Comment and Question
Not to be a jerk, but I am looking for a high-level philosophy discussion. I'm hoping to eventually take a Masters in Philosophy of Mind and thinking maybe I'm in the wrong place. I know there are serious philosophers here, and part of the goal is to teach entry-level philosophers. That's great, I get it. But some thread-starters don't seem like people wanting to learn, they seem more like armchair philosophers who think they know the field, but probably couldn't name three empiricists let alone explain the theory. When the real thinkers here respond, these folks never budge an inch. Am I way off here? Should I take a flying ____?
Ok...not that everyone hates me, here's my question. It might seem naive, and maybe it is. If so you can slam me for being a hypocrite, in light of my first paragraph.
QUESTION: Unless you believe in God, spirits, ghosts or other such things (pretty clear I'm an atheist) how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism, and our primitive tendency to believe in spirits, souls etc.?
Please accept the comment that answers your question.
Ok...not that everyone hates me, here's my question. It might seem naive, and maybe it is. If so you can slam me for being a hypocrite, in light of my first paragraph.
QUESTION: Unless you believe in God, spirits, ghosts or other such things (pretty clear I'm an atheist) how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism, and our primitive tendency to believe in spirits, souls etc.?
Please accept the comment that answers your question.
Comments (213)
What does that mean? If you just mean the brain causes or creates the mind then everyone can agree there I think.
If you believe that mental activity is a phenomenon that is special in some sort of way due to the fact that science is incapable of explaining it, you are a dualist. You've divided the world into two distinct phenomena: (1) those phenomena scientifically explainable and (2) those phenomena not scientifically explainable.
Where in your own dualism (as I've identified it) do you commit to the existence of spirits? Are you not just asking the distinction between property and substance dualism in your OP?
Thanks for the reply - yes it does seem like the current mood in philosophy is materialism. But what of people like Chalmers who still cling to a form of dualism? And there still seems to be some blowback when I suggest (even to some philosophy profs) that the brain is all there is. The argument goes "can you scientifically prove that." And as I understand it you can't ("yet" I would say)." My argument is more that the whole belief in a separate consciousness is based on folk psychology....as the Churchlands would suggest. (PLEASE correct me if I'm wrong in any of this).
Or...are you saying that the statement "some things are explained by science and some things aren't" is dualism. How so?
Possibly. But the origins of the belief do not determine its truth value.
Quoting GLEN willows
I happen to agree with him. But the site is generally very divided on the issue. The last time someone mentioned the cursed word “Qualia” it went on for 2000+ posts I think. And no one changed their minds (or brains).
But you haven't answered my question though, what does it mean that the mind is an "integral part of the material brain". Because Quoting khaled
...perhaps there are no strict laws explaining mental events - anomalous monism.
The Churchlands argue that "consciousness" in this sense is a folk psychological term, that they believe should be replaced. I'm not that militant about the need to replace it myself.
Sorry - my phrase just means I'm a full reductive materialist. Full stop!
"...perhaps there are no strict laws explaining mental events - anomalous monism."
Yes perhaps. Or perhaps everything is physical. This and Chalmers seem to want to say that the mind is the "source" of consciousness, but at the same time it's separate. I have trouble with that, unless it's explained to me better.
Davidson has another neat argument here...
On the very idea of a conceptual scheme.
The idea is, contrary to Hanover's suggestion, that the mind is entirely the result of physical processes, but that no causal link need be constructed between some physical state or process and a given mind state. So being in love might never be equated to the excitation of specific nerve clusters; and yet remain entirely a result of activity within the mind.
Problematic, but promising.
The more I read you the less I understand about your position. From a glance this seems to be exactly what I think. Yet you don't like the word "Qualia" even though it seems there is plenty of room for them (The sense of being in love which is not the same as the excitation of specific nerve clusters). I'll check out the SEP page.
Depends on what you mean by "material". How heavy is the smell of the ocean? Or are you saying the experience doesn't exist?
"Material" started out being things we can touch and smell like rocks and grass. Then the category broadened to include things we can neither touch, smell, nor see like electrons (at the time they were proposed we couldn't see them). And now the category includes things that don't make any sense like quantum wave functions, that we cannot touch smell or see.
Point is, whenever I see people say "everything is material" usually they are using such a wide definition of "material" that they might as well have just said "Everything is a thing". The way they use the word is so broad so as to somehow include experiences as "material". In that case, what is left to be described by the category "mind"? That would just make them monists.
That or they think that experiences don't exist, and I don't know how they could.
"I just had a stinging sensation to nociceptive-specific neurons located at the margin of the dorsal horn."
Instead of
"I just had a sharp pain."
Thanks - much appreciated. The objection I have to qualia is quite specific: if they are private, then they can't be the subject of conversation. But love - we can talk about that. So it's not a qual.
How could I tell that when you say "I just had a stinging sensation to nociceptive-specific neurones located at the margin of the dorsal horn" you were not really thinking "I had a sharp pain"?
We know quantum wave functions exist because we've done experiments that have proven their effects in the real world - like particle interaction, no? There is no such proof for God, nor for consciousness. But I think there will be, in the same way that electrons were thought to be invisible until science proved otherwise. Science still has strict rules for what is "material" - it seems to me anyway.
Color would be easier. We all know what inverted colors are. If I was born with "inverted vision" I would still be able to talk to you just fine. Because when I look at grass and see what you would call red, and you see what you would call green, we would still use the word "green" to describe it.
What makes you think that love is something floating outside of the brain, as opposed to being IN the brain as the result of neurochemical interaction? Because it SEEMS to you to be something "special" and (dare I say) holy? Reducing it to pure science would take the romance out of it (literally)?
Not attacking you, just trying to "get" this.
I agree. But in fairness I'll repeat my reply to your isomorphism. I effect, I agree with you, expect that you have the argument around the wrong way. You say " Love can feel radically different to different people but as long as the feelings are isomorphisms of each other then communication is possible", moving from isomorphism to communication. But there can be no evidence of this isomorphism, and so the only direction the argument can go in is from the fact of communication to the supposition of isomorphism. That we talk of love leads us to think that we are talking of the very same thing; but that conclusion is misguided. Indeed, I'd go a step further and say that there is no "thing" to be isomorphic, that all we have is the communication...
Eventually we won't talk about consciousness/emotions/qualia but the brain chemicals that are interacting.
We had to lear those terms in order to discard the false ideas we were afflicted with.
If I'm in disagreement with anyone here, it's Hanover.
Maybe we're not on the same page here. "Isomorphism" is a relation of two sets. It means that all their elements are related to each other in the same way.
So our experiences of sight can be isomorphisms of each other. As in, anything you would call red, I would call green had I had the experience you were having.
What I am supposing, is that we both have some experience when looking at grass. I don't think we disagree there.
And when having that experience we can communicate it only by saying "I see green grass"
My point is the experience need not be the same for both of us to say "I see green grass" and for us to even understand each other.
It could be the case that if you had my experience you would say "I see red grass".
But as long as what seems red to me seems green to you at all times, we would both communicate our experiences using the word "green"
But maybe we ARE on the same page because this:
Quoting Banno
Makes no sense to me. Had you said that there was a thing that we cannot talk about I would have understood that. But this just seems to be denying that we experience things.
The "thing" is experience. I am willing to wager experiences preceded our ability to communicate them. So I don't see how we can only have communication.
I remember the first time I felt angry and I didn't know what the word was. I learned after the fact that that experience is called "anger". Or maybe that's just a manufactured memory. Regardless, I am pretty sure children can feel angry or afraid before they know what the word means.
That doesn't mean my experience of anger is your experience of anger, only that we both call it anger and that we (hopefully) have it in similar situations (or else one of us has an anger issue)
No one is denying that. Every time "love" happens we see the same or similar brain activity (well I don't know about that but I'm assuming we do). That can't be coincidence.
The question is, is the experience of love, itself, a chemical. If so can you tell me its relative molar mass?
Quoting GLEN willows
I don't think it's a physical thing so I don't think it's "floating" anywhere.
So I defer to you on that, but the essential question is still "do all kinds of love reside in the brain, as part of a materialistic process, not separate." Love isn't magic, floating in a fantastical sphere of it's own. Again I THINK you're agreeing with that?
SPOILER ALERT - atheist statement ahead. The same way we say "for the love of God" even though we know God is not real either.
I'm saying: that we might, or that we don't, is irrelevant. Isomorphism is not required.
Anyway, too far off topic.
Quoting GLEN willows
Relative molar* mass. It is how much a mole of a chemical would weigh.
Quoting GLEN willows
Then you're not a materialist. Materialists would try to say that the experience of love doesn't exist. All that exists are the chemicals.
Quoting GLEN willows
Doesn't follow. "The feeling of love is a result of neurochemical interaction" does not lead to "We'll know that (the feeling of) love isn't really a thing". No the feeling of love will remain a thing. A thing that results from a specific neurochemical interaction.
What do you mean?
If we DO have experiences, and we can communicate them well, then the experiences are isomorphisms of each other (by definition).
So are you saying we don't have experiences? Or are you saying that those experiences need not be the same or we don't even need to be having the experiences (which is what I'm saying)?
Anyways I have to go now, some time later.
Quoting GLEN willows
Hmmm. I don't think love resides in the brain, so much as in the relationship between the lovers... but that's probably tangential. i agree with you that the interaction problem is good reason to dismiss dualism. Some mental events causally interact with some physical events.
Oh, Ok - I'll take your word for it. i suggest that any further talk fo qualia occur elsewhere - PM me? I don't wish to derail Glen's thread.
That's what I'm saying. You just expressed it better than me. I'm pretty sure you said something like "love isn't floating anywhere, it's not a physical thing." I was agreeing with you. There is no such thing as love, in terms of something that exists outside of the brain. I guess we could discuss what a "thing" is - is a unicorn a "thing?" Then yes love is a thing - a non-existent thing.
I respect your argument 100%. But I still sense the pull of wanting to say that love is "more than just a chemical." I hear it a lot from non-academics. But if it is "more" then it has to be dualism, pure and simple? You can't argue "the brain and consciousness are two different things" and then claim you';re not talking about two different things. Can you? Am I getting annoying? haha.
I am probably being technical, but is this dualism or idealism? I thought so far that the whole point of dualism is that the physical world is temporarily bonded with the person's consciousness or any transcendent reality. Either the mind is merely a witness, or acts as compelling force that produces miracles (or in the context of QM, could be producing determinacy, which is a kind of miracle). If the mind starts minding its own business (pun intended), what is the point of being submerged in material substance? What would be then the difference from subjective idealism?
It is probably tangent to the discussion, but I'd like to point out that some people are incapable of being in love. Or at least they don't show any signs of it. Neurological differences. The psychopathic form of APSD is linked strongly with variations of the amygdala volume under brain scans, and the people diagnosed also have differences in the action of their neurotransmitters. The problem I see with dualism is that we know we can alter the act of a human being by manipulating their brain function. So, if the mind doesn't act independently from the person's elicited response, which to me starts to approach subjective idealism (unless dualism is contented with a passively witnessing mind), I can't understand what room we leave for transcendent agency. Again, one can argue for determinisation in the context of QM.
Btw. Sorry for the interject.
I generally steer away from metaphysical discussions. I made entry in the forum with a question of some such nature, but there are certain things that I find can never be settled, unless the criteria is agreed upon. I don't think that I can argue against subjective idealism, or solipsism, or some kind of Leibniz monadism. I am myself partial towards panpsychism and pantheism. But in metaphysics, approaching the discussion from the point of view of modern positivism, where the only factor is the observable physical reality, little can be argued for the private subjective experience. Except for dualism. It tries to connect the physical and transcendent worlds and exposes itself to empirical criticism. Or so I think.
Would be be what a materialist would say.
My response would be: “That’s just not true”.
Have you never had experiences before? I find that hard to believe.
Quoting GLEN willows
So love is in the brain? How much does it weigh? What does it smell like? Where is it? Can you send me a picture of that part of the brain that is love?
Quoting GLEN willows
I don’t think so. Yes this is dualism.
Quoting GLEN willows
Nah you’re good.
How much does love weigh? How much do the chemicals that create the feeling of love weigh. That's your answer.
Option 2: The concept of love - and all it IS is a concept created by neurons firing etc. - weighs zero.
Or am I mistaking your meaning?
I don't understand this statement - "from the point of view of modern positivism, where the only factor is the observable physical reality, little can be argued for the private subjective experience. Except for dualism."
But as you yourself pointed out, electrons were once thought to be invisible. I'm making an inductive argument (only) that science has proven again and again that questions we thought were unanswerable, are indeed answerable. Maybe we'll use a new technique to find them or more likely we'll realize they are sensations we have that correlate with some sort of activity in the brain. Love is still a wonderful thing though!
My question posed at the beginning was what could consciousness be, if not simply a part of the brain? I would just add...part of the brain that we don't understand yet, but probably will soon enough.
That you had to make a distinction means they're not the same thing no?
Quoting GLEN willows
Ah so there is a concept (I would use the word "feeling") separate from the neurons?
Quoting GLEN willows
A sensation-o-meter. A very exciting idea. Imagine being able to point it at politicians speaking for example to make it apparent to all, that even the guy himself knows he's bullshitting out of his mind.
Wonder what would happen when you point it at priests and pastors....
Quoting GLEN willows
Then I'll reply with the same style of question. How much does consciousness weigh? What does it smell like? Is it edible?
"That you had to make a distinction means they're not the same thing no?"
No. I am saying they are the same thing, I figured you'd get that.
"Ah so there is a concept (I would use the word "feeling") separate from the neurons?"
No. I'm saying they are the same thing. Next I'll say "H20 is water" and you'll say "aha - you had to make a distinction!"
Oy! I'm a materialist - you know this, I think everything is the brain. That's what a materialist does. Enough with the lame "gotcha" moments...I'm sure you can come up with some better arguments.
No. I think they are the same thing. (didn't I answer this already?)
Sorry it's late and I have the Covid Crazies.
Quoting GLEN willows
Then you’re wrong. The experience of love is clearly different from the chemicals causing it.
A point to illustrate: People came up with words like “love” and “anger” way before they were able to scan the brain. How come? What were they referring to when using the words back then? It can’t have been any chemical. They didn’t even know what chemicals are!
Quoting GLEN willows
Quoting GLEN willows
What’s going on I’m confused... Are you parodying being a materialist?
I'm saying that you divided the world into two types of events: those explainable by science and those not. You have clearly placed mental events into a separate category. Since we have two categories here, we have a form of dualism. The question then becomes whether there is something about the underlying structure of mental events that causes this category distinction. From your OP, you reject that idea and state that mental events and non-mental events must all be composed of the same underlying substance. You therefore reject substance dualism, but that doesn't close the door on property dualism. Property dualism seems to say what you're saying: There are two types of events in the world (the mental and non-mental), both being composed of matter, but each being distinct enough to require differing ways to describe and explain them.
The question then becomes why that's the case. If a scientist uses a different explanatory system to explain mental events than non-mental events, then the scientist at some point needs to explain why that's the case. If the scientist cannot offer a physical explanation for the distinction, you will forever have substance dualists proclaiming there must be a non-physical explanation, invoking a fundamental metaphysical distinction.
Even your explanation demands a form of dualism. There are two types of physical events in the world: normally explainable ones and then those pesky anomalies.
I'd like to rephrase your observation:
"What does that mean? If you just mean the brain causes or creates the mind then everyone can know what I think."
Given the proper technology, of course.
I am an armchair philosopher as you remarked in your original post. A software guy by education and a confused person by vocation. My opinions are not very literate. You are warned to be skeptical about my imaginary views. I hope that when I expose the weaknesses therein someone will point them out to me with appropriate arguments.
Quoting GLEN willows
The institution is there in the first place to school you on what is right and wrong. If you start asking questions like "aren't we all high on grass", the discussion is as comfortable as a castaway asking the local cannibals "what's for dinner". (A vegetarian here, so don't mind the joke.)
Solipsism is no more than a hypothesis. It cannot be asserted. The lack of certainty in cognisance does not immediately confer ignorance. That is, in a physical world, the perseverance in entropic conditions might have evolved to the passionate pursuit for knowledge and the instinctive conviction in the inductive method, objective reality, etc. The perception of truth would then be compatible with an actual physical environment. (This I believe is close to the Hume style of explanation, modulo the Darwinism part) The correct conclusion to make is, "we don't know". These are hypotheses, not conjectures, not assertions.
Furthermore, there are multiple styles of inquiry for each scenario. We could ask ontic questions ("what is out there"), epistemic questions ("what are the indications that would reveal it to us"), ethical questions ("what value does it hold to us"), conventionalist/antropological/social questions ("what we agree upon to do about it"). For example, with solipsism, the possibility of being alone in the universe is a distinct case of reality. But it should never manifest as experience, because that it the entire point of the hypothesis. It does matter to us, because we gather motivation by believing to be together with other people. However, we agree not to invest in the idea socially (except in philosophy), because we have no way to refute or validate the hypothesis. It is interesting that solipsism has ethical implications to us even if it is false (merely as a possibility), and no epistemic implications even if it is true.
Dualism can be admitted in some restricted sense, I think. might have referred to it, but I had questions about it. For example, a mix between physicalism and solipsism, with some private and some shared physically experience is epistemically indistinguishable (during the earthly phase of life) from meterialism, because solipsism isn't either. The observable difference can show in the post-mortem phase, but would be uncofirmable for the philosophical inquiry and the social convention, where it will rely on culture of faith, based on unrelated socio-political necessities and the ethical consequences of the mere possibility (like solipsism). (It is one of the few views that, if true, may have epistemic fingerprint and no rational conventional consequences.) In contrast, views on dualism that imply (through physically autonomous agency, freedom of the mind) that a transcendent part confers irregular behavior on its physical embodyment, are effectively suggesting miracles. (Even if we are considering determinisation of the QM model of physics.) This is where they differ from pantheism / panpsychism, where the constituent particles of matter follow the usual physical law, but are inherently agent (my take - functionally emergently collectively conscious). If the miracles are not clarified in technical terms, in my opinion, they are ambiguous propositions and can only be tenuous devices of philosophical discourse, ideas, but not proper hypotheses. If clarified, they can either be empirically refuted or confirmed (inductively validated), or this will be impossible, forcing them to remain hypotheses. (Same for physical sciences. Obscurity to measurement is not the empirical justification of assertions. The criteria here is Occam's razor. That is, minimalism over redundancy. Speculations, i.e. hypotheses get a free pass in my book.) On a slightly tangent note, my first question on the forum investigated eliminative materialism. But the underlying reason was that I couldn't grasp the difference between materialism and pantheism in general. If consciousness exists, I still think that any non-eliminative materialism should be panpsychic or pantheistic, or just methodological (uninvolved with the questions of the mind). But that is discussion for a different time. Continuing with dualism, there is the remaining possibility that the transcendent features are passive witness of the physical form. This position is infalsifiable during the earthly phase of life, but it is also incompatible with certain ethical positions. The mind would either bare no personal responsibility or the personal responsibility would be (rather convoluted) function of the divine omnipotence. Some theistic views as Leibniz monadism are not dualistic and are more akin to inter-subjective pantheistic idealism, which are again, epistemically indistinguishable from materialism. This naturally continues to my stance on theism, which is similar. I accept different ideas as hypotheses for discussion, but not as assertions. For example, I would like to discuss the consequences of dystheism, polytheism, alien origin, etc. (That is, I am a possibianist.)
There are many different arguments from top philosophers who don't agree. My view is this (and this discussion has been beneficial for me in expressing it...thanks).
1) All mental experience derives from the brain. I think this is bullet proof - for one thing the fact that when a brain is damaged or cut up, it affects qualia as well as the physical brain. People have complete changes of the way they view emotions, love, other people when this happens. Changing the brain in other ways (psychedelic and pharmaceutical drugs) also changes emotions, and qualia.
2) Nonetheless, any materialist would admit we don't know exactly how qualia work. There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain.
Does that sound like a rational argument. BTW I'm not claiming I'm "right." But I base that admission (which I think all philosophers should acknowledge, to be honest) on changes that could happen in SCIENCE, the kind that move the earth beneath our feet. For instance no one could have predicted quantum weirdness, but when it was discovered, it was discovered through experimental science, not inductive or deductive argument.
In the early stages you seem to be arguing that solipsism, for some reason, can't be a tenable approach to life. You say it's a hypothesis, of course it is but so are all philosophical theories. I may be mistaking your argument, but I get the sense that you're saying "we can't be the only person in existence, watching a simulation of our life (not mean a computer virtual reality) because it would make life unbearable or impossible." Is that a fair assessment?
I think the way you pose the question is problematical. As has been pointed out above, you carve up the territory in a certain way, which conforms to your ontological categories, and then sort the responses in terms of those definitions.
Quoting GLEN willows
But there are contrary cases as well - cases where subjects have had such grossly damaged or deformed brains that they ought to be dead or vegetative, but they have survived and adapted. The obvious case is Phineas Gage, the railway man who had a crowbar blown right through his brain by a stick of dynamite, and lived to tell the tale. There's also a case of a man whose cranium was filled mostly by fluid but who lived and worked fairly normally.
There are also 'top-down' effects that can be demostrated with respect to brain physiology. An experiment was done with a group of subjects to determine neurological changes caused by learning motor skills, specifically learning piano. One of the control groups was given no piano, but only told to imagine that they were practicing scales. Yet the same neurological changes were observed in those subjects as in the group that had an actual piano (ref).
That experiment was part of the newly-discovered field of neuro-plasticity, the motto of which is 'change your mind, change your brain'. So in such cases, neurological changes are initiated by volitional direction of thought, which are called 'top-down', as distinct from 'bottom-up' changes.
That's one line of enquiry which I think undermines the materialist account.
I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis.
Quoting GLEN willows
I wouldn't use the needs of the human psychology to substantiate the claim. If you mean, the paragraph about your questions in philosophy classes, what I meant was that no productive discussion can arise from them, since there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right. Therefore, the topic is not going to get priority in class. It opposes knowledge, even if merely tentatively.
"But there are contrary cases as well - "
Your examples don't show that there's no change of qualia after brain injuries. Phineas Gage is usually used as argument to my side - he behaved aberrantly, was prone to outbursts and eventually couldn;t handle his job. BUT - it seems there's a reassessment going on. Nonetheless no one argues he behaved perfectly normally after such a horrendous brain injury, just that he eventually recovered enough to interact with people normally. The second example states the patient ended up behaving "fairly normally." Which means the injury did change his behaviour, albeit a small amount.
The vast majority of studies on brain injuries, including the fascinating split brain operations, show major changes to qualia.
Neuroplasticity doesn't argue against materialism either, IMO. It shows the amazing power of the brain to heal and renew the things lost by the injury.
The brain or the mind? That remains an outstanding question.
It's rather that Davidson supposes we can describe the same event i two different ways; I'm in love, and I have high levels of norepinephrine. THis does nto suppose an ontological bifurcation.
"I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis."
I say yes to all your assertions. They are reasons to see it as repugnant, but not reasons to reject the theory. The first time I encountered Locke or Hume, the idea that there isn't a "table there" was baffling. As was Hume's rejection of induction (I know it's more complex than that). If those thinkers believed that, said I, how they could even be sure the ground under their feet wouldn't disappear with every step they take? Hume acknowledged this, and admitted he doesn't really live his life that way.
I know this is broad strokes but please bear with me. Dismissing free will has very disturbing implications for the criminal system. I'm sure I don't have to explain that. But a lot of minds better than mine doubt it's existence.
My point is that it seems to me, the entry-level dude, that solipsism is no more or less valid a theory than empiricism...let alone Leibniz's bizarre monad-world. And just as counter-intuitive as those theories, or that of full-on determinism.
He turned on the light.
He alerted the burglar.
Two descriptions of the same event.
"...there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right."
I have been accused of such things haha. I'm pretty sure the study of philosophy can withstand my theories.
Materialists would say Qualia don’t exist. Not that we don’t understand how they work. They would say that the feeling of sight or taste is an “illusion” somehow (whatever that means).
Quoting GLEN willows
How, exactly? Let’s take vision for example. Are you suggesting a “vision chemical” in the brain? Well, we understand vision pretty well and there is no such thing. Are you maybe suggesting a “vision center”? Again, no such thing. There is no one part of the brain responsible for processing vision. Nor is there any pert of the brain that connects all our senses. But in waking life they seem connected. It feels as if you’re a little guy sitting behind your eyes getting fed sights sounds and tastes. There is no location like that in the brain.
You say that like it was a bad thing...
true. I'll come back later and revisit.
"Materialists would say Qualia don’t exist."
Maybe I should have said "consciousness" instead of qualia, to be more clear. Materialists come in different versions but I'm using the folk psychology term consciousness to describe a feeling, but not an entity. Do you believe words like "hope" and love" describe real things? If so, you'll have to define what you mean by "real."
"There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain.
— GLEN willows
How, exactly?"
If I knew that I'd publish a paper and win the Nobel Prize. I feel like we're repeating ourselves here. I've admitted that there are feelings, qualia, that we experience. I've admitted no one knows quite how it works, including you. What more can be said?
Whether or not these feelings/qualia are different from the chemicals correlated with them. You think they aren't. I think that's ridiculous. For one, if what you're saying is true, we would have needed to have a good grasp of neurology before we even came up with words like "love" or "anger". But clearly that's not the case. So clearly the words are not referring to the chemicals.
Quoting GLEN willows
But if you want to say that the qualia are not different from the chemicals causing them then we DO know how they work pretty well.
Quoting GLEN willows
What else would they describe? "Not real things"? You admit they exist so I think the word "real" in "real things" here is redundant.
"....if what you're saying is true, we would have needed to have a good grasp of neurology before we even came up with words like "love" or "anger". But clearly that's not the case. So clearly the words are not referring to the chemicals."
Why? We didn't understand science back then, let alone neuroscience, so we made up words to describe what we were feeling. Again we've discussed folk psychology already right?
"But if you want to say that the qualia are not different from the chemicals causing them then we DO know how they work pretty well."
Saying we know qualia are part of the neurochemicals of the brain (which I think is clearly proven by the fact that altering the chemicals. or operating on the brain, changes the qualia) doesn't mean we know exactly how it works. It's like saying we know how a watch works by watching the hands move.
"What else would they describe? "Not real things"? You admit they exist so I think the word "real" in "real things" here is redundant."
I think we need to circle back and define our terms. When you say something is real, what do you mean? Or maybe I should say "exist."
1. Mental events cause physical events.
2. All causal relationships are backed by natural laws.
3. There are no natural laws connecting mental phenomena with physical phenomena.
And they also argued for panpsychism?
So the words describe feelings correct? Not chemicals? And those cannot be the same thing. Or else we would not have made words that refer to one and not the other. "Love" refers to a feeling, not a chemical, by virtue of the fact that we came up with the word without knowing what chemicals are.
If "Love" referred to a neurotransmitter, we would have needed to know what neurotransmitters were before coming up with the word correct? But since that's not the case "Love" must not refer to a neurotransmitter.
Quoting GLEN willows
That doesn't follow. If I have a machine that makes ice-cream, and I change the settings of the machine to make different ice cream, that doesn't mean the ice cream is part of the machine. Now replace "Machine" with "Brain" and "Ice-cream" with "Qualia". Terrible example probably but I'm about to have lunch so I don't wanna spend too much time on this.
Quoting GLEN willows
But if qualia are no more than chemicals, then we do know exactly how they work no?
Quoting GLEN willows
Real like a table.
We came up with many words without knowing the science behind them, come on.
So are you saying if you use a word and describe it as a thing, that means it exists?
And if love is real like a table, then it must have material substance, right?
Quoting GLEN willows
No. Though that's exactly what a materialist would say!
But first off, what do you mean by "material substance". Because as I said all the way at the beginning the category seems to just keep widening and widening. Must we be able to touch and see the thing for it to be a material substance?
So you don't mean real like a table? A table has material substance. We already discussed what material substance means. But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love?
"We already discussed what material substance means. But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love?"
I am not rejecting it whatsoever, of course. I consider it, in its strongest form as technically irrefutable and rejecting it is as fallacious as conjecturing it. I was just pointing out that since as a hypothesis it already has consequences, as a conjecture (or more boldly assertion) people will be divided on how strongly they subscribe to that theory. Essentially, I am trying to remain skeptical, but not indifferent, to consistent propositions that we can neither inductively confirm, nor refute. It is a slightly hypocritical position, because honestly, I have my partialities. But I keep them at bay for the discussions herein.
But my contention is that many phil. theories THEMSELVES lead to solipsism. I've read more than once "if Descartes (or anybody's) theory of the existence of the world is wrong, you're left with a solipsistic void." It implies failure. Yet if there really isn't an outside world, but there IS an inside world, a la the cogito, then how is that NOT solipsism?
Anyway, I respect your opinion, and I could be wrong. Good nice Canadian response huh?
You could say we all are oversimplifying the brain function, and that neuroscientists are incapable of capturing enough signals therein. You could rightfully criticize that we are making conjectures stemming from the materialist explanation of reality, because of its utility to society. But you have very strong impartial commitments on the issue yourself. The synaptic connections that produce the person's neurological attitudes, including the emotion of love if they presently have such attachment, are one thing, and the synaptic connections that describe the person's conceptualization of love in the abstract, removed from their present emotion, in words or as notion, with self-deprecating generality, are a different thing. Feedback and self-learning by circular neurological pathways ("stored-program computer" style, but more elaborate) should be possible, at least theoretically. Another type of self-reference that supplements it is the indirect effect from observation of patterns of behavior and produced results. And finally, these days, inspection of the matter in the brain through artificial devices produces a more literal form of self-reflection through an external auxiliary loop, resulting in neuroscience itself. But the important point is, in principle, the states in the brain describing self-awareness would be distinct from the states that encode the emotions. The emotion, and the notion of that emotion (and conceptualization), could (probably somewhat impatiently we conjecture "would") relate to each other through neurological feedback, but need not have parapsychological mediation in the process. Honestly, we have no reason to think that it does not, but assigning value to different hypotheses in a pragmatic world is a style and an art.
Having the least amount of presuppositions is the most rationally correct approach, indeed. But it is also the least useful in practice, and philosophy, albeit the most abstract of sciences, still has some interest in its utility in the pragmatic sense. It is very important philosophically to explain what the assumptions are and to investigate their significance, so I am not dismissive of solipism at all, but extreme reductionism results in absurdism. Ultimately, everything lies on some amount of blind conviction. For philosophical purposes, I contest even "cogito ergo sum" (even though I wont go there, because I know I will sound delirious), but like Hume, I don't live that way.
Can you explain what you mean?
Not really. Just want to know how you use it.
Quoting GLEN willows
No we haven't which is why I'm asking. Does we have to be able to see and touch the thing for it to be "material substance"? What are the exact properties of a "material substance"?
Quoting GLEN willows
The options you gave me were: Table, Unicorn, or Fictional Character.
I didn't pick table because of touchability, I picked it because the other two don't exist (aka aren't real).
There are plenty of things that are real that you cannot touch. For example: Quantum wave functions. And emotions.
We have gone over these things, why I think QM exists (testing), our differing opinions on qualia, and your frustration over what you see as the expanding definition of "material." All good discussions and I appreciate the exchange, I really do. But I really think we've covered it...and anyway I'm sure these will come up in later discussions. Right at this moment I have to go to bed. Great meeting you and great chatting. Hope to do it again.
I'm quite sure you have this backwards. The reason you confound doctrinal materialism with brain physiological oriented scientism is to pretend to an explanation for the only thing we can be certain of, our selves.
Quoting GLEN willows
And that's the crux of the problem of dualism, we don't know how to logically relate our selves to a barely comprehensible illusory outside world with any of our theories. We are inventing absurd explanations out of ignorance.
But is this at all necessary? Isn't it possible that dualist hypotheses with connectivity CAN be constructed without anyone asking but where is this theory in space and how can I grasp it with my fingers?
The point was that you appear to think of two different references "the feeling of love" and "the synaptic activation of love" as referring to different phenomena, because they are differently expressed. I was remarking that this is not necessarily so. If it is correct that self-reflection manifests as a second order mental activity in a separate set of synaptic connections, there could be any number of synaptic expressions (and linguistic expressions) referring to the one unique original mental process, if those references are produced through different congnitive loops - internal cerebral loop, sensory loop of immediate observation of behavior, sensory loop of aided observation of the underlying physical causes. You are essentially asking, how can "the king" and "Arthur" refer to the same thing, if obviously they embody different ideas. That is because the same referrent is designated through different perspectives. And, if my neuroscience hypothesis is correct, those perspectives are second-order synaptic expressions, different from each other and the expression of the original phenomena, but amorphous. As a side note, not all animals can come to the realization that they are their image in the mirror. (Edit: I meant, that they are the object perceived through the image in the mirror. I hope that we wont have to start an argument over the semantics of the "image".) Thus, understanding that multiple references acquired though different cognitive pathways have the same referrent is an evolved feature of select number of species. (I think dolphins and guerillas or chimps, I am not sure.)
I would claim that if a proposition is not elaborated in terms that can be experienced, witnessed somehow, we cannot truly call it a hypothesis. I concur that it may be presumptive to insist that the terms refer to material aspects of life, but if they do not, the only way in which the proposition can be corroborated (on earth anyway) is through spontaneous agreement of intuition. Which doesn't appear to be all that effective for the philosophy on dualism, because it remains a divisive subject. If the proposition is not elaborated, it can be part of the discourse, in the positive or in the negative, but since it cannot be asserted even in principle, it is not a hypothesis. Second, a theist or a spiritualist is not claiming a hypothesis, but making a conjecture, even an assertion. According to my views, even materialists do that all the time - make conjectures based on unproven assumptions - but they are at least compelled to do so from emancipated forces in the external world. (And I don't mean just empirical evidence, but also sustained practices, biological dispositions.) I fail to see the motivation of a dualist to decide against the other choices - solipsism, intersubjective idealism, panpsychism and pantheism and claim dualism in particular. There doesn't seem to be enough particular arguments for it stemming from experience, in contrast to the other choices. It appears to be based on personal bias. Thirdly, if a hypothesis of dualism makes no physically tangible claims, then I fail to see how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from solipsism. I am not saying that all variants are like that. But certain flavors of dualism, particularly theistic dualism, are not even trying to be definite. (They rely on an "either you get it, or you don't" style of persuasion. Granted, life is like that in the end, based on intuition, but apparently the message does not translate well to everybody, so we have a problem for the philosophical debate.)
how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism.
Your comments later in your post seem to suggest that you don't think that dualism is a problem. That tells me your definition of 'proof" differs from mine and most philosophers, I would wager.
— GLEN willows
the whole belief in a separate consciousness is based on folk psychology
— GLEN willows
Are you familiar with the phrase "folk psychology" as used by Patricia Churchland?
"I'm quite sure you have this backwards. The reason you confound doctrinal materialism with brain physiological oriented scientism is to pretend to an explanation for the only thing we can be certain of, our selves."
You could be making a good point it here, just not really getting it - my bad. Could you rephrase it a bit?
"But is this at all necessary? Isn't it possible that dualist hypotheses with connectivity CAN be constructed without anyone asking but where is this theory in space and how can I grasp it with my fingers?"
So are you saying a connection between mind and body can exist without any empirical proof?
Thanks for this
"It appears to be based on personal bias. Thirdly, if a hypothesis of dualism makes no physically tangible claims, then I fail to see how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from solipsism."
I'd be a little less polite and add "...or how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from..." ANY theory with no proof, including any conspiracy theory you could concoct. ps - I will NOT discuss that topic here, just using it to make a point.
What evidence do you have for this?
Imagine I have a metal detector. It detects metal really well. No matter how well it detects metal, that isn't evidence that everything - including the metal detector - is metal, is it?
So, we have science - science investigates the sensible world and it does so very well. But it would be silly to conclude on that basis that therefore everything is sensible.
Perhaps you will point out that brain states have been found to be strongly correlated to mental states. Okay, but the flashing and bleeping that my metal detector makes is strongly correlated to there being metal in its vicinity, but that is not evidence that the flashing and beeping are metal.
Perhaps you will say that, nevertheless, as we have been so successful at finding metal, and lots of things turn out to be made of metal (though to be honest, all the things that turn out to be made of metal appeared to be made of metal in the first place, all the metal detector did is tell us more about the metal) we should have as our working hypothesis that the metal detector itself is made of metal, indeed that by default everything is until we know better.
But even if that's true - and it isn't - it would be perverse to insist that something is metal that positively appears not to be. I mean, if you insist that something of that kind is metal, then all you've done is show that you are a dogmatist in possession of an unfalsifiable thesis.
Yet that's how things are with our minds and their mental states. They do not begin to appear to be sensible objects, and mental states do not appear to be states of a sensible thing.
Sensible objects have colours, shapes, sizes, smells, tastes. But my reason assures me that it is positively confused to think of my mind as having any of these qualities. So my mind does not appear to be a sensible object. It may still be, of course, for appearances are sometimes deceptive, including rational appearances. But where's the evidence? We cannot have - on pain of a radical and inescapable scepticism - as a working hypothesis that appearances are deceptive until we have reason to think otherwise. The reverse is true: we have resaon to think that appearances are accurate until we have reason to think otherwise. But if we listen to our reason and not convention, it tells us loud and clear that our minds are not sensible objects.
My reason also tells me that I have free will, yet tells me at the same time that I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes. Yet if I were a sensible object, everything about me would trace to external causes. So my reason tells me, once more, that I - my mind, that is - am not a sensible object.
And on and on it goes - there are loads of these arguments (I think I have about 14). They're not decisive, admittedly. But each one counts for something - each one is some evidence, prima facie evidence, that our minds are not sensible objects.
What countervailing evidence do you have that our minds are sensible objects?
So my delivery might be a little rough, bear with me. Ok...first off I'll say that as a student of philosophy and science, both, I'm surprised at how little stock philosophers seem to put in the science involved with brain injuries and operations - including split-brain operations. In all of these, damage to the brain directly affects qualia. Can you explain that?
When you say "sensible object" you seem to mean something tangible, that can be touched. Is that correct? If so, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that qualia are clearly part of the brain and not separate "things" - either sensible or metaphysical.
Bartricks: My reason also tells me that I have free will, yet tells me at the same time that I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes.
most philosophers don't believe free will is possible, using THEIR reason (to use your words) so that point is debatable to begin with.
Bartricks: I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes.
Why do you say this? What's your proof of that? If we have free will, but it IS part of the brain, what would the difference be?
Some variants of dualism might be ontically distinguishable, albeit not in a way that can be corroborated. The differences might not be detectable on earth or might be perceivable only through the lenses of hypothetical psychic observer. I accept such notions, because like with solipsism, there is difference between the version of the proposed reality therein and the conventional ones, even if it fails to project into sensory experience. Such description is still irrefutable. I insisted originally that there are different categories of questions that we could ask to distinguish one theory from the rest - ontic, epistemic, ethical and antropological. Some are distinguishable only through some of these questions, but to me, all should be distinguishable in an unambiguous manner as ontic descriptions or they are synonyms to another theory.
Some other caveats can demerit my earlier criticisms of dualism. You asked me, why we choose materialism over solipsism in practice. Those are not ontically equivalent theories, in effect, because of the solitude vs material coexistence issue, but they are epistemically indistinguishable, so we cannot really choose between them. But because they are producing different view on the virtues of other pursuits - moral pedagogy, the scientific method - we are implicitly committing to one or the other when following those pursuits. This presents another question. Facing the many hypotheses, some of them will be adopted in practice. They will become evident when we implement institutions like prescriptive ethics, the scientific discourse, the political discourse, etc, without actually discarding the alternative theories in principle. This is slightly different then what is happening in the physical sciences, where some objective criteria can be used to select between equivalent models of the empirical data. Criteria not involving the descriptive power of the theory (accuracy, completeness). The obvious pragmatic virtues of minimalism and simplicity can justify making a theory canonical or even dogmatic. Then, the less obvious quality of continuity from previous theories can also make such difference. I am mentioning this practice of arbitration, because since philosophy tackles more complex aspects, additional criteria are in play, such as ethical neutrality, purposefulness, etc. These are not arguments of the validity and soundness of the theory, but rather factors that decide whether society adopts the stance of its hypothesis when committing social energy. Hence, dualists can argue that their views, when compatible with the observed world and sufficiently clearly explained, should be chosen for their socio-political effects (ethically pedagoic and therapeutic qualities).
Another caveat that I should mention, which I already did in a recent thread, is that empiricism relies on intuitive convictions. Namely, in the soundness of reason (logic applies to the world), the objectivity of the sensory experience (we can corroborate and attest to empirical statements), the applicability of the inductive method (proper natural laws exist, i.e. reproduciblity remains consistent over time), the utility of statistics (statistical methods of inference are net positive effect to decision making at large). Within the materialist worldview these can be explained by Darwinism. The explanation has to be that the aptitude relying on those intuitions has supported the sustenance of the utilizing subjects and the inability or disinclination to use those instruments has resulted in some categorical extinction. Thus, like Hume, we cannot rationally or empirically justify the correctness of empiricism (even though we confirm it case by case through satisfactory outcomes), but we are compelled with innate conviction to rely on it, because this is our survival programming and nature's implicit answer. A non-empiricist, non-materialist, such as a dualist, would rightfully object that the disparagement of dualism is focused on its irrefutable presuppositions, whereas the blind convictions of empiricism get a free pass. There are multiple arguments that can defend the empirical perspective, but they are unfortunately frail. First, the scientific method is at least retrospectively confirmable, whereas certain kinds of dualism are completely untestable. This relies on the idea that precedent evidence is valuable, which a dualist might object as another inductive assertion. We could argue that the scientific method's intuitions are more compelling, literally, in the physical sense, in the Darwinian sense, in the biological sense, since they are not inferred, but are conferred by irrepressible external forces or inherited as irrepressible instincts for survival. Here, a dualist, especially a theist or spiritualist, could claim that their private beliefs are equally irrepressible for them and just cannot be conveyed logically. That doesn't exonerate ambiguity in my opinion, but for beliefs that are at least definite, each presupposition can be defended with a sense of irrepressible faith. This style of defense depends on the subjects ability to discern cognitive bias from inherent knowledge, which I doubt anyone can do. That is why I recommend at least skepticism on all matters of ideology, rather then unshaking devotion and commitment. Unfortunately, there is little more that can be said on the subject. We should barely hope that our collective efforts are in sensible agreement (fat chance) and we don't act counterproductively.
I ask many times - why dualism and not solipsism, pantheism or panpsychism? You can have shapes and colors (which are just relations of some kind, nothing brutal), while still perceiving those shapes and colors. As an analogy, when we look at other people, they have faces, but we can never see our face directly. Why then assume that self-description should be innate quality?
You have said 'why not solipsism?' That's not an alternative view - it's like saying "why not eat a pizza?"
Solipsism is not a view about the nature of the mind, but the number of minds in existence (it is the view that there is precisely one mind in existence - your own). Solipsism, then, is neutral between materialist and immaterialist views about the mind.
Pantheism is a view about God. So quite why you're raising it I do not know.
And panpsychism is just silly and not implied by any of the arguments I gave.
Why are you surprised at this? Do you think philosophers have been labouring under the misguided belief that doing things to the brain has no affect on our minds? You don't need to do any science to know that the sensible world affects what goes on in our minds. I am seeing a computer right now. That's a sensible thing - and it is affecting my mind. I am 'seeing' it - the seeing is a state my mind is in.
So, for thousands of years, and without any assistance from science, philosophers have been abundantly well aware that the sensible world affects our minds. That wasn't a discovery made in science! It's been obvious to anyone and everyone for the history of rational humanity.
And it isn't - isn't - evidence that the mind is a sensible thing. Take a balloon and fill it with water and tie the end. What shape is the water? It's pear shaped, yes? Now alter the shape of the balloon by gently squeezing it. Has doing that to the balloon affected the shape of the water? Yes, obviously. Does it follow that the water 'is' the balloon? No, obviously not. That doing something to A affects B, does not entail that A 'is' B. (And that remains the case even if something about A determines something about B).
Doing things to our brains obviously affects what goes on in our minds. Nobody disputes that. But that is not evidence that our minds 'are' our brains. That would be to reason as fallaciously as in the balloon case.
When I ask for evidence that the mind is the brain, that's all I'm ever given. Yet it rests on a simple mistake: the mistake of thinking that if A affects B, A 'is' B.
The mind is clearly a distinct entity from the brain - that's what the evidence suggests. But it just as clearly interacts with the brain.
Some think this interaction would be impossible if the mind and the sensible objects it interacts with are fundamentally different kinds of entity. Pick up any intro book to philosophy of mind and this one will be lazily trotted out as if it is some kind of decisive refutation.
But a) it is a rubbish objection, as if we have good evidence that the mind is an immaterial object, and good evidence that the mind interacts with radically different objects such as the brain, then we have good evidence that two different kinds of thing can interact. And b) even if it wasn't a rubbish objection, it would not imply the mind is a sensible thing, so much as that sensible things are in fact made of mental states.
That's totally untrue. Most philosophers believe free will is both possible and actual. Only a minority believe we lack free will, and an even smaller number of those hold the even more extreme view that free will is impossible.
As well as being untrue, it is also irrelevant. I made an argument - which premise is false? One can't do philosophy by surveying contemporary philosophers.
Quoting GLEN willows
I say it because it is self-evident to the reason of most people. It's even got a name - it's called the transfer principle. If I am unfree in respect of A - so, exercised no free will over A's occurrence - and A is wholly causally responsible for B's occurrence, then I am unfree in respect of B.
If I am a sensible object, then the transfer principle entails I am unfree. But my reason tells me that I am free. Thus, as both the transfer principle and my possession of freedom are self-evident to reason, whereas materialism about the mind is not, then it is materialism about the mind that the rational person will reject.
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
What makes this so clear? Where is this evidence?
Solipsism denies an objective world. Materialism and dualism both require it.
Quoting Bartricks
It can have implication about the mind, because it spiritualizes matter, making it conscious. In other words, it can become a theistic version of panpsychism.
Quoting Bartricks
What is so silly about it? You can have mind and it can be the result of your material embodiment's innate ability for experience.
Edit:
You still didn't answer why you believe automatically that the mind must have inherent ability for realization of its own form? (The faces analogy.)
No, that's just confused. Solipsism is a view about the number of minds that exist. It is 'not' a view about the nature of the mind. One can be a materialist solipsist, one can be a dualist solipsist, one can be an immaterialist solipsist.
Quoting simeonz
What? I made arguments in support of the view that our minds are not sensible objects. No premise in any of my arguments (I gave 2, I have 14 - and what I am about to say is true of all 14) assumed a position on deities.
Quoting simeonz
There's nothing to be said for it. It doesn't solve any problems. It's just silly.
Quoting simeonz
I am afraid I don't know what you mean or what your faces analogy was supposed to illustrate.
The problem is that if you intend to include free will, B must also affect A. We need to corroborate this, and if we cannot perceive it, then it appears to be just your axiom. Which is fine, but little can be debated here. It cannot be confirmed.
Quoting Bartricks
This would be panpsychism, wouldn't it?
If there is just one mind, what would draw a boundary between the mind simply being compelled by unnatural forces and the mind being part of a physical world? Those two options become distinguishable only terminologically. There is no other sense of distinction between them.
Quoting Bartricks
You didn't state whether you are theist, so I provided a theist option.
Quoting Bartricks
What is the problem? I thought that the problem is how can the mind exist. It solves that problem.
Quoting Bartricks
You said that your mind tells you that it doesn't have colors. I wanted to tell you through analogy that the mind may have features that it cannot perceive unaided. The same way we cannot perceive that we have face without mirror. (Or photo, or description from another person.)
But anyway, this argument (and about 13 others) is prima facie evidence that the mind is immaterial (why? Because it is a valid and its premises are powerfully self-evident to reason):
1. If one's mind is a sensible object, then it makes sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture or taste it might have.
2. It does not make sense to wonder what colour, shape, smell, texture, or taste one's mind has
3. Therefore, one's mind is not a sensible object.
Like I say, I have 13 more of these. And to date, I haven't heard a single good one - not a single one - for the materiality of the mind.
So,
1. My mind appears not to be a sensible object.
2. My mind appears causally to interact with sensible objects (I just decided to move my hand, for instance - the decision was a mental event, but that mental event appears to have moved my hand, which is a sensible thing).
3. Therefore, my mind appears not to be a sensible object and appears causally to interact with sensible objects.
There. Two valid arguments, both with manifestly true premises.
If you justify this presupposition as being evident to you, then there is little that can be said about it. It is not evident to me. Nothing wrong altogether (doesn't make us both right either), but it is a difficult debate when the fundamental perspectives of two people cannot align.
Edit: And don't claim that my perspective is stupid. It hardly aids the discussion.
I don't know what you're talking about. Imagine materialism is true. Now imagine you're the only material object that has conscious states. Bingo, now you're a materialist solipsist.
Imagine dualism is true. Now imagine that your material body is the only one with an immaterial mind associated with it. Bingo, now you're a dualist solipsist.
Imagine immaterialism is true and imagine that your mind and its mental states are all that exist. Bingo, now you're an immaterialist solipsist.
Solipsism is a view about the number of minds in existence. It is the view that there is 1. It is not a view about what the mind is made of.
Solotincanism is the view that there is one tin can in my cupboard. It is not a view about what's in the can. It is consistent with beanism, and beetrootism, and pinneapleism.
Quoting simeonz
I didn't state it because it is not relevant. You can be a theist materialist, a theist dualist, and a theist immaterialist. Theism is the view that God, or a god, exists. It is not a view about the nature of the mind.
Quoting simeonz
And how does it solve that problem? Let's just be clear: this is a problem for the materialist, yes? They - and they alone - have difficulty explaining how mental states can somehow emerge from, or 'be' material states. Now, a) I have refuted that view. So there's no problem. B) even if there was a problem, how on earth would panpsychism solve it?
It is self-evident to virtually everybody. "Is your mind rough or smooth?" makes no sense. It's like asking "how loud is 3?"
This radical apparent dissimilarity between minds and sensible objects is what most contemporary philosophers of mind are, in one way or another, grappling with. So, the powerfully self-evident nature of my first premise is not exactly peculiar to me.
This is contemporary philosophy of mind: let's assume as our working hypothesis that the mind is a piece of cheese. Now let's note what a whole heap of problems this generates. And now let's exercise our ingenuity and strut our intellectual stuff trying to solve them.
It's really silly.
Materialism to me has only one consequence, objective reality, meaning agreement between subjects about the nature of compelling external forces. There can be nothing to agree upon, if there is only one subject. The notion of objectivity becomes meaningless to me, if there are not multiple subjects.
Quoting Bartricks
I provided an option that afforded it in case you were theist, because otherwise you may not have subscribed to the others. It is related to the mind, as I said, because if matter is inherently spiritual, then it is also conscious. You cannot have soul and not mind, in a theist worldview.
It makes no sense to ask it as unaided self-reflection, but that doesn't mean that through some assisted view (externally) your mind could not see itself better.
That's just the thesis. Materialism 'just is' the thesis that there is an objective - that is, 'existing extra-mentally' - reality.
False. Minds are immaterial. I agree with that bit. I disagree with the bit that says that they interact with the brain. On the grounds that that would violate conservation of energy and momentum. Which I think are principles that supersede how things seem to us in terms of reliability. Because they haven't been false for centuries.
Quoting Bartricks
Sure, and that's the first argument I gave on the thread. I asked "What's the relative molar mass of Love"
Quoting Bartricks
But you said you had some evidence for this. By "evidence" did you simply mean that it seems so?
I was expecting some study or something showing that when people raise their arms, the causal chain leading to the movement starts arbitrarily, suddenly, without any detectable material causer. That's what we would expect to see if immaterial minds really did interact with material brains.
That would constitute evidence.
"Exist" is just another word for having a form. But the only way we define the idea of form is through the account of our interactions, through phenomenology. How can we talk about objectivity vs subjectivity of the form we perceive when there is only one subject. The two ideas are indistinguishable even conceptually to me. But I must say, I see where you are coming from. You are not asking the question epistemically at all it appears and to you the ontic difference is evident.
I am not entirely sure what you mean. I interpret you as saying that just because our reason tells us that it makes no sense to ask "what does your mind smell of?" that does not entail that our minds lack smells.
I agree. None of the 14 arguments I have is a proof. Not by themselves. The 14 together are. But individually they just provide prima facie evidence.
There's an animal in my kitchen that appears to be a cat. Perhaps I'm just hallucinating it. Perhaps it is a cleverly disguised hamster. But it appears to be a cat. And that's good prima facie evidence there's a cat in my kitchen.
Likewise, my reason represents my mind to be an immaterial thing, for it says of it that it makes no sense to wonder about what sensible properties it might have.
That is not a proof, for my reason could be misleading me. But it is prima facie evidence nonetheless. And to challenge it one would need to locate some more powerfully rationally self-evident countervailing evidence.
Does your mind say that it makes no sense to wonder about (derive by contemplation itself) its sensible properties, or that it makes no sense to witness its sensible properties?
Where's your argument for this?
1) You don't seem to think the mind-body problem is a problem. You say "The mind is clearly a distinct entity from the brain - that's what the evidence suggests. But it just as clearly interacts with the brain."
How?
2) You have 14, not 13, not 15...but 14 arguments against materialsm (repeated multiple times).
3) You seem a tad antagonistic?
4) Just teasing
If it didn't have some degree of privacy we could never lie.
That's not my argument. That's just a question. There's playing every note on the piano, and then there's a Chopin etude. If Chopin plays his etude no. 1 you can't then say "yes, I wrote that - I did it when I played all those notes earlier".
No, that's just you being confused and begging the question. It's what you do.
Argument? That momentum and energy are conserved? I have none, because it's not a conclusion arrived at by argument. It's a conclusion arrived at by observation. Centuries of it.
And you for some reason think that that makes it more reasonable to doubt than doubting what things seem like to us?
Quoting Bartricks
The purpose of the question is to demonstrate that asking for physical properties of minds makes no sense, and the reader is expected to fill in that "Thus the mind cannot be a physical object" from the premise "If the mind is a physical objects it would make sense to ask for its physical properties". Don't be obtuse just for the purpose of being obtuse.
Or did you seriously not get it? If so you'd be the only one.
Quoting Bartricks
You would rather doubt the conservation of energy and momentum than doubt what things seem like. That would put you in the same boat as flat earthers.
If "it seems like this" is all your evidence, not sure there is much more to say.
And yes, I have 14 arguments for the immateriality of the mind (most of them aren't mine, I hasten to add - but the vast bulk of the great philosophers have thought the mind immaterial due to there being such overwhelming evidence in support of the thesis......most contemporary philosophers disagree, but who'd you rather have on your side? A thousand contemporary philosophers, or Plato, Avicenna, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Bartricks... the list goes on). I haven't heard a single good one for the materiality of the mind. Not one.
Yes, I suffer fools crossly.
I don't dispute the laws you mention. I want you to show me that they are inconsistent with a premise in my argument.
They are consistent with the conclusion that your mind appears to interact with your brain.
They are inconsistent with the conclusion that your mind interacts with your brain.
You frequently confuse the two. Or claim that in the absence of a reason to doubt what things seem like, things are what they seem like. Agreed. Except in this case there is plenty of reason to doubt what things seem like.
Your mind is immaterial yes?
Therefore if it interacts with the brain (IE causes some movement) there would be no detectable physical source of that movement yes?
That would be an example where net momentum increased.
Something gained momentum, and nothing else lost it or gained momentum in the opposite direction.
That contradicts the law of conservation of momentum.
Wouldn't say "no connection" but no interaction.
The mind relies on the brain. But doesn't affect it.
All of the philosophers you mention had several things wrong, you know that right? Specifically dualism, Descartes - epic fail. Have you heard about Elizabeth of Bohemia?
Event A - brain event - causes event B - mental event. Event B causes event C - brain event.
We can sensibly detect A and C, not B.
Now, what in that picture is inconsistent with the laws you mention? Show me the actual argument - for if you do that, then you will have to import an unnecessary premise in addition to the laws you mention, and those premises will be question begging.
My thinking of switching the TV channel is done by my brain. So is the switching. So is the sense that I switched due to the desire to switch.
I think that you suggest that the relationship between B and C (and therefore the entire existence of B) happens in complete physical transparency. Then, how would free will manifest here?
Er, no - they were right about the immaterialism of the mind. Their arguments are among the 14. No one has refuted them. (You said you were a philosophical rooky. Yet you're confident that these giants were wrong?! Are you aware of their arguments?)
And yes, obviously I have heard about her. And I have read her exchanges with Descartes. Have you? She is hugely overrated. She is credited - wrongly - with having raised the 'problem of interaction'. She didn't. Pierre Gassendi raised it first. And if you've read Descartes' replies to Gassendi you'll know just how thoroughly unimpressed he was by it. But Gassendi wasn't a young princess with a big bank account.
.
That mental event B causes brain event C.
Let's say brain event C is that neurotransmitter X is pushed by some force Y. And that results in you raising your arm. Stupidly simply but it will do.
This would be a case of net momentum increase. Since neurotransmitter X suddenly gained momentum, without colliding with anything (without anything else losing momentum).
That cannot happen per the laws of conservation.
No. It is not the thought that does it. Though it certainly seems to me like it is the thought that does it.
My brain does everything. Including the thought. And the seeming.
No. A - which is a sensible event - causes B - which is a mental event - which causes C, which is another sensible event.
There's no new energy coming in, just energy transferring from A to B and then to C. It's just that B isn't sensibly detectable.
The thesis is not incompatible with the laws of conservation. If you don't believe me, check out Jose Gusmao Rodriguez's article "There are no good objections to substance dualism" in the journal "Philosophy".
"which is a sensible event - causes B - which is a mental event"
How?
Your mind gains energy? :rofl:
Wasn't your argument for why the mind is not sensible this:
Quoting Bartricks
Well one of the things that it does not make sense to ask of the mind is "How much kinetic energy does it have"? Because "energy" applies only to physical things. Just like shape and color. It makes no sense to say anything non physical gained energy.
It's exactly like saying "Fear weighs 20 pounds"
Quoting Bartricks
Ah, so you're suggesting that energy not only disappears into the ether momentarily, but that it then magically reappears conserved...
This is breaking the laws twice over, not abiding by them.
Quoting Bartricks
I would if it wasn't behind a paywall. But not right now in either case, you should be able to argue for your position yourself.
ps - only 14? I have 27. (smiley face) toodles!
Yes, if that's what causal interaction requires. Note, this is also what would happen if the mind is your brain, right? So, either way the answer is 'yes'.
But you haven't shown a violation of the laws of conversation. There's no violation.
Quoting Bartricks
Does your mind gain weight too if you don't exercise? Ridiculous. You are literally going against your own argument about why the mind is non sensible. Again:
Quoting khaled
"Energy" has a very specific meaning in physics, you can't just randomly apply it to something that is by definition outside of the scope of physics.
Quoting Bartricks
Except that's not my position. My position is that they do not interact. Not that the mind is sensible.
Quoting Bartricks
Correct, there is no violation. There is two.
Energy, which I repeat, is something only defined for physical things, firstly disappears, then reappears.
That's one... two violations.
Two violations don't make a right.
And furthermore you claim that energy, which disappears and reappears, does so because it is being taken by a non physical thing. Which is just as ridiculous as saying that "fear gains 20 joules of energy". It makes no sense. Just a confused application of a very specific term.
When it comes to causation - and let's just stick to causation between sensible things - about the best we can do is say that causation happens. That 'what it is' for one thing to cause another is simply for a causal relation to obtain between them.
Now, that may be felt inadequate, but note that it is not a 'problem of interaction', for here we are dealing with causation between sensible things.
Well, if that's all we can say where causation between sensible things is concerned, I fail to see what's problematic about saying the same where causation between sensible and immaterial things is concerned.
But perhaps there is a problem - perhaps objects of one kind cannot possibly causally interact with objects of a fundamentally different kind. I don't see why not, but perhaps.
Okay, let's run with that. Well, I have 14 arguments that my mind is immaterial, and I'm still waiting for one - just one - in support of the materiality of the mind.
So, at this point I have very good evidence that my mind is immaterial. And if immaterial things truly cannot causally interact with anything other than immaterial things, and my mind appears to interact with a sensible world, then the conclusion any rational person will draw is that the sensible world is therefore a mental world and not an extra mental world. That is, the conclusion we reach is not materialism, but immaterialism.
I am an immaterialist, so if there really is a problem of interaction - and there isn't - then all this will do is furnish us with another argument for immaterialism. What it won't do is anything at all to establish materialism about the mind.
Odd that for someone who describes themselves as a philosophical rooky you are so confident about these matters. Methinks your humility was b/s, yes? I am not a philosophical rooky, btw.
Ah, there you go - begging the question again. You really don't understand, do you? There's no violation of those laws. You have to add to those laws physicalist assumptions to get a violation - but that begs the question.
The above quote states, factually, that energy has a very specific meaning in physics. It is with that meaning that I use it. And it is by that meaning that the laws make sense.
Our colloquial use of "energy" (like in "I'm just so low energy") is not what's being referred to in "conservation of energy".
No. Your body will. Not your mind.
Unless you're not an immaterialist about the mind. In which case, yes. It will.
So, you're either a materialist about the mind or your not, right? If you're not, then you're with me. And as there is clearly causal interaction between the mind and the body, whatever that involves occurs.
Or you are a materialist about the mind. In which case the same is true.
Sure but I'm not with you in saying that mind interacts with brain. I've given you an argument for it. You've claimed it begs the question. Where does it beg the question, specifically.
The quote you provided is literally a definition. I do not see how that can be begging the question.
If the laws in question govern the totality of what exists, then that includes immaterial souls. And there is no violation involved in mind/body interaction (anymore than there would be if minds were material).
This is pure unadulterated handwaving.
All of the properties they conserve are ONLY defined for physical things. That is literally what the laws are defined for.... They're PHYSICAL laws. It's not begging the question.
You'd have to propose some new "spiritual conservation laws" to push for what you want. But they are not the same in any way. Whatever this "spiritual energy" is you'd have to point out exactly how it can be translated to kinetic energy.
And if you were to pose those, then you still have the fact that your view requires two violations of the original physical laws. Which are, again, PHYSICAL laws. Therefore are clearly not defined for minds.
Your view requires energy, in the purely physical sense (which is the only sense it was defined for) to disappear and reappear. And energy, again in the purely physical sense, is conserved. Therefore your view contradicts the law of conservation of energy in the purely physical sense (which is just the law of conservation of energy)
I'll repeat again for good measure: Your view requires energy to disappear momentarily. This has never ever been detected. And is a violation of long standing laws.
Quoting Bartricks
Minds are immaterial, yes, for like the 4th time.
Precious coming from you :rofl:
Right. So when I decided - a mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised, what happened there?
Your view must be that it was pure coincidence that my decision to raise my arm was followed by my arm raising.
Which is too silly for words.
And when I eat food and feel satisfied, that feeling was just coincidental.
Silly, silly, sillyingtons
Or do you, perhaps, believe there was causal interaction after all?
Now, once more: event A - sensible event - causes B - mental event - which causes C - sensible event.
No new energy coming in. Everything's being nicely conserved. It's just a pipe with an immaterial section.
Your brain caused the mental event. And your brain also caused the arm to move.
Quoting Bartricks
When was that implied? No the brain does it in pairs. The thought, and the action. And also the thought that the thought led to the action. So I guess it does it in threes.
I would be willing to give that whatever the brain does to move the arm also results in the thought. That the thought is necessarily caused alongside the movement. But that's it. Not that it is causing the movement.
Quoting Bartricks
Nope.
Quoting Bartricks
False dichotomy. I explained what happens. The brain does it in threes.
Quoting Bartricks
False. Energy disappeared in the first step. Then new energy came in.
You cannot say it was the "same energy" as that would be attributing energy to minds. Which makes as little sense as attributing color to minds. That was your whole argument (among others) that the mind is immaterial.
Quoting Bartricks
You get what you pay for. Bad scorn and worse ideas.
But regardless, critiquing my position (badly) doesn't make yours any better. Yours requires a violation of the laws of conservation. You have not been able to show this statement to be false.
So the brain interacted with the mind. On your view. You think the mind is immaterial. Mental events are events of the mind (in case you didn't know). So, if your brain....material thing....causes a 'mental event'...an 'event of the mind'.......then.......wait for it......wait.......you have a material thing, causally interacting with an immaterial thing.
Which you think doesn't happen.
Only you also think it does.
Must be good being able to do that - being able to just think all these contradictory things at once. I spend ages trying to avoid doing that. What a waste of time!
Yikes.
When did I say that?
I said an immaterial thing cannot cause material movement. The other way is fine.
Quoting Bartricks
No, it's just that you're mistaken as usual... I explained above.
Must be good being able to do that. Being so sure of yourself despite being wrong so often.
That would be.....Question Begging.
What you call question begging is called "Using technical terms correctly"
But you can replace every instance of "energy" with "energy in the purely physical sense" if you insist on misusing the word energy.
So causal interactions can take place between material and immaterial entities.
If a physical event can cause a non-physical event, why can't a non-physical event cause a physical one? Odd. Seems entirely arbitrary to believe that, given we have equally strong evidence for the latter as for the former.
Anyway, must go to bed now - but how? Doors can only be pushed. They can't be pulled. Dammit. I'm stuck in my study.
Not safe to assume both ways.
Quoting Bartricks
Metaphysically seems possible. Actually was never seen. Despite looking for it. So good reason to think it is impossible.
Quoting Bartricks
Of course it does to you, since you would sooner overthrow centuries of confirmed science because "things don't seem to me that way". Just like a flat earther would.
The reason to believe that is, as just stated: No such interactions have ever been shown. Despite effort looking for them. For centuries. So good reason to assume they are impossible.
On the other hand, physical changes causing mental changes is easy to see.
Sure when you raise your hand it SEEMS like your mind is causing the movement. However, that is consistent with both of our theories. But only one requires overthrowing centuries of science in favor of how things seem to us.
Quoting Bartricks
Some doors CAN only be pushed. And even if it was a 1 way door, you’d still not be stuck....
Even your attempts at analogies are subpar.
Quoting Bartricks
Make sure not to move too much. Your mind might fall off the bed since apparently immaterial things are subject to material laws! Maybe it already has... Sweet dreams.
Quoting Bartricks
"It seems that way to me" is not evidence. Not next to centuries of futile search.
and...?
No one is denying that some things are private.
Not too sure what "this" is. Do I think mental events cause physical change? Well, obviously; as Searle pointed out, I decide to raise my arm, and the darn thing goes up.
Does the feeling of anger have some real world causal power? It does not seem odd to say that Banno abused Khaled because he was angry. Unpacking that might be a bit more difficult.
Are you familiar with Davidson's descriptions of actions? Curious stuff. Might have to dig up the article if there is interest.
Noticed this: Quoting khaled
Add that one can get drunk to Searle's example, and it is clear that physical events effect mental events and vice versa. This gives the illusion of a bridge between dualisms, bit that strikes me as a poor ontology.
But maybe it’s: You brain, in the process of raising the arm, creates the intent that you are raising the arm, and the impression that the intent caused the raising.
Just because A always precedes B doesn’t mean A caused B. In this case A being the intent and B being the arm raising. Maybe it’s more like: X causes A and shortly after B.
Quoting Banno
Is clear.
Quoting Banno
But how does this work exactly? How does it square with our understanding of physics, such as conservation laws?
Because consciousness is an integral part of both the material brain and the universe that hosts it/is in symbiosis with it, including the very fabric of space time itself, not to mention any consideration to what existed before the big bang, We do not yet understand gravity at the quantum level for example. We do not truly understand the human brain and it's place "within" the universe.
There does seem to be a lot more atheists in academia in the mored era. Ironically though, we are not really in a golden age of discovery I would argue. Newton wasn't an atheist but an unconventional theist though he disagreed with the divinity of the trinity for example. Einstein believed that God existed, but that he was nebulous, universal, and not comprehensible to the human mind. Marie Curie was agnostic but not outright atheist.
I think there is a tendency in intellectual projection nowadays to attempt to set oneself apart by proclaiming ones atheism. But I would warn that that may not necessarily grant you additional favour, given that so many accomplished scholars greatly respected in the upper echelons of academia today are not atheist and a lot in fact believe in some higher power.
Quoting khaled
I've not considered it, but you seem to have something in mind. Do tell.
It’s as weird as throwing an astronaut into space, watching him move at a uniform speed for a while, then watching him suddenly.... stop. For no detectable reason. Then saying “That was his mind doing it”.
In other words, minds affecting brains is nothing short of telekinesis.
Two descriptions:
1. My arms move because I decide to move my arm,
2. Certain neurone fire, causing specific muscle fibres to contract.
One event.
Sure that I’ll buy. Though I would say statement 1 is liable to misinterpretation. Makes it sound almost as if the thought is a causal agent.
Bartricks on the other hand for example was claiming telekinesis.
@Bartricks might re-think things.
We might proceed to:
1b. My arms move because certain neurones fired,
2b. I decide to move my arm, causing specific muscle fibres to contract.
No issue so far...? But we are starting to mix the language games together.
But not:
3. I decide to move my arm = certain neurones fired,
...that's the anomalous part of anomalous monism.
Yes issue so far. If you deciding to move your arm causes any physical change, that would be telekinesis. It would be as weird as an astronaut deciding to stop moving suddenly in space using his mind.
Unless by 2b, you're being colloquial and you just mean 1b.
I would say:
1b. My arms move because certain neurons fired
2b. I decide to move my arm because certain neurons fired
3. I decide to move my arm =/= certain neurons fired.
You're saying the mind-body problem was solved? What's the solution?
I decided - mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised - sensible event.
If all the evidence is that my mind is an immaterial thing, then what we have there is evidence that immaterial events can and do cause sensible events.
If you think there's evidence that the mind is a material thing, provide it.
Quoting Bartricks
Not arbitrarily. Though, again, it must seem so to you since your highest form of evidence is "It seems to me that way".
Quoting Bartricks
False. You just don't understand them. Seeing as you are attributing physical laws to non physical things. I'll say it again, hopefully it sticks: Energy is literally only defined for physical things. It makes no sense to talk of energy that is not that of a physical thing. Same with momentum, mass, velocity, torque, etc.
And the funny part is, you whole argument for why the mind is immaterial was that you can't ask about its mass or color. Yet here you are repeatedly doing exactly that.
Quoting Bartricks
Attributing energy to minds makes as little sense as attributing color to minds.
You know what, forget conservation of energy. You seem incapable of using the term correctly. So let's look at another conservation law that is more difficult to misuse. Conservation of momentum.
Are you going to propose that minds gain momentum and gives it back later in order to cause a change of momentum in the brain (which is just movement)? For a mind to gain momentum that would necessarily mean it has mass and velocity. That would make it a physical thing. But it isn't. So minds don't gain momentum. Therefore if a change of momentum occurs in the brain that is caused by the mind, then momentum is not conserved (as the mind couldn't have gained or lost any momentum, so any change it causes must be a net increase or decrease of momentum, which violates the law)
Quoting Bartricks
"Event B followed event A therefore A must have caused B"
Can't say I expected much better from you at this point but wow.
The explanation is that consciousness cannot arise from non-conscious stuff. It's an absurdity. Since we know consciousness exists, therefore, we know there is no non-conscious stuff.
Now, what do you think the mind-body problem is, and how was it solved?
Quoting khaledYep.
SO we nmight look for the connection that makes some of these mixes work, but not others.
Not knowledge of. Just that neurons firing caused my decision. And also the movement. In a pair.
I would even be willing to bet that they were the same neurons! But I don't know enough neurology to say so for sure. Though I think Isaac might have said something similar a while ago.
I didn't say otherwise.
Quoting Bartricks
"Material thing" - what's that , then? Is temperature a material thing? Light?
Let's drop that word, for fear of it leading us astray. Instead, go back to:
Quoting Banno
Could you bring yourself to concur? We may not be disagreeing.
I can't avoid the image of you sitting there saying "Ah, my c-fibres are firing - I think I might move my arm!" Or on my asking "why did you move your arm?", you reply "Because my c-fibres fired...!"
Nuh. You don't think that. SO what's going on?
Well we both agree there.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
There is no buildup there (or any reason) for me to say that. My c-fibers would fire. And then I would feel like moving my arm. And also my arm would move shortly after (not sure if the c-fibers also did that part or not).
I would later say "I felt like raising my arm so I raised my arm". And by that I would mean "I raised my arm because my c-fibers fired, which, incidentally, is also what caused me to feel like raising my arm".
The former implies the latter. I felt like raising my arm, so the c-fibers must have fired. That also leads me to raise my arm. The "I felt like raising my arm so" is not meant to imply that the feeling is causal.
Quoting Banno
Not sure what I said to make you think so. I've been saying that the brain causes both the act and the intent since the very start.
That's why I said "yes?" just to confirm that you agree.
Quoting Banno
Something extended in space.
A 'thing' incidentally, is a bearer of properties. So, if something is extended in space, then there will be a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't. Therefore it will have a shape. Shape is not a thing, but the property of a thing. Temperature would also be a property of a thing.
I don't think material things exist - I don't think they make sense - but 'if' they exist, then I think there's no problem with them interacting with immaterial things. Immaterial things, btw, are things that are not extended in space.
Quoting Banno
Fine by me - I call them 'sensible objects'. Let's call them that, for that term is neutral between materialist and immaterialist interpretations of them. Plus there is no dispute that my arm is a sensible object.
Quoting Banno
No, obviously not. My decision is a mental event. No doubt it was caused by a sensible event. But it is a mental event. And it causes a sensible event.
So explain how that is consistent with the physical laws you're mentioning. Do. It.
If the mind is an immaterial object and not a material object, then one does not have to explain how consciousness arises from material substances, does one? It doesn't.
So, 'how can material objects be conscious?' They aren't. Consciousness is a property of an immaterial thing, not a material thing. As one will see if one attends to the evidence - the evidence provided by Plato, Avicenna, Descartes and the like.
This is how you get the mind/body problem: you 'assume' that the mind is the body, and then you have a problem. Silly, isn't it?
It's like me just assuming that my partner is not in the garden lopping down branches and then thinking "how is it that branches are just magically dropping from my trees, all neatly cut?".
The physical laws talk about how material things interact. I’m saying that interaction also causes minds and such.
Let’s look at conservation of momentum for example. When objects collide the total momentum of the system remains constant, assuming the system is closed. I am saying that when objects collide in a specific manner, minds pop out. What’s inconsistent in the latter statement with the former?
And besides, it’s weird that you ask me this when even you think that material events cause immaterial ones. Why am I the one that has to explain this supposed inconsistency away?
And I like how you completely ignore the entirety of my comment and address nothing. And instead ask me to deal with a non-existent inconsistency that is in both of our positions.
Address what I said. Or don’t waste my time. Do. It.
By 'closed' do you mean to exclude immaterial objects? If so, then you are begging the question.
If the system includes them, then two-way interaction between the material and the immaterial will not violate the law.
But anyway, you now allow, clearly, that one thing can cause another without transferring any energy to it, yes?
No. This is elementary school physics. Closed means no energy exchange from outside the system to inside it or vice versa. If it is too complicated for you just consider the whole universe as a system. Momentum and energy are conserved in the universe.
Quoting Bartricks
A physical system cannot include non physical things.
I am talking physics. Not non-physics. Which means it applies to, guess what, physical things! And you’re just talking nonsense.
And don’t repeat the “It’s begging the question to assume energy only applies to physical things”. No it isn’t. And I’ve explained why in multiple ways and I’m not going to repeat myself.
Is it begging the question to assume momentum only applies to physical things too? You want non physical things that have momentum? IE mass and velocity?
Quoting Bartricks
Don’t overgeneralize. I have no clue where you got this or what it means.
What I allow is that physical events cause non physical events.
Seriously, what does “one thing can cause another without transferring energy to it” mean? What is “it” here? An event? You don’t transfer energy to an event. A thing? You don’t cause a thing! Nonsense! Complete word salad!
I find it incredibly difficult to believe you’re not trolling again.
If an immaterial mind is caused by the brain, there needs to be an explanation for how that works.
The One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church is a material thing?
The traffic code of New South Wales is a material thing?
Quoting Bartricks
I agree; but cups and chairs do.
Quoting Bartricks
No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense. Calling them such prejudges their existence outside sensibility. It won't do.
Quoting Bartricks
Not obvious at all. Seems to me that you are stuck with an unhelpful sundering of the mental from the physical. I offered you a way to mend the break.
You're making an assumption here.
Yes, I know that is what you want to say, but it still looks odd.
And that intents happen because of neurons. Or, at least that intents don’t cause movements (or else you get telekinesis), just precede them.
So what’s odd?
No, I refer you to my earlier answer.
Quoting Banno
Yes, not really the issue though.
Quoting Banno
Well, we're not going to have a profitable conversation then, are we? I am going to call them sensible objects because in that way no questions are begged.
Quoting Banno
No, you're just an amateur. The direction of help is me to you, not you to me.
It has an extended place in the world.
It is more than just what I sense, because you see it, too.
It is more than just what I sense, because I once mistook it for a bowl - it looked like a bowl, not a cup. My senses were mistaken. If it were just my senses, it would have become a bowl instead of a cup.
That'll do.
All three are extended in space...?
:rofl:
You get paid?
I used to get paid to do philosophy, back when I were a lad.
Once, long ago, amateurs were held in higher regard than professionals, because professionals only did it for the dollars, while amateurs did it for love.
Ah, well, it's long been suspected that @NOS4A2 was being paid, by the Kremlin, perhaps, or North Korea. Who pays you to post here?
Look, it ain't my fault your definition seems to include odd material things.
The One True Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church is extended in space - it's in Italy, Canada, Brazil - how odd that you should deny this.
Quoting BartricksThe traffic code of NSW is extended in space, having "a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't", just like you said. Hence, by your definition it is a material thing.
This is getting tedious as it is beside the point. But no, it isn't extended in space, because what you're talking about is a set of beliefs - yes? - and they're not extended in space. Coz they're mental states - states of mind - and minds aren't extended in space.
Or you're talking about the bodies of the believers - yes, those are extended in space if, that is, material objects exist (which they don't).
Or you're talking about the churches the bodies of these people go and hang around in. Those are extended in space (if material objects exist, that is, which they don't).
Minds are immaterial. There's a ton of evidence that they are, and none - I stress, none - that they are not.
Sensible events clearly have affects on our minds. They often alter what conscious state they are in. The wine in the glass in front of me is a sensible substance. If I down it, this will affect my conscious states.
My decision to drink the wine is a mental event. It causes - or seems to be causing - my arm to raise the wine to my face. The drinking of the wine is also a sensible event. And the improved mood that the wine induces is mental.
You can perform these experiments yourself. Indeed, one is happening right now - for these words are appearing on a sensible computer screen and you're seeing them and thinking about them. Your visual sensations and your thoughts are mental states.
Clearly then, a quick survey of how things appear to be reveals that there is plenty of causal interaction between the sensible and the immaterial.
Do I have to explain how that occurs? Nope. Not sure what an 'explanation' would be in this context. But anyway, one is not owed. One does not have to be able to explain how something is the case, before one has evidence that it is the case.
My typing on the keyboard is clearly affecting what appears on the screen in front of me. I have excellent evidence for this. Yet I haven't a clue how it is happening.
One might agree that the mind is immaterial but not that it is ‘an object’. In what sense is the mind an object, and for whom? My own mind never appears as an object to me.