On the Essay: There is no Progress in Philosophy

Now where's my old sig gone? Ah yes...

[quote=John Cowper Powys]Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought. [/quote]

Picasso said the same about art, in respect of the cave paintings of Lascaux. It was all there from the beginning.

But the religion of progress is a fairly recent degeneration; the ancients always presumed that the golden age had passed.

Do you really need a definition of progress? We can assume that something on the order of mysteries revealed, questions answered, new mysteries opened up, new questions formulated, would be what progress would look like.

I think I would say that philosophy is generally in the business of disenchantment. So from my point of view the heroes are the sceptics rather than the builders of grand theories, and since there is always another builder with another grand theory, there is always work to do, but it is always a demolition job, and that is why there is no progress. We never quite become completely disenchanted, and so never quite return to the golden age.

"Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men." John Dewey

Progress requires that problems we face be resolved or mitigated. Traditional philosophical problems don't lend themselves to resolution in any manner that can be confirmed to the satisfaction of more than a few. I would say that those who have established that certain philosophical problems are illusory have in a sense resolved those problems, and to the extent their efforts have resulted in a lessening of the time and effort spent in address non-problems, there has been progress of a sort. Perhaps this sort of thing is related to the disenchantment you speak of.

Perhaps Dewey was engaged in wishful thinking in proposing that philosophy become a method for dealing with the "problems of men." But if philosophers turned their attention to considering those problems and recommending solutions to them (and if anybody paid them any attention, I suppose I should say) it might become possible to assess whether those recommendations solve the problems, and therefore whether philosophy could be said to progress, based on whether the recommendations were successful.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White There are philosophers who deal with the "problems of men." Peter Singer, for instance, is an advocate for the global poor and for animal rights. Other philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum and Christina Hoff Sommers grapple with issues surrounding contemporary feminism, the law, and related topics.

Other philosophers deal in more abstract problems, which are of less practical relevance. Why is this such a problem? We accept that some scientific work has immediate technological applications, and other is pure "pie in the sky" research. Why oughtn't it be the same for philosophy?

Reply to Arkady You're quite right; there are philosophers who are addressing those problems now. I should have noted that.

As for the more abstract, there is no problem with them, but if the "problem" addressed is one that isn't subject to a satisfactory resolution, even to a reasonable degree of probability, it's hard to even speak of progress being made. I don't know what pie in the sky science you're referring to, but it may be that the author of the article would maintain that progress isn't being made as to that kind of science.

Reply to Ciceronianus the White There are many scientific fields and endeavors I would consider to be "pie in the sky" (which I would define as lacking immediate practical technological benefits, and which I don't mean pejoratively in this context), e.g. particle physics, cosmology, most of astronomy, paleontology, etc. No reasonable person could claim that "progress" hasn't been made in these fields unless they're employing a highly idiosyncratic sense of the term.

Quoting Arkady

We accept that some scientific work has immediate technological applications, and other is pure "pie in the sky" research. Why oughtn't it be the same for philosophy?

I think possibly because the scientific pie in the sky research is at least headed for a consensus. This is why we give grants to theoretical physicists and not philosophers.

Reply to darthbarracuda I thought academic philosophers did receive grants to fund their work (e.g. from the NEH or a similar funding agency).

In the good old days, science was known as 'natural philosophy'. Life was simpler back then, and these questions were not asked.

Reply to Arkady I hadn't heard of the NEH. But I looked it up and learned that the NEH has a budget of $160 million. The NSF has a budget of $7.0 billion.

Reply to darthbarracuda Uh, ok. Does it follow that the NEH doesn't fund philosophy (again, I'm not certain that it does, but I thought that it, or similar funding agencies, provided grants to philosophers)?

Philosophical research involves a lot of thinking. Scientific research involves expensive equipment.

Reply to Arkady True, but there are still conferences and symposiums for philosophy that cost money.

Reply to Saphsin Dietrich's case is exactly what I was trying to argue about in a different thread. I enjoyed the essay, although I felt it was a little clunky at times. Now I'm looking for a good counterargument that doesn't just validate the original argument.

I can see a possible counterargument. The author uses the examples of philosophical "camps" a lot, such as consequentialism vs deontology, as examples of the gridlock in philosophical communities.

But look at this forum. We have a bunch of people with differing opinions discussing topics and trying to change each others' minds. Sure, we might not belong to strict philosophical camps, but we still hold positions, This is no different from the academic camps. These guys have just thought about it much more and are still in debate.

Unless I was misunderstanding him, the author seemed to be concluding that philosophy inevitably leads to gridlock via camps. I'd argue that this is the inherent nature of philosophy, and it is foolish to assume otherwise.

Reply to Arkady I hesitate to say anything about particle physics, but if "progress" includes an increase in knowledge and understanding of the subject matter of inquiry, then I think we can speak of progress in the areas of science you refer to.

Who needs progress?

Quoting unenlightened

In the good old days, science was known as 'natural philosophy'. Life was simpler back then, and these questions were not asked.

Or, alternatively, life was so much harder back then that nobody had the time to ask these questions. Efficiency in productivity and more leisure time (i.e., time to think) might be the greatest development for philosophy.

Reply to Benkei This is my position on philosophy. There is no progress, and philosophers need to stop fooling themselves into thinking there will be.

If there is no progress in philosophy, then why is that? Are the questions that philosophers ask unanswerable? Are they bewitched by language? Is perhaps the very foundation of philosophical thought from which questions flow mistaken? Is it that we're cognitively closed to such matters?

I think on the one hand there is progress, and on the other, there isn't. There's progress in the proliferation of possible answers to questions, and new questions which arise. Philosophical inquiry evolves over time, building on itself, despite the lack of consensus.

But there isn't progress in that fundamental questions of metaphysics, epistemology, morality and aesthetics seem to never reach a conclusion. We can't say beyond reasonable doubt and with consensus that we've arrived at the truth as to the nature of universals or whether the ends justify the means in some cases, for example. There remain deep divisions on all these matters, and an objective person might say all answers provided are problematic in one or more ways.

TLDR - philosophical inquiry grows over time, but the truth remains elusive.

As an addendum to my post above, Simon Blackburn wrote that philosophy exists because there is a loose fit between mind and world. I found that fascinating. Our intuitions and concepts seem good until scrutinized, and then they come apart in all sorts of ways.

For philosophers to make progress, do they need to make the mind "fit" the world? Is it a grand puzzle to sort out which we apes might not be quite smart enough to do given our mammalian baggage? Or perhaps that's just one more misleading metaphor.

Lets look at the dissection of natural philosophy. If it is of the soul it is religion - which is just symbol and ritual, so they don't have problems (not the type with solutions, anyway). That leaves us with philosophy and science. If we have a philosophical question that is answerable, which is to say, we can prove and demonstrate the answer - then it becomes science. Any question that can't be demonstratively proven remains philosophy. Hence, any philosophy that 'makes progress' (answers a question) is science, Science is progress in 'natural philosophy', and what we call 'philosophy' is necessarily the school of unanswered (and answerable) questions. Furthermore, it could be said, with the dissection of natural philosophy, that anything answered using math and experiment is a scientific question, and all other questions are philosophical (or religious).

Questions that can be answered are necessarily scientific, and questions that can't are philosophical. The dissection of natural philosophy requires that science is the progress while philosophy is that on which no progress has been made - because what we call 'progress', culturally, is answering questions.

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

As for the more abstract, there is no problem with them, but if the "problem" addressed is one that isn't subject to a satisfactory resolution, even to a reasonable degree of probability, it's hard to even speak of progress being made.

Sometimes the progress being made is in us. Getting a better grip on an unsolvable problem makes us better thinkers, which prepares us to better solve the problems of man.

Quoting darthbarracuda

This is why we give grants to theoretical physicists and not philosophers.

There are plenty of grants for philosophers—even for metaphysicians!—and they don't all come from the NEH. Off the top of my head, there's also the American Council of Learned Societies, the Templeton Foundation, and the Pew Charitable Trusts.

Reply to Postmodern Beatnik
Point taken. But my impression is philosophy isn't primarily devoted to making us better thinkers through the consideration of unsolvable problems.

Philosophy functions roughly as a research program whose output is other research programs. By that metric it's been extremely fruitful.

Reply to The Great Whatever

Which is arguably equally true of science. The difference with science is that it generates new possibilities for technological inventiveness, and thus possesses very obvious practical applications.

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

Point taken. But my impression is philosophy isn't primarily devoted to making us better thinkers through the consideration of unsolvable problems.

I never said that this was a primary goal of philosophy. The point was twofold. First, contrary to your claim that it is hard to speak of progress being made when the problem addressed is not subject to a satisfactory resolution, I say that there is progress being made. It's just not where you expected it to be. Second, insofar as you are endorsing the Dewey quote you posted ("philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men"), I am pointing out that addressing such problems plays an important role in enabling philosophers to deal with the problems of men. Thus you don't really have any grounds for objecting to such pursuits.


Quoting John

The difference with science is that it generates new possibilities for technological inventiveness, and thus possesses very obvious practical applications.

And philosophy helps us to learn more and more about how to live well, which also has very obvious practical applications. The technologies it refines are the oldest kind of all: cognitive, linguistic, moral, and political.

It's important to understand that philosophy is not science, and that to expect it to produce results on the magnitude and abundance of science is misunderstanding what philosophy is and what it does. Progress can be made in philosophy, but not in the manner of scientists being awarded the Nobel prize by discovering the Higgs Boson. There's not going to be an E = MC^2 in philosophy, although personally I feel Kant comes close.

How is one to determine whether a philosophical problem cannot be satisfactorily resolved? And even if it cannot be, hasn't it still been paradoxically resolved to a worthwhile degree of satisfaction? Namely that one has reached a conclusion regarding the problem, and can move on to other problems.

There are few - if any - philosophical problems of which I could say that I've satisfactorily resolved, but there are just as few - perhaps even fewer - of which I could say that they cannot be satisfactorily resolved. Hence, in my view, progress is at least possible.

But I don't [i]just[/I] think that progress is possible; I think that progress is made with each and every conclusion that one reaches - or even approaches.

Reply to Postmodern Beatnik You seem to be stating that there is progress being made in addressing problems which have no satisfactory resolution. It just doesn't involve resolving those problems. Well if that's the case then it's clear I'm wrong.

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

You seem to be stating that there is progress being made in addressing problems which have no satisfactory resolution. It just doesn't involve resolving those problems.

Correct.

Quoting Ciceronianus the White

Well if that's the case then it's clear I'm wrong.

Which was more or less my point. 8-)

I'm not big on the idea that philosophical problems are perennial, unanswerable, or mysterious. To take just one example, I believe that the so-called 'problem of perception' was actually definitively resolved over two thousand years ago in ancient Greece. The reason it persists is not because it remains mysterious, but because people are not very good at arguing. With other sciences you don't have to be that good at arguing, because eventually some material technological circumstance (or ideological one) forces people's hands and everyone just accepts that there's some sort of consensus on something (even though there's probably not). Progress largely comes from forgetting about disputes, rather than resolving them, and it's hard to forget in philosophy because it's a discipline obsessed with its own history, and whose results don't come in technological form.

Quoting Sapientia

How is one to determine whether a philosophical problem cannot be satisfactorily resolved?

I agree that this is a real issue for those who would decry the study of problems they have deemed unresolvable, and I have serious doubts about many claims that are made along those lines. But I also think the objection to engaging with such problems can be largely diffused by pointing out that it doesn't necessarily matter whether the problems themselves are resolvable so long as engaging with them at least provides other benefits.

Quoting Sapientia

And even if it cannot be, hasn't it still been paradoxically resolved to a worthwhile degree of satisfaction?

I think it might depend on how we come to this conclusion. If the problem is one that we think must have an answer, but not one we can find, there is bound to be a certain residual dissatisfaction with stopping there. If, on the other hand, we declare it unresolvable because it turns out that the problem was ill-conceived in the first place, I think you are correct that dissolving the problem counts as a sort of resolution.

Quoting Sapientia

But I don't just think that progress is possible, I think that progress is made with each and every conclusion that one reaches or even approaches.

This is an interesting idea. It mirrors something I've argued before, which is that every dead end we discover is a mark of progress because we often have to figure out 10,000 ways that don't work before we figure out the one that might. Learning that x won't work lets us put ¬x into the pool of accumulated data.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

But I also think the objection to engaging with such problems can be largely diffused by pointing out that it doesn't necessarily matter whether the problems themselves are resolvable so long as engaging with them at least provides other benefits.

I agree.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

I think it might depend on how we come to this conclusion. If the problem is one that we think must have an answer, but not one we can find, there is bound to be a certain residual dissatisfaction with stopping there.

Yes, I agree. But even that could be broken down further into whether we just cannot presently find an answer the way that we've been seeking one, or whether we cannot find an answer indefinitely - regardless of the way in which one is sought. In the former case, progress is still possible, at least in the sense that we've mentioned of ruling out and moving on; and in the latter, progress of that sort would've been made in having reached that conclusion, and the problem would've been dissolved.

Reply to Postmodern Beatnik

I didn't say philosophy cannot have any practical applications. The suggestion was merely that it does not have anything like the very obvious practical applications that science does.

In any case you would need to provide an argument to support the contention that "living well" should be counted as a practical matter, even if it were accepted that philosophy inevitably helps with that.

Quoting Sapientia

...in the latter, progress of that sort would've been made in having reached that conclusion, and the problem would've been dissolved.

I'm pretty sure we're in agreement here, but I would like to clarify. I take it you are saying that even in these unsatisfying cases (when we think the question must have an answer but is indefinitely unanswerable for us), we must still admit that some progress has been made. This I agree with. I don't think that progress will entirely mitigate the dissatisfaction, however, insofar as we still think the question must have an answer (just not one we can obtain, even if we can still rule out a few). I also don't think that this counts as resolving the problem. Though I suppose it would tell us how much of a resolution is possible, which would at least be enough to let us (as you say) move on to other problems. So it's a resolution of sorts to the inquiry, insofar as the inquiry might end (though not a resolution in the sense that it is completed).


Quoting John

I didn't say philosophy cannot have any practical applications.

And I neither said nor implied that you did.

Quoting John

The suggestion was merely that it does not have anything like the very obvious practical applications that science does.

And that was what I was disagreeing with. Ethics strikes me as an extremely obvious practical application of philosophy—and, indeed, one of the oldest practical applications thereof. That philosophy is linked to ethics and living well goes back further than even ancient Greece.

Quoting John

In any case you would need to provide an argument to support the contention that "living well" should be counted as a practical matter, even if it were accepted that philosophy inevitably helps with that.

It would seem to be a practical matter by definition. Living well has to do with what we actually do in our everyday lives. One cannot live well merely in theory because living is something we do in the world. Thus one must put wisdom into practice in order to live well. Indeed, the technical use of the word "practical" within philosophy was invented precisely for this sort of pursuit. To deny that living well is a practical matter is to misunderstand the very words one is using.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

And that was what I was disagreeing with. Ethics strikes me as an extremely obvious practical application of philosophy—and, indeed, one of the oldest practical applications thereof. That philosophy is linked to ethics and living well goes back further than even ancient Greece.

Well, for a start, Ethics is just one part of philosophy. Epistemology and Metaphysics are arguably a much greater part of modern philosophy, and there don't seem to be any obvious practical applications of those. The fact that it "strikes you as extremely obvious" means little. Can you present any actual data from any studies that show that philosophers have generally tended to live better lives than other humans? Because that is what you would need to show that philosophy actually does have practical applications.

Again, note that I have not claimed it has no practical applications; just that it has no obvious practical applications.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

It would seem to be a practical matter by definition. Living well has to do with what we actual do in our everyday lives. One cannot live well merely in theory because living is something we do in the world. Thus one must put wisdom into practice in order to live well. Indeed, the technical use of the word "practical" within philosophy was invented precisely for this sort of pursuit. To deny that living well is a practical matter is to misunderstand the very words one is using.

It is a trivial truism that living is practice as opposed to theory, or merely thinking about it. I think it is arguable that very many philosophers have spent more time on the latter than the former; more time, that is, thinking about living than engaging in practical pursuits.

Also, the attribute of being "practical" is generally applied to ideas which facilitate the achievement of a very specific purpose. "Living well" is too nebulous a concept - impossible to quantify, or even to precisely qualify, to count as a specific purpose. Farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well, are all practical matters. What constitutes doing those well is easily determinable, but what constitutes "living well" cannot be determined at all, and remains a matter of speculation and opinion. What contributes to farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well (that is, what, in these ambits, has practical application) is also easily determinable. Such is not the case with living well, so I would say that what you have claimed is well off the mark.

Quoting John

Well, for a start, Ethics is just one part of philosophy.

And according to some ways of thinking, the main part—and the part towards which all others are aimed. But we can leave such claims to the side. Ethics is part of philosophy; therefore, any obvious practical application of ethics is an obvious practical application of philosophy.

Quoting John

Epistemology and Metaphysics are arguably a much greater part of modern philosophy

By what measure? Specialists? Faculty positions? Dedicated journals? Publications? Word count? Metaphysics and epistemology wins out in some of these, and it loses in others. But even when it constitutes a greater proportion in one of these areas, it never constitutes a much greater proportion. In terms of people claiming a specialty in an M&E field versus in an ethics field, for instance, the ratio is 4:3 in favor of M&E (so greater, but not much greater).

Quoting John

and there don't seem to be any obvious practical applications of those.

The obvious practical application of epistemology is the scientific method (since scientists got it from philosophy), so any practical application of science is dependent upon this practical application of philosophy.

Quoting John

The fact that it "strikes you as extremely obvious" means little.

I see. If you are going to play games with such picayune matters of language, then I will state my meaning more plainly: ethics is an extremely obvious application of philosophy, and any competent thinker who considers it honestly for more than five seconds ought to recognize it as such. Is that more to your liking?

Quoting John

Can you present any actual data from any studies that show that philosophers have generally tended to live better lives than other humans? Because that is what you would need to show that philosophy actually does have practical applications.

This is an absurd straw man. One need not be a professional philosopher—or even much of a philosopher at all—in order to benefit from the products of philosophy (some examples of which are science, morality, and democracy).

Quoting John

Again, note that I have not claimed it has no practical applications; just that it has no obvious practical applications.

I have already noted this twice. I note it again a third time. I also disagree with it yet again. Your denial does not tell me that the practical applications of philosophy are not obvious. It only tells me that you are oblivious to them.

Quoting John

I think it is arguable that very many philosophers have spent more time on the latter than the former; more time, that is, thinking about living than engaging in practical pursuits.

Which arguably makes them bad philosophers in an important respect (though we may be better off overall if some philosophers dedicate themselves to theory, so perhaps they are not bad philosophers after all). Regardless, nothing follows from this about the products of their work or the practical applications thereof.

Quoting John

Also, the attribute of being "practical" is generally applied to ideas which facilitate the achievement of a very specific purpose.

False. "Practical" is opposed to "theoretical." Indeed, one of the oldest philosophical uses of the word (in cognate form, of course) comes from Aristotle's discussion of practical wisdom, which is an ability with broad applications. We could sum up those applications, but the term we would use to do so just causes further problems for your argument because the specific purpose at which practical wisdom aims in Aristotle is living well (aka eudaimonia). So again, it looks like you do not understand the words you are using (or at least, how they are used in a philosophical context—this being a philosophy forum, after all).

Quoting John

"Living well" is too nebulous a concept - impossible to quantify, or even to precisely qualify, to count as a specific purpose.

This seems to beg the question against any number of philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Diogenes of Sinope, Epicurus, Zeno of Citium, Pyrrho, and Aristippus of Cyrene being the most obvious, but also just about all medieval philosophers, the vast majority of early modern philosophers, and a growing number of contemporary philosophers). Granted, there are many accounts of what it takes to live well, but it does not follow from this that it is impossible to give a precise account of it.

Quoting John

Farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well, are all practical matters. What constitutes doing those well is easily determinable [...] What contributes to farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well (that is, what, in these ambits, has practical application) is also easily determinable.

And yet these are all still the subjects of debate (see the ongoing debates regarding the merits of organic agriculture, factory farms, and the treatment of farm animals, or the variations in technique among professional sailors and tennis coaches). So disagreement must not be a reliable guide to what is determinable.

Quoting The Great Whatever

To take just one example, I believe that the so-called 'problem of perception' was actually definitively resolved over two thousand years ago in ancient Greece. The reason it persists is not because it remains mysterious, but because people are not very good at arguing.

So that means all the professional philosophers since then who disagreed were not very good at argument. I doubt that.

Reply to Marchesk But you can read their stuff and see they aren't. Kek!

Found an interesting interview of Peter Unger, who thinks philosophy is a bunch of empty ideas:

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/06/philosophy-is-a-bunch-of-empty-ideas-interview-with-peter-unger.html

Quoting The Great Whatever

But you can read their stuff and see they aren't. Kek!

I'm not convinced either, and I'm not going to go and studiously read through all that material just to put it to the test. It'd be more efficient to put your supposed resolution to the test. You could create a new discussion in which to do so.

Reply to darthbarracuda Yes an interesting interview and many here agree with him. But doesn't it change things if we consider everyone a philosopher? That anyone with a world view is making philosophical decisions every day and participating whether they think about it or not. I think Gramsci and others have said this. If all humans are philosophers then the realization that we are running on a hamster wheel is hardly surprising. We philosophize because it's an activity that informs our operating system to make decisions. And decisions are necessary.

Reply to Monitor I agree with you that philosophy is something that is inevitable. However since there is no way to actually verify that our thoughts are correct, as in, they are an accurate representation of reality, then ultimately the entire enterprise of thought is nihilistic.

Reply to Monitor Which, incidentally, also means that the previous statement is also unverifiable. We cannot trust our senses, nor can we trust our rationality. I see no reason why our rationality alone would allow us to concoct grand metaphysical theories. It is very anthropocentric and narrow minded, but then again this argument is also an appeal to rationality, so it cannot be entirely trusted, which also cannot be trusted.

Reply to darthbarracuda That it can't be trusted or verified would seem to be a condition of the fact (?) that we are metrical and the world is non-metrical. We project a unitized overlay on the world, count the units in pro and con, and make a decision. How we identify and count those units is prone to error and ignorance but it earns the badge of rationality anyway. But trying to keep up with science is trying to keep up with the Jones's. I find it depressing.

Quoting Sapientia

I'm not going to go and studiously read through all that material

I know you're not. Kek!

Reply to The Great Whatever And you're not going to put your money where your mouth is by putting your supposed resolution to the test. Or are you?

Kek to you too!

A delayed response; I have been away.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

Ethics is part of philosophy; therefore, any obvious practical application of ethics is an obvious practical application of philosophy.

Give me an example of an "obvious practical application" of ethics.

Epistemology and Metaphysics are arguably a much greater part of modern philosophy — John

By what measure?

Just look at the number of posts in Metaphysics and Epistemology compared to Ethics on your typical philosophy forum to get an indication of what exercises the average amateur philosophical interest.

In any case, apart from ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, we have aesthetics, phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, semantics, semiology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and so on.

The obvious practical application of epistemology is the scientific method (since scientists got it from philosophy), so any practical application of science is dependent upon this practical application of philosophy.

This is nonsense; one can just as well practice the scientific method without ever having given any thought to epistemology. As to the historical relationship between epistemology and scientific practice it is arguable that the latter is prior to what is merely thinking about the implications of what we already do.

The fact that it "strikes you as extremely obvious" means little. — John

I see. If you are going to play games with such picayune matters of language, then I will state my meaning more plainly: ethics is an extremely obvious application of philosophy, and any competent thinker who considers it honestly for more than five seconds ought to recognize it as such. Is that more to your liking?

This is funny! Rather than offer a cogent argument for why I should agree with you, you suggest that anyone that doesn't agree with you could not be counted as a "competent thinker"!
And so now, ethics itself is the practical application, rather than being a discipline of thought which merely may have practical applications?

This is an absurd straw man. One need not be a professional philosopher—or even much of a philosopher at all—in order to benefit from the products of philosophy (some examples of which are science, morality, and democracy).

Science is only itself practically applied as technology, and is not dependent on most of philosophy; in fact it just was previously natural philosophy (as distinct from philosophy's other ambits). Morality exists independently of philosophy (or else all culture without a philosophical tradition are amoral). Democracy? A "practical application" of philosophy?? Really???

Again, note that I have not claimed it has no practical applications; just that it has no obvious practical applications. — John

I have already noted this twice. I note it again a third time. I also disagree with it yet again. Your denial does not tell me that the practical applications of philosophy are not obvious. It only tells me that you are oblivious to them.

No, it should tell you that I disagree with you that they are as obvious as the practical applications of science, a disagreement which you have given no cogent reason to relinquish.

I think it is arguable that very many philosophers have spent more time on the latter than the former; more time, that is, thinking about living than engaging in practical pursuits. — John

Which arguably makes them bad philosophers in an important respect (though we may be better off overall if some philosophers dedicate themselves to theory, so perhaps they are not bad philosophers after all). Regardless, nothing follows from this about the products of their work or the practical applications thereof.

As I understood it, the argument was over whether doing philosophy is very obviously helpful when it comes to practical matters; that is, over whether philosophical thought leads directly (very obviously) to very clear practical applications.

False. "Practical" is opposed to "theoretical." Indeed, one of the oldest philosophical uses of the word (in cognate form, of course) comes from Aristotle's discussion of practical wisdom, which is an ability with broad applications.

Again, nonsense, as I see it. Theorizing is "opposed" to doing. But much of 'doing' is not practical in the sense of "practical application". For example, things that are done for fun are not normally thought to be done for practical purposes.

Farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well, are all practical matters. What constitutes doing those well is easily determinable [...] What contributes to farming well, sailing well, and playing tennis well (that is, what, in these ambits, has practical application) is also easily determinable. — John

And yet these are all still the subjects of debate (see the ongoing debates regarding the merits of organic agriculture, factory farms, and the treatment of farm animals, or the variations in technique among professional sailors and tennis coaches). So disagreement must not be a reliable guide to what is determinable.

You are misinterpreting my meaning here. All I intended to convey was the fact that the measure of farming well, leaving aside other ethical questions (for example, sustainability is a further consideration), is the measure of efficient food production. Similarly, the measure of playing tennis well is winning tournaments (which is, similarly, to leave aside questions such as the long term effects on the player's physical well-being, and so on).

Science's progress is divergent and human progress is convergent.

Reply to Cavacava Converging on what?

Reply to Monitor

Converging on what?

Answering that question.

Reply to Cavacava I'm sorry, but I wasn't sure which comment or question you were responding to. Human progress converges on the resolution of...? Or true knowledge of....?

Hi Monitor, just teasing a little. I think science is expanding with new disciplines all the time, new areas of study. We seem driven to want to know, more and more. This same desire to know, makes us want to know 'who/what/why' we are, pushing us towards resolving problems related to our own reality/actuality as beings in the world. This is what I meant by convergent.

Quoting The Great Whatever

But you can read their stuff and see they aren't.

Only if you happen to agree that there is no world.

Reply to Marchesk No, they're just not good at it. Bad argument always fails on its own terms, not due to outside influence.

Quoting Cavacava

human progress is convergent.

I thought there may be a Hegelian in our midst. I thought it my duty to announce my suspicions.

Reply to The Great Whatever If there is a world, then there is a problem of perception. Get rid of the world and you can dispense with the problem of perception. Problem with that is most people consider it insane to get rid of the world. So you end up with drastically different starting grounds to argue from.

Quoting John

Give me an example of an "obvious practical application" of ethics.

Ethics is about how to live (with some people focusing more on what makes a life good, others focusing on what counts as living rightly, and still others focusing on fitting the two concerns together). Everyone makes decisions about how they should live—even those who conclude that they should stop living, or that they should live selfishly, or that they should not let the ethical principles of others interfere with their decision making—so everyone does ethics (though many do it sloppily and/or badly). When someone decides that they ought to live a particular way (or that they ought not to live some particular way), they imply some sort of ethical commitment and base their decision on some sort of ethical principle (even if that principle is vague or nihilistic, since ethics is not any particular conclusion). So I would say (as I have before) that ethics itself is an example (when properly understood). We do ethics not just when thinking about ethical issues, after all, but when making ethical decisions. Ethics, like philosophy itself, is as much an activity as it is an area of inquiry. And the inquiry is of great practical benefit when applied to the activity.

But if you want a more specific example, I have again given one already: living well. This goes beyond just making individual decisions about how one should live (which may be made moment to moment, invoking different principles each time), but trying to make one's life cohere into something worth living (and not just minimally worth living, but as maximally worthwhile as we can manage). Perhaps not everyone actually engages in an attempt to live well, but it ought to be clear why it is in everyone's interest to do so. So while not everyone in fact applies ethics in this way (just as not everyone avails themselves of the applications of science), it is nevertheless an available application—and an obvious one, I would say. I realize that you consider this to be too broad to count as practical, but notice that living well is ultimately a combination of many specific decisions. Even decisions about what career to pursue can have significant effects on one's eudaimonia in terms of one's relationship with both the good and the right. And note that this connection has also long been recognized by ethical traditions outside of the West. Buddhist ethics, for instance, makes choosing the right career one of the primary concerns described by the Eightfold Path.

These examples should suffice. But if one construes ethics broadly so as to include both moral and political philosophy, then I have already given at least one more: democracy (which has been developed over the long course of time by philosophers both within and without the Western philosophical tradition). Particularly as instituted today, our political system has been profoundly influenced by philosophy (both in terms of the general structure and specific policy issues, though I do not take the connections between philosophy and specific policies to be obvious). Philosophy has also been important in creating the conditions for democracy to take hold, such as in the early modern period when a sustained critique of the divine right of kings and the concurrent refinement of social contract theory led to a significant change in popular notions of political legitimacy. If we do not want to construe ethics broadly and instead wish to treat political philosophy as a separate area, then we can leave that as an obvious practical application of philosophy (and specifically political philosophy, but not ethics).

Indeed, ethics is the part of philosophy that everyone rushes to point to when asking for an application of philosophy, and we rush to it because its applications are so apparent. Not everyone realizes that ethicists are concerned with such a broad array of issues. Ethical philosophy is often presented to beginners as if it were just deontologists and consequentialists hashing out the metaphysics of ethics despite agreeing in the vast majority of cases regarding what specific actions were right. If that is one's familiarity with the subject, then one can be forgiven for misunderstanding the scope of the discipline. But when one gets to know the range of ethical concerns, the applications of ethics to life should be much clearer.

Quoting John

Just look at the number of posts in Metaphysics and Epistemology compared to Ethics on your typical philosophy forum to get an indication of what exercises the average amateur philosophical interest.

First, that depends on which forum one visits. There are plenty that cater to audiences more interested in ethics, and there are even independent forums dedicated to moral and political philosophy. Looking at TPF and PF, both have a greater number of posts in M&E—but both sites also have a greater number of topics (aka "threads," aka "discussions") in ethics. In any case, it doesn't make sense to ground pronouncements about the whole of philosophy on the activity of amateurs alone (nor on the activity of academics alone, for that matter).

Quoting John

In any case, apart from ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, we have aesthetics, phenomenology, hermeneutics, deconstruction, semantics, semiology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and so on.

Indeed we do, but this seems irrelevant. Your claim involved a direct comparison between ethics on the one hand and metaphysics and epistemology on the other. Every area of philosophy is small compared to the whole, particularly the finer we cut it up. But that says nothing about the relative sizes of any two areas of philosophy, nor to the question of whether there are any practical applications of philosophy (since a universal generalization is disproved just as well by one counterexample as it is by a thousand).

Quoting John

This is nonsense; one can just as well practice the scientific method without ever having given any thought to epistemology.

Whether or not one has to give epistemology a thought has nothing to do with whether or not one is applying it or its products. As my claim was only that the scientific method is an application of epistemology, it matters not at all that some people do not realize what they are doing when they use the scientific method—just as modern computer engineers do not have to understand how their science came about in order to apply its results, and I do not have to understand computer engineering to occasionally make use of various markup language tags (technology, of course, being your own example).

Quoting John

As to the historical relationship between epistemology and scientific practice it is arguable that the latter is prior to what is merely thinking about the implications of what we already do.

Not really. Aristotle's early version of the method started with reflections on common practice (as did all of his ideas), but it was also the product of a conscious effort to standardize and improve upon those methods. Alhazen relied heavily on Aristotle, but found it necessary to diverge from the received methods (leading him to develop the foundations of experimental methodology). And the Baconian method—which is generally seen as the beginning of the modern scientific method, particularly when synthesized with the efforts of his contemporaries Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler—was a conscious effort to replace Aristotelianism. Later refinements by Descartes and Mill were also concerted philosophical efforts aimed at expanding and improving current practices rather than just describing and reflecting on them, as were the important contributions of the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Then, of course, there are the well-known efforts of Karl Popper to overcome the problem of induction by reframing science in terms of falsifiability. All of these were conscious philosophical attempts to ground science on sound epistemological principles.

Quoting John

This is funny! Rather than offer a cogent argument for why I should agree with you, you suggest that anyone that doesn't agree with you could not be counted as a "competent thinker"!

No. I replied to your word games with a qualification of my meaning. And if you read carefully, you'll notice that what I said offers multiple possible explanations for your failure to recognize my examples. You've just chosen to focus on a particular one.

In any case, your request for an argument is confused. One cannot prove obviousness. One can only point to examples and expect others to see the obviousness. If they do not, there really isn't much to say. I could just as easily dig in my heels and refuse to acknowledge that science has any obvious practical applications. And if I did so, you would not be able to offer any sort of proof. All you'd be able to do is offer examples of your own and tell me to educate myself if I did not understand them (as a lack of familiarity is often the problem here). It is generally taken as obvious that 1 + 1 = 2, for instance, but try getting a one-year-old child to see that. A certain level of familiarity with the subject matter is required before one can see even such "obvious" facts as this, after all.

This leaves us with a question about treating obviousness as any sort of interesting or relevant measure. You say philosophy has no obvious practical applications. I say it has several (and of course, I only need one to disprove the generalization). So my question now is why you think it matters. It clearly matters to you, and so I have endeavored to offer you examples. Ultimately, however, I wonder what you think turns on the issue.

Quoting John

And so now, ethics itself is the practical application, rather than being a discipline of thought which merely may have practical applications?

Ethics was one of my original examples, so I'm not sure why you are treating it here as a new suggestion. In any case, ethics is both a discipline of thought and a practice informed by that discipline of thought. I have already discussed this above, but here is yet another example. Devoutly religious people often act without needing to think very much about what to do. This is because they are influenced by the ethical thinkers of their faith's past and the systems of ethical practice those thinkers left behind. They are influenced in this way regardless of whether they have thought deeply about these issues themselves or not. This is still an application of that thought, however. Indeed, inherited ethical systems are another obvious practical application of ethics—for better or worse—and thus of philosophy.

Quoting John

As I understood it, the argument was over whether doing philosophy is very obviously helpful when it comes to practical matters; that is, over whether philosophical thought leads directly (very obviously) to very clear practical applications.

Then you have misunderstood. The question under discussion is whether philosophy has any practical applications. This is confirmed by the wording found in both of our posts at the outset of this disagreement, during which we both spoke in terms of philosophy itself and neither of us spoke in terms of doing philosophy. When it comes to doing philosophy, a lot depends on the philosopher. Plenty of people philosophize without ever applying it to their life. Others think hard about the connection between what they think and what they do. As such, I would not say that doing philosophy obviously will be helpful when it comes to practical matters (even if it can be helpful). The same is true of science, however. I know academic physicists who can hardly walk straight despite voluminous knowledge about mechanics (both classical and quantum).

Quoting John

Again, nonsense, as I see it.

How interesting that you think the way something strikes me means little, but I am expected to find it relevant how something is as you see it. In any case, you again seem to be unaware of what the words you are using mean. Particularly in a philosophical context, the theoretical is indeed contrasted with the practical. But this is not merely a linguistic convention of philosophers. The phrase "it works in theory, but not in practice" is commonplace in English (enough so for the reverse—"it works in practice, but not in theory"—to be a frequent joke in fields where techniques have far outpaced explanations).

Quoting John

Theorizing is "opposed" to doing. But much of 'doing' is not practical in the sense of "practical application". For example, things that are done for fun are not normally thought to be done for practical purposes.

But even if we were to accept this, the example of living well would still stand. And in any case, living well is a quintessentially practical enterprise given how that word is used in philosophy (that being the relevant sense of the word in a philosophical discussion on a philosophy forum).

Quoting John

All I intended to convey was the fact that the measure of farming well, leaving aside other ethical questions (for example, sustainability is a further consideration), is the measure of efficient food production.

But that is not the measure of farming well; it is the measure of farming efficiently. To do something well is not necessarily, and not necessarily just, doing it efficiently. Perhaps it would be in a case where there were no other concerns, but it is not the case here.

Quoting John

Similarly, the measure of playing tennis well is winning tournaments (which is, similarly, to leave aside questions such as the long term effects on the player's physical well-being, and so on).

Again, though, this is not the measure of playing well. One can win by cheating, for instance.

Reply to Postmodern Beatnik

There are a lot of words here PB and I believe you are speaking in good faith. So, in good faith I must say that I am still not convinced that I should think that philosophy, either for those doing it or for society in general, has the kind of obvious practical applications that science does.

I don't have the time, energy or desire to respond to all your points, particularly since I don't think the issue we are apparently arguing over is of much import, anyway, so I will just make one last point of my own, and leave it at that.

If you are taking 'doing philosophy' or the 'existence of philosophy' to refer to the fact that people obviously think about what they do, then I would say that it is trivially true that it has practical applications, but I also think that such a definition of philosophy would be too broad. For sure, any thought may feed into the practical, but to say that is not the same as to say that it has direct and obvious practical applications, the way chemistry, physics, geology or genetics, for example, do.

Quoting John

I must say that I am still not convinced that I should think that philosophy, either for those doing it or for society in general, has the kind of obvious practical applications that science does.

Well, of course you're not. At this point, you are too invested in saying that there aren't any to suddenly see them. And as I've already noted, there's no argument that can be given. All I can tell you to do is to better familiarize yourself with the discipline. That's the only way you'll come to understand.

(But since you seem to think an argument ought to be forthcoming, I wonder what your argument is for the claim that science has any obvious practical applications. We've had technology longer than we've had formal science, after all, so it can't just be that.)

Quoting John

If you are taking 'doing philosophy' or the 'existence of philosophy' to refer to the fact that people obviously think about what they do, then I would say that it is trivially true that it has practical applications, but I also think that such a definition of philosophy would be too broad.

That's not what I've said, though. I do think that we ought to define "philosophy" broadly (after all, academic philosophy grows out of a less formal type of philosophical thinking), but I would not define it so broadly as to refer to any thinking we do about things. Regardless, the main point can be made even if we limit ourselves to formal philosophical thinking: we are all stuck making decisions of the sort with which ethics is concerned, so it is obviously to our advantage if we can think well about these decisions rather than thinking poorly about them; but philosophy is fundamentally about improving the way we think, and ethics is fundamentally about improving the way we think about a particular set of questions; therefore, philosophy (and thinking philosophically) can help us make these decisions.

On the actual topic of this discussion, Simon Blackburn recently published an essay on the value of studying philosophy. In it, he makes some comments about progress in philosophy—and about the sort of progress that philosophy can be expected to make:

[quote=Simon Blackburn]Do the practices of philosophy change, and do they improve? One of the most potent causes of mistrust of philosophy is that it provides no answers, only questions, so that to many it does not seem to have progressed since its very beginnings in Plato, or even in pre-Socratic Greece (or China or India). Of course, one might similarly ask whether other human pursuits, such as music, literature, drama, architecture, painting or politics, have 'improved' (and by what measure this judgement is supposed to be made), and if the answer is at best indeterminate we might query whether this reflects badly on those practices, or whether perhaps it indicates a problem with the question. It may be enough that their practitioners improve as they get their musical, literary and other educations, and that, having improved, they can help to keep some of humanity’s most important flames alive.

Nevertheless there is another answer, which is that philosophy has indeed both changed and improved. It has always changed, because the social and historical matrix in which it is practised changes, and it is that matrix that throws up the questions that seem most urgent at particular times. And it has improved first because there is a constant input of improved scientific knowledge that feeds it, and second because sometimes improved moral and political sensibilities filter into it. An example of the latter is the way that the improving status of women, and their increased representation in the philosophy classroom, has both thrown up new and interesting issues and generally altered for the better the way discussions are conducted. Examples of the former influence are legion: from Copernicus through Newton to Darwin, Einstein and today’s neurophysiologists, philosophers have absorbed and then tried to interpret advances in scientific knowledge. Nineteenth-century advances in mathematics helped to propel logic to its enormous 20th-century leaps forward (and that in turn helped the computer age to get started). In recent years, there has been much valuable collaboration between philosophy and learning theory, neurophysiology, economics and cognitive science.[/quote]And, of course, there is always the possibility that philosophers have made great progress without it being recognized as such. But I suppose that's more of an epistemological question.

Reply to Postmodern Beatnik

You are jumping to unwarranted and tendentious conclusions about "what I am invested in" and the degree of my familiarity with "the discipline". On this account I can't see how any further response on my part will be fruitful.

Reply to John I don't have to assume what your comments reveal. And in any case, my point about becoming more familiar with the discipline was just a repetition of what I had said earlier—namely, that it is the only response left when this sort of impasse arises. It's not an insult, but rather an admission that there's nothing else to say. But I see you have again chosen to focus on the parts of my response that bruised your ego rather than the substance. Given that, perhaps I should accept your own admission that you are not capable of responding fruitfully. So be it.

No, it seems to be your excessive focus on 'being right' that leads to you assume (again, and incorrectly) that my ego is bruised. It's your tendency to assume that you know where I am coming from and your patronizing tone which makes me feel a sense of the futility of responding. I'm just not interested in the kind of pedantic conversation you seem to be offering.

However, since you seem to be complaining that I didn't respond to the part of your previous post that had "substance" I will respond to that, as one last attempt to engage with your way of thinking.

My point from the beginning has not been that philosophy has, or can have, no practical applications, just that whatever applications it may be argued to have are not as obvious and unarguable as the applications of science to technology. For examples, the application of QM to electronics, Relativity Theory to GPS, microbiology to genetic engineering of crops, and so on; I mean, the possible list of direct and obvious applications of science is no doubt huge.

I don't know why you think that a posited pre-scientific existence of technology, even if true, (and I think that whether you counted it as true would depend on your definitions of the terms 'science' and 'technology') would qualify as an argument against obvious practical applications of science.

I would agree that any improvement of general thinking ability attributable to philosophy could count as a general contribution to human practical abilities, but not as a direct and obvious practical application. This difference in our ways of thinking about this may be simply due to our different interpretations of the term 'practical'. I also don't count 'living well', which is a term subject to an enormous range of different interpretations, as being a term that denotes a purely or obviously practical matter.

If you think that my thinking this way displays my "unfamiliarity with the discipline" (as though philosophy were a single well-defined discipline) rather than being merely due to different familiarities and interpretations than yours, then so be it. Conversely, I may think that you are only familiar with an excessively narrow ambit of the "discipline" such that it allows you jump to such an unwarranted conclusion. If we disagree on these accounts then we are going to have to be content to agree to disagree, because any further conversation will consist in talking past or insulting one another. For me this would just be a waste of time.

Quoting John

For sure, any thought may feed into the practical, but to say that is not the same as to say that it has direct and obvious practical applications, the way chemistry, physics, geology or genetics, for example, do.

If I may interject, I believe Russell held this position regarding his own profession of philosophy. The last chapter in his book "The Problems of Philosophy" talks directly about the value of philosophy. He criticizes the man who does not seek knowledge for its own sake (or at least does not respect this tradition), because they are perpetually locked into a tyranny of common sense.

He would agree with your assessment that philosophy is not meant to enhance the community (as do I). If any value is to be found in philosophy, it is what it can do to the individual; and any residual effects afterwards are seen as something to be appreciated, not expected.

Yes, but it's worth noting that science too is (ideally at least) practiced for its own sake and not for any practical benefits that may follow from its practice. If happiness comes from pursuing knowledge for its own sake, then PB would probably say that it therefore contributes to living well and so counts as a practical application. I think, as I must have already made obvious, that this is too broad a conception of "practical application".

If you and Russell agree with me in thinking this, then so much the worse for you, for it would seem that according to PB's position, this would show that you and Russell are both not sufficiently "familiar with the discipline" ;) .

Reply to John I think the pursuit of knowledge should only be restricted by ethics. To hear people say there needs to be a practical aspect of philosophy is quite disappointing. (Y)

Quoting darthbarracuda

I think the pursuit of knowledge should only be restricted by ethics. To hear people say there needs to be a practical aspect of philosophy is quite disappointing. (Y)

Did you mean to write 'should not' here db?

Reply to John No, I meant should. The ethical implications of research should be the only factor that decides whether or not a body of knowledge is worth pursuing.

Reply to darthbarracuda

I assume that you mean by "ethical implications" something like "implications for living well". According to the standpoint I have arguing against this would be synonymous with "practical implications", so it certainly seems you do want to separate the ethical from the practical, else your position would be self-contradictory.

In relation to regulating research on this basis (if that is what you mean) the question that comes up for me is whether we can know (always if not ever) beforehand just what the ethical implications of any research would be. The other question I have is whether by research you mean any and all kinds of research including, for example, historical, sociological, economic and philosophical inquiry.

Quoting John

In relation to regulating research on this basis (if that is what you mean) the question that comes up for me is whether we can know (always if not ever) beforehand just what the ethical implications of any research would be.

That's true. Hadn't considered that.

What I meant was that a person who studies archaeology simply to learn more about the ancient history of the earth's biological organisms would be perfectly justified in saying their job is worthwhile even if it does not give any "practical" gifts to society. But a sociopath who tortures mice in various ways to see how long mice can endure physical pain is not justified in saying their activities are worthwhile. They might be intellectual (the sociopath might actually be curious to know the survival rates of mice), but the method of inquiry is horribly unethical.

Quoting John

No, it seems to be your excessive focus on 'being right' that leads to you assume (again, and incorrectly) that my ego is bruised.

If I were focused on "being right," I wouldn't be admitting that my argumentative resources had run out on the issue. Instead, I'd be trying to bring new ones to bear. I do find it interesting, however, that you seem perfectly comfortable denying that I can infer anything about your attitudes from what you've written while simultaneously attempting to do the same based on what I've written (particularly given how many times you have misinterpreted my posts so far). Curious.

Quoting John

My point from the beginning has not been that philosophy has, or can have, no practical applications, just that whatever applications it may be argued to have are not as obvious and unarguable as the applications of science to technology.

I have already acknowledged this. I will do it again now for what I think is the fourth time. But I deny that philosophy has no obvious applications, and I will also deny your new claim that the applications of science are unarguable. Leaving aside the "pedantic" point that everything is arguable, I think anything that can be said against the obviousness or unarguability of the applications of philosophy (and I will take this opportunity that I have only claimed that the applications of philosophy are—or at least ought to be—obvious and not that they are unarguable) can be said just as well against the obviousness or unarguability of the applications of science.

Quoting John

For examples, the application of QM to electronics, Relativity Theory to GPS, microbiology to genetic engineering of crops, and so on; I mean, the possible list of direct and obvious applications of science is no doubt huge.

These are clearly applications of science to technology. Are they obvious? I doubt that the average person realizes how QM has affected electronics, how relativity has affected GPS, and so on. So common knowledge must not be the measure of obviousness. This rather supports my contention that one might need to know quite a bit about philosophy to understand the "obviousness" of its applications. Thus I would return to my example of democracy, which would not and could not exist in the form it does today without philosophy.

Quoting John

I don't know why you think that a posited pre-scientific existence of technology, even if true, (and I think that whether you counted it as true would depend on your definitions of the terms 'science' and 'technology') would qualify as an argument against obvious practical applications of science.

I don't. I think it narrows the range of objections you can use against the claim that philosophy also has obvious implications. It's a fairly straightforward strategy: every time you make a claim against philosophy, I point out that the same point can be made against science; and every time you try to limit what sort of philosophy counts for the purposes of our discussion, I make sure that the same limitation applies to what we are counting as science.

Quoting John

I would agree that any improvement of general thinking ability attributable to philosophy could count as a general contribution to human practical abilities, but not as a direct and obvious practical application.

I see that you are once again moving the goalposts. "Direct" is yet another new addition to the claim you are trying to defend. I hereby reject this moving of the goalposts and insist on sticking to the original claim: that philosophy does not have obvious applications in a way that science does. As such, is your objection to the conjunction "direct and obvious" based on directness, obviousness, or both? If it is only based on directness, then we have entered into a different conversation.

Quoting John

This difference in our ways of thinking about this may be simply due to our different interpretations of the term 'practical'. I also don't count 'living well', which is a term subject to an enormous range of different interpretations, as being a term that denotes a purely or obviously practical matter.

In which case you are misusing the terms. You might as well go to a physics forum and insist that relativity is false only to reveal several posts later that you meant moral relativism. Because on a philosophy forum, saying that "living well" does not count as a practical matter is nearly as bad as talking about colorless green ideas sleeping furiously. (Please note that I said "nearly.")

Quoting darthbarracuda

If I may interject, I believe Russell held this position regarding his own profession of philosophy.

Quoting John

If you and Russell agree with me in thinking this, then so much the worse for you, for it would seem that according to PB's position, this would show that you and Russell are both not sufficiently "familiar with the discipline."

More misreading, I see. As darthbaraccuda explicitly noted, Russell was talking about the profession. I am not. Moreover, Russell's claim that we ought to seek knowledge for its own sake regardless of whether it has any practical applications is clearly consistent with the claim that it in fact has such applications (and even with the claim that such applications are obvious). Nor is my claim limited to community benefits. Russell recognizes a benefit to the individual that would fit quite well into the category of living well.

Quoting Postmodern Beatnik

I have already acknowledged this. I will do it again now for what I think is the fourth time. But I deny that philosophy has no obvious applications, and I will also deny your new claim that the applications of science are unarguable

The fact that Quantum theory has enabled the development of electronics is an example of a direct application of theory to practice and hence very obvious, and unarguably the case. The same can be said for Relativity theory and GPS, gene theory to genetic modification and I have no doubt there are plenty of other examples, but these examples suffice for the point.

Can you cite even a single example of such a direct and hence obvious practical application of any specific philosophical theory? If you can't then, so be it, that is all I have been arguing, despite your attempts to deflect the discussion onto other considerations, including my personal reactions.

I think it is rich that you claim that I have misread you; can you give an example of that? If you say that I have misread you in the sense that I haven't noticed that you agreed with my original point about the more obvious practical applications of science compared to philosophy then I don't know what you think we have been arguing about, since that was my only point.

Your claim that I am misusing the term "living well" is laughable. All terms are subject to interpretation; and "living well" would have to one of the more obvious examples. Just look at the multifarious ways in which people actually do choose to live to educate yourself about that. It's a cheap cop out to accuse your interlocutor of misusing terms, instead of providing an actual argument for the rightness of some specific usage you are purporting is the correct one. What is, in your opinion, the very specific meaning of "living well" that I am, according to you, not getting?

In your last paragraph you incorrectly accuse me of misreading. I think you should focus on your own reading; I wrote "If you and Russell agree with me...." I made no claim that Russell did agree with me.

You are treating the idea of practical application so broadly as to be able to easily, but I think vacuously, claim that we should think of living well as a practical matter.