Functionalism and Qualia

I am defending functionalism against the problem of Qualia, would the following stand up?

"I propose that this notion of counter-intuitiveness (regarding Blockhead having qualitative states) is a consequence of disanalogy, which arises through the supposition that the functional organisation of the human brain can be quite conceivably mapped, in all its complete intricacies, at this point in time.
Such naivety leads to inappropriate analogies between (A) the 'supposed' complete functional organisation of the human mind, and (B) a mapping of said 'supposed' organisation, which lacks qualitative experience.
The concluding possibility of (B) appears inevitable when our conception of the functional state we are referring to in (B) cannot be complex enough to accurately depict (A) until we have empirically established such a functional organisation. Such a point is consistent with "organisational invariance" between (A) and (B), i.e, if they really where functionally equivalent, and one had qualitative states, then the other would also.

Yet, it seems to me that I need some empirical/scientific support for this suggestive disanalogy. Is my supposition fair, so that if I pursue it, I am likely to find said evidence? Or is it enough that critique the structure of the argument as analogy?

Thank you!!