A spectrum of ideological enmity
I think it's useful to differentiate between at least these five different shades of ideological (dis)agreement, and treat each kind of person differently in conversation:
- People who solidly hold correct opinions for good reasons
- People who just socially identify with the side of those correct opinions
- People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all ideas a fair shake
- People who have been duped or manipulated into thinking that bad causes are good causes
- People who honestly and devoutly have genuinely bad intentions
This line of thought was prompted by a discussion elsewhere on the internet tonight where I as a mod had to stop people who I see as the first two groups (people on "my side") from treating someone in the third group like he belonged to one of the last two groups.
That person in turn raised the importance of differentiating between the last two groups, lamenting the case of a friend of his who used to be in the third group with him and then got suckered into the fourth group by the fifth group.
Topically, I think making these kinds of distinction is very important given the kind of turmoil happening in America today, where:
- there are relatively few (though still too many) of the last group (and even they, I think, see themselves as good people, but have just dug their heels in way too far with some really bad ideas),
- but a much larger number of the second-to-last group, and that is what's responsible for events like those of January 6th,
- and it's the people in the middle group who feed into the second-to-last, and treating them like enemies only makes them more likely to shy away from our side and get suckered in with our enemies,
- and it's the people in the second group who are most likely to attack the people in the middle as though they are on the other side, seeing things as they do in tribal in- and out-group lines, so they are the ones on "our side" who we need to police if we as a group want to reach "the other side";
- while even those of us in the first group don't have complete agreement with each other, but can rest assured enough that we're all after the same general good and can have more open and honest conversations about what exactly the best form of that is and how best to attain it.
- People who solidly hold correct opinions for good reasons
- People who just socially identify with the side of those correct opinions
- People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all ideas a fair shake
- People who have been duped or manipulated into thinking that bad causes are good causes
- People who honestly and devoutly have genuinely bad intentions
This line of thought was prompted by a discussion elsewhere on the internet tonight where I as a mod had to stop people who I see as the first two groups (people on "my side") from treating someone in the third group like he belonged to one of the last two groups.
That person in turn raised the importance of differentiating between the last two groups, lamenting the case of a friend of his who used to be in the third group with him and then got suckered into the fourth group by the fifth group.
Topically, I think making these kinds of distinction is very important given the kind of turmoil happening in America today, where:
- there are relatively few (though still too many) of the last group (and even they, I think, see themselves as good people, but have just dug their heels in way too far with some really bad ideas),
- but a much larger number of the second-to-last group, and that is what's responsible for events like those of January 6th,
- and it's the people in the middle group who feed into the second-to-last, and treating them like enemies only makes them more likely to shy away from our side and get suckered in with our enemies,
- and it's the people in the second group who are most likely to attack the people in the middle as though they are on the other side, seeing things as they do in tribal in- and out-group lines, so they are the ones on "our side" who we need to police if we as a group want to reach "the other side";
- while even those of us in the first group don't have complete agreement with each other, but can rest assured enough that we're all after the same general good and can have more open and honest conversations about what exactly the best form of that is and how best to attain it.
Comments (208)
Do you have any evidence if this?
The problem is that, as you point out, people in the last group think they're in the first, and treating an idea as a valid contribution to the 'marketplace of ideas' makes it seem more 'good', by inclusion at the big table than it might otherwise be.
So, what is it that prevents people in the third group from being facilitated in joining the last group by being convinced that the last group's ideas are just as valid and likely to be right as the first group's? Afterall "if there wasn't a chance they're right, why would we even be considering them".
And don't say "by rational argument", because the very existence of these groups is evidence that people adopt and maintain ideas for reasons other than rational arguments. It would be a perfomative contradiction to argue that we could use rational argument to resolve a situation brought about by a failure of rational argument.
This seems like a bit of a biased categorization, because I think the basic disagreement is one of methodology. One group doesn't think the way to arrive at 'correct opinions' is through reason, or at least reason alone, but via tradition predominately. In making distinctions this way you are already favoring one method above another, and misrepresent people who favor the other method by looking at it solely the perspective of your preferred method.
What I think could help, is trying to understand why people come to different opinions, and see if there is enough of a common methodology and basic values that I think are necessary to make it even possible to continue discussing these things rationally. If not, there's little point to it, and the best thing to do might be to just agree to disagree.
Key is to recognize that people hold ideas from a standpoint of a complete worldview that is primarily action-oriented.
I don't mean to suggest that we should treat the truly ridiculous ideas of the "other side" as legitimate like that, but only that we shouldn't treat the people as enemies merely for not having made up their minds about them, because that then frames us and the undecided as enemies, as so inclines them to whatever side is opposite ours. We should be clear in our view that those ideas are not worth consideration, but we should convey that in a way that's more like warning a stranger away from a path they may not have seen the dangers of, and less like attacking an enemy for daring to even consider going down that path.
I see. I didn't get that from my first reading, but it makes more sense now. I think distinguishing the forth from the fifth group will be difficult, and so ensuring we present a sufficiently resilient front against the fifth might be compromised by a less antagonistic treatment of the fourth. In theory I agree, but in practice I think it might only apply to a few cases where one is sure one's interlocutor is in the fourth group and not the fifth, otherwise one had better be sure they know that they are made one's enemy by holding such ideas.
Why on earth would you centre such an analysis on a book that's 70 years out of date. Do you really have such a poor opinion of modern sociology that you think nothing of note has been advanced since then?
I agree here too. I was thinking specifically of cases where one knows the person in question and has seen them fall in with bad views in real time. I think of my parents in this category; I know from a lifetime of experience they are well-intentioned and loving (albeit severely flawed) people at heart, but they've also both been suckered in by whatever they're reading on the internet into believing stuff on the edges of Qanon territory. The person in the conversation elsewhere that inspired this thread was talking about a friend of his who he can now barely speak to because that friend has been suckered into Qanon too. These are people who weren't going around their whole lives throwing around the N-word and Nazi salutes or the like, but otherwise good people who somehow fell for some bad rhetoric.
I suspect that it's only the people who do know such people well enough to tell that they're in group 4 rather than 5 who have any chance of reaching them anyway, so it seems fine that the only people for whom the distinction can be made are also them, the only ones in a position to act on that distinction.
Why read Plato? Philosophies can only present certain things within the limitations of the social and ideational context in which they developed. Within new contexts, new meanings can arise. That is also in that out of date book and a common theme to studies in historicism.
If you really don't believe that great historical works contain elements of current merit and value, then you're probably not in the right place....
It's not an unfamiliar phenomenon unfortunately. I don't know anyone personally, but have been made aware of people who used to be within my social group starting to adopt Trumpian style rhetoric. All from the far left, curiously. All citing political correctness around transgender issues as their tipping point. Don't quite know what to make of it, but I hear it a lot, just anecdotally.
Quoting Pantagruel
...is not a philosophical investigation, it's an empirical one. Social membership is an empirical property and the effect it has is an empirical observation.
You might have a philosophical approach to the way in which you want to frame that data, but to do so, you need the data itself. A lot of Mannheim's ideas have been corroborated, it's not that he's wrong, just that ideas about empirical matters should be checked against up to date data where possible, not discussed from the armchair as if we could work out what is the case just by thinking hard.
Quoting Pantagruel
I didn't say anything about it lacking either merit or value. What I claimed it lacked was contemporaneity. I'm asking why you'd want to base an analysis on a book which has that particular flaw, regardless of its other potential merit, which I'm sure any modern sociology text could equally lay claim to.
The middle group, AKA the "fence sitters". A decidedly derogatory term. These people are a liability because they are undecided, so it's no wonder they get considered enemies.
We, we, we. There's that us vs. them rhetoric.
Do you personally know what it's like to be that "fence sitter"? I do. Your style so far is not inviting me to get closer to your side.
Wtf is a "correct opinion"? Politics has obviously driven some our members insane.
Putting people.that you don't know into groups. Sounds like a bigot to me.
Empiricism is a philosophical position. Maybe that's the advantage of reading seventy year old books. You pick up a few things.
John Dewey makes the obvious point that there is nothing more ephemeral than "the modern". I like to think that, when I absorb the nuances of Mannheim's thought, or Heidegger's, I am in a way bringing the force of their intellects to bear on current situations. I believe Heidegger would agree with that inasmuch as he talks about a kind of exo-temporal dialog of a "community of rational beings".
Mannheim may not be your contemporary, but I certainly am.
This is true. There is a strong, underlying normative tenor here.
I do. The "fence sitter" in the conversation elsewhere that inspired this thread reminds me of a younger me. It's for the sake of people like that that I'm even thinking about this topic. I don't want to see them treated as enemies, but as potential friends.
Quoting Pantagruel
Because politics is a normative field. The questions at hand are what are the right or wrong things to do with our society. Anyone who thinks that nothing is actually right or wrong are just bowing out of that discussion. Anyone who is participating in that discussion is asserting something as right or wrong and acting as though some people (like themselves) are correct in their assessment of which is which and others are incorrect.
The topic of this thread isn't determining which is which, but just what's a good way to address people relative to their place on a spectrum of (dis)agreement about which is which. "A good way" both in the sense of a kind and respectful way, and also in the sense of a productive and effective way.
Maybe. But while it may be reasonable to flag certain opinions as less credible because of poor justification (kind of ethical falsification), saying that other opinions rise to the standard of correctness is overreaching. Being well-justified is a long way from being correct. Correctness conveys an absolute authority which can only contribute to antagonism when mediating between conflicting viewpoints.
Judging from the reactions, it would seem that what you are proposing isn't very effective and productive. And honestly, I don't know why that should be all that surprising considering following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only be incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me. If I were to make a guess, it's this kind of attitude that drives people in the middle group to the other side.
Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments. And people seem to especially resist being told what to think or do if they feel like something is being forced onto them. What maybe helps is just listening without trying to convert them and trying to engage them on their terms. But yeah nobody ever does that.... ships passing in the night, all the time.
This is why I am pursuing the sociological approach which views detailed ideological positions as representative of more fundamental social trends, driven by actual volitional energies of the "whole man". If we can understand why groups of people come to believe what they do then we can begin to find ways to bridge the disparate positions. And indeed, we can see that these type of inter-evolutions and even reconciliations do occur, aiding us in our analysis.
I think that's a step in the right direction, but it might also be worth considering that it's not a real possibility to bridge certain disparate positions. Beliefs seem to be clustered in coherent wholes, i.e. you typically don't just change your mind on some fact or value in isolation, but because it fits better into a larger structure of beliefs that is already there. And those seem very hard to alter, as is I think well documented with the phenomenon of religious conversion or de-conversion.
Absolutely, which is why it may be necessary to excavate the historical origins of some positions to see where the fundamental divergences really are.
So. That empiricism is a philosophical position doesn't affect what things are empirical, it only affects the extent to which you believe that those things inform us of reality as a whole. Are you implying that social membership is not a property derived from the senses?
Quoting Pantagruel
How could you possibly? They're unaware of data from modern research and so are unable to apply their intellects to it. Not even Heidegger is clever enough to consider data gathered nearly fifty years after he died (though I would not put it past some of his acolytes to claim as much). No, what you're doing is using your own intellect to elbow modern data into theories people came up with without the benefit of. It's fitting the data to the theory. Something rightly frowned upon in the sciences.
As Khaled and others have said, the way this is cast looks like the difference between 1 & 5 is whether you agree with it. That's not very satisfactory.
I think it's better to consider it in terms of mode of discussion.
1. Does the speaker have respect for facts?
2. Is the speaker consistent in their view?
3. If their assumptions are biased (which isn't necessarily bad in itself), does the speaker identify those biases?
4. Is the speaker looking to start a dialogue?
I'd then suggest that the scale runs from answering Yes to all four, to answering No to all 4. Not sure of the order. Not sure it matters. Someone for whom it's No across the board is likely a bad faith propagandist looking to recruit naive fence-sitters. Doesn't much matter whether they're a raving fascist or a raving communist, they're beyond engagement.
It will just so happen that your 5s will be mostly No (I think).
I'm currently reading Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. When it was written, it was a cutting-edge contemporary philosophical critique of contemporary society.
In it, Marcuse excavates historical thought all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Your criticisms of my post are simply not credible from any perspective. So, you can focus on criticizing the actual content of my post, or, better yet, come up with something substantive yourself.
Chapter 5 - Negative Thinking, from One-Dimensional Man
The closed operational universe of advanced industrial civilisation with its terrifying harmony of freedom and oppression, productivity and destruction, growth and regression is pre-designed in this idea of Reason as a specific historical project. The technological and the pre-technological stages share certain basic concepts of man and nature which express the continuity of the Western tradition. Within this continuum, different modes of thought clash with each other; they belong to different ways of apprehending, organising, changing society and nature. The stabilising tendencies conflict with the subversive elements of Reason, the power of positive with that of negative thinking, until the achievements of advanced industrial civilisation lead to the triumph of the one-dimensional reality over all contradiction.
This conflict dates back to the origins of philosophic thought itself and finds striking expression in the contrast between Plato’s dialectical logic and the formal logic of the Aristotelian Organon. The subsequent sketch of the classical model of dialectical thought may prepare the ground for an analysis of the contrasting features of technological rationality.
In classical Greek philosophy, Reason is the cognitive faculty to distinguish what is true and what is false insofar as truth (and falsehood) is primarily a condition of Being, of Reality — and only on this ground a property of propositions. True discourse, logic, reveals and expresses that which really is as distinguished from that which appears to be (real), And by virtue of this equation between Truth and (real) Being, Truth is a value, for Being is better than Non-Being. The latter is not simply Nothing; it is a potentiality of and a threat to Being — destruction. The struggle for truth is a struggle against destruction, for the “salvation” (sozein) of Being (an effort which appears itself to be destructive if it assails an established reality as “untrue”: Socrates against the Athenian city-state). Inasmuch as the struggle for truth “saves” reality from destruction, truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth, Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.
This conception reflects the experience of a world antagonistic in itself — a world afflicted with want and negativity, constantly threatened with destruction, but also a world which is a cosmos, structured in accordance with final causes. To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself two-dimensional. Appearance and reality, untruth and truth, (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions.
I think you've misunderstood what @Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. So there are no other ways to categorise those who disagree with you ethically. They're either wrong, misinformed (where an ethical choice might be based on empirical data), or misguided (where an ethical choice might require some complex consideration). I'm not sure what other category you might imagine putting people in...
'Also right' doesn't work because that would take them outside the scope of the people being considered (those who disagree with you).
'Differently right'...? 'Using alternative facts'...? 'Not yet right'...?
What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong?
They could be right.
If you thought they were right they wouldn't be in the category of people with whom you disagree would they?
If you thought you were wrong, then why would you persist in that idea? If you thought you might be wrong (and they might be right) then their idea would be equally value and they wouldn't be in the category of people with whom you disagree. It's set out in the OP
Quoting Pfhorrest
A person whom you think might be right is not a person with whom you disagree and so is outside of the scope of situations this advice applies to.
Well there's always the possibility that you are or I am wrong, no? If two people disagree about something, isn't it strange to assume that one is always automatically right and the other must be wrong? Seems like a constructive conversation would have to start from the idea that you might also be wrong about some things. Otherwise aren't you effectively always taking on the role of teacher/moral authority? I don't think anyone really likes being on the receiving end of such a conversation.
But aside from that I also do believe that you can come to different conclusions on ethical questions. And I don't mean this in a totally relativistic sense, better and worse arguments can be made, something can be more or less coherent, you can be misinformed etc... but usually - if it's not about extreme clear-cut cases - ethics is not like mathematics or science where you can demonstrate with absolute certainty that this one answer is the right one. And with politics I think this becomes even more questionable because of the enormous complexity involved. There are ideas that seem better or worse, but I don't think anybody really "knows" with any kind of certainty, and I would have that epistemic uncertainty reflected in the terms I use and in the way I approach those conversations.
Yes, as others have commented, the OP as formulated has problems. Following Habermas (and discourse theory in general) if you are entering into a genuine dialog, then you must not only be prepared to offer reasons but also be persuaded by them. Which precludes ever making such assumptions as that one is "correct" and the other "incorrect". The OP, as presented, is the end of dialog, not the beginning.
From the introduction to "Facts and Norms"
Yet modernity, now aware of its contingencies, depends all the more on a procedural reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself on trial.
Yeah, but the advice is obviously regarding the categories as they are perceived at the time, not as they might be perceived at some time in the future. People who I think are wrong at this moment would fall into one of the three categories of wrong. The fact that I might, at some future date, come to think they're right doesn't have any bearing on the matter.
Wouldn't that fall into the category of
Quoting Pfhorrest
? Seems to be right there in the OP.
I'd say it is more a fundamental premise which contradicts the reasonableness of some of the other categories.
I think I'm just going to watch and see where this goes with some other comments for now.....
I did misread him, I thought he had a more objective distinction in mind. My reaction was maybe a bit to strong because of that.
Quoting Isaac
I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society.
If they’re well-intentioned just for bad reasons, that would put them in group 2. E.g. if you’re a socialist atheist and a socialist Christian agrees with you politically but for religious rather than rational reasons, they’re group 2 to you. OTOH a prosperity theologian would be group 5 to you: they really wholeheartedly and devoutly believe something that is completely contrary to any good reasons you can think of.
Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually. A socialist Christian and a socialist atheist would typically not be voting for the same party, and those parties may or may not be in the same ruling coalition.
The problem is that you don't see fence-sitting as a legitimate position, like the left or right. The only possible positions for you is left or right and any other position is "fence-sitting". What a limited way to see the world.
Quoting Pfhorrest
In other words, people that don't limit their thinking like you do and think like you do can't be part of the discussion, but you can decide what is right for me? Damn, bruh. You're nothing more than an authoritarian despot. You're getting worse everyday.
I do think something is wrong with society. I just don't see the right answers coming from the authoritarian left or the authoritarian right. I see the correct answers in letting each individual speak for themselves and not be dictated by group-think. My right answer would be to abolish the left and right so that everyone is a "fence-sitter" - capable of being reasoned with. Emotionally invested group-thinkers like yourself are incapable of being reasoned with.
Is it right or wrong to speak for others and to determine what is right or wrong for others? Who determines what is right or wrong for yourself, Pfhorrest?
Its not possible for us both to be objectively correct, but it is possible for both of to be objectively wrong. Pfhorrest seems incapable of acknowledging the latter, or at least acknowledge the possibility that there is no objective morality.
A group-thinker doesn't know what is wrong or right. Group-thinkers look to the group to tell them what is wrong or right. This is pleading to popularity and authority, which are logical fallacies, therefore cannot be the objectively right thing to do.
The question is not what might, later, turn out to be the case, but what I now consider the case to be. That I might later be wrong is trivially true of every position I hold, so it's useless as a distinguishing property.
The point (I think) @Pfhorrest is making here is strictly about how to treat people whose position you disagree with (now), nothing more.
It's got nothing whatsoever to do with the epistemic status of that position, nothing whatsoever to do with politics, extremism or any of these associated issues people seem to have wanted to latch on to. I disagree vehemently with @Pfhorrest's epistemological position, for example, but I broadly agree with his position here.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I don't really understand how this comment relates to either my post, or the OP. Regardless of that, it's obviously wrong. Some people believe quite strongly in principles like democracy, for example, where, in its most radical form, what the majority believe is the right course of action is exactly the right course of action. It can also be a very useful heuristic in situations where one is inexperienced (especially where the group in question is vastly more experienced). There are numerous scenarios where trusting the collective judgement of a group is a good logical choice.
At best, it's just a useful heuristic for navigating social life more easily.
Yes, absolutely. In European countries, things are not so either-or or black-and-white as in the US. Although there is a less or more visible trend toward such a simplification and polarization of political life in Europe as well.
Yes definitely. There's a trend of 'extremist' or 'populist' parties gaining more traction in Europe now for 20 or more years, depending on the country. The difference with the US is I guess that they are for the most part not subsumed in the traditional parties and so don't get all that much chances to effectively take part in power. But the trend is unmistakably there and probably caused by more or less the same socio-economic dynamics, i.e. globalization, neo-liberal policies and rise in inequality from the 1970 on wards.
How can political discussion on an internet forum be productive and effective?
Political discussion can be productive and effective in, for example, a parliament or a board meeting, where the people involved actually have tasks to accomplish, their political discussion is supposed to lead to some goal (such as passing a bill, voting an official into or out of office, etc.).
But on a forum like this, political discussion is bound to lack this practical element, which, arguably, renders a political discussion into a philosophical one, so different rules apply.
Indeed, this is why a philosopher cannot be a politician, nor a politician a philosopher.
A philosopher is supposed to "give all ideas a fair shake", whereas a politician is supposed to take sides and work toward a particular practical outcome.
Permanently? Are they never allowed to reach conclusions about said ideas?
Presumably a philosopher will stay open to new ideas indefinitely, so that any conclusion will, at most, be just temporary.
That is questionable. Assuming that people think a certain way because of how they look often gets you into trouble.
My point was that one of the ways of how you treat people whose position you disagree with (now) is by acknolwedging that there is the possibility that the reason they disagree with you is because you are wrong. That never seems to be even a contemplated possibility for Pfhorrest.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, for your own social well-being, not because of what they said is true.
My point was that there is no such thing as an objective morality. We all do what we think is right for ourselves, but whether that is right for others in every possible circumstance is highly questionable and illogical to assume.
What do you mean by that?
How can one do politics if one belives that?
:up:
I wasn't really referring to 'new' ideas. Very few ideas are new. The vast majority have been expressed before. So what about those? OK to categorise them, or do we have to remain open to them indefinitely?
I don't understand how this could possibly work as an assessment of a disagreement about an idea you currently think is right. How could it possibly be the case the reason they disagree with you (according to you) is because you're wrong? If you thought you were wrong, you wouldn't hold the idea in question. So we have to only include categories which assume you're right. The question I understood the OP to be addressing is "assuming I'm right, why might my interlocutor think the way they do?"
The important point is that the OP is about ethics, not knowledge in general. In most ethical cases one must act in accordance with some assumption (many more empirical cases of knowledge fall into this category too). Personally I don't see much merit in making an entirely academic distinction between 'acting as if x were right / the case' and 'believing x is right / the case', especially in ethics and politics, the two are for all intents and purposes, the same. Which means that, for all binomial dilemmas (and obviously all dilemmas can be framed binomially as x,~x), we can treat each person as believing either x or ~x.
That's the point. If you need a Big Brother, that's your problem, not mine.
You seem to be just as thick-headed as Pfhorrest. Assuming that you are right is one thing. Proving it to others is another. Once you try to prove it to others and they don't agree, at that point you may want to revisit your assumption. I'm not saying that you being wrong is the only possibility if someone disagrees, just that it is a possibility to be considered. If you don't consider that, then you would be no better than the person you are arguing with that you assume is wrong and just won't admit it, or even consider it.
To think that you can assume that you are right without having to prove it to others - without having exposed your ideas to open criticism - is the problem.
Quoting Isaac
Ethics is about knowing the difference between right and wrong. So ethics is based upon a sound epistemology. The problem of induction is akin to the problem of ethics. Is what is right for me in this particular circumstance good for another in a similar circumstance? How do you know that what is right for you in a particular circumstance is always right for not just you, but everyone else?
Presumably a philosopher is still a human and still in the process of learning, so to him, there are ideas that are new, even if someone else might have known those ideas for a long time.
My point is that if one doesn't believe in objective morality, then how can one hope to get along with others in the pursuit of some common goal (which is, presumably, what politics is about, ie. the pursuit of some common goal)?
I also don't believe there is objective morality, but I think it is of vital importance to assume and act as if there was objective morality. Otherwise, we're talking about a bunch of moral egoists/moral narcissists who will never be able to get anything done together.
Why on earth should that be a problem for someone who doesn't believe in objective morality?
You don't need to believe that any differences between yourself and others must inevitably be their moral failures in order to negotiate with them. Diplomacy is itself a policy. For the most part, people pursue their own interests rather than a common good.
Indeed it is. What has that got to do with an OP about how to interpret the disagreement of others?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yep. A good point. One which I'm not sure anyone here would disagree with. If other people disagree with you, one of the things you might want to do is check your workings. Again, how does that have any bearing on the question of how to interpret the disagreement of others on those matters where, one having carried out this check, one still disagrees? Or alternatively, if carrying out this check does not yield any improvement in certainty, then why advocate it?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Definitely a possibility. again, not really progressing on the notion of how to interpret others whilst one is performatively assuming it is not the case.
Quoting Harry Hindu
True again. Still not seeing the link in those situation where one is performatively presuming one is right already.
Quoting Harry Hindu
This is an odd thing to say. If I'm unsure which path to take, and I decide the left is more likely to lead home than the right, are you saying that, in the absence of a person to talk to about it, i don't consider my assessment of likelihood as 'right'? What status would you say I'd assigned it then?
Yep, probably. But not all ideas are in this category, surely?
Why would a lack of objectivity preclude commonality. There's no objective 'best film' but that doesn't prevent people from collectively promoting the one they all agree is such.
How does this refer to anything I said?
Dismissing politics right off the bat! Yay!
What do you mean?
My grandmother was a Catholic her whole life, and then renounced it in her 70's. Apparently, some idea had become so prominent to her relatively late in her life that warranted a dramatic change in her beliefs.
People can change, even dramatically, even late in life.
Some ideas must surely be ideas we've already heard, no? When we re-hear those ideas, must 'philosophers' give them due consideration on each occasion, or may they say "I've already heard this one, and disagree". If the former, then it somewhat gives the floor to whichever ideas are repeated most, which seem inefficient at best.
I suspect that commonality has to do with more than just some moral and epistemic egoists/narcissists discovering that they have something in common. No, I think they firmly believe that there is more to them considering some film to be the best one; that they don't think it's just a matter of their subjective preference, but that there is more to it: that the film truly, really, inherently, objectively _is_ the best one.
One indication for this is how they talk about it. They don't say, "This is my favorite film" or "This is the best film I've seen so far." No, they say, "This is the best film". And when pressed or faced with opposition, they say something like "You're entitled to your wrong opinion" or "You just don't don't know what a good film is".
No doubt such people exist, but that wasn't my question. My question was "why must lack of objectivity preclude commonality?", not "why may it do so in some circumstances?"
Must must must. What is it with this must??
Presumably a philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, will act wisely with his time and resources and won't rehash stuff. Nor get himself into exchanges that he reasonably predicts will bear little fruit.
Unless he has some good reason to do so. Like if he's uncharacteristically unexuberant, or he finds some old idea presented in a new context.
There is a difference between "an objective truth" and "being objective".
From a strictly theoretical standpoint, if "being objective" means adopting a certain type of perspective oriented towards agreement with others, then a lack of objectivity certainly has to, at the very least, limit the extent to which commonality can be realized.
You introduced necessity, I'm only asking you about it
Quoting baker
So you seem now to be saying that a philosopher is not, after all supposed to give all ideas a fair shake, but rather only those which would be neither a rehash, nor fruitless?
I agree.
By contradicting:
Quoting baker
Politics does not proceed on the basis of a common morality.
Quoting baker
It's becoming increasingly clear that you have an idiosyncratic idea of what politics is.
What can I do, there's still a smidgen of a romantic in me, thinking that politics ought to be about, you know, getting things done. Silly me!
There comes a point when it's important not to be an ass, Buridan's or otherwise.
"Fairness" is relative to one's situation, as it is, on the spot.
Maybe not, but that is definitely part of the standard under which democracy operates:
Decisions about laws typically involve a combination of validity claims: not only truth claims about the likely consequences of different legal options, but also claims about their moral rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different options in light of the polity's shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which option is feasible or more efficient.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/
Because to begin with, people, unless they are pathologically narcissistic, have an existential need to believe there is more to their preferences than just subjective whims and molecular chance.
This need becomes pronounced when interacting with others: people must believe that what they have in common are more than subjective whims and molecular chance, or else they'll have a sense that what they're doing together is wrong or at least not worthwhile.
I don't have a study to support this, but it seems to me that this sketches out best an explanation for why people are the way they are when they are together and how they can take their joint pursuits seriously.
Oh, I don't object to the sentiment :)
True. But since that's not what "being objective" typically means, I'm not sure I see the relevance.
You think that "being objective" is typically used in the sense of "possessing objective knowledge?" I'd have to strongly disagree. I'd submit that in its usual use and here "being objective" in the sense of "trying to minimize one's personal biases to achieve a more collectively consistent perspective" is a much better description of "objectivity" than "possessing objective knowledge".
So how are you judging it to be 'the best' explanation?
So if I found myself in a group of Rolling Stones fans, a more 'objective' view of whether Mick Jagger hit the right note would be obtained, not by analysing the recording, but by adjusting my belief thereby gained to be more consistent with that of his fan base, regardless of the spectrum analyser.
If you were at a concert, yes. Also, what if he was "objectively" out of tune, but so was the entire band, uniformly? Then he would be objectively in tune. This really illustrates the point.
Relative to my current state of knowledge and understanding.
This seems exceedingly odd. If you're at a concert, the most objective way of determining the pitch of a note is not to use a spectrum analyser, but to ask the crowd? This is an extremely heterodox use of the term.
Quoting Pantagruel
Maybe, but I wasn't talking about being in tune, I was talking about pitch (an absolute measure, not a relative one). I didn't just pick the example at random.
And you're not willing to give any other views a fair shake?
People who hold (what they think are) correct opinions for (what they think are) good reasons: the ideologues. Steer clear of them.
People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all (non-dogmatic, non-ideological) ideas a fair shake:the critical thinkers, the fair-minded, the realists, the anti-idealogues. Cleave to them, for they are the only hope for humanity.
People who just socially identify with the side of those (purportedly) correct opinions: people who have been duped or manipulated into thinking that bad causes are good causes.
People who honestly and devoutly have genuinely bad intentions: don't engage with them, ignore them, ostracize them, lock them up or kill them as the situation requires and/ or allows.
How do people who don't have strong opinions one way or the other take any action at all? These people sound positively dangerous to me, in a dynamic situation such as real life.
I’d go one step further and say that the “objective” in “objective knowledge” or “objective reality” or “objective morality” just means that same thing: unbiased, divorced from any particular point of view, consistent with all points of view — which is not the same thing as consistent with all opinions, else it would be impossible for anyone to ever be wrong about objective things.
:up:
I don't need to have "strong opinions" in order to have preferences that guide and motivate my actions. By "strong opinions" I have in mind political and religious ideologies; they are what most of the conflict are over. And they are a distraction, because we don't need strong opinions at all to realize that most of us are being fucked over by the elites.
If everyone refused to consume the unnecessary shit they fatten us up on, that action by itself would bring immense change. It's really up to the individual to take responsibility for their own lives, and I think common decency and compassion dictate that we should also take care of those who are unable to care of themselves. Nothing to do with "strong opinions'!
Nothing imposed from "above" is ever going to solve the problems we face, because the imposers are always prone to corruption. That said, of course the law should codify values which support social harmony; that is only pragmatic. Again, nothing to do with "strong opinions".
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
They sure sound like a list of strong opinions. Are you prepared to actually give the alternatives to all those positions a 'fair shake'?
Let's try them. I propose, for a five year period (one parlimentary term), we consume all the unnecessary shit they fatten us up on, take over responsibility for other people's lives, not take care of those who are unable to take care of themselves, impose all these solutions 'from above', ignore corruption, and not codify values which support social harmony. Are you prepared to give that a shot?
I seriously doubt it. So why do none of them qualify as "strong opinions"?
Because they are not based on ideology but on pragmatics, common sense and decency. If you can't see the difference, then I'll leave you to to it.
Yeah. And your political opponents wouldn't say exactly the same about their positions?
In other words, good reasons.
So, you're suggesting that it could be arguable that consuming all the unnecessary shit they fatten us up on, taking over responsibility for other people's lives, not taking care of those who are unable to take care of themselves, imposing all these solutions 'from above', ignoring corruption, and not codifying values which support social harmony are examples of measures based on pragmatics, common sense and decency?
Quoting Pfhorrest
Sure, but I was addressing the issue of rival ideologies that are "strong opinions" held for what their proponents think are "good reasons". I'm suggesting that there is never a good reason for holding to an ideology. Those pragmatic, common sense and decent values are not strong opinions or ideologies but necessary values if your aim is to achieve social harmony and fairness. If your aim is not that then you are one of those Quoting Janus
I think that you take “ideology” and “opinion” to mean something different and much more pejorative than I do. To “have an opinion that such and such” is just to “think that such and such”, as I mean it. For that opinion to be strong is just to not be on the fence about it: to be really sure that such-and-such. An ideology is just a comprehensive set of opinions, usually normative opinions: it’s your big picture thoughts about things, usually about how they ought to be.
So if you think (as I do) that there ought to be social harmony and fairness, and that a variety of things are necessary toward that end, and you are very sure about all that, then that corpus of thoughts you hold are a set of strong opinions, an ideology. People like us who agree about those things see each other as group 1.
I see plenty of people who agree with most of the things I think ought to be, but do so without having really thought through why, they just agree with what whoever they think are good people think. Those are our group 2.
Then there are people who aren’t exactly opposed to those things we think, but they’re not solidly opposed to those who think otherwise either, they haven’t made up their minds yet. Those are our group 3.
Then there’s the people who were once group 3 and could have been swayed to our group 2 but instead were swayed the other direction. Those are our group 4.
And then there’s those who just don’t share the same values or means of reasoning or anything like us as all, who come to conclusions that are the opposite of what we think are those pragmatic necessities toward good ends, either because they’ve somehow come to value completely different ends or because they for some reason can’t see the pragmatic necessity that we see. Those are our group 5.
Yeah, easily.
consuming all the unnecessary shit they fatten us up on - makes businesses profitable which leads to more jobs and more prosperity, and anyway, all that unnecessary shit is stuff we want, that's why we buy it so it would be against values of autonomy to discourage people from doing so.
taking over responsibility for other people's lives - is only our duty as good citizens, some people are too irresponsible to look after themselves and it would be both disruptive to social harmony and indecent of us to just let them ruin their lives out of a misplaced sense of individual freedom. The harmony of the community as a whole must come above individual freedom if the community is to thrive.
not taking care of those who are unable to take care of themselves - People who are unable to take care of themselves are a burden on others, it will be painful at first to not take care of them, but it will be best for the long-term health of the community if we don't continue to support their dependency. All they need is a bit of a 'kick out the door' and they'll stand on their own two feet, which will not only benefit the community, but give them more self-respect and dignity.
imposing all these solutions 'from above' - is necessary because only that way can the voices of the dis-empowered be truly heard. If we let community groups manage their own affairs it's too easy for the loudest voices in those groups to simply dominate and we can police that as well with hundreds of small groups as we can with one big government.
ignoring corruption - is necessary because corruption does not actually change policy to any great extent yet focussing on it takes government and policing effort away from matters which actually affect people to the detriment of society. There are serious crimes like murder and rape, there are important decisions to make like fighting terrorism and this focus on a trivial matter of a few thousand in bribes detracts from that important work.
and not codifying values which support social harmony - is important because societies are dynamic and policies toward social harmony need to be reflective of that fast moving situation. Codifying them in law would make yesterday's solutions legally binding for today's problems. We need as small a law as possible so that we can remain adaptive to changing circumstances.
'Other folks have "ideologies". I just have principles!'
Awww. You're trying to clearly delineate a philosopher's efforts that testify of his love of wisdom, you're looking for the principles by which love of wisdom proceeds, right?
So let's try with this one:
A philosopher is willing to give all ideas a fair shake, if and when he decides to do so.
This distinguishes him from the wannabe and the juvenile who has not set such boundaries and limitations.
Who decides what are "good reasons"?
There's a difference between having strong opinions and voicing strong opinions in a particular social setting.
It seems to me that people typically have strong opinions, but they often don't voice them.
Who isn't?
Quoting baker
Yes, I find that too.
To be clear: You're looking for the principles by which love of wisdom proceeds, right?
How is a philosopher different from a non-philosopher?
Quoting Isaac
Some people are by default opposed to consider any other views than their own (some religious people are like that, some politicians, some psychologists, for example). So that's one group of people who aren't willing to give all ideas a fair shake, ever. Some of these people can rightly be considered ideologues, some are just so authoritarian that they don't allow anything else to exist in their proximity, some are extremely narcissistic.
We are all human beings, and most humans share the same goals. It's just the means by which we attain them can vary. Most agree that being happy and healthy is good, but we disagree on what makes one happy and healthy or the means by which we obtain happiness and health.
We are also social animals and social animals depend on the social relationships with others of their kind to be happy and healthy. How we go about establishing relationships, and what kinds of relationships, can vary. There is no particular right way to be happy that applies to all. There is a wrong way to be happy and that is to take other's happiness away. That is the only means by which one can obtain happiness that should be denied. Why should it matter how another obtain's happiness if it doesn't affect how you obtain happiness? If you are only happy in telling others how to live their lives or that they should obtain happiness and health the way you do then you are the problem of society, not those that don't agree with that assumption.
Quoting baker
There is what is true in one instance, and then there is believing that makes it true in all instances.
This is a red herring. The right way home for you is not the right way home for others, nor will it be the right way home all the time as traffic, accidents, and other obstacles can change which way is the best way home from day to day.
In assuming that you are right, you are only assuming that it right for yourself. To assert that it is right for others, you need to ask them, not assume it.
That is what you and Pfhorrest fail to understand. It's no surprise that you don't understand it. Authoritarians inherently have trouble understanding this. It's what makes them authoritarians.
How is that different from them being "willing to give all ideas a fair shake, if and when [they] decides to do so"? 'Never' is just the 'if and when' that they decide upon.
I don't see how that changes the logic. You're right, of course, when dealing with subjective preferences, but since politics and ethics hardly ever deal with subjective preferences, I hardly see how it's relevant to the discussion.
Maybe I'm missing something. Can you give me an example of an ethical or political dilemma where the 'right' answers can be tailored to each individual?
Think Laws (and taxes) seems like a pretty good idea anyways. Gives people room for initiatives within given frames and still possibilities to give help for the ones really in need. You have a lot of stuff here, som that I approve of and some not, but the concept of a state with an effective framework of laws, taxes and government has proven to be a useful solution to the problems you mention.
The Globalized world makes this a little more tricky, of course.
Someone who is willing to give all ideas a fair shake, if and when he decides to do so, occasionally decides to do so. The people I listed above never do so, as a matter of principle; it's not an option for them.
I don't see how that follows. Either the philosopher is deciding at random which ideas to give a fair shake, or he is deciding based on some factor. If the latter, its not prima facie impossible that such a factor might, by chance, never arise.
Either way, is there some minimum number of ideas then one must give a fair shake in order to count as a philosopher? If I give one idea fair shake in my teens, am I then set for life to be a dogmatic idealities and still be called a philosopher?
Thats is where you are wrong. If that were the case, then why all the political disagreements, wars, ethical dilemmas, etc.? It's like asserting that there is only one god, but then all I have to do is point to all the other gods that are believed in. Which god is the right god?
Quoting Isaac
That would require me to know what it is like for every individual - what makes them happy and their preferences for obtaining happiness. I know that you haven't been really reading what I've said, but I'll say it again: That isn't knowable unless you ask them first. It's not something that you assume.
Can you give me an example of a moral conclusion that can be applied in all instances for everyone person in the same way that gravity works for every person?
You seem to be confusing different opinions about the right course of action with different possibilities over the right course of action. There can, for example, only be one import tax rate. There might be a hundred different opinions as to which is the best rate, but there can be only one rate, and so somehow a choice must be made about which is the right rate given all those diverse opinions. We cannot have one rate each.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I didn't ask for the answers people would give. I asked for an example of a dilemma for which it is possible to tailor the answer to each individual. For example, two men share a car, one thinks they should go left, the other right. It is simply not possible to tailor the answer to this dilemma to satisfy their individual preferences. There's only one car and it must go either left of right. I'm saying most ethical and political dilemmas are like this, I'm asking you to give me any examples of ones which aren't.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yes. That carrying a weapon in public is wrong. It only works if it's considered wrong for everyone. If it's the case that those who think it's wrong don't carry one but those that don't can carry one with impunity, then everyone will have to carry a weapon to defend themselves. Moral rules which de-escalate violence only work if they apply to everyone.
It's not that simple. There can be different import tax rates for different countries, and the right rate depends on the country. So there isn't only one import rate. There are numerous rates dependent upon the needs of the country and it's relationship with other particular countries.
Quoting Isaac
LOL! I know! Because you don't give a shit what other answers people would give. You already assume that you know what the right answer is for them. That's my point!
Quoting IsaacWhether you go left or right depends on where they want to go. What if they want to go to different places? Your examples are stupid.
Quoting Isaac
Carrying a weapon in public does nothing to infringe upon your right to be happy and healthy. Using a weapon on an unarmed person is wrong as it goes against what I said in infringing on other people's goals of being happy and healthy. So you are confusing the distinction between carrying a weapon in public and using one on innocent, unarmed people. Carrying a weapon can prevent you being a victim of an armed attack. Speak softly but carry a big stick.
Yes, I was talking about within one country, obviously.
Quoting Harry Hindu
So what? There's still only one car. How do they decide?
To make it clear why I'm picking examples like that (which I thought might have gone without having to explain), there's only one atmosphere, there's only one ocean, there's only one biosphere. And that's for the whole world. When it comes down to countries and communities, there's only one hospital, there's only one school, there's only one park, there's only one road network...
The example is like every political dilemma I can think of. Which is why I asked you for any alternatives. You seemed to think we can have one right answer each.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No. If people generally carry weapons, then others will feel the need to do so themselves, violent assaults are then more likely to involve weapons and therefore be more harmful to all involved. Do you think the difference in homicide rates between the US and the UK is entirely unrelated to the fact that we've banned guns?
Then, again, you've forgotten that you were the one trying to make the case for what is right for all, not just one (objective vs. subjective morality).
Quoting Isaac
That's your problem, not mine. Remember that you were the one asserting the existence of objective morality, not me.
Quoting Isaac
My point is that even if the two occupants of the vehicle can come to an agreement about where to go, that doesn't mean that that is the right conclusion for everyone in every situation where the occupants of a vehicle can't agree on where to go.
There are many variables that can affect what type of compromise can be reached. Whose car is it and who is driving? You can always go to both places, but not at the same time. So if one isn't in a hurry then the other gets to go where they want to go first. These are but a small fraction of variables that can be in effect, and they are not all the same in each and every instance where occupants of a vehicle cannot decide where to go.
Like I said, it's the problem of induction. How do you know that what is true in this instance is true in every instance? Well, the problem is that every other instance is unique. States-of-affairs can be similar, but never exactly the same. The amount of similarity and difference between states-of-affairs is dependent upon the level of detail (measurement) we are talking about, or that is useful in some particular instance.
Quoting Isaac
Again, you are conflating carrying a weapon with using it against innocent unarmed people. Does carrying a hammer make you want to bash people's heads in? Does driving a car make you want to run people over? Not everyone that owns a hammer, car, or gun harms innocent people with those things. In fact, most people that own those things don't harm innocent people with those things. Taking away the rights of everyone based on the actions of a few is what I consider wrong as it infringes upon the rights of innocent people. This is no different than racial profiling, which I think you would agree is wrong. So, why would you want to be inconsistent in your application of the rules, if not because of some political bias?
There's more than one person in a country. You know that, right?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Where? Quote me doing that....literally anywhere on this site.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Indeed. Nor did I ever, anywhere, say that it was.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Where did I say it did?
Quoting Harry Hindu
But I thought you said...
Quoting Harry Hindu
So this is what? An exception to the rule? Something you somehow know to be right in ways others can't access?
Anyway, since you seem more happy arguing with a simulacrum than taking any notice of what I've actually written, I'll leave you to it. Do drop me a line every once in a while though, just to let me know all the things I'm saying, it's nice to be kept in the loop.
I came late to this, but think you are right on here as to what a constructive debate entails, and the way to approach ethics. In purely ethical matters this respectful stance of interlocutors should be taken. However, I can see @Pfhorrest frustration maintaining respect for people who may not agree on basic historical facts or always doubt to the point of absurdity. They can always say that you are being duped by media and the deep state and nothing convinces. But you are absolutely right in terms of how to not be a condescending prick debates where it is purely logic applied to moral axioms and applications.
Of course, but then the criterion "Giving all ideas a fair consideration, at one's discretion" becomes moot, and there is, for all practical intents and purposes, no difference anymore between a philosopher and an ideologue.
*hrmph*
"No true philosopher would refuse to give all ideas a fair shake."
Terms that denote racial, national, cultural, religious, or political identity are hard to pin down, they have multilayered meanings. The No True Scotsman fallacy doesn't apply to them (just like it doesn't apply to the story from which it originates, which was a case of an equivocation -- 'person living in Scotland' vs. 'a good person').
It would be more profitable to try to delineate what makes for love of wisdom, as opposed to what a lover of wisdom would/should be like.
One doesn't actually need respect for people in such discussions. It's not like one intends to take them out for dinner afterwards or start a company together.
I find visciousness and vitriol a reason to stop all debate and is exactly the reason why discussions break down and become emotional fiat. I dont go into a discussion to stoke emnity like some troll. There should be some element of respect to keep the conversation from devolving into a brawl. I dont buy the idea that all arguments must get personal and that using condescension and ad personum attacks count as anything resembling phosophical discourse. If you resort to that, then its poisoning the well right off the bat. Who wants that except a bunch of asshole types that get pleasure at complete conflict mode.
Not respecting a person doesn't automatically translate into being vicious toward them or that the conversation will devolve into a brawl. Why should it?
It's perfectly possible to be polite to someone whom one doesn't respect.
If you want to make a distinction between having respect and acting respectfully, I am totally fine with that. The outcome for debating purposes is the same. No reason to shit in the arena where you are debating. Just make your argument and counterargument, no reason for the other rhetorical antagonisms other than as a rhetorical tactic or because people can't control themselves when dealing with people they disagree with. To actually want to be an troll seems pretty screwed up to me, if you want to have a fair and clean debate of actual content.
None of the spurious arguments you presented are based on pragmatics, common decency or common sense, if your aim is social harmony. It's not worth the effort of addressing them in detail, because they are so obviously bullshit arguments, based on speculation about what might happen rather than on humanistic principles in the here and now. Such arguments are flawed simply because no one knows the future, and any arguments based on what purportedly will happen are therefore driven by ideology not by principle.
We certainly may agree on some points in this, but this is where we disagree. To my way of thinking an ideology is an overarching formulation of how everything should be. At the extremities people will kill and terrorize to advance their ideologies. Ideologies include both political and religious dogmas. You can't argue successfully with people like that; they are beyond reason.
What I am advocating is a strong set of humanistic principles which are held for their own sakes because they are based on the ideas of freedom and equality, and they are promoted not for any consequentialist reasons other than that they are necessary for social harmony.
Any strong consequentialist motivations are based on mere speculation because no one knows the future, or is able to understand the human situation adequately due to its complexity.
So for all practical purposes you couldn't actually tell the difference, in any given discussion because it's extremely unlikely you're going to know you interlocutor's past sufficiently to know if they have ever given any ideas a fair shake - ie you'll never know if they're dismissing your idea out of hand because they decided to do so on that occasion (philosopher) or because they always do so (idealogue).
Quoting baker
OK - have at it then.
You mean like...
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
...rather than, for example...
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
...other than the consequentialist reason that they...
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
So how then do you determine which ideas are necessary for social harmony if you cannot make a claim that X will promote or disrupt social harmony because of complexity of the human situation?
So if someone were to come on and politely, patiently explain why Jews were the inferior race and need to be exterminated for the benefit of the master race, and I told them to "fuck off", I'd be the one in the wrong there? We should, rather, have a long in-depth and polite conversation exploring our difference of opinion about the extermination of an entire race.
Should I interfere at the building of the gas chambers? Or is it too soon whilst the debate is still to be settled?
We're only disagreeing about terminology, and since this is about the terminology I used in my OP, you are not free to disagree about what I meant by that terminology. You can disagree about whether that is the best terminology for the things that I meant, but not that I meant what I meant by it. You can use that terminology to mean different things than I did, but if you do then you're talking about something different than I was. In which case anything you say is non-sequitur as a response to anything I said, and you haven't commented on the actual topic at all, but rather on what you thought the topic was due to a miscommunication, that I have since cleared up (unless you still actually don't understand the different way I'm using those words, rather than just disagreeing with the appropriateness of the use of them in that way).
I don't understand why you would want to lose the valid distinction between ideologies and the common sense ethical principles to be applied in everyday life. I say ideally any large scale contraventions of those common sense principles should be resisted by everyone with any sense. Are there other terms whose meanings you think we are disagreeing about?
Because what you call "common sense" someone else may call "crazy nonsense", and vice versa. It sounds like you and I broadly agree on what is common sense, and of course I think that we're actually right about that and that people who wildly disagree with it are seriously wrong and, as you say, should be resisted. I'm not saying that every point of view is equally (in)correct; I'm not espousing relativism. I'm just saying that every point of view is a point of view.
The distinction you're making between "common sense" and "ideologies" sounds like a distinction between "facts" and "beliefs". Beliefs are things that you think are facts. There are some actual facts that are not dependent on them being believed, but the people who think that those actual facts are the facts thereby believe those facts. Other people believe differently. Saying it's a belief doesn't say whether it's a correct or incorrect belief, even though some beliefs may be correct and others incorrect. Beliefs aren't non-facts by definition. Facts are the things it is correct to believe, but those beliefs in the facts are still beliefs.
What word would you prefer to use instead of "ideology" to mean one's "big picture thoughts about how things ought to be", regardless of whether those thoughts are the correct ones ("common sense" as you'd call it) or not? I.e. what's the umbrella term encompassing "common sense" and "ideologies" in your taxonomy? What are those both types of?
I'm aware of that. What I'm struggling to see is how you can pretend there's not still massive disagreements about which policies best meet these criteria in the real world.
The idea of...
Quoting Janus
...is one with which I doubt anyone would disagree, ideologues included, but surely you can see it intrinsically sets up a balance (how much must my actions impinge on the freedom of others in order to outweigh my autonomy?). It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought.
'Freedom' is not something which can be easily measured, it is something which different people measure differently, as is privilege. There are an insignificantly small group who would actually disagree with such nebulous notions as freedom, autonomy and equality. The disputes are over what those terms actually mean.
Here's the thing: What do you want to accomplish with debate or discussion?
Of course. Like I said earlier -- It's not like one intends to take one's interlocutor's from this forum out for dinner afterwards or start a company together.
Again, it comes down to what one wishes to accomplish with debate or discussion.
Frankly, I think much of what we do here is a kind of philotainment. For socializing and for fun, some people go out drinking and talking nonsense, some play golf, some remodel their house, and some engage in philosophy-ish discussions on the internetz ...
Perhaps I'l start a thread on this some day.
This is one of those situations where the impotence of internet discussion forums becomes painfully evident.
Would you actually go out to the building site and interfere?
To learn, and to teach.
Those on the farther parts of the spectrum are those who show little sign of having anything to learn from and little hope of being teachable. Those on the closer parts are those with whom one can most effectively have a mutually educational conversation.
But are others here for those same purposes?
Do you believe there are people here who come here to be taught by you?
I was talking about the point at which engagement stops, rather than the nature of the action to take. It goes back to what I said right at the beginning, most of these ideas are not new, and those that are become old very quickly. Most of what people consider 'not engaging with the ideas' is more properly "I've hard these ideas before, they were daft then and they're not any less daft in their new clothes".
Quoting Pfhorrest
Good principles.
Unfortunately those from whom you could learn are those to whom you think you should teach, and those whom you could teach think the same about you.
I suppose it comes down to how much education a person has and how much reading and thinking they've done so far, so considerable differences among individuals are to be expected because of that.
But a person's life experiences can also radically change their outlook on life and change the way they view ideas they had dismissed long ago.
For example, I have a situation with several new neighbors for about a year now that has made me completely rethink moral realism.
To say nothing of how the election of Trump made me rethink things.
Like I've been saying all along, but your not payng attention, you can only claim what us right or wrong for yourself. Are you saying it is right for you to infringe on other peoples rights? :roll:
Quoting Isaac
Then we have been agreeing all this time that Pfhorrest's assumption that what they consider right is right for all, is actually wrong? It was you asserting that Pfhorrest is right in their assumption that they know what is right for others. It was me telling you that assuming that you know what is right for others is the wrong way to go about engaging others about what they consider right or wrong.
You seem to be incapable of maintaining a consistent thought in your head.
Just because morality is subjective doesn't mean that we can't come to an understanding of what is right or wrong for an individual and why. Going into the discussion already assuming that you know what is right for them isn't going to get you anywhere in understanding that.
True, although I think a topic like philosophy is perhaps a little unusual in this regard. Unless the subject being discussed is what some philosopher said (or was likely to have meant - exegesis), then there is no body of knowledge that's relevant to the question. Particularly true in ethics.
So, often an idea might be expressed even more doggedly by someone invested in that framing than it might be by a layman, but the idea itself does not gain anything by repetition, whether by expert or layman.
Yeah, pig-headedly refusing to address an issue doesn't make the issue go away. We're talking about moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas are almost exclusively social which means that any answer cannot be individually tailored. There can only be a single right answer and it must apply to everyone sharing the common interest that isvthe subject of the dilemma.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No.
That everyone has a different idea about what is the 'right' solution to any given moral dilemma, and that we cannot adjudicate between those opinions is moral relativism. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of to whom one's 'right' solution applies.
I think most of the conversations at forums like this are about people, ie. the people directly involved and the way some particular idea is relevant or irrelevant to them.
These conversations aren't about adding to the body of work of philosophy as such. Or, at most, adding only in small ways or indirectly. These posts aren't like contributing articles to a philosophy journal.
You may read a different range of posts to me. The overwhelming majority of threads I read are of the form...
"it seems to me that X is the case".
"X cannot be the case because it seems to me that Y is the case and that Y contradicts X",
"but Y cannot be the case, because, as you have just admitted, it contradicts X and yet it seems to me that X is the case"...
...and so on.
The point was that something's seeming to you to be the case is not contradictory to that thing's seeming to someone else not to be. And yet the bulk of disagreement seems to be on that very issue.
In fact, this is quite rightfully called a "forum", reminiscing of its ancient function:
In addition to its standard function as a marketplace, a forum was a gathering place of great social significance, and often the scene of diverse activities, including political discussions and debates, rendezvous, meetings, et cetera. In that case it supplemented the function of a conciliabulum.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forum_(Roman)
Sure, as is to be expected in an informal place like this.
So? I don't understand where you're getting with this.
I was countering your view that "most of the conversations at forums like this are about people, ie. the people directly involved and the way some particular idea is relevant or irrelevant to them." Were that the case disagreement over the status of X would be irrelevant since one would have no reason to think its relevance to oneself might need to be corroborated by relevance to another.
People do not simply passionately declare that X us relevant to them. They passionately declare that X seems to them to be the case in such a way as to imply that such a property renders X necessary, in some way.
This is the conceit we adopt when we imagine the 'polite debate', respecting the views of either side.
Either it doesn't matter at all what your interlocutors think (in which case, by extension, it doesn't matter to them what you think) - rendering the exercise trivial at best. Or, it does matter what they think (it affects society in some way) - in which case their thinking it has a moral dimension with all the potential judgement and ostracism associated with that.
Not at all. See below.
Sometimes, this is the case and people are in fact acting in such conceit.
But other times, what you're seeing is simply amateur philosophizing. It's quite messy. It's when people don't know yet how to properly formulate a syllogism, when they don't know much about informal fallacies, and so on. So they express their thoughts and their concerns in a pre-philosophical way. Hence all the "it seems to me" mixed with all those expressions of certainty.
A person could rightfully be accused of the conceit you mention if they also demonstrate that they are able to think and write philosophically, but that in some instances, they characteristically refuse to.
I can't make out what you're trying to say here. My point was that philosophical agreements are either trivial or they have moral connotations (with all that's incumbent). I can't quite see how the issue of skill at analysing arguments plays in.
Sure. So where seems to be the problem?
Obviously lost in the labyrinthine discussion we seem to be having.
@Pfhorrest posts an OP which identifies groups of dissenters (from one's own view of what's right), people generally chime in criticising the idea that any group might be treated as 'wrong', or having 'bad' ideas. I'm arguing that opposing ideas are either trivial (disagreement doesn't matter), or non-trivial, in which case there's a moral dimension to holding any given view. When people act outside of our moral code we usually express some opposition. It seems odd to me that there would be such an resistance to doing so with the holding of ideas which have a moral consequence.
Another way of putting it might be that ideas are either meaningless or they affect the world. If the former, then what's the point in resolving disagreement? If the latter then it's no less morally relevant to hold an idea that it is to act.
We dismiss, ostracise, even fight with people whose behaviour is in opposition to our moral codes. Why do ideas get treated differently?
Way to use the fallacy of Appeal to Extremes to try to contradict a simple plea for more agreeable conversations on debate platforms...
It's more like this example:
He believes that the mind is computational. She believes that mind is connectionist. He comes in the debate dripping with hatred for her position, calling her argument the "worst thing I've ever seen".. intersperse with ACTUAL content.. more ad personum attacks.. the End.
And you can interchange that with ethical debates, political, debates. It doesn't matter. To use the extreme violence and bigotry to make your point, just shows how much you are trying to avoid the actual topic at hand which is that people do debate in a style of total enmity. It has nothing to do with "Only when the topic is about extreme violence and bigotry". A strawman. If anything, the way the media pits people against each other, Trumpism, etc. should warn us against this sort of enmity debate style. Not EVERYTHING is an offense of the utmost worst degree. To keep treating people you disagree with like this is to perpetuate being a troll.
The constitutional clause of freedom speech drives a wedge between words and actions, as if the two would be in different categories.
People who want to uphold the constitutional clause of freedom speech have to, if they want to be internally consistent, maintain that words and actions are two different categories.
Some free speech absolutists, for example, believe that words (ideas) can be neither moral or immoral or have anything to do with morality. It's the old sticks and stones.
Probably because the general consensus is that thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad as actually killing someone, for example.
Somehow, for some people, this "not so bad" faded into oblivion, or the above clause got truncated to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad", and further to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not bad".
Hold on. I've yet to see this! People who discuss models of the mind and use terms like "computational" and "connectionist" actually use phrases like "worst thing I've ever seen" and who knows what name calling??
I thought that at that level, even the ad homs would be more classy ...
Notice I said this...
Quoting schopenhauer1
Indicating I'm just trying to give a type of an example. Do you want me to start pulling what people do on this forum as exemplars? Isaac's contention is that we ONLY do this sort of "dripping with condescension and enmity" schtick when the debate is something as extreme as call to violence and bigotry. I'm trying to convey that debates get this dirty in cases that are nowhere near something like that.
So a
Quoting schopenhauer1
then?
No this stuff happens on any debate in these forums. A lot of the time it's the "style" of the poster. They like poisoning the well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisoning_the_well
Such fights are legal matters and can only be settled in the context of the current law. That has nothing to do with what I am addressing. If the laws are not fair then they should be changed. If they are not served properly it is because of corruption. It's an imperfect world to be sure.
Quoting Pfhorrest
No it's a distinction based upon the difference between ethical principles founded on common sense and decency that should be practiced and insisted upon by all thinking people at the local level, and ideologies based upon totalizing visions of the human situation and speculative systems proposing what should be done about it on the largest of scales.
The point is that when it comes to the everyday ethical principles I'm saying should be practiced and insisted upon by all thinking people, there is nothing to argue about. You don't see arguments about whether rape, theft, exploitation, murder, and so on are acceptable or unacceptable.
The arguments are over whether such ethical infractions have actually been committed in particular cases or whether certain social practices involve them. These are matters for debate and for the law, but they are debates concerning particulars, not debates about general principles. The general principles are always already agreed upon. It's about what's actually being done to cheat the principles that basically everyone agrees upon, or at least pays lip service to; that's what most needs to be addressed.
At least one of those for most people, I would expect. They either think they have something to teach other people, or they have something they hope to learn from others. Possibly and ideally both.
Quoting baker
Not me in particular, but there are plenty of OPs asking questions, and those people obviously hope to learn the answers to them from someone or another, and I’d like to help in that way whenever I can.
The topic of this thread is not specifically about this forum though, BTW. I was thinking more of political conversations with non-philosophers out there in the wild.
Quoting Janus
Consider a group of people who believe that all Jews are conspiring together to commit white genocide and that it would therefore not be murder but righteous self-defense to gas them all to death. They superficially agree with the rest of us about all the important common sense principles — they’re trying to stop many wrongful killings, murders, of innocent people, by committing some killings themselves sure, but righteous killings against would-be murderers. They just disagree with us about the little details about the facts of this particular situation: whether there really is such a Jewish plot, etc.
Does that make such Nazi ideology “not an ideology”? Because if so, it looks like there are no ideologies, because everyone thinks their moral outlook is grounded in generally agreeable moral principles (“common sense”) that others just don’t see the implications of on the facts of the current world, or else disagree about those facts.
And what solid evidence do they have for their belief in your thought experiment. None, I'll warrant, and for me that's the very essence of ideology; strong, even fanatical, beliefs without any actual evidence to support them.
I don’t think there is any good evidence to support such beliefs, which is why I don’t believe those things, but no doubt they would point you at things they think are good evidence.
Do you deny all possibility that despite your best efforts, at least some of your evidence could be bad?
Things being in two different categories is insufficient to justify any two responses to them. You must show how each category justifies each response.
Quoting baker
Indeed, some do (curiously they do so with very impassioned speeches, despite apparently believing that speech has no effect whatsoever). But if that were the case, then all disagreement would be trivial. There'd be no reason at all to resolve it.
Quoting baker
Obviously. And telling someone to "Fuck off" is not as bad as imprisoning them for life, so that difference seems already covered in our responses, no?
Quoting baker
It wasn't an historical question. I was asking why you believe they should be treated differently, not why other people might have come to.
Really? You're saying I could pick any debate and you'd be able to find me an example of responses quote="schopenhauer1;495195"]dripping with hatred[/quote]?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Quote me saying that then, don't assign contentions to me based on what you reckon they are. I choose my words carefully.
To quote one of our esteemed mods on the subject I read only yesterday.
Quoting Baden
The reason I choose an extreme example is exactly the reason you do exactly the same thing in the antinatalism threads - to show that the principle is scalar not binomial. To demonstrate that, at some point, we would all agree that insult was warranted, so we can focus the debate on the location of that point, not the existence of it. Your example shows only the other extreme - that at some point insult is not warranted, the disagreement is indeed trivial and insult is gratuitous.
So that out of the way, the question is - where is that point? At what level of real-world consequence is it justified to show your disrespect for someone's position in order to let them know that your group do not accept such attitudes?
???
I said...
Quoting Isaac
...and you're saying there's no moral element to that at all, it's just a matter of whatever the law of the country happens to be?
Yes, there's no moral element involved in determining whether some moral principle is being transgressed by some practice.If we are asking the question we've already acknowledged the importance of the moral principle about which we are inquiring whether it has been infringed upon.
The enquiry is an empirical one. If an infringement is discovered then that is something to be addressed by the law. Or if the law won't address it then it is up to those who care enough about the transgression in question to protest.
Quoting Pfhorrest
If they learn to think critically they will. I do my very best never to believe anything for which I don't have what is arguably sufficient evidence.
That said I don't put personal faith into the category of believing without sufficient evidence. I think (intersubjectiely) sufficient evidence is only required for beliefs that I think others should share, and I don't think anyone is justified in thinking that when it comes to religious faith.
The moral principle itself is in question, not the practice. The moral principle of personal autonomy is in conflict with the moral principle of care for the autonomy of others. If there's no moral element to the balance, then the moral is never transgressed because absolutely any practice whatsoever can claim to be considering both elements, just to differing degrees. One could say that gun-laws in Britain were moral because the personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighed by the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. Likewise one could argue the laws of the US were the more moral because one's personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighs the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. You seem to be saying that so long as the two have been considered, the result is moral. Well that solves no moral dilemmas at all.
Do you think they realize they’re not thinking critically?
No, not if they are not thinking critically.
Quoting Isaac
Not at all. The moral principle of personal autonomy is contingent upon not encroaching upon the personal autonomy of others.
To what extent? How much is it reasonable to expect others to tolerate by way of restriction to their freedoms such that I might experience freedoms myself?
I think most people of reasonable disposition have a good sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms.
Some cases may be nuanced to be sure, but someone will soon tell you if they feel encroached upon. Why would you feel you need to disrespect others' personal spaces?
I see, so we're back to the delusion that what seems to you to be the case is actually the case. You personally have a sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms, other people have a different sense.
Really...most people grasp theory of mind by the age of three and you're still having trouble with it.
You need to get out of your armchair more and engage with actual people.If you do that you will realize that most people have a reasonable moral sense.
Anyway how is your claim that most people grasp "theory of mind" by age of three any different than my claim that most people have a reasonable moral sense?
Your claim is based on your own experience, isn't it?
You do realise I literally study people for a living?
So what? Everybody who engages with people and has a critical mind studies people constantly. Doing it for a living only makes it more likely you will be predisposed to bias in my experience.
So people who are not thinking critically may nevertheless think that they are thinking critically.
So merely thinking that you're thinking critically doesn't guarantee that you are in fact thinking critically.
If we asked both you and the aforementioned imaginary neonazis whether each of you hold beliefs grounded in good evidence, and whether each of you are thinking critically about those beliefs and that evidence, both of you would say yes about yourselves, and no about the other. If words meant what you say they meant, both of you would consequently say that your own beliefs were common sense, and the other's were an ideology.
...
I don't know why I'm letting myself get bogged down with arguing this angle with you. It doesn't matter whether "ideology" really means what you say it means or what I meant by it. All that matters is that you understand what I meant when I used it earlier. I think you do, and this conversation about my choice of words is entirely beside the point. Substitute whatever word you want in place of "ideology" in my OP, whatever the superset of "ideology" and "common sense beliefs" is, whatever your general word for "worldview" or "set of beliefs" or whatever you want to call it is. You must understand by now what it was I meant, and quibbling over the phrasing is just a derailment.
So you're suggesting that studying something disposes one to biases but a lay approach, what, magically removes bias? So should we no longer listen to the climate scientists, but rather engage with the 'unbiased' assessments of those who just experience the weather themselves as laymen?
And that is what pfhorrest is arguing and what you are defending - that Pfhorrest assumes what is right before engaging with anyone. Every time you post a reply you contradict yourself, just like Pfhorrest. Its impossible to have a meaningful conversation with you.
What I've been saying is what you assume to be right or wrong can only be the case for yourself and that you have to talk to others to discover what is right or wrong for them.
Moral dilemmas are the result of conflicting goals. They are a dilemma because every individual is considered equal and should have the equal right of achieving their goals. So moral dilemmas are the result of the idea of equality.
Ironic how the idea of an objective morality stems from the idea that not everyone is created equal - that there are some that have the power to determine what is right or wrong for others, that there are some that can realize their goals sooner than others.
Where does he say anything like that?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Right.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yep.
...so what do you call the solution arrived at via working through this conflict, after we've talked to everyone, asked them all what's right for them, devised some compromise which best meets everybody's views...? That solution is the _____ solution. Fill in the blank for me because I'm having trouble filling it with any word that isn't just a synonym for 'right'.
And what would you say to someone determined to have their solution implemented despite it not being the (right) one we'd just painstakingly worked out.
I'm happy to use whatever terminology you want to pick.
Edit: I deleted previous remark because I read your last paragraph which at least has some content before the posturing...
Quoting Isaac
Hate speech and bigotry is probably a good place to start questioning the user. Is this incorrigible hate speech.. simply meant to inflame, or is there some broad point? If it is a broad point of philosophy, can this be easily defeated being that it is misguided?
Anyways, an example would be surely vegans feel strongly of their anti-animal product policy. A vigorous debate may ensue on the matter. Just because vegans feel non-vegans are wrong in their actions/views, and that non- vegans continue with their views/actions does NOT mean non-vegans are absolute enemies that deserve contempt, disrespect, etc. At the same token, non-vegans shouldn't be so "hurt" from vegans thinking their activity is wrong to look at them with contempt and disdain either. Any moral claim is a claim. Any moral claim argued in good faith on a philosophy forum is meant to be an exchange and healthy debate in the realm of ideas. Both parties should know this. NOW, if this was a vegan forum meant for a community of vegans, and I kept posting stuff about how veganism is wrong-headed and misguided, then I think that WOULD be appropriate to bristle with ire at someone trying to troll the community. So it depends on context, the way the person approaches the subject, the interlocutor. It is not just one factor.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So these are two examples of where you think the line should be drawn, but you don't provide any justification or reason for your choice. Why would (in the view of the person concerned) talking hatefully be deserving of disrespect, but complicity in the torture of sentient beings not so deserving? What is it about these two behaviours which makes the condoning of one worthy of contempt but the condoning of the other merely a good natured disagreement?
Quoting schopenhauer1
What do you mean by 'good faith' here? It seems as though you're creating a meta-morality around debate. If people can respectfully disagree about something like the suffering of animals or whether abortion is murder, why can we not equally respectfully disagree about methods of discussion?
That's the problem when it comes to issues that are not clearly determinable by direct observation, that are not everyday empirical observations or hard science backed up by hard data; interpretation is always involved.
All I am really saying is that there is a vast difference between people who are committed to an ideology, a system of ideas which purports to be generally salvational either in this life or the next, and the everyday moral principles which pretty much everybody agrees about. I think there are never good reasons for the former, and every good reason to hold to the common moral principles; the latter are not arguable, and in fact people do not generally argue about them, unless they are idiot philosophers.
I disagree strongly with this, but I think perhaps the source of our disagreement is about what constitutes a moral principle. I think that when I talk about some moral dilemma, about which non-philosophers definitely do argue - abortion, charity, ethical trade, veganism, social responsibility, children's rights, animal testing, wars (just/unjust), wealth taxes, public health...etc you see those not as differences in moral principles, but differences in how to apply the same principles (something more like fostering some balance between autonomy and social harmony which we all have a general idea of).
I can understand that (though to me it's too far to put it down to one principle - the neurological evidence is strongly against you on that one, there's at least a dozen different types of calculation which need to be accounted for), but notwithstanding...
It's the second part I struggle to get behind. The bit where ideologues are any different. to my mind, they're doing the exact same thing - apply these general principles of morality to the knowledge the (think they) have. Whether that knowledge is of an afterlife, of some God-given rules, of some deep political conspiracy no-one else is aware of... It's this special knowledge which means that the application of these same general principles lead to bizarre behaviours and reprimands.
More importantly than either, though. Is that @Pfhorrest's second and fourth groups represent almost everybody on the planet. People simply do not give much thought to the moral aspects of their behaviour by relating them to deep foundational social (or biological) principles. The overwhelming majority of people behave as they do because other people in their social group are behaving that way. They say what they do because other people in their social group say those things. So the commonality you're seeing is not the result of some deep human trait, it's the result of reversion to the mean. Large societies mix a lot and that mixing creates such a wealth of potential influences that the result tends to be fairly watered down in most cases. You only need to look at some of the bizarre cultural practices and taboos in tribes to see the effects of smaller group sizes. Of course there are biological restrictions - taboos and practices which are actually detrimental to the group cannot thrive and so will die out, plus our biological mechanisms can only come up with a limited range of types.
I'll give you what I hope might be an example. I'm quite a strong advocate of children's rights. Something which you'd say (on the face of it) came under the 'common moral principles' right? But I have a fundamental disagreement with what seems to me a purely ideological belief. I've never reprimanded my children, nor have I ever told them what to do, they did entirely as they pleased (still do, but that's because they're adults now). That, to me, is children's rights. According to the Human Rights Act, however, children can be forced, by their parents or government, to attend school, to dress a certain way, even imprisoned and physically abused.. etc. That children can be treated this way – ways which would often constitute criminal offences if done to adults, seems to me to be an ideological difference, not a ‘common sense morality’ one. Children are given full autonomy in hunter-gatherer societies, then at some point in time it became culturally acceptable to treat them as the ‘property’ of adults, much like women were in marriage. Now, treating them that way is the cultural norm and it is rarely questioned. Whole mythologies build up around it. The point is, I don’t see any more of a ‘common principle’ here that I share with most normal people, than there would be with an ideologue of any other persuasion. I could couch it in terms of people trying to do their best for their children, but that would include religious fundamentalists too (who, arguably are still just trying to do the same, within the world-view they have)
My point is basically that I think the split you’re seeing is not revealing a difference in moral epistemology. It’s just cultural. Things which our culture thinks of as extreme seem ideological, things our culture thinks of as normal seem ‘common sense’.
It was you who interpretted his words in that way:
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
And Pfhorrest agreed with your interpretation:
Quoting Pfhorrest
The fact that I have to do you homework for you and remember what you said for you, just shows how lazy of a thinker you are.
Quoting Isaac
So NOW you finally have come around to seeing things as I have been explaining them. The problem is that you believe that compromises can always be reached. If they could, there would be no such things as moral dilemmas. You need to give me an explanation as to what moral "truth" can be true for all in the same way that gravity is true for all. We all fall at the same rate, but how hard we hit the ground depends on our mass, and there is no compromise in that.
Indeed. I have so far been unable to get this answer from free speech absolutists (FSAs).
Not just attempts to resolve disagreement, but any situation where people use language to accomplish anything would become trivial.
It appears that the FSA position is internally inconsistent.
I don't believe they are in different categories, I'm not a FSA.
Understanding that other people think differently than oneself doesn't automatically lead to caring about that.
Heh.
Some things do escape those who study people professionally.
For example, there are areas of studying people that are ethically prohibited for direct study (such as the behavior of people in their privacy, when they don't know they are being observed and have never agreed to being observed), then there are areas that would be prohibitively time-consuming or expensive (such as detailed long-term all-round studies).
Secondly, there are social phenomena that can only be studied emically, by the observer becoming a member of the group he's studying (like the motivation for taboos, or the content of public secrets), and are as such problematic.
However, it is precisely these areas that ordinary people routinely have access to and in which they have to function. They can study these areas qualitatively, but not quantitatively (which would be relevant for generalizing scientific purposes).
I don't see why a categorization like the one in the OP would be necessary or helpful. Other than in the case where one assumes one's superiority over others, and thus feels justified to unilaterally define the terms of engagement.
Because this is what the categories in the OP are: unilaterally defined terms of engagement.
Where in any of that does is say anything about whether this assumption is "before engaging with anyone"? If you actually read what I write rather than jumping to conclusions about what you think I'm saying we might have had a profitable conversation. As it it you're just arguing against a caricature from your imagination.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Once more then. Where have I made an assumption that this is always possible? I've highlighted the key word for you to make the job easier.
Quoting Harry Hindu
And the last one...where have I spoken about what is true?
I choose my words carefully. If you can't be bothered to read them with equal care don't bother replying at all.
You've given a really good list there of the limits of psychological investigation. I'm largely in agreement. You've prefaced the list rather unfortunately though. These things do not escape those of us who study people professionally. We have no lesser access to them than others.
Sure, you can do so as private persons (ie. when not in your professional capacity), or else, only produce qualitative case studies, which are of limited scientific value.
I doubt that we've been talking past each other this whole time, but if that is how you want to finally admit that you're agreeing with everything that I said, that's fine with me.
It might help you see better if you realize that it is proposed in juxtaposition to the common practice of treating people as only being in groups 1 or 5. I’m advocating more nuance than that.
Since I don't practice that common practice, the whole classification is moot for me.
Like I said: The categories in the OP are unilaterally defined terms of engagement.
How would you multilaterally define the terms of engagement, since to do so one would have to first engage?
I eschew the defining of terms of engagement in advance, and instead just follow the arguments/ideas.
It's an interpersonal communication dynamic, with emphasis on it being dynamic.
I see no need to categorize people in advance in such a forum setting.
But after engaging with people, it will become clear whether their opinions are the ones you think are correct or not, and how strongly held those opinions are and for what reasons they’re held.
It’s then appropriate to engage with them differently based on those various factors. My proposal in the OP is to use more nuance in that differentiation than just “agree with me good, otherwise bad”, which is a sadly common method.
I’m first and foremost advocating the recognition of a difference between “doesn’t agree with me” and “disagrees with me”, as there are people who are undecided and might eventually end up agreeing or disagreeing, and treating them like they’ve already sided against you is counterproductive.
Then within the groups who do agree or disagree, I’m advocating a differentiation between those who just go with the social flow of agreement with their in-group, and those who hold their views for thoroughly introspective personal reasons. Because people who are “on your side” but not for good reasons might make problematic allies, and people who are “against you” but not really personally committed to the opposite of your principles might still be swayed away from being your enemies.
I think those issues are not really moral dilemmas in the sense that an any moral principles is being disagreed about. If it is accepted that most would agree that a person's life should not be taken, except in very extreme circumstances, then whether someone thinks abortion is acceptable or not depends on whether they think the fetus is a person or not. The same goes for animal testing; those who think, like Descartes, that animals are not persons but machines would not have much reason to be against testing. Very few people valorize war, I would say most people see it as an evil, either unnecessary or necessary depending on other non-moral considerations.
When it comes to charity, health care and wealth taxes I think most people feel obliged only to look after their own. This is one area where there is moral disagreement when it comes to whether the government should look after those who cannot care for themselves. And this disagreement is ideological. The 'dog eat dog' view of life is ideological I would say, but the nurturing view is based on compassion.
Quoting Isaac
Sure, there are "minor" moral issues that people disagree over like whether it's right to have sex before marriage, right to be gay, whether children should enjoy full autonomy and so on. I would say the differences in those areas are ideological. A person of good moral sense would be inclined to a live and let live approach, when it comes to such issues, insofar as I think it is arguable that a good moral sense just is a feeling for and respect of others' autonomy and freedom.
I have no right to say whether you should have sex before marriage, whether you should be gay, or whether you should grant your children full autonomy. Those who want to prescribe such things to others are driven by ideology. I also agree that much of what we take for normal in our societies is ideologically driven, so I have not wanted to say that ideology exists only in extremis. Those ideologically driven elements of common social morality should be expunged, because just as there is no good basis for ideological thinking, there is no good basis for the moral principles they inform.
I mean that you're presenting a model of different ways of engaging with people, based on whether they agree with you or not.
Not that you suggest that Tom be put in category 1, Dick in 3, and Harry in 5, based simply on their names or some such.
I don't see it this way at all.
I can't even begin to understand why one would take this approach, at least not in philosophy(ish).
What you're saying makes sense in terms of politics (whether it's ordinary citizens or professional politicians discussing politics, or whether it's employees discussing workplace politics, and such).
But beyond that ...?
People who hold views based on things that both of you agree are good kinds of reasons are people you can philosophically reason with, and those are all group 1. As I said before, being in group 1 doesn’t mean they agree with you completely. Those differences grounded in what you nevertheless agree is solid reasoning are the places you have learning opportunities.
People who see you as “on their side” socially-speaking might at least be open to reasons to refine their beliefs, but if they aren’t “on your side” for reasons you see as rational then there’s not really opportunity for you to learn from them in turn. Those are group 2. They don’t necessarily agree with you completely either, but they at least trust that you’re an ally rather than an enemy, and may at least listen to you openly and honestly.
People who are undecided, group 3, similarly at least don’t see you as an enemy and so might be willing to listen honestly if you convey to them successfully that you are allied with their interests. Then you might have opportunity to explain why the reasons of your opposition are not good ones, and why they should not trust that kind of argument.
Group 4 sees you socially as an enemy and won’t be willing to engage with your arguments in an open and honest way. There’s no opportunity to learn anything from your uncle who fell for Qanon because of something he saw on Facebook, or to reason him out of beliefs he didn’t reason himself into in the first place. But you could at least maybe stand a chance of convincing him that you really do care for him and that those kinds of sources and arguments are unreliable.
And lastly, you just can’t do honest philosophy with a died-in-the-wool Nazi or such, in group 5. Their entire worldview is founded entirely in things you don’t see as rational at all, so there’s just not a common ground of reason from which to conduct a rational argument.