human mind and is not implanted there by God.
Neither is the idea of my contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity) obtained, as Descartes would claim, by my limiting or bounding, in some way, the ontologically prior, innate idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity). Instead, my idea of necessary thinking activity is a direct result of my deliberate attempt to try to remove, albeit unsuccessfully, that characteristic from the idea of my contingent thinking activity which limits and constrains it; viz., its vulnerability to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. This, I submit, is the genuine way in which I arrive at an understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity).
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow, either from the former interpretation of Descartes or from the latter interpretation of this author, that I can have a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) in the same way as I do, in fact, have a direct personal experience of contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity).
As I see it, the central issue is not a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, an idea of perfect thinking activity or an idea of perfect being – be those ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious. Instead, the central issue is a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, a direct personal experience of that perfect thinking activity or of that perfect being.
Or, approaching it from a slightly different direction, doubts and desires may come from an understanding that I lack something, and that I would not be aware of that lack unless I was aware of a more perfect being that has those things which I lack. However, my ability to have an idea of, or conception of, or understanding of, or awareness of a more perfect, or infinite, being that possesses all those things which I lack (inclusive of necessary thinking activity), does not mean that I am also able to have a direct personal experience of that being and its necessary thinking activity in precisely the same way as I am able to have a direct personal experience of my being and my contingent thinking activity.
Certainly, I can postulate the existence of a being that thinks necessarily and exists necessarily, but I cannot have a direct personal experience of the necessary thinking activity which would simultaneously yield an intuition of the indubitably certain existence of such a necessary being.
Again, I can perform the “Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter,” but I cannot perform the “Cogito necessario, Sum necessario.”
Descartes’ a priori ontological argument for the existence of God is not an experientially grounded performative argument like the one he formulated that successfully and persuasively proved the existence of the human self. His ontological argument, lacking the crucial, indispensable experiential foundation of necessary thinking activity, is destined to fail from its very inception. It is a non-persuasive, quasi-intuitive argument espousing a so-called self-validating idea of God which is given in consciousness and which represents God as existing, but which, in fact, completely misses the mark.
In fact, one could assert even further that the ultimate test of the efficacy of any argument for the existence of God, be that argument a priori or a posteriori, does not consist in the ability of that argument to provide the meditator with a clear and distinct idea of God’s necessary personal existence. Instead, one could assert that the efficacy of any such argument is determined, first and foremost, by whether, or not, it can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). And even assuming such an argument can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity, then can it also engender in that meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum)?
However, in conclusion, this author knows of no traditional, professionally recognized, a priori or a posteriori argument for the existence of God that has succeeded in providing the meditator with the requisite foundation of a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) while also engendering in the meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).
No it doesn't. The argument does not rely on the «divine cogito» nor on the experience of «necessary thinking activity», nor on the idea that God gives us an idea of the infinite.
The user «TheMadFool» formalized the argument in premise-conclusion form, if you go back on the thread you can see it, and you'll see it's not like the argument that article criticises.
1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]
Start at the beginning. Why would anyone accept this premise? It's not as if we have covered all the logical ground just by capitalising the disjunction, since maybe neither is a mark of greatness, since greatness, in the sense required by the argument, simply has no marks. The problem with all arguments for god's existence is that you need to give people more reason to accept the premises than to reject the conclusion, and that is an uphill struggle.
Let's see... if one admits that existence and non-existence are predicates, and that a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then said subject must either have the perfection of existence or that of non-existence.
Why? Because, unless we hold the view that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, but meaningless/nonsensical, either the proposition «God exists» is true, or the proposition «God does not exist» is true.
Since «God exists» means, according to the argument, «The subject of all perfections exists», then if «God exists» is true, then necessarily existence, which is one of God's predicates, must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.
Likewise, if «God does not exist» is true, then the predicate «non existence» must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.
I forgot to respond to this statement of yours:
But if God is nothing and can't be anything at all, doesn't that imply that «God does not exist» is true? But I thought your view was that both «God exists» and «God does not exist» were meaningless, neither true nor false.
At any rate, if «God does not exist» is a true proposition, then non-existence must be a perfection and we get into the same difficulties.
Would you say the statement «The round square does not exist» is true, or would you say it is meaningless?
For most Eastern philosophy infinite perfection is a state that humans can attain. It's not a substance that your mind turns into a person, like you've been doing. You assume that moral perfection is different from virtue and you turn moral perfection into a substance and then into a person
Let me clarify (even thought I already did since my first post):
I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.
But I am! Is the greatest thing possible a person or a state? Your logic has assumptions
In order to defend your "argument" you have to prove there is something greater than human virtue and the rewards (since the human goal is happiness) of it. Prove something greater is even possible
Technically you're correct.
But the whole point of my argument, which you are missing or ignoring, is that your type of exceedingly abstract argument, which is typical of the paradigm to which all traditional ontological arguments subscribe, completely misses the point that it is inherently impossible for the arguer, a human being, to have "a concrete personal experience of divine thinking." Only the occurrence of such an impossible experience by a human being would constitute a legitimate, concrete verification of the existence of that abstract divine being which he falsely claims to be able to prove.
It seems you misunderstand the argument. It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonyms, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God.
Perhaps you think I hold that view because I mentioned Aquinas' idea that God is, literally, truth; but I mentioned it only to point out to the user I was responding to that his conception of God is not the only possible one, I don't hold that Aquinas is right or wrong nor am I defending his views.
You are right about that, one should prove that the idea of God is possible first.
If you want to read a proof (or at least attempt of proof) of that, lookup Leibniz' proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible (the one he showed to Spinoza).
But the subject of all perfection is God and that is core to your argument. Whether it is a reasonable philosophical concept in itself has not been defended by you. Instead:
Quoting Amalac
You should provide the argument yourself in your own words instead of sending people on a goose hunt
Like I said, the argument does not depend on that «experience», if you could tell me why you think it does, that would help.
What is the basis of this claim? The argument I mentioned (which is not Descartes', but anyway) holds that if existence and non-existence are predicates, and a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then it's non existence implies a logical contradiction. It has nothing to do with any «experience».
Your argument says "I can think of God so he exists". It doesn't seem strange to you that you believe you can tweek that idea into proving a priori a being's existence?
1. You said
Notice what you are defining here isn't «God», but rather «perfection»
Then I replied: and once again, I was refering to «perfection», not «God».
The subject of all perfections (plural) is how God is defined in the argument. There is a difference between saying the subject of all perfections and the subject of all perfection.
If you are saying that maybe the subject of all perfections isn't a «person», that's fine, it may be something else. I have no interest to defend the notion of a personal God as is presented in many religions.
It is not about «sending people on a goose hunt», I said merely that if you want to see a defense of the possibility of God's idea you can look it up, if you don't care about it, then don't look it up, that's fine.
Now, I could present his proof (or attempt at proof) with my own words, but it would not be as clear or as detailed as what Leibniz presented. I don't see what could be gained by me repeating what others have already expressed better than I can.
Yet you go on to define your argument as proving perfection, not a person
Quoting Amalac
Is there?
Quoting Amalac
Then all you are trying to prove is that perfection exist. I wouldn't argue that it does. But why are you using the word God then?
Quoting Amalac
Because you are trying to present a proof and the core of the argument hasn't been presented. Now we know you are talking about perfection existing instead of a being. Maybe you need to explain what "perfection exists" means in the sense you speak of
2. If you think that is equivalent to the argument, which was formalized by the user «TheMadFool», then this is clearly a strawman.
3. First of all, I am not advocating the argument, I am only mentioning it. I don't think it's conclusive.
Second, it doesn't seem strange to me (and even if it did, that's irrelevant). You may argue that it is impossible to prove the existence of anything a priori, but it is not enough to state that it is, you should also say why you think that is so, unless you don't care enough to do it.
Because God is defined as the subject of all perfections in the argument, which is what it intends to prove, not «perfection».
So your argument proves exactly what then?
Quoting Amalac
You have to provide an example of something proven a priori and one proven so conclusively
Quoting Amalac
Subject doesn't mean person in your usage. So you're saying you can prove, but not conclusively, that something perfect exists but not necessarily a person. Is that your position? Again, I said it could be a state, but do you reject that? And on what grounds?
Leibniz tried to say a person was the subject of perfection. Again, are you only saying there is a perfection in the universe?
I never claimed it proves its conclusion (unless it's valid, which I don't claim), I only mentioned it because I wanted to see how people in a philosophy forum would refute it in order to clarify to what degree (if any) it is valid. I certainly don't rely on it nor advance it.
That is what the argument is trying to do.
1. Yes, I mean subject as in «subject-predicate».
2. I never claimed I can prove anything, I only mentioned an argument that might, if valid, prove that God, defined as the subject of all perfections, exists. It is purely due to intellectual curiosity and epistemological interest.
3. I don't reject that the subject of all perfections could be a state.
Ok. I asked that several times and now I have an answer. I think your argument works in a certain sense, in the sense of being consistent with the system of Hegel. (see: https://www.amazon.com/Hegel-Proofs-Personhood-God-Philosophy/dp/019879522X)
It doesn't prove anything a priori outside the mind imo. It proves something about the mind
Since Leibniz was a christian, he probably did. But I am not trying to defend what Leibniz says, I only borrowed some of his definitions, and his proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible.
But once again, the argument, if valid, does not prove the existence of a «perfection», rather the existence of «the subject of all perfections».
Depends how you mean by that. Why draw a distinction between perfection, perfections, and a subject of them? If perfection is the state of Nirvana, for example, these distinctions don't mean much perhaps
And according to the notion of existence used in the argument from the eternal truths of Leibniz in combination with this argument, a unicorn does not have the perfection of existence, even though it does have the predicate «existence» ,and therefore it is limited to existing only as an idea in the mind. Or alternatively: it has the predicate «non existence», but not as a perfection, therefore it need not not exist as an idea in the mind. You can pick whichever you like.
Source: Leibniz' Monadology
The point being that your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true.
The basis for this claim is that the Cogito Sum performance, when executed by a human being in the first person, present tense mode, would be able to prove the existence of a Necessary Being IF AND ONLY IF it had access to a kind of thinking which was inherently closed, rather than open, to the possibility of complete cessation (i.e., a necessary or divine, rather than a contingent or human, kind of thinking) --which, unfortunately for your argument, it does not have access to and never will.
Aquinas wrote (I can quote too) "But the order of things is the best it can be, since the power of the first cause does not fail the potency in things for perfection." Really though, we learn of perfection subjectively and have a limited understanding of its objectivity. To try to list perfections and increase them to infinite in order to assign it to a subject is very suspect. To try to prove this subject exists as you create the idea of it is worse.
1.An argument may be invalid or valid, but not true or false. The conclusion of the argument, on the other hand, may be false. But that's not what you are trying to say, is it? You are trying to say it is invalid.
Quoting charles ferraro
2. No, it is not the case that the argument is valid if and only if the «cogito sum performance» had access to «divine thinking». All it needs is the tool humans use to think: logic. Unless you are going to call logic «divine».
3. If, on the other hand, you mean that God's existence cannot be proven a priori because we do not know God's essence (like Aquinas maintained) it is not enough to say that that is so, if you want your position to be convincing. Tell us how you know that we do not know God's essence.
Quoting Gregory
Why is it suspect? I'm all ears.
Quoting Gregory
Again, why?
Fair enough, then it's a question whether Leibniz is right or whether Aquinas is right (given some assumptions).
I'm open to both possibilities. What reasons does Aquinas give for accepting that? You can just tell me where you got the quote if you don't want to put it here.
Because it undefended. I am not saying it's indefensible, but you have not given a reason to think we can turn all our ideas of good into a single subject. The argument you used in the OP to "prove" this subject exists is just a "bait and switch" linguistic tactic and it's not going to fool people who read philosophy
That was from the Summa Theologica I believe. I do not have the exact article from that work but I wrote down that sentence when I was reading the Aquinas's works. According to Aquinas God could create infinite universes so this one is relatively perfect, but God could always have created greater ones. Leibniz thought this was THE greatest universe, period. Leibniz believed in the ontological argument, Aquinas did not. You're version of it is not stronger than Anselm's or Descartes or Malebranches's or Leibniz's. You just choose a different way to try to trip up the reader, AND I don't say this to put you down but just to be objective. You obviously like these kinds of ideas/arguments and I do to. But again they say much about the mind but say nothing about what is outside the mind.
Quoting Gregory
I'm open to the possibility that there may be more than one subject of all perfections, provided we define that subject also as one such that nothing more perfect or better can be conceived.
But if such a subject is defined as also being greater than all other beings without exception, then clearly there can only be one.
Quoting Gregory
Again you just make assertions and don't give a reason to accept them. It may be that it is only a linguistic trick, but it is not enough to say that it is, you should give a reason to accept that claim.
And like I said before, I only mentioned it because I thought it was a curious idea. I don't claim that I know with certainty that it is valid.
Quoting Gregory
1.I never claimed it was. It may or may not be weaker, stronger or as strong. That's what I want to find out.
2. Don't worry, since I don't think the argument proves that God exists, it doesn't put me down. (That is to say, I don't assert that it is certain that it is valid)
3. As for your claim that they say nothing about what is outside the mind, once again: give a reason for accepting that or it's just a bare assertion. At worst, it still says «much about the mind» as you say, and it may help clarify some logical and epistemological matters.
You say (1) we have the idea of perfection. (2) existence is a perfection "which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind"
Youre just playing with logic. We can think that we have an idea of perfection. But again, does that idea have a consistent form in our minds and does it accord with something outside our minds? You don't have the crucial form of an argument because you use a linguistic trick. You haven't laid out a clear argument really for anything
Quoting Gregory
I first gave a definition of perfection, then I said we have the idea of the subject (or a subject) of all perfections.
Quoting Gregory
Which would imply the subject of all perfections (not perfection) would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.Quoting Gregory
Once again you are trying to say that I say perfection=God, but what the argument says in that regard is:
1. There is more than one perfection.
2. A subject of all perfections can be conceived.
That we (or at least I) can conceive of a «perfection» (perfections rather) is shown by the fact that I understand the definition of it given by Leibniz: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express», and in fact can understand it without the need of clarifying it further.
If you don't understand it, then there is nothing I can reply to that.
If you think there is something self-contradictory about that definition, I will listen to that contradiction.
1, Semantic distinctions are tangential to the core issue.
2. As a human being, the only kind of thinking I can have both an idea of, and a direct personal experience of, in the first person, present tense mode, is a kind of thinking that is open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. What I call contingent thinking, or human thinking.
Nothing prevents me from entertaining the idea of a kind of thinking that is closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. What I call necessary thinking, or divine thinking.
But logical thinking, which is human after all, cannot enable me to have also a direct personal experience of this kind of necessary thinking, in the first person, present tense mode.
Logical thinking is not divine. Logical thinking has its limits, and this is one of them.
3. I am not pretending to know God's essence. What I am speculating about is one way in which divine thinking might differ from human thinking, if the divine existed, by extending certain basic principles derived from Descartes' epistemology.
4. Human thinking is the idea of an: "While I think contingently, I exist contingently," which idea I can experience in the first person, present tense mode.
5. But Divine thinking is the idea of an: "While I think necessarily, I exist necessarily," which idea I cannot experience in the first person, present tense mode.
"Leibniz' definition of perfection is: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Source: Monadology)"
Let that be the definition.
"For the following argument, I shall also use the notion of existence given by Leibniz, specifically from his argument from the eternal truths, according to which eternal truths (eg: 2 • 2 = 4) exist in the mind that apprehends them. The proof, which is a new form of the ontological argument, can be formulated like this: A subject of all perfections can be conceived."
Ok
"Said subject either exists or does not exist."
Of course
"If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection."
Existence is a perfection
"When existence is a perfection, then in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind."
If it exists yes.
"Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind."
FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far
"Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind."
FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far
"But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction."
NO. The idea that it exists as perfection exists in the mind but there is no argument so far that absolute perfection must exist
"And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists."
So why are you now retracting and saying you are no talking about God.
"Hume's objection to the original argument is the following: «I will begin by noting that there is an obvious absurdity in the claim to prove a factual point, or to prove it with a priori arguments. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies contradiction. Everything that we can conceive as existing, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is, therefore, no being whose non-existence implies contradiction. Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and I am willing to let the entire controversy depend on it.'
But we see that if this new argument were valid (which I neither affirm nor assure), the manifest contradiction would be that if God did not exist outside the mind, he would not exist as an idea in the mind either."
FALSE. The idea is an idea only. Getting from idea to REALITY was the goal, right?
"This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection."
It doesn't answer that at all. Non-existence of a good is not a perfection. But you presented not one argument for anything. No argument was presented.
"It does not, however, answer the objection that existence is not a predicate."
It's not a predicate if its absolute. Something may lack something, but the non-existence is not a predicate
"Thoughts?"
You are being really dumb
"1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]"
Existence us
"2. Nonexistence is a mark of greatness [assumption]"
False
"3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]"
Yes
"4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]"
Outside our thoughts, yes
"5. God is the greatest being [definition]"
In thought
"6. God cannot exist in any way possible [4, 5 Substitution: The greatest being = God]"
Outside us
"7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea"
THERE is the problem. You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection. God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection. HOWEVER, it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate
"8. God cannot exist as an idea [6, 7 Modus ponens]"
9. God exists as an idea [premise]"
God can exist as an idea
"10. God cannot exist as an idea AND God exists as an idea [8, 9 Conjunction, contradiction]"
You didn't prove this contradiction exists
"11. False that nonexistence is a mark of greatness [2 to 10 Reductio Ad Absurdum]"
Obviously
"12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]"
Obviously
"13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]"
FALSE
Quoting charles ferraro
1.The complete cessation and non-existence of what? Of anything?
2. Why are you only open to that kind of thinking?
Quoting charles ferraro
The argument is a priori, which means precisely «independent of any experience», just as I don't need experience to know that 1638373783 is an odd number. The difference is that unlike mathematical truths it is not nearly as self evident, and I don't know if it is valid. But if you are going to say the argument depends upon the experience of the divine, it seems to me you are mistaken. That applies only to experiential ontological arguments. Earlier you said:
Quoting charles ferraro
Then when I asked you why if the argument is not a posteriori then it can't be valid, you just repeat that it can't be. Seems to me like circular logic.
Quoting charles ferraro
And how do you that it has a limit that makes the argument invalid?
Quoting charles ferraro
Did I say that you claimed to know God's essence? No, I said:
Quoting Amalac
That is not «divine thinking», that's just Descartes' cogito, and it's not relevant to the argument.
Quoting Gregory
Quoting Gregory
But do you accept that those disjunctions are true? If you do, then either p or not p must be true, where p is «Existence is a perfection» and not p is «Non-existence is a perfection».
Quoting Gregory
If the proposition «the subject of all perfections does not exist» is true, and you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then said subject (precisely because it does not exist) must have the predicate «non existence» (non existent subjects have predicates too). But what is it that has such a predicate? The subject of all perfections, and it follows from the definition of perfection that said predicate, since it is a perfection, must be expressed without any limits, and if that's true, then necessarily it can't also not not exist as an idea in the mind, for otherwise it would not have that perfection, meaning non existence would not be a predicate of it, which contradicts either the disjunctions or the Law of the Excluded Middle.
How can you deny that when you yourself accept premise 3?:
Quoting Gregory
And since God exists as an idea, that is a fact that contradicts the idea that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of non-existence (since he does exist in that way: as an idea in the mind). Whence it follows that the assumption that non-existence is a perfection must be false. And because of the disjunction, the only possibility is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject must exist not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.
Quoting Gregory
What leads to that conclusion is the assumption that non-existence is a perfection, and since God exists «only in the mind so far», that can't be the case. Therefore, via Reductio ad Absurdum (Proof by Contradiction), we conclude that the only possibility , in view of the disjunctions and the Law of the Excluded Middle, is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject exists not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind, for to say that the subject of all perfections exists only as an idea in the mind is to deny the only possibility that we have left.
Quoting Gregory
1.Do you deny that the subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind? If you don't, and you accept the previous premises and steps, you must also accept what you have quoted right there.
If you do, then you must hold that the subject of all perfections is inconceivable. But the fact that we (or at least I) can understand the proposition «There is a subject of all perfections» contradicts that claim. Unless you say that you don't understand that proposition, in which case this argument won't convince you.
Remember that the notion of existence (the one used in Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, which you accepted) I mentioned implies that what exists as an idea in the mind also, in some sense, exists (with said predicate either being a perfection, or not; in the latter case whatever has that predicate only exists as an idea in the mind, but not in the former case) and the same applies, the other way around, to non-existence.
2. Again, the argument does not attempt to prove that «absolute perfection» exists, rather it attempts to prove that «the subject of all perfections» exists.
Quoting Gregory
I am not retracting, when for example I said that the subject of all perfections might be a «state», I meant that God (defined as the subject of all perfections) might be a «state» (until I read one post of yours that I skipped, and realized that you were talking about a «mental» state.)
I am not assuming that God must be a person, as I said previously.
Quoting Gregory
1. «Non-existence of a good»? Non-existence of the subject of all perfections is what that part of the argument asserts.
2. Do you deny the disjunctions then? If you say non-existence is not a perfection, either you deny the disjunctions or you accept that existence is a perfection. If you deny the disjunction, then you must hold that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, that it is meaningless/nonsense.
If you say that existence is a perfection and don't deny the disjunction, then necessarily the subject of said perfections must exist (for the reasons given above: it follows from the definitions that you have accepted and the remarks on this comment). To reject this is to reject the definitions of «perfection», «the subject of all perfections» and/or «exists».
Quoting Gregory
1. If you mean that the greatest being can exist outside our thoughts, remember that what the argument asserts here is the following: IF non-existence is a perfection, then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible. IF that's true, then obviously it can't exist outside our thoughts either.
If you mean that It only cannot exist outside our thoughts but may exist in our thoughts, If it cannot exist in any way possible (If you accept 2, 3 and Modus ponens), it can't exist in our thoughts either, for then he would exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the definition of non-existence as a perfection, since it would then be limited and not a perfection.
And if you deny that non-existence could be a perfection while accepting the disjunctions, then you must, as I said, accept that God must have the perfection of existence, that is: He must exist.
Quoting Gregory
No, the argument says: IF non-existence is a perfection, THEN God cannot exist in any way possible, not the other way around. This is setting up a Reductio ad Absurdum.
No, «God exists in our thoughts» means: we can conceive of the subject of all perfections, which means we can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it's true or false). It does not mean: «God's existence is a perfection».
It does if you accept that the disjunctions are true, and if you accept the definitions.
Quoting Gregory
If you accept 12 you must accept 13, for to deny 13 while accepting 12 is to deny either that existence is a perfection or a mark of greatness, or the definitions given. Remember that the «greatest being» is in the argument synonimous with «the subject of all perfections».
The argument (in summary) is that if the proposition «The subject of all perfections does not exist» were true, then necessarily non-existence would be a perfection of said subject, which would imply a logical contradiction, which would then imply that the proposition «God does not exist» must be false.
"But do you accept that those disjunctions are true? If you do, then either p or not p must be true, where p is «Existence is a perfection» and not p is «Non-existence is a perfection»."
I said existence is a perfection. I wont repeat that
"If the proposition «the subject of all perfections does not exist» is true, and you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then said subject (precisely because it does not exist) must have the predicate «non existence» (non existent subjects have predicates too)."
Of course. To not exist is to not exist
"The subject of all perfections, and it follows from the definition of perfection that said predicate, since it is a perfection, must be expressed without any limits, and if that's true, then necessarily it can't also not not exist as an idea in the mind, for otherwise it would not have that perfection, meaning non existence would not be a predicate of it, which contradicts either the disjunctions or the Law of the Excluded Middle."
False on every point. The LEM has nothing to do with this. God exists only as an idea
"And since God exists as an idea, that is a fact that contradicts the idea that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of non-existence (since he does exist in that way: as an idea in the mind)."
I never said God has the perfection of non-existence but the fact that one can have a vague notion of him does not mean he exists or does not exist
Whence it follows that the assumption that non-existence is a perfection must be false. And because of the disjunction, the only possibility is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject must exist not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind."
Existence is a perfection, a perfection only this world has.
"1.Do you deny that the subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind? If you don't, and you accept the previous premises and steps, you must also accept what you have quoted right there.
If you do, then you must hold that the subject of all perfections is inconceivable. But the fact that we (or at least I) can understand the proposition «There is a subject of all perfections» contradicts that claim. Unless you say that you don't understand that proposition, in which case this argument won't convince you.
Remember that the notion of existence (the one used in Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, which you accepted) I mentioned implies that what exists as an idea in the mind also, in some sense, exists (with said predicate either being a perfection, or not; in the latter case whatever has that predicate only exists as an idea in the mind, but not in the former case) and the same applies, the other way around, to non-existence.
2. Again, the argument does not attempt to prove that «absolute perfection» exists, rather it attempts to prove that «the subject of all perfections» exists."
All you are SAYING is that you have the idea of God. That's not going to get it into someone else's head by the laws of logic unless you have a true argument, which you CLEARLY do not
"If you say that existence is a perfection and don't deny the disjunction, then necessarily the subject of said perfections must exist (for the reasons given above: it follows from the definitions that you have accepted and the remarks on this comment). To reject this is to reject the definitions of «perfection», «the subject of all perfections» and/or «exists»."
There is no moving "two ideas" you are using. There is one idea, that you have an idea of God. Where is the other idea
"1. If you mean that the greatest being can exist outside our thoughts, remember that what the argument asserts here is the following: IF non-existence is a perfection, then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible. IF that's true, then obviously it can't exist outside our thoughts either."
God doesn't exist outside our thoughts within the paradigms of this discussion. Nothingness has nothing to do with the argument. You have a premise "I have an idea of God" and nothing else. Don't use that "nothing" as an argument.
"If you mean that It only cannot exist outside our thoughts but may exist in our thoughts, If it cannot exist in any way possible (If you accept 2, 3 and Modus ponens), it can't exist in our thoughts either, for then he would exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the definition of non-existence as a perfection, since it would then be limited and not a perfection.
And if you deny that non-existence could be a perfection while accepting the disjunctions, then you must, as I said, accept that God must have the perfection of existence, that is: He must exist."
False. Modus ponens and all forms of argument require more than one premise.
You have one premise "I have an idea of God"
"This is setting up a Reductio ad Absurdum"
There is no reduction except of your words to one premise "I have an idea of God". I don't care if you have an idea of God, I don't care FOR your idea of God, your game you have devised is boring, and your agenda is clear
"The subject of all perfections does not exist» were true, then necessarily non-existence would be a perfection of said subject, which would imply a logical contradiction, which would then imply that the proposition «God does not exist» must be false."
Quoting charles ferraro
There.
Maybe you think you are God. Oh well
1. The occurrence of my personal thinking along with the simultaneous occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In this sense they are both contingent.
2. No one knows why the occurrence of my personal thinking and the occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence; i.e., are contingent. They just are.
3. I am "only open to this kind of thinking;" viz.; contingent thinking, because I cannot engage in any other kind of thinking. All my thinking is contingent. If I could engage in necessary thinking, which I cannot, I would be divine, because my existence would also be necessary.
4. Descartes' Cogito Sum is primarily an existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying performance which must be executed in the first person, present tense mode. It is not originally a proposition, although it can be expressed as one; viz., Cogito, ergo Sum. In other words, if, whenever, and while I am thinking in the first person, present tense mode, I will simultaneously have an indubitably certain intuition of the truth that I must be existing. Any attempt on my part to try to perform the opposite in the first person, present tense mode will be existentially self-defeating. But my thinking and my existing are inherently contingent.
5, I think issues revolving around the Cartesian notions of Contingent and Necessary Thinking and Existing are extremely relevant to all ontological arguments, including yours, even if you persist in preferring not to think so.
Quoting charles ferraro
I agree, but I don't see what that has to do with the argument.
Quoting charles ferraro
How does that relate to the argument exactly?
Quoting charles ferraro
Oh, so that's what you meant by that. I thought you meant that you only accept the «kind of thinking» that rejects right off the bat that the existence of anything can be proven a priori.
Now, if what you are saying is: The existence of something cannot be proved a priori using «contingent thinking» (meaning, someone whose thinking can cease to exist cannot prove the existence of anything a priori) , but only through «necessary thinking», i.e. that only God (if he existed) could prove his existence a priori, then:
1. I ask: how do you know that that is true?
2. It seems to me that such a view leads to the kind of paradox that Leszek Kolakowski pointed out as follows:
(Source: If there is no God...)
Unless of course you accept that the existence of God has not been proved yet by any argument at all, as I do.
In your attempt to mechanize an abstract logical puzzle so that it can be told to society "a computer can prove there is a God", consider that if we mechanize the barber paradox and set it side by side with yours, a computer would say relativism is true. The barber shaves those and only those who do not shave themselves. Think of those being shaven as holding the razor away from themselves. So the barber shaves those and only those who hold the razor away form themselves. So the barber does not shave himself. He does not shave himself because he shaves only those who not shave themselves. Even if he shaves everyone who does not shave themselves, he still couldn't shave himself. But as TPR member Srap Tasmaner said here awhile back:
"Let S be the set of all men who don't shave themselves.
P is a member of S.
To be a member of R, you have to shave all the members of S.
Since P is a member of S, to be a member of R he would have to shave himself.
But he doesn't.
Therefore P is not a member of R."
Check out my thread on the barber paradox if you want to see other renditions which explain how this expounds to infinity (and I always want to, again, give credit to Srap for the above). These kind of ABSTRACT logic puzzles can go on forever and if you set your "argument" side by side with the barber paradox a computer can come up with the solution of "infinity" as in the sense of a spurious infinity of relativity
I'm not trying to PROVE the existence of anything! You are!
All I'm saying is that the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode. Only the occurrence of CONTINGENT thinking and existing can be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode.
And you're claiming that this fact has no bearing on whether an ontological argument for the existence of God is feasible? Not true or false, but feasible?
I beg to disagree!
The only kind of thinking and existing human beings can experience, in the first person, present tense mode, is contingent, i.e., vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. Ontological arguments, in one way or another, try to contest this fact. Ontological arguments claim that necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first person, present tense mode.
Ontological arguments can, at most, only prove the occurrence of human ideas of necessary thinking and necessary existing. They cannot, and do not, prove the occurrence of human experiences of necessary thinking and existing, in the first person, present tense mode.
If not necessary thinking and necessary existing, then what would an ontological argument argue for?
Quoting charles ferraro
No, I'm not trying to prove anything either, I only mention that this is an argument that can be presented, I don't maintain, like some theists who defend some form of ontological argument would, that it's certainly valid or even more likely to be valid than not.
Quoting charles ferraro
1. That the occurrence of necessary or divine thinking cannot be experienced by a human being is obviously true, since said «occurrence» could only be experienced by God, in God's mind (which is doing the «necessary thinking») (if he exists). But the argument does not imply that one has that experience.
2. You use the term «experience» in a strange way:
I may experience pain or a cold sensation for example. But if, hypotetically, I said that I can prove the existence of the subject of all perfections a priori, and that it exists necessarily, does that mean I am «experiencing necessary existence» or «experiencing necessary thinking» in the same way as I experience pain or a cold sensation? No, because «I can prove that X exists necessarily» does not equal «I am experiencing necessary existence» nor «I am experiencing X's necessary existence», nor «I am experiencing necessary thinking» (where «necessary thinking» means «God's thoughts») in the usual sense of the term «experience».
If by «the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode.» you mean « It can't be the case that a human being thought or conceived as an idea that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily», then once again I say you must give a basis for the claim that that is impossible.
So now I need to know what you mean by «experience» in order to make the discussion clearer.
Quoting charles ferraro
No, they claim the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, that is not the same as «necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first, present tense mode».
Quoting charles ferraro
They argue that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, «The subject of all perfections exists necessarily» ? «necessary thinking and necessary existing»
I think it would be more measured to say that I use the term "experience" in a way you choose not use it. I do think your use of the word "strange" conveys an unwarranted negative value judgment. Perhaps I think your use of the same term "experience" is not comprehensive enough and somewhat narrow.
Experience = whatever I can encounter. I can encounter objects as objects. I can encounter my consciousness (thinking) as an object. I can encounter my consciousness (my thinking) as a subject.
But, I cannot encounter the other's consciousness (the other's thinking) as a subject.
Excuse me, I don't know why, but your use of the term "the subject of all perfections" reminds me of the term "the great wizard of Oz." I think my ability to experience your "subject of all perfections" (by the way, how do you define a subject and perfections?) is less likely than my ability to experience "the great wizard of Oz."
So, let me see if I understand correctly. I must believe that some, or all, ontological arguments are capable of convincing me of the truth of the idea that a purported subject of all perfections exists necessarily, but I can't verify the truth of this idea empirically because I can't have a personal experience of it's perfect thinking and its perfect existing in the first person, present tense mode.
Quoting charles ferraro
Strange as in unusual, since when many philosophers use that term they usually mean something different from what you say. Didn't want to convey anything negative.
Quoting charles ferraro
Like I said, I don't disagree, unless you are saying at the end that encountering God's (the subject of all perfections') consciousness = thinking that God exists necessarily. If you are saying that, I think you are wrong: what I would be experiencing in that case would not be God's thinking, nor God's necessary existence, nor necessary existence, rather I would be experiencing a thought (of mine, not of God's), namely the following: «I think the subject of all perfections exists necessarily». The thought about the idea of «the subject of all perfections» is not the same as that subject which may exist outside the mind, meaning when saying that, I am not «experiencing» that subject, but rather an idea of it.
If we phrase it according to the notion of existence used in the argument, then you could say that I hold that God exists as an idea in the mind, and that therefore I must, in some sense, experience God (as an idea in my mind), then in that sense what I would be experiencing isn't God, but rather a thought about the idea of God. Now, if you are going to say that experiencing that is impossible, you should add your reason for thinking that.
So if you are going to say I can't even experience an idea of that subject in the way that I have described, I ask: Why not?
Quoting charles ferraro
1. When I say subject I don't mean «person», I mean it as in «the subject of X, Y, Z... predicates». By definition, all the predicates that can be truly asserted of said subject are the perfections it possesses. (Though you are right that I forgot to add this in my OP)
2. You don't need to «experience the subject of all perfections» for the argument to be valid. Like I said before, this is not an experiential ontological argument.
Quoting charles ferraro
You can't verify the truth of the idea empirically and you don't need to, beacuse the argument is a priori. Just as you don't need to verify empirically that 2+2=4. All you need to know that that's true is to analyze the meaning of «2+2» and «4». And as I said, you don't need to have a personal experience of perfect thinking and/or perfect existing.
What the argument says is: If God didn't exist and it is admitted that existence and non-existence are predicates, then by analysis we would see that that implies a logical contradiction (if the argument were valid). At no point in the argument is there a need to experience anything. No more than you need to experience the «4» that is eternal, and exists beyond space and time (if indeed platonism is correct, which I neither affirm nor deny) to know that 2+2=4.
Quoting jkg20
By definition they are, because the perfections the subject of all perfections possesses are all those things can can be predicated truly about it. If existence or non-existence can be predicated about it, then necessarily one of them must be a perfection, since otherwise they would not be predicates of the subject of all perfections.
If you are going to say that there are no perfections, then you must hold that you can't conceive of a subject of all perfections, meaning that you must hold that the subject of all perfections is impossible even as an idea.
The definition of perfection given by Leibniz is: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express». Are you going to say that there is something logically selfcontradictory contained in that definition? There might be, but I've yet to see what that is. I don't affirm nor deny that there is not anything contradictory about it.
As you say, maybe the very concept of «perfection» is a mistake, I'm open to the idea that someone could prove that it is.
You have the idea of God and the idea that existence is perfection. So I see you are using two premises and really using Descartes's first ontological argument of the third meditation and then linking it to his next argument. Because you have a thought of God, does it have to correspond to what it represents? I did threads on them but the moderators didn't like the topic and deleted them. I at least presented them in true philosophical form, while you are (im sad to say) presenting muddle in order for people to have faith in your logic. I don't use faith, I use logic. Descartes, ironically, did not use faith but logic, yet they could not get him out of his arguments in the "Replies". Why does your idea of God have any substance in it? Why should you assume it has any potency to do anything by way of showing what is outside subjectivity? Atheist nowadays are not into phenomenology of spirit. They are looking for an objective demonstration that there is a God, and even Mr. Feser's or whatever Thomistic "proof" doesn't do it for them. Too many assumptions!!
Descartes' Evil genius scenario postulated hyperbolic conditions under which the necessary a priori truths of logic and mathematics (his clear and distinct ideas) could be doubted.
Quoting Gregory
The idea of God (defined as the subject of all perfections) and the idea that existence is A perfection (one among other perfections).
Quoting Gregory
When saying «The subject of all perfections can be conceived», that implies «The subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind» just like a unicorn exists as an idea in the mind, and so my «thought» is: the idea of «the subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it exists outside the mind or not).
Does it «correspond» to the subject of all perfections, that is: to a subject that exists not merely as an idea in the mind but also outside the mind? That depends upon the validity of the argument: If it is valid, then yes, meaning: it is the idea of that subject which exists both as an idea in the mind, and also outside it. If it's not valid, then it refers to something that exists merely as an idea in the mind, and does not refer to something that also exists outside the mind.
Quoting Gregory
I never claimed that people should have «faith in my logic». I myself already said many times that I don't hold that it is certain that the argument is valid nor do I even hold that it is more likely to be valid than not. I try to follow Aristotle's maxim:
I know about Descartes' Evil Deceiver argument. And so far as theory is concerned, I am a philosophical sceptic, so I am not concerned with refuting it (which seems to me to be an impossible task anyway).
In practice, however, no human being can pretend to act doubting the most self-evident a priori truths of logic and mathematics, and also to survive more than 5 minutes or not act like a lunatic.
I was under the impression that for the sake of the discussion we took for granted the most obvious truths of logic, because if we don't, then there is no point to this discussion at all. You can't criticise whatever flaws you think the argument has because you may be deceived about that, and the same goes for me.
What's more, if we don't accept the law of contradiction then there's no reason why we should have not both asserted and denied everything that we have said thus far.
You need to stop using these: «»
It's already been mentioned on your other thread
Descartes tried and he ended up using the ontological argument to get out
Srap Tasmaner wrote the following last year:
" The barber (B), a philosopher (T) who doesn't shave himself, and a mathematician (M) who does.
We have all and only men who shave all and only men who don't shave themselves.
1. M is never a member of R because he shaves a man who shaves himself.
2. P can't be a member either because he doesn't shave himself, so he'd have to shave himself to be a member, but he doesn't.
3. What about B? He would have to shave P and not M. No problem. If he shaves himself, he'd be out, like M, but if he doesn't, he'd be out like P. So B can't be a member no matter what he does.
So R = { }. No one shaves all and only men who do not shave themselves, therefore the barber does not shave all and only men who do not shave themselves. The three cases are exhaustive, in fact: no one can be a member of R whether they shave themselves or not.
— Srap Tasmaner"
What is your analysis? If logic breaks down here, does it break down in your argument by implication?
Thanks
Quoting Gregory
Well, I don't know if I should argue with you about that, since that would get us slightly off-topic, but I'll only say this:
It seems to me like Descartes was inconsistent when he thought that that argument was a certain proof of God's existence, because that seems incompatible with his previous attitude of doubting everything.
First, because his argument against the Evil Demon deceiving us based on the fact that God exists and is good, begs the question: He already assumes that he is not deceived by the Demon when he starts and ends to reason about the existence of God, and assumes that his argument proving God's existence cannot be flawed in any way. It seems odd that he doubted that 2+2=4 or that a square has 4 sides, but not that.
Then there is this other inconsistency:
Leszek Kolakowski
But ok, I'll stop that.
I don't know that anyone can follow through with all doubts. Descartes tried and his doubts ripped through math and empiricism but had to fall short, for some reason, before his two ontological arguments for God. Others will be rationally capable of doubting God (in order to test the strength of rational faith) but will stop short of doubting math. Everyone might be different and I don't know if your argument just works for you but is incapable of working in other minds, keep in mind that other people have different logical aparatuses and that you argument may never work for some people, and not to their fault. Why not give Descartes 5 meditations another read today? They are fun and were the first complete work on first philosophy I read. His "Replies to Objections" are fascinating too
Quoting Gregory
You sound kind of like a relativist here, since you say people «have different logical aparatuses», which sounds a lot like Protagoras' doctrine that «each man is the measure of all things».
I don't mind, but is that really what you are saying?
I thought most people just took things like the Law of Contradiction or the Law of the Excluded Middle for granted, just as they take it for granted that they are not constantly deceived. Wouldn't you say it's possible that each logical apparatus can at least have something in common with the others?
Take relativity for example, instead of relativism. There is a Meta sense in which to people really talk to each other face to face and have "a moment". But simultaneity is rejected in relativity as in Kantianism. Balancing both truths is important and the bottom line is people will always disagree with each other. As I experience life and the world, I am not much concerned with finding something abstract which everyone must agree on. Conversations on this forum are just digital "face to face" discussions designed to stimulate thought. If you contradict something my heart knows is wrong, I will contradict you
Quoting Gregory
I quite agree.
Quoting Gregory
Fair enough.
If you and I were in identical mental states and given identical arguments, we would come up with the same results if we chose to follow the truth of logic. However minds right from the start are infinitely complex so you can never be sure where my mind, heart, or soul is. Catholicism teaches you cannot even infallibly know the state of your own soul (council of Trent) let alone someone else's (pius x in pascendi), and in common usage the mind is the soul. These are certain things in Catholicism I think are correct although I don't go to church
Quoting Gregory
If I were to look at that here that would get us off topic (specially since after reading your thread it's still unclear to me how the argument is related to the barber paradox).
Is it possible for me to send you a private message in this site, or should I post in that old thread?
Post your thoughts on that thread. I thought that it indicated that proving anything a priori from logic alone is futile, but I may be wrong